Eckstein v. Colian , 2012 Ohio 4038 ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as Eckstein v. Colian, 
    2012-Ohio-4038
    .]
    STATE OF OHIO, COLUMBIANA COUNTY
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    SEVENTH DISTRICT
    KATHRYN ECKSTEIN                                )   CASE NO. 
    11 CO 22
    )
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE                      )
    )
    VS.                                             )   OPINION
    )
    ANTHONY T. COLIAN                               )
    )
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT                     )
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                           Civil Appeal from the Court of Common
    Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio
    Case No. 11 DR 168
    JUDGMENT:                                           Affirmed.
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee:                             Atty. Jeffrey Lilly
    Community Legal Aid Services
    First National Tower
    11 Central Square, Suite 700
    Youngstown, Ohio 44503
    For Defendant-Appellant:                            Atty. Tracey Laslo
    3258 East Main Street
    Alliance, Ohio 44601
    JUDGES:
    Hon. Cheryl L. Waite
    Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich
    Hon. Mary DeGenaro
    Dated: August 27, 2012
    [Cite as Eckstein v. Colian, 
    2012-Ohio-4038
    .]
    WAITE, P.J.
    {¶1}     Appellant Anthony T. Colian appeals the judgment of the Columbiana
    County Court of Common Pleas adopting a magistrate's decision to grant a domestic
    violence civil protection order (“DVCPO”). Appellant argues that the manifest weight
    of the evidence does not support the decision to grant the DVCPO. The record
    reflects that Appellant had been married to the victim, Kathryn Eckstein (“Kathryn”).
    Appellant went to the victim's home to pick up their two minor children. Appellant and
    Kathryn engaged in an argument and Appellant punched Kathryn in the head. The
    evidence presented at trial supports a determination that Kathryn needed protection
    against Appellant and that the DVCPO was justified. The judgment of the trial court
    is affirmed.
    Background
    {¶2}     Appellant and the victim were divorced in 2008. They had two children
    together, now ages four and five. On March 27, 2011, Appellant went to Kathryn's
    house to pick up the children on their usual exchange day. He was accompanied by
    his fiancée Mandy Grimes, who waited in the car. Kathryn was on her front porch
    and as Appellant approached he began yelling and swearing at her. He punched her
    in the head while she was kissing one of the children goodbye. Kathryn then called
    her mother and the police. She was taken by ambulance to the hospital, where she
    was told she had a concussion.
    {¶3}     On March 29, 2011, Kathryn filed for a DVCPO. She filed on only her
    own behalf. A hearing was held on April 7, 2011. Kathryn and her parents testified
    -2-
    for the issuance of the order and Appellant’s fiancée, Mandy Grimes, testified for the
    defense. Appellant also testified on his own behalf.
    {¶4}   Kathryn stated that when Appellant arrived she was in the house with
    the children. She stepped out onto the porch to talk to Appellant about changing the
    next exchange day. She saw Grimes in the car. While they were on the porch,
    Appellant became angry and “flipped out all of a sudden.” (Tr., p. 7.) When she was
    bending over to kiss one of her children, Appellant punched her in the head. She did
    not see the punch coming. She started crying and things became fuzzy. Grimes
    then got out of the vehicle and told Appellant to get in the car. (Tr., p. 8.) Kathryn
    called her parents, who said they would come right away. She then called the police.
    Kathryn’s parents and the police arrived at the same time.       Appellant's mother,
    Barbara Eckstein (“Barbara”), put an ice-pack on Kathryn's head.          The police
    questioned her and called for an ambulance. She was taken to Salem Hospital,
    where they took a CAT scan. Kathryn testified that she had a concussion and that
    she is still being treated for headaches and neck pain from the attack. She said that
    she was afraid of Appellant, that he has a bad temper, and that he had attacked her
    in the past. (Tr., pp. 11-12.)
    {¶5}   Barbara and Michael Eckstein (“Michael”), Kathryn's parents, also
    testified. Barbara stated that Kathryn lives with them, but Barbara acknowledged that
    she was not at home when the attack happened. Kathryn called Barbara and was
    sobbing and hysterical.     (Tr., p. 37.) She said that Appellant had punched her.
    Barbara said that she would come home immediately. The police arrived shortly after
    -3-
    Barbara got there.     Barbara saw Kathryn sitting on the front stairs sobbing and
    holding her head. She put a cold compress on Kathryn's head. An ambulance
    arrived and took Kathryn to the hospital. Barbara testified that she had never seen
    Kathryn so upset or scared before, and that Kathryn is still suffering head and neck
    pain from the attack. She also testified that she had experienced Appellant's temper
    in the past and that she is afraid of him. (Tr., pp. 41-43.)
    {¶6}   Michael testified that his daughter Kathryn lives with him. He and his
    wife Barbara were only a mile and a half away when Kathryn called them. He said
    that Barbara received the call and that she was “[p]anic stricken” after the call. (Tr.,
    p. 29.) He testified that he arrived at his home on March 27, 2011, to find his
    daughter sitting on the steps holding her head, scared and sobbing, saying “Tony
    punched me in my head.” (Tr., p. 29.) Paramedics soon arrived. They brought a
    gurney in and took Kathryn away. He and Barbara went to the hospital while Kathryn
    was being treated. He testified that he has known Appellant for eight or nine years.
    He carries pepper spray in his car because he is concerned that Appellant poses a
    threat to his wife and daughter's safety. (Tr., p. 33.) He related an incident that
    occurred shortly after Kathryn and Appellant were divorced. Kathryn had phoned
    Appellant to tell him that the children were sick and she would not allow them to leave
    to go to church with him that day. Appellant arrived at the house anyway, and started
    beating on the front door.     Michael intended going to go out to talk to him, but
    Barbara said, “[d]on't go out; he's a mad man.” (Tr., p. 36.) They called the police,
    who got Appellant to leave.
    -4-
    {¶7}   Grimes testified that she was present when Appellant went to pick up
    his children on March 27, 2011. She and Appellant had been engaged to be married
    for two years. She saw Appellant go up to the porch and knock on the door. She
    saw Kathryn and the children come out. She saw Appellant and Kathryn talking, and
    although she could not hear exactly what they were talking about, she stated that
    “[a]t one point in time I noticed things were getting heated.” (Tr., p. 50.) She could
    hear the argument getting louder over a period of about 13 minutes. (Tr., pp. 54-55.)
    She eventually got out of the vehicle and told Appellant that it was time to go. (Tr., p.
    50.) She testified that she did not see Appellant touch Kathryn at all during the
    argument. (Tr., p. 51.) She also testified that even though she was watching the
    entire argument, she could have missed something “in a blink of an eye.” (Tr., p. 56.)
    {¶8}   Appellant testified that he arrived at 6:00 p.m. to pick up the children.
    Kathryn asked if she could have the children on Easter Sunday, and he refused.
    They began to “bicker back and forth.” (Tr., p. 62.) He stated that Kathryn swore at
    him and yelled at him. He stated that he was not angry at any point and that the
    bickering did not become loud. He testified that Grimes told him it was time to go, so
    he took the children and left for home. Appellant lives only two doors away from
    Kathryn, and he soon saw the police and ambulance arrive. He stated: “I had no
    clue what was going on. She went out on a stretcher. You know, for all I know she
    rammed her head in the wall.” (Tr., p. 63.)
    {¶9}   Appellant also testified that soon after the divorce there was a day
    when Kathryn told him the children could not go to church. He admitted that he went
    -5-
    to Kathryn's house and banged on the door of the house so hard that the vibrations
    set off the anti-theft alarm on his truck. (Tr., p. 70.)
    {¶10} The magistrate issued the DVCPO on April 15, 2011. The magistrate
    found that Appellant was less than credible, particularly when he claimed he never
    got angry. The magistrate noted that Appellant exhibited his anger during cross-
    examination. The magistrate also considered the contradictory testimony between
    Appellant and his own witness Mandy Grimes regarding whether a heated argument
    had taken place. The DVCPO was issued for a period of five years, terminating on
    March 29, 2016.
    {¶11} On April 25, 2011, Appellant filed a motion to set aside the DVCPO,
    claiming that it was issued against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court
    treated this motion as an objection to the magistrate's order. The court ruled on the
    objection on June 27, 2011. The court determined that competent credible evidence
    supported the magistrate's findings. This appeal followed.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    THE TRIAL COURT’S AFFIRMATION OF THE MAGISTRATE’S
    DECISION TO GRANT A FINAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CIVIL
    PROTECTION ORDER WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AS IT
    WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
    {¶12} Appellant believes the trial court's decision to issue the DVCPO was
    against the manifest weight of the evidence. The issuance of a DVCPO will be
    upheld against a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence if the trial court’s
    -6-
    decision was supported by sufficient, competent, credible evidence.           Rosine v.
    Rosine, 7th Dist. No. 09-MA-18, 
    2010-Ohio-613
    , ¶11, citing C.E. Morris v. Foley
    Construction Co., 
    54 Ohio St.2d 279
    , 
    376 N.E.2d 578
     (1978). When reviewing the
    evidence, the appellate court must indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of
    the trial court's judgment and findings of fact. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 
    10 Ohio St.3d 77
    , 79, 
    461 N.E.2d 1273
     (1984). The rationale for this presumption is that
    the trial court is in the best position to view witnesses and observe their demeanor,
    voice inflection, and gestures, and to weigh the credibility of each witness. 
    Id.
    {¶13} R.C. 3113.31 provides for a petitioner's right to request a DVCPO on
    behalf of herself or anyone living in the residence with her in order to obtain
    protection from domestic violence.          Domestic violence is defined in R.C.
    3113.31(A)(1), in part, as follows:
    (1) “Domestic violence” means the occurrence of one or more of the
    following acts against a family or household member:
    (a) Attempting to cause or recklessly causing bodily injury;
    (b) Placing another person by the threat of force in fear of imminent
    serious physical harm or committing a violation of section 2903.211 or
    2911.211 of the Revised Code;
    {¶14} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen granting a protection
    order, the trial court must find that petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the
    evidence that petitioner or petitioner's family or household members are in danger of
    -7-
    domestic violence.” Felton v. Felton, 
    79 Ohio St.3d 34
    , 
    679 N.E.2d 672
     (1997),
    paragraph two of the syllabus. “Preponderance of the evidence” means the greater
    weight of the evidence, or evidence that leads the trier of fact to find that the
    existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence. State v.
    Stumpf, 
    32 Ohio St.3d 95
    , 102, 
    512 N.E.2d 598
     (1987).
    {¶15} Five witnesses testified at the final hearing in this case.       Kathryn
    testified about the encounter with Appellant, the heated argument that ensued, and
    that she had been punched in the head by him resulting in her calls to the police and
    her parents. There is no dispute that paramedics arrived and took her to the hospital.
    Kathryn's parents did not see the attack, but their testimony confirms that she was
    crying and very upset after the incident, that she was holding her head when they
    arrived, and that she told them Appellant had punched her. Two witnesses testified
    that Kathryn is still suffering the side effects of a concussion from the incident.
    Appellant's own witness, Mandy Grimes, confirmed that a heated argument had
    taken place, although she did not personally witness the punch to the head. Michael
    Eckstein testified that there was a prior incident where Appellant was beating on the
    front door and acted like a “mad man.” Michael Eckstein also testified that he carries
    pepper spray with him because he is afraid of what Appellant might do. Appellant
    denied that he became angry at Kathryn or that a heated argument had taken place,
    but the court did not find him to be credible and discounted his testimony. The court
    particularly noted that Appellant displayed his violent temper during his testimony.
    -8-
    There is abundant evidence in the record to support the issuance of a DVCPO in this
    case.
    {¶16} Appellant takes issue with the fact that only Kathryn specifically testified
    about being punched and that none of the other witnesses saw it happen. This
    observation disregards the extensive circumstantial evidence that supports Kathryn's
    testimony, and circumstantial evidence has the same probative value as direct
    evidence.    State v. Treesh, 
    90 Ohio St.3d 460
    , 485, 
    739 N.E.2d 749
     (2001).
    Furthermore, “[t]he mere number of witnesses, who may support a claim of one or
    the other of the parties to an action, is not to be taken as a basis for resolving
    disputed facts. The degree of proof required is determined by the impression which
    the testimony of the witnesses makes upon the trier of facts, and the character of the
    testimony itself.” Cross v. Ledford, 
    161 Ohio St. 469
    , 477-478, 
    120 N.E.2d 118
    (1954).
    {¶17} Because there is competent credible evidence to support the trial
    court’s judgment granting a DVCPO, the judgment is affirmed.
    Vukovich, J., concurs.
    DeGenaro, J., concurs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11 CO 22

Citation Numbers: 2012 Ohio 4038

Judges: Waite

Filed Date: 8/27/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021