Lees v. Lees , 2012 Ohio 770 ( 2012 )

[Cite as Lees v. Lees, 2012-Ohio-770.]
COURT OF APPEALS
DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
: JUDGES:
TERESA G. LEES : William B. Hoffman, P.J.
: John W. Wise, J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Julie A. Edwards, J.
:
-vs- : Case No. 11CAF050039
:
:
ROBERT WILLIAM LEES, JR. : OPINION
Defendant-Appellant
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from Delaware County
Court of Common Pleas, Domestic
Relations Division, Case No. 99 DRA
10 0379
JUDGMENT: Affirmed In Part and Reversed and
Remanded In Part
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: February 24, 2012
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
GARY PAUL PRICE CRAIG P. TRENEFF
555 City Park Avenue Craig P. Treneff Law Office
Columbus, Ohio 43215 155 Commerce Park Drive, Suite 5
Westerville, Ohio 43082
[Cite as Lees v. Lees, 2012-Ohio-770.]
Edwards, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Robert William Lees. Jr., appeals from the March 31,
2011, Judgment Entry of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic
Relations Division.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶ 2} Appellee Teresa Lees and appellant Robert William Lees, Jr. were
married on January 30, 1981. On October 4, 1999, appellee filed a complaint for divorce
against appellant. A Judgment Entry Decree of Divorce was filed on September 15,
2000. The Judgment Entry Decree of Divorce, which indicated that appellant had
entered into full military service on November 10, 1999, stated, in relevant part, as
follows:
{¶ 3} “12. The Wife shall have a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) in
all the retirement benefits of the Husband whether designated as pension, profit-
sharing, or otherwise. The Order shall not interfere with the timing or optional modes of
settlement that the Husband may have under such plan. However, at the time that any
benefits would be received under the retirement plan, the entire retirement benefit shall
be divided into two shares. The Wife’s share shall equal the following fractional share
of the total value of the benefit:
{¶ 4}
“The number of the Husband’s years of service
under the Plan during which the Parties were
1 married
2 times The total number of the Husband’s years of
service under the Plan at the time the payment of
benefits commences”
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAF050039 3
{¶ 5} “The Husband’s share shall consist of all the remaining benefits. The Wife
shall have all the optional modes of settlement as to her share, as determined above,
that the Husband has with respect to his share of such benefits. The Court retains
jurisdiction to effectuate this award.
{¶ 6} “The Husband shall prepare this QDRO within 120 days of the date
hereof.”
{¶ 7} The Judgment Entry Decree of Divorce further stated in paragraph 13 that
appellant was awarded his Navy Reserves pension “subject to Paragraph 12.”
{¶ 8} On August 27, 2008, appellee filed a Motion for an Order to Show Cause,
asking that appellant be found in contempt for failing to prepare a QDRO regarding his
military retirement benefits. A pretrial hearing before a Magistrate was held on May 4,
2009. The Magistrate, in an Order filed on May 7, 2009, stated, in relevant part, as
follows:
{¶ 9} “Counsel reported that the issue with setting the apportionment of the
Defendant’s Naval Reserve Pension is that the computation of duty ‘points’ because the
defendant has been in active service.
{¶ 10} “Defendant resides in Florida and was here for the hearing and for a
deposition immediately preceding the hearing. The parties attempted to obtain this
information, and could not get the information from DFAS.
{¶ 11} “The defendant is ordered to forthwith obtain the documented ‘points
history’ from DFAS or sign any and all necessary release for Plaintiff to obtain the same
information for the computation of the calculation of the Plaintiff’s entitlement to a
portion of the naval reserve pension as stated in the decree.”
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAF050039 4
{¶ 12} After appellant was unable to obtain the above information, the trial court,
on August 12, 2009, issued an Order to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service
directing it to produce documents reflecting, in part, the retirement benefits that
appellant was or would be entitled to, appellant’s date of retirement from the United
States Navy Reserve, and documentation evidencing the number of reserve points,
active pay points commission duty points and inactive duty points that appellant had
earned.
{¶ 13} On September 2, 2009, appellee filed a Second Motion for an Order to
Show Cause or in the Alternative Motion to Enforce, asking for an order requiring
appellant to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failing to prepare a
QDRO. Appellee, in the same date, filed a motion asking for attorney fees and
expenses accrued in connection with such motion and Motion to Impound appellant’s
U.S. military retirement pay.
{¶ 14} Pursuant to an Agreed Judgment Entry filed on September 10, 2009,
appellee’s August 27, 2008, Motion for an Order to Show Cause was dismissed without
prejudice.
{¶ 15} A hearing on appellee’s September 2, 2009, Second Motion for an Order
to Show Cause or in the Alternative Motion to Enforce was held before a Magistrate on
December 15, 2009. At the hearing, appellant testified that he was not present at the
Spring 2000 divorce trial because he was in Japan at the time with the United States
Navy. Appellant testified that he was in the Army National Guard from November 17,
1976, until September 15, 1977, and that he enlisted in the United States Navy on
September 16, 1977. Appellant testified that he served in the Navy until November of
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAF050039 5
1987, and then enlisted in the Navy Reserves. Appellant was in the Navy Reserves
from November 8, 1987 until November 7, 1989. Appellant then reenlisted in the
Reserves on February 23, 1990, until January 19, 1996. He then reenlisted in the Navy
Reserves from January 20, 1996, through November 9, 1999. After such time, appellant
went back on active duty until he retired on March 31, 2009.
{¶ 16} Appellant testified that he had a total of 32 years between his National
Guard, Navy Reserve and active duty service. When asked about the relationship
between the 32 years to his pension calculation, appellant testified that if he were
receiving 32 years of pension, his retirement check would be approximately $2,800.00.
He testified that he was not receiving a retirement from the Navy Reserve and that the
only impact that his Navy Reserve Service had was that it reduced by 5 months the
amount of time that he had to serve to get his 20 years of service to qualify for
retirement. Appellant further testified that if he had stayed in the Reserves, he would
have been eligible for a pension based on Reserve service when he was 59 ½ year old.
{¶ 17} At the hearing, appellant testified that when he received the Decree of
Divorce, he did not believe that he had to provide a QDRO within 120 days because he
was on active duty at the time and “what I read in the divorce decree was the naval
reserve pension. I wasn’t going to get a naval reserve retirement….So there’s nothing to
send.” Transcript at 61-62.
{¶ 18} At the time of the hearing, appellant’s gross monthly retirement pay was
$1,839.00 a month. Of this amount, $192.47 was withheld for federal income taxes.
{¶ 19} The Magistrate, in a Decision filed on September 7, 2010, found appellant
in contempt of court for failing to comply with the trial court’s order as to the preparation
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAF050039 6
and submission of the appropriate retirement division order as set forth in the Decree.
The Magistrate found appellant in contempt for the period from August 2009 forward
and found that appellant could not have complied with the Decree’s requirement that he
prepare a QDRO to divide his military retirement until approximately August of 2009.
The Magistrate recommended that appellant be sentenced to 15 days in jail with such
sentence being suspended/purged upon the following conditions:
{¶ 20} “A. Defendant shall make immediate arrangements to prepare and file the
appropriate DFAS Military Retirement order using the coverture fraction as outlined in
the decree NO LATER than within thirty (30) days of the Order adopting this Decision;
{¶ 21} “B. Defendant shall remit to the plaintiff, commencing October 1, 2010,
and each and every month thereafter, direct, until the DFAS Order is accepted and is
withholding, the sum of $545.95 representing the monthly amount due her from the
retirement.
{¶ 22} “C. Further the Defendant shall be responsible for and pay the full amount
of $8735.20 within 30 days of the Order adopting this Decision representing the sum of
past due sums owed to her from the commencement of his retirement benefits to
9/1/10.”
{¶ 23} The Magistrate also recommended that appellant be ordered to pay
appellee the sum of $3,000.00 plus interest for attorney fees regarding the contempt.
{¶ 24} Appellant filed objections to the Magistrate’s Decision. Pursuant to a
Judgment Entry filed on March 3, 2011, the trial court overruled the objections and
adopted the Magistrate’s Decision.
{¶ 25} Appellant now raises the following assignments of error on appeal:
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAF050039 7
{¶ 26} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING THAT ALL OF
APPELLANT’S MILITARY RETIREMENT IS TO BE APPORTIONED.
{¶ 27} “II. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION OF THE FORMULA
FOR CALCULATION OF THE APPELLEE’S PORTION OF THE APPELLANT’S
MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS.
{¶ 28} “III. THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT APPELLEE IS
ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE APPELLANT IN THE AMOUNT OF
$8,735.20.
{¶ 29} “IV. THE COURT ERRED BY FINDING THE APPELLANT IN CONTEMPT
OF COURT DUE TO HIS FAILURE TO PREPARE AN ORDER DIVING (SIC) THE
APPELLANT’S ACTIVE DUTY, LENGTH-OF-SERVICE MILITARY RETIREMENT.
{¶ 30} “V. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF
APPELLANT’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE REQUIREMENT THAT HE DIVIDE HIS
MILITARY RETIREMENT WAS CLEAR AND CONVINCING.
{¶ 31} “VI. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLEE WAS
ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF $3,000.00 PLUS STATUTORY
INTEREST.”
I
{¶ 32} Appellant, in his first assignment of error, argues that the trial court erred
by ordering that all of appellant’s military retirement was required to be apportioned.
Appellant maintains that the Divorce Decree ordered that appellant’s Navy Reserve
pension and ERISA qualified plans be divided and did not include appellant’s active
duty Navy retirement.
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAF050039 8
{¶ 33} As noted by the court in Hasselback v. Hasselback, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-
776, 2007-Ohio-762. “The Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act
(“USFSPA”) was passed by Congress in 1982, and gives state courts the authority to
treat military retired pay as marital property and divide it between the spouses. Passage
of the USFSPA was prompted by the United States Supreme Court decision McCarty v.
McCarty (1981), 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, which precluded state courts from
dividing military retired pay as an asset of marriage. The USFSPA, among other things,
limits the amount of the member's retired pay that can be paid to a former spouse to
50% of the member's disposable retired pay. Section 1408(e)(1), Title 10, U.S.Code.
While specifying how an award of military retired pay must be expressed, the USFSPA
is silent with respect to how a division of assets is to be calculated. Ohio's enabling
statute, R.C. 3105.171(F) authorizes a division of a pension as marital and separate
property, but also, does not speak to a method of valuation.” Id at paragraph 7.
{¶ 34} In the case sub judice, the Divorce Decree states, in paragraph 13, that
appellant was awarded his Navy Reserves pension “subject to Paragraph 12.” In turn,
paragraph 12 of the Decree states as follows:
{¶ 35} “12. The Wife shall have a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) in
all the retirement benefits of the Husband whether designated as pension, profit-
sharing, or otherwise. The Order shall not interfere with the timing or optional modes of
settlement that the Husband may have under such plan. However, at the time that any
benefits would be received under the retirement plan, the entire retirement benefit shall
be divided into two shares. The Wife’s share shall equal the following fractional share
of the total value of the benefit:
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAF050039 9
{¶ 36}
“The number of the Husband’s years of service
under the Plan during which the Parties were
1 married
2 times The total number of the Husband’s years of
service under the Plan at the time the payment of
benefits commences”
{¶ 37} “The Husband’s share shall consist of all the remaining benefits. The Wife
shall have all the optional modes of settlement as to her share, as determined above,
that the Husband has with respect to his share of such benefits. The Court retains
jurisdiction to effectuate this award.
{¶ 38} “The Husband shall prepare this QDRO within 120 days of the date
hereof.” (Emphasis added).
{¶ 39} The Magistrate, in his Decision, found that the above language clearly and
unambiguously granted appellee one half of all of appellant’s retirement benefits –
including his benefits from military service. We note that the trial court has the inherent
power to interpret and enforce its own orders. Steineck v. Steineck, 5th Dist. No.
92AP110080, 1993 WL 221343 (June 3, 1993). Such interpretations are within the
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that
discretion. In order to find an abuse of discretion, we must determine the trial court's
decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable and not merely an error of law
or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140, (1983). We
find that the trial court’s interpretation was not arbitrary, unconscionable or
unreasonable.
{¶ 40} Furthermore, while appellant contends that a QDRO is not applicable to
military retirement but only to ERISA qualified plans, we concur with the Magistrate that
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAF050039 10
“[t]he mislabeling of the Military retirement order for a QDRO is at best a harmless error
of connotation, and not one of substance.” A “QMCO is a qualified domestic relations
order (QDRO) that directs a military service, rather than a civil pension plan
administrator, to make direct payments of a military retiree's retirement pay to a former
spouse. See Section 1408(d)(1), Title 10, U.S.Code. ‘[A] QDRO is essentially a
mechanism through which marital property is allocated.’ Weller v. Weller (1996), 115
Ohio App.3d 173, 178, 684 N.E.2d 1284 (Citation omitted.). ‘[It] is [ ] an order in aid of
execution on the property division ordered in the divorce or dissolution decree.’ Bagley,
at ¶ 26.”1 Bagley v. Bagley, 2nd Dist. No. 2010-CA-17, 2011-Ohio-1272, ¶ 9.
{¶ 41} Appellant’s first assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
II, III
{¶ 42} Appellant, in his second assignment of error, argues that the trial court
erred in determining the formula for calculation of appellee’s portion of appellant’s
military retirement benefits. In his third assignment of error, appellant contends that the
trial court erred in determining that appellee was entitled to reimbursement from
appellant in the amount of $8,735.20. We agree.
{¶ 43} As is stated above, the Divorce Decree stated that appellee was entitled to
½ of all of appellant’s retirement benefits earned during the marriage. The Divorce
Decree set forth the following formula for calculation of appellee’s share of appellant’s
retirement benefits:
1 nd
The complete citation is Bagley v. Bagley, 181 Ohio App.3d 141, 2009-Ohio-688, 908 N.E.2d 469 (2
Dist.)
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAF050039 11
{¶ 44} ½ times the number of the Husband’s years of service under the Plan
during which the Parties were married divided by the total number of the Husband’s
years of service under the plan at the time the payment of benefits commences.
{¶ 45} Appellant, in his brief, argues that the trial court should have utilized a
different formula in determining the portion of the military retirement benefits to which
appellee was entitled. Appellant maintains that the “proper fraction to compute
Appellee’s benefit should consist of a numerator of the five (5) months of Appellant’s
Navy Reserve service, which contributed to a reduction of the time for Appellant to
qualify for 20 year active duty service retirement, over a denominator of 240 months (20
years) of active duty service utilized for determining Appellant’s active duty, length-of-
service retirement.” Appellant, in the alternative, argues that the trial court should have
used a “points” formula in calculating appellee’s portion of appellant’s military retirement
benefits. We agree in part.
{¶ 46} Appellant and appellee were married on January 30, 1981 and were not
divorced until September of 2000. Testimony was adduced that appellant retired with 32
years of total service which includes approximately 10 months in the National Guard, 19
years 7 months in the Navy and 12 years in the Naval Reserve. Of those 32 years the
appellant served 19 of those years, 12 in the Naval Reserve and 7 in the Navy, during
the marriage. Thus, according to the trial court’s interpretation of the decree, appellee
was entitled to one half times 19/32, or one half of 59.375 percent, of appellant’s
disposable retirement pay of $1,839.00 per month. This figure amounts to $545.95 per
month. The trial court found that appellee was entitled to this amount per month
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAF050039 12
commencing when appellant began receiving benefits and calculated the arrearage as
of September 1, 2010 as being $8,735.00 ($545.95 x 16 months).
{¶ 47} We disagree with the trial court’s calculations regarding the pension
benefits of appellant. While appellant may have been accumulating pension benefits
during his 12 years in the Naval Reserve, he is only receiving pension benefits from 20
years in the Navy. He actually served approximately 19 years, 6 months and 13 days in
the Navy and testified that he has no Naval Reserve pension benefits but was able to
use his time in the Naval Reserves to get 5 months credit toward his 20 year Naval
retirement benefits. Those 5 months added on to his actual time in the Navy gave him
his 20 years.
{¶ 48} Therefore, we conclude that his only pension benefits come from his 20
years of Naval service which were calculated using his actual Naval service (19 years, 6
months and 13 days) and his Naval Reserve service (12 years in the Naval Reserve
equals 5 months toward his Navy retirement). Of these 20 years, we find that
approximately 7.2 years occurred during the marriage. The parties were married on
January 30, 1981, while the appellant was in the Navy, and he left the Navy on
approximately November 7, 1987, for a total of approximately 6 years 9 months and 8
days. Plus he earned 5 months credit toward his Navy pension for his 12 years of
Naval Reserve service, all of which occurred during the marriage. 6 years, 9 months
and 8 days plus 5 months equals 7 years 2 months and 8 days or 7 years 2.267 months
or approximately 7.2 years.
{¶ 49} Therefore, we conclude that 7.2 years should be the numerator of the
coverture fraction, representing the amount of appellant’s pension earned during the
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAF050039 13
marriage, and 20 years should be the denominator of the coverture fraction,
representing the total number of years the appellant participated in the plan. The
appellee is entitled to ½ of 7.2/20 of the appellant’s pension. 7.2/20 x
$1,839.00/monthly benefit equals $662.04. One half of this is $331.02 per month for the
amount appellee should receive.
{¶ 50} Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in using $1,839.00,
appellant’s gross monthly income, in the above formula. According to appellant, he “has
already had taxes withheld on the full retirement amount he has received and Appellee
(sic) asserts that the amount owed to the Appellee for reimbursement should be net of
taxes…”
{¶ 51} Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b) provides that a party may, if he or she so desires, file
objections to a magistrate's decision within 14 days of the filing of the decision. The rule
also requires that the objections be specific. Further, Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv) provides that
“[e]xcept for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court's
adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion * * * unless the party has objected to
that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).”
{¶ 52} A review of the record reveals that appellant did not mention the tax issue
in his objections to the magistrate's decision. We thus find this issue waived for
purposes of appeal, and we further decline to invoke the plain-error doctrine.
{¶ 53} Appellant’s second and third assignments of error are sustained in part.
This matter is remanded to the trial court for issuance of the appropriate monthly order
of $331.02 per month to appellee, for correction of the arrearage figure and for making
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAF050039 14
any orders necessary to square the financial obligations of the parties based on the
$331.02/month figure.
IV, V, VI
{¶ 54} Appellant, in his fourth assignment of error, argues that the trial court
erred in finding him in contempt for failing to prepare an order dividing his active duty,
length-of-service military retirement. In his fifth assignment of error, he contends that the
trial court erred in finding that the evidence of his knowledge of the requirement that he
divide his military retirement was clear and convincing. Finally, in his sixth assignment
of error, he challenges the trial court’s order requiring him to pay $3,000.00 to appellee
for attorney fees regarding the contempt.
{¶ 55} Appellant, in his brief, asks that if this Court overturns the contempt ruling
of the trial court, it should also find that appellant is not responsible for the payment of
attorney fees.
{¶ 56} Ohio courts have defined contempt of court as “conduct which brings the
administration of justice into disrespect, or which tends to embarrass, impede or
obstruct a court in the performance of its functions.” Windham Bank v. Tomaszczyk, 27
Ohio St.2d 55, 271 N.E.2d 815, (1971), paragraph one of the syllabus. Our standard of
review regarding a finding of contempt is limited to a determination of whether the trial
court abused its discretion. Wadian v. Wadian, 5th Dist. No. 2007CA00125, 2008-Ohio-
5009, ¶ 12, citing In re Mittas, 5th Dist. No. 1994 CA 00053, 1994 WL 477799 (Aug. 6,
1994).
{¶ 57} An appellate court's standard of review of a trial court's contempt finding is
abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Gibbs, 60 Ohio St.3d 69, 573 N.E.2d 62,
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAF050039 15
(1991). In order to find an abuse of discretion, we must determine the trial court's
decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable and not merely an error of law
or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140, (1983).
{¶ 58} The burden of proof in a civil contempt action is proof by clear and
convincing evidence. Jarvis v. Bright, 5th Dist. No. 07CA72, 2008-Ohio-2974 at ¶ 19,
citing Brown v.. Executive 200, Inc., 64 Ohio St.2d 250, 416 N.E.2d 610, (1980). The
determination of “clear and convincing evidence” is within the discretion of the trier of
fact.
{¶ 59} We further note the trier of fact is in a far better position to observe the
witnesses' demeanor and weigh their credibility. See, e.g., Taralla v. Taralla, 5th Dist.
No. 2005 AP 02 0018, 2005-Ohio-6767, ¶ 31, citing State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d
230, 227 N.E.2d 212, (1967).
{¶ 60} Proof of purposeful, willing or intentional violation of a court order is not a
prerequisite to a finding of contempt. See Pugh v. Pugh (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 136, 140,
472 N.E.2d 1085{¶ 61} Upon our review of the record, we find that the trial court did not err in
finding appellant in contempt because the trial court’s decision was not arbitrary,
unconscionable or unreasonable. Appellant argues that the Decree of Divorce required
him to prepare a QDRO within 120 days and that QDROs do not apply to military
retirement plans. According to appellant, the “order relevant to a military retirement plan
is an “MQO” or Military Qualifying Order.” However, as is stated above, we find that
such mislabeling is, at most, a harmless error. Appellant also contends that the Decree
of Divorce only names his Naval Reserve pension for division and not his active duty
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAF050039 16
length-of-retirement pension and that, therefore, he did not have to prepare a QDRO to
divide his active duty retirement. However, it is clear from the record that the trial court
intended to divide all of appellant’s retirement benefits which had accumulated during
the marriage and directed appellant to prepare all of the paperwork to do so. Appellant,
however, did not do so. On August 27, 2008, appellee filed a Motion for an Order to
Show Cause, asking that appellant be found in contempt for failing to prepare a QDRO.
While such motion was later withdrawn because appellant lacked the information
necessary to prepare a QDRO, appellant was on notice at such time that appellee was
claiming a right to a portion of all of his military retirement benefits. Had appellant been
unsure of the meaning of the language contained in the Decree he could have
requested clarification from the trial court. After appellee filed her second Motion for an
Order to Show Cause on September 2, 2009, appellant still failed to have a QDRO
prepared. As noted by the Magistrate, appellant “knew that there was an order that
clearly stated ‘all the retirement benefits of the husband.’ The evidence of his
knowledge of the requirement is convincing and clear. The husband’s ‘belief’ goes to
the issue of mitigation, and not to the underlying compliance.”
{¶ 62} Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court’s decision finding
appellant in contempt was not arbitrary, unconscionable or unreasonable and that the
trial court’s order requiring appellant to pay attorney fees in the amount of $3,000.00
was just and reasonable.
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAF050039 17
{¶ 63} Appellant’s fourth, fifth and sixth assignments of error are, therefore,
overruled.
{¶ 64} Accordingly, the judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common
Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in
part.
By: Edwards, J.
Hoffman, P.J. and
Wise, J. concur
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
JUDGES
JAE/d1026
[Cite as Lees v. Lees, 2012-Ohio-770.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
TERESA G. LEES :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee :
:
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
ROBERT WILLIAM LEES, JR. :
:
Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 11CAF050039
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion on file, the
judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations
Division, is affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. Costs assessed 66% to
appellant and 34% to appellee.
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
JUDGES