State v. Hollobaugh ( 2012 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as State v. Hollobaugh, 
    2012-Ohio-2620
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    MORGAN COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    JUDGES:
    STATE OF OHIO                                    :       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
    :       Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
    Plaintiff-Appellee      :       Hon. John W. Wise, J.
    :
    -vs-                                             :
    :       Case No. 11-AP-0006
    ERIC HOLLOBAUGH                                  :
    :
    Defendant-Appellant          :       OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                             Criminal appeal from the Morgan County
    Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 10-CR-
    0007
    JUDGMENT:                                            Vacated and Remanded
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                              June 11, 2012
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                               For Defendant-Appellant
    MARK HOWDYSHELL                                      DEBORAH LAMNECK
    Prosecuting Attorney                                 Gottlieb, Johnston, Beam & Dal Ponte
    19 East Main Street                                  2640 Glenn Circle
    McConnelsville, OH 43756                             Zanesville, OH 43701-9408
    [Cite as State v. Hollobaugh, 
    2012-Ohio-2620
    .]
    Gwin, P.J.
    {¶1}    Defendant Eric Hollobaugh appeals a judgment of the Court of Common
    Pleas of Morgan County, Ohio, which accepted his plea of guilty to three counts of
    trafficking in drugs in the vicinity of a juvenile in violation of RC.2925.03. Appellant
    assigns a single error to the trial court:
    {¶2}    I.   THE      TRIAL      COURT   ERRED   WHEN     IT   ACCEPTED      THE
    APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WHICH WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY,
    AND VOLUNTARILY MADE.”
    {¶3}    At the change of plea hearing, the court engaged in a Crim. R. 11 colloquy
    before accepting appellant’s guilty plea. The court reviewed appellant’s constitutional
    rights and ascertained appellant had no mental or physical impairments and was not
    under the influence of any alcohol or drug. The court explained the charges against
    appellant, advising him that “***you could be sentenced to prison for a definite term of
    either two, three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years on each count and fined up to
    $15,000.00 on each count***”. The court also advised appellant it could order that he
    serve his prison sentences consecutively.
    {¶4}    Appellant signed a written waiver of rights, which stated, among other
    things, that he understood the court could impose more than a minimum prison term, it
    could impose a maximum term, and it could run the sentences consecutively. The
    waiver also stated the court “may” impose a prison term rather than community control.
    The court deferred sentencing until a pre-sentence investigation was completed.
    Morgan County, Case No. 11-AP-0006                                                      3
    {¶5}   The offenses to which appellant pled guilty carry a mandatory prison term
    and appellant was not eligible for probation or early release.        The court informed
    appellant of this at the sentencing hearing.
    {¶6}   Crim. R. 11 (C) states in pertinent part:
    (2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea
    of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without
    first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the following:
    (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with
    understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty
    involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation
    or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing
    hearing.
    A defendant’s plea in a criminal case must be made knowingly,
    intelligently, and voluntarily, and if it is not, enforcement of the plea is
    unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio
    Constitution. State v. Engle, 
    74 Ohio St.3d 525
    , 527, 
    1996-Ohio-179
    , 
    660 N.E.2d 450
    .
    The court is required to discuss both constitutional and non-
    constitutional rights before accepting a guilty plea.      A court’s discussion of
    constitutional rights must be in strict compliance with the Rule. See, e.g., State v.
    Veney, 
    120 Ohio St.3d 176
    , 2008–Ohio–5200, 
    897 N.E. 2d 621
    , syllabus; State
    v. Ballard, 
    66 Ohio St.2d 473
    , 
    423 N.E.2d 115
     (1981), paragraph one of the
    syllabus. However, a court must only substantially comply with the Rule in
    Morgan County, Case No. 11-AP-0006                                                   4
    ensuring the defendant understands his or her non-constitutional rights. State v.
    Griggs, 
    103 Ohio St.3d 85
    , 2004–Ohio–4415, 
    814 N.E.2d 51
    , ¶ 12, citing State v.
    Nero, 
    56 Ohio St.3d 106
    , 107, 
    564 N.E.2d 474
     (1990). Substantial compliance
    has been defined to mean under the totality of the circumstances the defendant
    subjectively understands the implication of his plea and the rights he is waiving.
    Nero at 108.
    {¶7}     Appellant argues the court did not substantially comply with Crim. R. 11
    because at the time it accepted his plea, it had misled him into believing he could be
    eligible for probation or parole when in fact he faced a mandatory sentence.
    {¶8}     In State v. Stewart, 
    51 Ohio St. 2d 86
    , 
    364 N.E. 2d 1163
     (1977), the
    Supreme Court reviewed a case wherein the defendant was charged with two counts of
    aggravated murder with specifications, kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. The
    defendant pled to the lesser included offense of murder and the other charges were
    dismissed. The defendant was not informed he was not eligible for probation, but the
    Supreme Court found the defendant subjectively knew he would not be eligible for
    probation, and further, he had not demonstrated prejudice.
    {¶9}     In Nero, supra the Supreme Court of Ohio found substantial compliance
    with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) when the record clearly showed defendant knew that he was
    going to be incarcerated and even asked for time to straighten out his affairs.
    {¶10} In State v. Abuhashish, 6th Dist. No. WD–07–048, 2008–Ohio–3849, the
    court found substantial compliance because the prosecution mentioned the mandatory
    sentence at the plea hearing when it asked the court to revoke the defendant’s bond,
    and because the written guilty plea correctly stated the offense carried a mandatory
    Morgan County, Case No. 11-AP-0006                                                    5
    sentence. Id. ¶35. But see, State v. Wilson, 
    55 Ohio App. 2d 64
    , 
    379 N.E.2d 273
    , (1st
    Dist. 1978) wherein the court of appeals found the Rule requires an oral dialogue
    between the court and the defendant, and a written plea is simply not an adequate
    substitute.
    {¶11} In State v. Fink, 11th Dist. No. 2006-A-0035, 
    2007-Ohio-5220
    , the Court of
    Appeals for Ashtabula County found substantial compliance although the court
    mistakenly advised the defendant he was technically eligible for probation. The court
    found the defendant was subjectively aware he would not be sentenced to probation
    when the court informed him a waiver of the pre-sentence investigation report precluded
    probation. The defendant had been charged with sixty counts of rape, each with the
    specification of a victim less than ten years of age, thirty-seven counts of pandering
    obscenity involving a minor, fourth degree felonies, thirty-seven counts of pandering
    obscenity involving a minor, second degree felonies, and twenty-two counts of
    pandering sexually oriented matters involving a minor. We find as in Stewart, supra, the
    severity of the charges alone might convince a defendant he was not going to avoid
    prison.
    {¶12} Here the offenses charged were not as serious as in Stewart, and unlike
    Abuhashish, the guilty plea appellant signed does not state the offenses carry a
    mandatory sentence.
    {¶13} In State v. Howard, 2nd Dist. No. 06–CA–29, 2008–Ohio–419, the Second
    District found the defendant could not have understood the effect of his plea when the
    trial court misadvised him he would be eligible for community control. The court
    reasoned the Supreme Court deemed ineligibility for community control sanctions to be
    Morgan County, Case No. 11-AP-0006                                                       6
    a sufficiently important factor in choosing to plead guilty or no contest that it was
    incorporated in Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(a) as a subject that must be specifically addressed.
    Id. ¶ 25.
    {¶14} The Twelfth District reached a similar result in State v. Phillips, 12th Dist.
    No. CA2008–05–126, 2009–Ohio–1448, finding where the trial court affirmatively
    misinformed the defendant about his eligibility for community control, it had completely
    failed to comply with the Rule. Id. ¶19. Likewise, in State v. Farley, 1st Dist. No.
    C0100478, 2002–Ohio–1142, the appeals court found a trial court has not substantially
    complied with the Rule if it misinforms a defendant about his or her eligibility for
    community control. The court found the prospect of probation or community control is a
    factor weighing heavily in favor of the decision to enter guilty or a no contest plea.
    {¶15} The Farley court opined it could not assume the defendant would have
    entered his guilty plea if he had been properly advised. Howard did not discuss whether
    the record showed actual prejudice, implying the prejudice is implicit. In Phillips, the
    court found it did not need to address the issue of prejudice because failure to properly
    advise the defendant of his ineligibility for probation constituted a complete failure to
    comply with the requirements of the Rule.
    {¶16} We find the trial court erred and misled appellant prior to accepting his
    guilty plea. We find further there is no indication appellant subjectively knew he faced a
    mandatory sentence.      We conclude the court did not substantially comply with the
    requirements of Crim. R. 11, and should not have accepted the plea of guilty.
    {¶17} The assignment of error is sustained.
    Morgan County, Case No. 11-AP-0006                                               7
    {¶18} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of
    Morgan County, Ohio, is vacated, and the cause is remanded to the court for further
    proceedings in accord with law and consistent with this opinion.
    By Gwin, P.J.,
    Hoffman, J., and
    Wise, J., concur
    _________________________________
    HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
    _________________________________
    HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
    _________________________________
    HON. JOHN W. WISE
    WSG:clw 0522
    [Cite as State v. Hollobaugh, 
    2012-Ohio-2620
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MORGAN COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                    :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee   :
    :
    :
    -vs-                                             :       JUDGMENT ENTRY
    :
    ERIC HOLLOBAUGH                                  :
    :
    :
    Defendant-Appellant      :       CASE NO. 11-AP-0006
    For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the judgment of
    the Court of Common Pleas of Morgan County, Ohio, is vacated, and the cause is
    remanded to the court for further proceedings in accord with law and consistent with this
    opinion. Costs to appellee.
    _________________________________
    HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
    _________________________________
    HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
    _________________________________
    HON. JOHN W. WISE
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-AP-0006

Judges: Gwin

Filed Date: 6/11/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014