State v. Howell ( 2013 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Howell, 
    2013-Ohio-2979
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                    JUDGES:
    Hon. William B. Hoffman, P. J.
    Plaintiff-Appellee                       Hon. John W. Wise, J.
    Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
    -vs-
    Case No. 2012 AP 11 0068
    TRACY A. HOWELL
    Defendant-Appellant                      OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                      Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common
    Pleas, Case No. 2012 CR 06 0134
    JUDGMENT:                                     Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                       July 9, 2013
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                        For Defendant-Appellant
    MICHAEL J. ERNEST                             RODNEY A. BACA
    ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR                          SCHNARS, BACA & INFANTINO
    125 East High Avenue                          610 Market Avenue North
    New Philadelphia, Ohio 44663                  Canton, Ohio 44702
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2012 AP 11 0068                                                  2
    Wise, J.
    {¶1}   Appellant Tracy A. Howell appeals his sentence and conviction on two
    counts of trafficking in drugs following a bench trial in the Tuscarawas Court of Common
    Pleas.
    {¶2}   Appellee is the State of Ohio.
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
    {¶3}   On June 8, 2012, the Tuscarawas County Grand Jury filed an Indictment
    against Appellant Tracy A. Howell charging him with two counts of trafficking in drugs, in
    violation of R.C. 2925.03, a felony of the fourth degree and a felony of the fifth degree.
    {¶4}   Count one of the indictment alleged that on September 13, 2011,
    Appellant engaged in the sale or offered to sell Cocaine. Count two of the indictment
    alleged that Appellant either sold or offered to sell a Schedule II controlled substance,
    Oxycodone, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1).
    {¶5}   On August 28, 2012, a bench trial commenced in this matter.
    {¶6}   At the trial, the State presented testimony from its confidential informant,
    James Hanshaw, Jr. (T. at 22). Hanshaw stated that in September, 2011, he worked as
    a confidential informant for the LEAD Task Force. 
    Id.
     Hanshaw stated that he was
    provided $250.00 to purchase powder cocaine from Appellant. (T. at 31). According to
    Hanshaw, he spoke with Appellant on September 13, 2011, and asked Appellant if he
    had "anything". (T. at 27). Appellant replied that he could supply Hanshaw with powder
    Cocaine. (T. at 29). Prior to the sale taking place, Hanshaw contacted Appellant and
    advised him that he and another man were ready to make the purchase of the Cocaine,
    and that he should come over to his apartment. (T. at 29). A short time later, Appellant
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2012 AP 11 0068                                                  3
    appeared at Hanshaw's apartment, sat down at a table with him, and exchanged money
    for a white powder substance. (T. at 30).
    {¶7}   Subsequently, the substance was tested at B.C.I. & I., and it was
    determined that it was not a controlled substance.
    {¶8}   At the trial, Appellant testified that the substance he exchanged during the
    transaction was crushed aspirin that Hanshaw provided him. Appellant stated he was
    allegedly approached by Hanshaw and was told that if he sold him the crushed aspirin
    for $300.00, the two of them would be able to split the money. Appellant did not produce
    any evidence to corroborate his story.
    {¶9}   At trial, Appellant admitted to selling Oxycodone as alleged in the
    indictment.
    {¶10} Following    the   bench    trial,    both   sides   submitted   written   closing
    summations. The Court later issued a Judgment Entry on September 13, 2013, finding
    Appellant guilty on both counts of trafficking in drugs.
    {¶11} Appellant now appeals, assigning the following error for review:
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    {¶12} “I. THE EVIDENCE REGARDING THE SEPTEMBER 2011 SALE IS
    INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION AND THE VERDICT IS AGAINST
    THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.”
    I.
    {¶13} In his sole Assignment of Error, Appellant argues that his conviction is
    against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence. We disagree.
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2012 AP 11 0068                                                4
    {¶14} Our review of the constitutional sufficiency of evidence to support a
    criminal conviction is governed by Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319, 
    99 S.Ct. 2781
    , 
    61 L.Ed.2d 560
     (1979), which requires a court of appeals to determine whether
    “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
    trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
    doubt.” Id.; see also McDaniel v. Brown, 
    558 U.S. 120
    , 
    130 S.Ct. 665
    , 673, 
    175 L.Ed.2d 582
    (2010) (reaffirming this standard); State v. Fry, 
    125 Ohio St.3d 163
    , 
    926 N.E.2d 1239
    , 2010–Ohio–1017, ¶ 146; State v. Clay, 
    187 Ohio App.3d 633
    , 
    933 N.E.2d 296
    ,
    2010–Ohio–2720, ¶ 68.
    {¶15} Weight of the evidence addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief.
    State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 386–387, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
     (1997), superseded
    by constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated by State v. Smith, 
    80 Ohio St.3d 89
    , 
    684 N.E.2d 668
    , 1997–Ohio–355. Weight of the evidence concerns “the
    inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one
    side of the issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party
    having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in
    their minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible evidence sustains the issue
    which is to be established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but
    depends on its effect in inducing belief.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 387, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    ,
    quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1990) at 1594.
    {¶16} When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis
    that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a
    “‘thirteenth juror’ ” and disagrees with the fact finder's resolution of the conflicting
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2012 AP 11 0068                                                    5
    testimony. Id. at 387, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    , quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 
    457 U.S. 31
    , 42, 
    102 S.Ct. 2211
    , 
    72 L.Ed.2d 652
     (1982). However, an appellate court may not merely
    substitute its view for that of the jury, but must find that “ ‘the jury clearly lost its way and
    created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and
    a new trial ordered.’ ” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State v.
    Martin, 
    20 Ohio App.3d 172
    , 175, 
    485 N.E.2d 717
    , 720–721(1st Dist.1983). Accordingly,
    reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved for “ ‘the exceptional case in which the
    evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ” 
    Id.
    {¶17} “[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly against the
    weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment and every reasonable
    presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of facts.
    {¶18} * * *
    {¶19} “If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the
    reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict
    and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.” Seasons Coal
    Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 
    10 Ohio St.3d 77
    , 80, 
    461 N.E.2d 1273
     (1984), fn. 3, quoting 5
    Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 60, at 191–192 (1978).
    {¶20} Appellant was charged and convicted of two counts of trafficking in drugs,
    pursuant to R.C. §2925.03(A)(1), which provides:
    {¶21} “(A) No person shall knowingly do any of the following:
    {¶22} “(1) Sell or offer to sell a controlled substance;”
    {¶23} At trial, the trial court heard testimony from the State’s confidential
    informant and viewed a video of Appellant in the C.I.’s apartment. Further, Appellant
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2012 AP 11 0068                                                    6
    himself admitted he sold crushed baby aspirin and Oxycodone pills to the C.I. (T. at
    106, 109).
    {¶24} Appellant argues that the testimony of the C.I. in this case is suspect and
    that he was “set up” by the C.I. in this case prior to the sale.
    {¶25} Ultimately, “the reviewing court must determine whether the appellant or
    the appellee provided the more believable evidence, but must not completely substitute
    its judgment for that of the original trier of fact ‘unless it is patently apparent that the fact
    finder lost its way.’ ” State v. Pallai, 7th Dist. No. 07 MA 198, 2008–Ohio–6635, quoting
    State v. Woullard, 
    158 Ohio App.3d 31
    , 2004–Ohio–3395. In other words, “[w]hen there
    exist two fairly reasonable views of the evidence or two conflicting versions of events,
    neither of which is unbelievable, it is not our province to choose which one we believe.”
    State v. Dyke, 7th Dist. No. 99 CA 149, 2002–Ohio–1152, at ¶ 13, citing State v. Gore,
    
    131 Ohio App.3d 197
    , 201, 
    722 N.E.2d 125
    (1999).
    {¶26} The weight to be given to the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses
    are issues for the trier of fact. State v. DeHass, 
    10 Ohio St.2d 230
    , 
    227 N.E.2d 212
    (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Hunter, 
    131 Ohio St.3d 67
    , 2011–
    Ohio–6524, 
    960 N.E.2d 955
    , ¶ 118. Accord, Glasser v. United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80,
    
    62 S.Ct. 457
    , 
    86 L.Ed. 680
     (1942); Marshall v. Lonberger, 
    459 U.S. 422
    , 434, 
    103 S.Ct. 843
    , 
    74 L.Ed.2d 646
     (1983).
    {¶27} Here, the trial court, as the finder of fact, was free to accept or reject any
    and all of the evidence offered by the parties and assess the witness's credibility. “While
    the [finder of fact] may take note of the inconsistencies and resolve or discount them
    accordingly * * * such inconsistencies do not render defendant's conviction against the
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2012 AP 11 0068                                               7
    manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence”. State v. Craig, 10th Dist. No. 99AP–739,
    
    1999 WL 29752
     (Mar 23, 2000) citing State v. Nivens, 10th Dist. No. 95APA09–1236,
    
    1996 WL 284714
     (May 28, 1996). Indeed, the [judge] need not believe all of a witness'
    testimony, but may accept only portions of it as true. State v. Raver, Franklin App. No.
    02AP–604, 2003–Ohio–958, ¶ 21, citing State v. Antill, 
    176 Ohio St. 61
    , 67, 
    197 N.E.2d 548
     (1964); State v. Burke, 10th Dist. No. 02AP–1238, 2003–Ohio–2889, citing State v.
    Caldwell (1992), 
    79 Ohio App.3d 667
    , 
    607 N.E.2d 1096
     (4th Dist. 1992).
    {¶28} “[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly against the
    weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment and every reasonable
    presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of facts. * * *
    {¶29} “If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the
    reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict
    and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.” Seasons Coal
    Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 
    10 Ohio St.3d 77
    , 80, 
    461 N.E.2d 1273
     (1984), fn. 3, quoting 5
    Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 60, at 191–192 (1978).
    {¶30} Further, in the instant case, Appellant clearly could be convicted of
    violating R.C. §2925.03(A)(1) for offering to sell cocaine, even though the substance
    was actually aspirin, not cocaine. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a conviction
    for R.C. §2925.03(A)(1) can stand despite the fact that the substance offered as
    cocaine was actually baking soda. State v. Chandler, 
    109 Ohio St.3d 223
    , 2006-Ohio-
    2285, 
    846 N.E.2d 1234
    , ¶ 9. See also, State v. Cooper, 5th Dist. 11CA0125, 2012-Ohio-
    3058.
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2012 AP 11 0068                                        8
    {¶31} Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we
    conclude that a reasonable person could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
    Appellant had committed the crimes charged.
    {¶32} We hold, therefore, the State met its burden of production regarding each
    element of the crimes and, accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support
    Appellant’s convictions.
    {¶33} Appellant’s sole Assignment of Error is overruled.
    {¶34} For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas of
    Tuscarawas County, Ohio, is affirmed.
    By: Wise, J.
    Hoffman, P. J., and
    Delaney, J., concur.
    ___________________________________
    ___________________________________
    ___________________________________
    JUDGES
    JWW/d 0612
    Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2012 AP 11 0068                                      9
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                             :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee                 :
    :
    -vs-                                      :        JUDGMENT ENTRY
    :
    TRACY A. HOWELL                           :
    :
    Defendant-Appellant                :        Case No. 2012 AP 11 0068
    For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
    judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Tuscarawas County, Ohio, is affirmed.
    Costs assessed to Appellant.
    ___________________________________
    ___________________________________
    ___________________________________
    JUDGES
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2012 AP 11 0068

Judges: Wise

Filed Date: 7/9/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014