State v. Williams , 2012 Ohio 5256 ( 2012 )

[Cite as State v. Williams, 2012-Ohio-5256.]
STATE OF OHIO, JEFFERSON COUNTY
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
SEVENTH DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO ) CASE NO. 11 JE 7
)
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE )
)
VS. ) OPINION
)
RASSOL WILLIAMS aka )
RASOOL HASSAN WILLIAMS )
)
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT )
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from the Court of
Common Pleas of Jefferson County,
Ohio
Case No. 10 CR 62
JUDGMENT: Affirmed.
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: Atty. Jane M. Hanlin
Prosecuting Attorney
Jefferson County Justice Center
16001 State Route 7
Steubenville, Ohio 43952
For Defendant-Appellant: Atty. Kristopher M. Haught
Scarpone & Associates
2021 Sunset Blvd.
Steubenville, Ohio 43952
JUDGES:
Hon. Cheryl L. Waite
Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich
Hon. Mary DeGenaro
Dated: November 6, 2012
[Cite as State v. Williams, 2012-Ohio-5256.]
WAITE, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant Rassol Hassan Williams has appealed his convictions for
murder and having a weapon while under a disability. The crime arose while
Appellant was having an argument with the victim, Charles King, in Steubenville.
While they were arguing Appellant shot King multiple times, resulting in King’s death.
Appellant was sentenced to life in prison with an opportunity for parole after 20 years.
Appellant argues that the court should have given a jury instruction on voluntary
manslaughter. However, Appellant pursued a theory of self-defense at trial, which is
generally incompatible with a theory of voluntary manslaughter. The court was
correct in giving only an instruction on self-defense. Further, there was no evidence
that Appellant experienced a sudden fit of passion or rage, which is necessary before
an instruction on voluntary manslaughter can be given. Appellant also argues that
his conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, primarily the evidence
dealing with self-defense. The record shows that King walked away from the
argument, after which Appellant pursued him and taunted him. When King turned
around and approached Appellant, he shot him. Appellant then went into his home,
came out again, returned to the victim, and shot him a few more times. This
evidence does not support a theory of self-defense and certainly does not support
reversal based on the manifest weight of the evidence. The judgment of the trial
court is correct and is affirmed.
{¶2} At 7:20 a.m. on April 20, 2010, Appellant and Charles King were having
an argument outside of Appellant's occasional residence at 234 North Eighth Street
in Steubenville, Ohio. The home is owned by Kathryn Taylor, an aunt of Appellant's
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girlfriend. A neighbor, Ronald May, heard and observed the argument. He saw King
walk away while Appellant taunted him. King then turned around and approached
Appellant. At this point, Appellant shot King a number of times. King fell to the
ground screaming in pain. May saw Appellant leave the victim and enter 234 North
Eighth Street. He saw Appellant “messing with his gun” in some way while he was in
the house. (Tr., p. 264.) Appellant then came back out of the house and walked up
to King, who was still screaming. Appellant looked at the victim and said “[y]eah, now
what?” (Tr., p. 264.) Appellant then shot him a few more times. King soon died from
the gunshot wounds. May watched Appellant go back into the house, then run out of
the house a few minutes later, fleeing down an alley.
{¶3} Appellant's girlfriend, Sabrina Isaac, later picked up Appellant in
Steubenville and took him to Steubenville Municipal Court where he was scheduled
to appear on another, unrelated offense. After the court appearance, Appellant fled
Steubenville. Appellant was captured in New Rochelle, New York, twenty-eight days
later.
{¶4} Another neighbor, Bethlum Frye, witnessed the murder from across the
street. He was awakened by the sounds of arguing. He looked out of his window
and saw King stumbling and falling in the street after being shot. Frye called 911.
When police arrived, King was barely alive, unarmed, and unable to speak. The
autopsy later revealed that he was shot five times, and two of the shots were fatal.
The bullets used in the shooting were .380 caliber full metal jacket rounds. A box of
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those same bullets was later found in Appellant's home with his fingerprint on the
box. The murder weapon was not recovered.
{¶5} Appellant was indicted on May 26, 2010. He was represented by
retained counsel. Jury trial began on March 14, 2011. The state called 22
witnesses. Appellant testified in his own defense but did not call any other witnesses.
{¶6} Appellant testified that he graduated from high school in New Rochelle,
New York in 1995. He had seven children by five different women. His girlfriend
Sabrina Isaac was the mother of one those children. He would come to Steubenville
to visit Sabrina and his child, and sometimes stayed at her aunt's house at 234 North
Eighth Street.
{¶7} Appellant described a number of arguments he had with the victim in
the months leading up to the shooting. King accused Appellant of trying to strike up
a relationship with King's girlfriend, Laceya Lavender. Appellant said that King
threatened to “burn” him for talking to Laceya, which Appellant interpreted as
meaning that King would shoot him. (Tr., p. 759.) Appellant testified that in two of
the arguments, King had shown Appellant a gun. Appellant testified that he was
“fearful” of King. (Tr., p. 767.) He testified that he was just protecting himself when
he shot King. (Tr., p. 792.) Appellant also testified that he never told anyone about
these incidents in which King threatened him with a gun, and never reported the
incidents to the police.
{¶8} The jury found Appellant guilty of both counts, along with the firearm
specification, on March 18, 2011. The court held the sentencing hearing immediately
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after the jury was dismissed. The court sentenced Appellant to life in prison with the
possibility of parole after 15 years for the murder charge, with an additional
mandatory 3 years in prison for the gun specification, and 2 years in prison for the
charge of having a weapon while under a disability, all to be served consecutively.
The total sentence was life in prison with the possibility of parole after 20 years. This
appeal followed.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING OF GUILTY WAS AGAINST THE
MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND WAS NOT
SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
{¶9} Appellant contends that his conviction for murder is against the
manifest weight of the evidence because he proved the elements of the affirmative
defense of self-defense. The record does not support Appellant's argument.
{¶10} “Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount
of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the
other.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d
541 (1997). A conviction will only be reversed as against the manifest weight of the
evidence in exceptional circumstances. Id. When determining whether a criminal
judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court acts as a
“thirteenth juror” to determine whether “the jury clearly lost its way and created such a
manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial
ordered.” Id. at 387, citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App. 3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717
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(1983). The verdict is not against the weight of the evidence when the record
contains evidence which, if believed, will convince the average person of the
accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Eley, 56 Ohio St. 2d 169, 172,
383 N.E.2d 132 (1978).
{¶11} A reviewing court will normally defer to the credibility determinations of
the trial court because the trier of fact is in a position to personally view the
demeanor, voice inflections and gestures of the witnesses. State v. Hill, 75 Ohio
St.3d 195, 204, 661 N.E.2d 1068 (1996); State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St. 2d 230, 231,
227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). “When there exist two fairly reasonable views of the
evidence or two conflicting versions of events, neither of which is unbelievable, it is
not our province to choose which one we believe.” State v. Dyke, 7th Dist. No. 99 CA
149, 2002-Ohio-1152, ¶13, citing State v. Gore, 131 Ohio App. 3d 197, 201, 722
N.E.2d 125 (7th Dist.1999).
{¶12} Appellant is arguing that the jury lost its way regarding the question of
whether he acted in self-defense. Self-defense is an affirmative defense, and thus,
the accused has the burden to prove it by a preponderance of the evidence.
Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St. 3d 116, 124, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997). To establish
self-defense, a defendant must prove the following elements: (1) the defendant was
not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray; (2) the defendant had a
bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and
that his only means of escape from such danger was in the use of such force; and (3)
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the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger. State v.
Robbins, 58 Ohio St. 2d 74, 388 N.E.2d 755 (1979), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶13} Since self-defense is an affirmative defense, and given that a jury is
free to believe some, all or none of the testimony of any witness, the mere existence
in the record of the elements of self-defense does not mean the jury was required to
believe that evidence. A reviewing court may affirm the conviction for the simple
reason that the jury did not believe the testimony regarding self-defense. See State
v. Griffin, 7th Dist. No. 01 CA 151, 2002-Ohio-6900, ¶23-25.
{¶14} The first element of self-defense is that the defendant was not at fault in
creating the situation leading to the affray. Appellant selectively quotes from Mr.
May's testimony in an attempt to show that Appellant was not at fault. This attempt is
not persuasive. May testified that King was walking away from Appellant at some
point during the argument, and that King said he was done with the argument. (Tr.,
pp. 261-262.) May testified that Appellant responded that he was not done with the
argument. Appellant walked over to King and continued to yell obscenities. (Tr., p.
262.) They walked away from 234 North Eighth Street and went in the direction of a
local store. At this point, King decided to leave Appellant, but then turned around
and starting walking back toward him. (Tr., p. 262.) At that point, Appellant fired the
first shots. Appellant then entered the residence at 234 North Eighth Street,
“messed” with his gun in some way, and came out again and walked up to the
wounded victim, who was screaming in pain. Appellant taunted King by saying
“[y]eah, now what?” and then shot him a few more times. (Tr., p. 264.) May did not
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see King holding a gun at any point during the altercation, nor was any other physical
evidence presented to indicate the presence of a second gun.
{¶15} This evidence reveals that Appellant was at fault by continuing and
escalating the argument after King had already walked away. Thus, the first element
of self-defense is not met. Even if the evidence could possibly be interpreted as self-
defense with respect to the first shots, there is absolutely no evidence that self-
defense could have played any role in the second series of shots. Appellant returned
to the unarmed victim, who was screaming in pain, then taunted him and took shots
at him until he stopped screaming. (Tr., p. 264.) This describes a cold-blooded
murder rather than a shooting in self-defense.
{¶16} Regarding the second element of self-defense (did the defendant have
a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and
that his only means of escape from such danger was in the use of such force),
Appellant primarily relies on his own testimony to prove the point. His version of the
events is not corroborated by any other witness. He testified that King attacked him
and hit him over the head with a gun while Appellant was on his porch. Appellant
then ran upstairs, found a gun, and waited until he heard King leave the house. He
“tiptoed” downstairs to lock the front door, but before he got there, King came back in
“with the gun on his leg”. (Tr., p. 773.) Appellant pointed his own gun at King and
forced King to back up a few steps out the front door. He then thought he saw King
pull the trigger, so he turned and ran back into the house, firing behind him as he ran.
He kicked the door closed after he was in the house. He testified that he went back
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outside to look at King, who was now unarmed. (Tr., p. 775.) Appellant claims that
another man named Lloyd was now with King, and Lloyd turned around and starting
shooting at Appellant, so Appellant started shooting back. Appellant speculated that
King might have been shot by his “partner” named Lloyd. (Tr., p. 848.)
{¶17} On cross-examination, the prosecutor established that Appellant's
testimony was inconsistent with all the other evidence in the case, including the
evidence of the other eyewitnesses. The prosecutor tried to get Appellant to explain
why the shell casings were found far away from where Appellant stated he fired the
gun, and he responded by speculating that the casings had been moved. (Tr., p.
845.) Appellant also had no explanation why there were no other casings, bullets, or
other evidence found to support his theory that another gun was fired by the victim’s
friend, Lloyd.
{¶18} Appellant's contradictory and inconsistent testimony is not credible.
The jury plainly did not believe his testimony, and without such belief there was no
basis on which to consider a theory of self-defense. Appellant’s first assignment of
error is without merit and is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT PROVIDING A JURY
INSTRUCTION FOR MANSLAUGHTER.
{¶19} Appellant contends that he was entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary
manslaughter and that the failure to give the instruction was reversible error requiring
a new trial. Appellant is incorrect.
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{¶20} Murder is defined as “purposely caus[ing] the death of another.” R.C.
2903.02(A). In contrast, voluntary manslaughter is defined as knowingly causing the
death of another “while under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of
rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the victim
that is reasonably sufficient to incite the person into using deadly force.” R.C.
2903.03(A).
{¶21} Voluntary manslaughter is an inferior degree offense of murder, rather
than a lesser included offense. State v. Kanner, 7th Dist. No. 04 MO 10, 2006-Ohio-
3485, ¶17. This is true because the elements of the crime of voluntary manslaughter
are contained within the offense of murder, except for one or more additional
mitigating elements. Id.
{¶22} For a court to include an instruction on the inferior degree offense of
voluntary manslaughter, the evidence presented at trial must “reasonably support
both an acquittal on the charged crime of murder and a conviction for voluntary
manslaughter.” State v. Lewers, 5th Dist. No.2009 CA 00289, 2010-Ohio-5336,
¶100, citing State v. Shane, 63 Ohio St. 3d 630, 632, 590 N.E.2d 272 (1992). Where
insufficient evidence of provocation is presented and no reasonable jury could decide
that the defendant was reasonably provoked by the victim, then no instruction on
voluntary manslaughter can be given. Id. at 638.
{¶23} An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision whether to give a
particular jury instruction under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Kaufman,
187 Ohio App. 3d 50, 2010-Ohio-1536, 931 N.E.2d 143, ¶103. An abuse of discretion
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connotes more than an error of judgment; it implies an attitude on the part of the
court that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio
St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).
{¶24} Appellee correctly points out that an instruction on voluntary
manslaughter is generally incompatible with and contradictory to a defense of self-
defense. See, e.g, State v. Marcum, 7th Dist. No. 04 CO 66, 2006-Ohio-7068, ¶46
(“a self-defense theory is usually contradictory to proof of sudden passion or rage.”)
Fear is insufficient to demonstrate the emotional states of sudden passion or a fit of
rage, and these latter emotional states are essential elements of the definition of
voluntary manslaughter. Kanner, supra, ¶51-53. Appellant's own testimony at trial
was that he was afraid of the victim, not that he was overcome by sudden passion or
a fit of rage. (Tr., pp. 767, 769, 776.) There is nothing in the record indicating any
type of sudden passion or fit of rage from Appellant. Appellant's theory on appeal
appears to be that the victim was enraged because he thought Appellant was
becoming involved with the victim's girlfriend. However, voluntary manslaughter
requires proof that the defendant, not the victim, acted out of a fit of sudden passion
or rage. No such evidence appears in this record. Appellant's second assignment of
error is without merit and is overruled.
{¶25} In conclusion, the manifest weight of the evidence supports the
convictions. Appellant admitted in his own testimony that he shot at the victim, and
his inconsistent theory of self-defense, based almost exclusively on his own
testimony, contradicts all of the other evidence in the case. Appellant was not
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entitled to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence
that he acted in a sudden passion or sudden fit of rage provoked by the victim.
Appellant pursued a theory of self-defense at trial, which is usually contradictory to a
theory of voluntary manslaughter. Appellant only testified that he was afraid of the
victim, and fear does not rise to the level necessary to support a charge on voluntary
manslaughter. Appellant's two assignments of error are overruled and his
convictions and sentence are affirmed.
Vukovich, J., concurs.
DeGenaro, J., concurs.