State v. Smith ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Smith, 
    2011-Ohio-6872
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    STARK COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO,                                  Case No. 2011CA00140
    Appellee,                              JUDGES:
    Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
    v.                                             Hon. John W. Wise, J.
    Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J.
    SMITH,
    Appellant.                             OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                       Appeal from the Stark County Court of
    Common Pleas, Case No. 2011CR0489
    JUDGMENT:                                      Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                        December 30, 2011
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                         For Defendant-Appellant
    JOHN D. FERRERO,                               MATTHEW PETIT
    PROSECUTING ATTORNEY,                          116 Cleveland Ave. North, Suite 808
    STARK COUNTY, OHIO                             Canton, Ohio 44702
    By: RENEE M. WATSON
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
    Appellate Section
    110 Central Plaza, South – Suite 510
    Canton, Ohio 44702-1413
    Hoffman, P.J.
    (¶1)   Defendant-appellant Daymion Smith appeals his June 1, 2011 conviction
    entered by the Stark County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of
    Ohio.
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
    (¶2)   On March 29, 2011, Parole Officer Rick Polinori received an anonymous
    phone tip regarding a parolee absconder, Toriano Howard. The tip stated Howard was
    living at an apartment complex where he was engaged in selling drugs. The caller
    further alleged Howard was in possession of a firearm.
    (¶3)   Polinori testified he then personally verified Howard was leasing the
    apartment at #11, 139 17th Street N.W., Canton, Ohio. The terms of Howard’s post-
    release control provided his person, car and home were subject to a warrantless search
    at any time. Polinori then contacted the Canton Police Department for assistance in
    apprehending Howard on the parole violation at the apartment.
    (¶4)   Polinori and members of the Canton Police Department proceeded to the
    apartment, where they surrounded the building and announced their presence.
    Appellant answered the door to the apartment, and told the officers he lived in the
    apartment but was unsure whether anyone else was inside. As a result, the officers
    performed a protective sweep of the premises, searching a bedroom and finding a
    substance suspected to be cocaine in plain view, along with cash and a scale. The
    bedroom was later determined to be Appellant’s. The officers proceeded to secure the
    property and to obtain a search warrant.
    (¶5)   Subsequent to the search, Appellant was charged with one count of
    trafficking in cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)(C)(4)(f), a first degree felony;
    trafficking in cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)(C)(4)(d), a third degree felony;
    possession of cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(4)(e), a first degree felony;
    possession of cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(4)(b), a fourth degree felony.
    (¶6)   On May 25, 2011, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence
    seized incident to the search of the premises. The trial court overruled the motion to
    suppress. Appellant then entered a plea of no contest to the charges. The trial court
    accepted the plea, convicted and sentenced Appellant to three years incarceration on
    the first degree trafficking and possession charges, three years on the third degree
    trafficking offense, and six months on the fourth degree possession charge.
    (¶7)   Appellant now appeals, assigning as error:
    (¶8)   “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S
    MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE THE STATE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE
    APPELLANT’S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS.”
    (¶9)   Appellate review of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
    suppress involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Long (1998), 
    127 Ohio App.3d 328
    , 
    713 N.E.2d 1
    . During a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the
    role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to
    evaluate witness credibility. State v. Brooks, 
    75 Ohio St.3d 148
    , 1996–Ohio–134, 
    661 N.E.2d 1030
    . A reviewing court is bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if they
    are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Metcalf (1996), 
    111 Ohio App.3d 142
    , 
    675 N.E.2d 1268
    . Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must
    independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court's
    conclusion, whether the trial court's decision meets the applicable legal standard. State
    v. Williams (1993), 
    86 Ohio App.3d 37
    , 
    619 N.E.2d 1141
    .
    (¶10) There are three methods of challenging a trial court's ruling on a motion to
    suppress on appeal. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's finding of fact. In
    reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether the trial
    court's findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See State v.
    Fanning (1982), 
    1 Ohio St.3d 19
    , 
    437 N.E.2d 583
    ; and State v. Klein (1991), 
    73 Ohio App.3d 486
    , 
    597 N.E.2d 1141
    . Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed to
    apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an appellate
    court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. See State v. Williams
    (1993), 
    86 Ohio App.3d 37
    , 
    619 N.E.2d 1141
    . Finally, an appellant may argue the trial
    court has incorrectly decided the ultimate or final issues raised in a motion to suppress.
    When reviewing this type of claim, an appellate court must independently determine,
    without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether the facts meet the appropriate
    legal standard in any given case. State v. Claytor, (1993) 
    85 Ohio App.3d 623
    , 
    620 N.E.2d 906
     and State v. Curry (1994), 
    95 Ohio App.3d 93
    , 
    641 N.E.2d 1172
    .
    (¶11) “[A] probation officer may search a probationer's home without a warrant
    and upon less than probable cause.” State v. Cowans, 
    87 Ohio St.3d 68
    , 76, 1999–
    Ohio–250, 
    717 N.E.2d 298
    , citing Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987), 
    483 U.S. 868
    , 877–878,
    107 S .Ct. 3164, 
    97 L.Ed.2d 709
    . Ohio law permits a probation officer to conduct a
    warrantless search of a probationer's person or home if an officer has “reasonable
    grounds” to believe the probationer failed to abide by the law or by the terms of
    probation. See State v. Hendricks, Cuyahoga App. No. 92213, 2009–Ohio–5556. To
    establish “reasonable grounds,” an officer need not possess the same level of certainty
    that is necessary to establish “probable cause.” Instead, the officer's information need
    only establish the “likelihood” that contraband will be found in a probationer's home.
    State v. Howell (Nov. 17, 1998), Jackson App. No. 97CA824, 
    1998 WL 807800
    ; Helton
    v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (June 26, 2001), Franklin App. No. 00AP–1108, 
    2001 WL 709946
    .
    (¶12) Here, the officers acted on a tip to Parole Officer Polinori relative to a
    parolee engaging in the sale of illegal drugs. Appellant was a parolee absconder and
    had consented to a search of his residence. Polinori confirmed the parolee’s name was
    on the lease, and the parolee was living at the apartment. Accordingly, we find the
    officers legally entered the apartment without a warrant. When Appellant opened the
    door and informed the officers he was uncertain as to whether anyone else was in the
    apartment, the officers properly performed a protective sweep of the premises to
    ascertain if Appellant was present, and the officers observed cocaine in plain view
    during the lawful search. Maryland v. Buie (1990), 
    494 U.S. 325
    , 
    110 S.Ct. 1093
    .
    (¶13) Accordingly, we find the trial court did not error in denying Appellant’s
    motion to suppress the evidence herein.
    (¶14) Appellant’s conviction in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is
    affirmed.
    Judgment affirmed.
    Wise, J. and Edwards, J. concur.
    HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR STARK COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO,                            Case No. 2011CA00140
    Appellee,                           JUDGES:
    Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
    v.                                        Hon. John W. Wise, J.
    Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J.
    SMITH,
    Appellant.                          JUDGMENT ENTRY
    For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, Appellant’s conviction in
    the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs to Appellant.
    s/ William B. Hoffman _________________
    HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
    s/ John W. Wise _____________________
    HON. JOHN W. WISE
    s/ Julie A. Edwards___________________
    HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2011CA00140

Judges: Hoffman

Filed Date: 12/30/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014