State v. Walker , 2014 Ohio 1827 ( 2014 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Walker, 2014-Ohio-1827.]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 99998
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    DAJHON WALKER
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART;
    REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-12-567946
    BEFORE: Kilbane, P.J., Blackmon, J., and Stewart, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 1, 2014
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Leif B. Christman
    1370 Ontario Street
    Suite 2000
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    Kerry A. Sowul
    Christopher D. Schroeder
    Assistant County Prosecutors
    The Justice Center - 9th Floor
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J.:
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant, DaJhon Walker (“Walker”), appeals from his
    aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, and having a weapon while under disability
    convictions.   For the reasons set forth below, we vacate his aggravated murder
    conviction and sentence, affirm his remaining convictions, and remand for resentencing.
    {¶2} In October 2012, Walker and codefendants, Otis Johnson (“Johnson”) and
    Derrell Shabazz (“Shabazz”), were charged in a ten-count indictment.1 Count 1 charged
    each of them with the aggravated murder of Antwon Shannon (“Shannon”) and carried a
    one- and three-year firearm specification.      Count 2 charged each of them with the
    murder of Shannon and carried a one- and three-year firearm specification.       Counts 3-5
    charged each of them with the felonious assault of Shannon, with Counts 3 and 5 carrying
    a one- and three-year firearm specification.     Count 6 charged each of them with the
    felonious assault of Ivor Anderson (“Anderson”). Counts 7 and 8 charged each of them
    with the felonious assault of Eunique Worley (“Worley”).         Count 9 charged Shabazz
    with having a weapon while under disability. Count 10 charged Walker with having a
    weapon while under disability.
    {¶3} The matter proceeded to a jury trial on February 13, 2013.           Defendants
    moved for a mistrial the next day. The trial court granted defendants’ motion based on
    1CodefendantShabazz has filed an appeal with this court in State v. Shabazz, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 100021.
    juror misconduct and rescheduled the trial for May 20, 2013.2 The following evidence
    was adduced at trial.
    {¶4} In the early morning hours of February 19, 2012, Shannon and Anderson
    were at the Tavo Martini Loft (“Tavo”) in Cleveland, Ohio.                The two men met up with
    Worley and her three friends, Marvella Grant, Ashley Nix, and Asia Rudolph.                          At
    approximately 1:30 a.m., an unknown male, later identified as Robert Steele (“Steele”),
    spilled champagne on Anderson while he and Shannon were on the dance floor. 3
    Anderson looked at the man and moved his hands up and down to gesture “in a sense like
    I don’t care.”       He told the man, “you’re doing too much.”            This was the only verbal
    exchange between Anderson and Steele.
    {¶5} After this incident, Anderson testified that he observed Steele walk over to
    two men, later identified as Shabazz and Johnson. He felt that they were plotting against
    him, so he continued to watch them for approximately ten minutes and then went about
    his business. Anderson told Shannon “to keep an eye out” because the group looked
    suspect.     Anderson then went over to Worley to have a conversation.                They spoke for
    approximately three minutes when Anderson heard someone yell out “yeah, nig***.”                    As
    he turned around, Steele struck Anderson in the head with a champagne bottle.                     Both
    men fell, where they tussled on the ground. Part of the bottle hit Worley in the head and
    2Count   10, the having a weapon while under disability charge, was bifurcated and tried to the
    bench.
    3Steele’s
    identity was unknown until the eighth day of trial.    Steele pled guilty to one count
    of felonious assault and was sentenced to two years in prison.
    she also fell to the ground.       At this point, an altercation ensued among Shannon,
    Anderson, Walker, Shabazz, Johnson, and other persons in the nightclub. Anderson was
    tackled by a female while he fought with Steele. Anderson was on the ground again
    when he heard a gunshot.
    {¶6} Tennison Malcolm (“Malcolm”), a medical school student, testified that he
    was at Tavo with some friends when he heard the gunshot.          He then ran into the
    bathroom. While he was in there, Shannon came into the bathroom looking confused.
    Malcolm asked him if he was okay and if he was shot. Shannon replied that he did not
    know. Malcolm asked him to lift up his shirt. Malcolm observed blood coming from
    Shannon’s chest. He put pressure on Shannon’s chest and called 911. At one point,
    Shannon became unresponsive so Malcolm started chest compressions.      The ambulance
    arrived shortly thereafter.
    {¶7} Meanwhile, Anderson was still on the ground grabbing the female on top of
    him. A few minutes later, Johnson picked the female up off Anderson and then he
    exited the nightclub.    Anderson later told police that the gunshot came from the area
    near the exit door.           Upon exiting the building, Anderson waited outside for
    approximately five minutes looking for Shannon. He did not see Shannon so he went
    back inside the nightclub. Tavo’s security guards escorted him back outside.
    {¶8} While he was outside, two women approached him, one of which was the
    woman who attacked him in the nightclub. To avoid them, he went back into Tavo and
    checked on Worley.      He escorted Worley to her car, and as he walked to his car he
    noticed that Shannon’s car was still in the parking lot. At that point, he determined that
    Shannon was the individual who got shot in the nightclub. Anderson then went to the
    Metro Health Hospital where he learned that Shannon had died.
    {¶9} The incident was captured by surveillance video, which the jury was able
    view.   The video shows Walker speaking with Johnson, Shabazz, and Steele after he
    spilled champagne on Anderson. The video also shows Steele dancing with a bottle in
    his hand and Johnson walking around with a bottle in his hand. The four men are
    standing by Anderson and Shannon. Steele strikes Anderson with the object in his hand
    and the fight begins. Anderson is fighting with Steele and then is tackled by a female
    who knocks him to the dance floor. Shannon is seen pulling a female back from the
    fight. Walker is seen punching Shannon and also hitting him with a bottle. The video
    then shows Walker pull an object out of his waistband and walk behind a pillar that is
    right next to the dance floor. At the same time, the fight continues on the dance floor
    and Shannon is trying to break up the fight by removing one of the females off of
    Anderson.    The fight then spills over to the area next to the dance floor and the pillar
    where Walker walked behind. Shannon is seen bending forward, with his back in the
    direction of where Walker went behind the pillar. The video then shows two flashes —
    one small flash in front of Shannon, similar to one that would come from a cell phone
    camera, and a large flash directly behind Shannon, which was the gunshot.      Within less
    than a second, the video shows particulate matter falling in front of the camera.   Walker
    can then be observed running from behind the other side of the pillar and across the dance
    floor toward an exit door.     Shabazz was on the dance floor.    He met up with Walker
    and they exited the nightclub together. As Walker was running, the video shows him
    fumbling with his waistband.
    {¶10} At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Walker guilty of aggravated
    murder (Count 1), murder (Count 2), the felonious assault of Shannon (Counts 3-5), and
    the felonious assault of Anderson (Count 6). The jury found him not guilty of the
    felonious assault of Worley (Counts 7-8). The trial court found him guilty of having a
    weapon while under disability.     The trial court sentenced Walker to life in prison, with
    the possibility of parole after serving 20 years, on the aggravated murder charge.     The
    trial court merged the murder and felonious assault charges (Counts 2-5) with the
    aggravated murder for purposes of sentencing.      The court also merged all the firearm
    specifications into one three-year specification to be served prior and consecutive to the
    aggravated murder charge.      The trial court sentenced him to two years in prison on the
    remaining felonious assault charge (Count 6) and nine months in prison on the having a
    weapon while under disability (Count 10). The court ordered that Counts 1 and 10 be
    served concurrently and Count 6 be served consecutively to Counts 1 and 10.
    {¶11} Walker now appeals, with his appellate counsel raising ten assignments of
    error for review.    Walker filed a pro se supplemental brief in which he raises an
    additional assignment of error. The assignments of error will be discussed together,
    where appropriate.
    Assignment of Error One
    There was insufficient evidence to support a finding of prior calculation and
    design.
    Assignment of Error Two
    There was insufficient evidence that Walker fired the shot.
    Assignment of Error Three
    There was insufficient evidence to convict Walker of felonious assault.
    Assignment of Error Four
    There was insufficient evidence that Walker possessed a firearm.
    Assignment of Error Five
    The verdict finding prior calculation and design was against the manifest
    weight of the evidence.
    Assignment of Error Six
    It was against the manifest weight of the evidence to conclude Walker was
    the shooter.
    Assignment of Error Seven
    The verdict of felonious assault was against the manifest weight of the
    evidence.
    Assignment of Error Eight
    The court finding that Walker possessed a firearm was against the manifest
    weight of the evidence.
    Assignment of Error Nine
    It was prejudicial error to give a jury instruction on complicity based upon
    the evidence presented.
    Assignment of Error Ten
    It was prejudicial error to give jury instruction on flight based upon the
    evidence presented.
    Pro Se Supplemental Assignment of Error One
    Did * * * trial counsel prejudice appellant causing [a] guilty outcome
    verdict[,] due to the ineffective assistance of counsel [by failing] to
    successfully challenge [the] state[’s] expert witness[.]
    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    {¶12} In the first, second, third, and fourth assignments of error, Walker
    challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to his aggravated murder, murder,
    and felonious assault convictions.
    {¶13} The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Diar, 
    120 Ohio St. 3d 460
    ,
    2008-Ohio-6266, 
    900 N.E.2d 565
    , ¶ 113, explained the standard for sufficiency of the
    evidence as follows:
    Raising the question of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support
    the jury verdict as a matter of law invokes a due process concern. State v.
    Thompkins (1997), 
    78 Ohio St. 3d 380
    , 386, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    . In reviewing
    such a challenge, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the
    evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
    fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks (1991), 
    61 Ohio St. 3d 259
    , 
    574 N.E.2d 492
    , paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia (1979),
    
    443 U.S. 307
    , 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 
    61 L. Ed. 2d 560
    .
    Aggravated Murder and Murder
    {¶14} In the instant case, Walker was convicted of the aggravated murder of
    Shannon under R.C. 2903.01(A), which provides that “[n]o person shall purposely, and
    with prior calculation and design, cause the death of another[.]” Walker argues the state
    failed to prove that the shooting was the result of prior calculation and design. He
    maintains that the shooting was a spur-of-the-moment act. He further argues there was
    no reliable evidence that anyone attempted to purposefully cause Shannon’s death.
    {¶15} In State v. Cassano, 
    96 Ohio St. 3d 94
    , 2002-Ohio-3751, 
    772 N.E.2d 81
    , ¶
    79, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that there is no bright-line rule to determine whether a
    defendant acted with prior calculation and design. The Cassano court acknowledged that
    “‘prior calculation and design’ is a more stringent element than the ‘deliberate and
    premeditated malice’ * * * required under prior law.” 
    Id., quoting State
    v. Cotton, 
    56 Ohio St. 2d 8
    , 
    381 N.E.2d 190
    (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus. Specifically, prior
    calculation and design requires “‘a scheme designed to implement the calculated decision
    to kill.’” State v. D’Ambrosio, 
    67 Ohio St. 3d 185
    , 196, 
    616 N.E.2d 909
    (1993), quoting
    Cotton at 11. Walker claims there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of prior
    calculation and design.   We agree.
    {¶16} The Ohio Revised Code does not define the phrase “prior calculation and
    design,” but the Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase to require evidence of
    “more than the few moments of deliberation permitted in common law interpretations of
    the former murder statute, and to require a scheme designed to implement the calculated
    decision to kill.” Cotton at 11.   While “‘[n]either the degree of care nor the length of
    time the offender takes to ponder the crime beforehand are critical factors in themselves,
    * * * ‘momentary deliberation’ is insufficient.’” D’Ambrosio at 196, quoting the 1973
    Legislative Service Commission Comment to R.C. 2903.01.               According to the
    committee comment, “the phrase ‘prior calculation and design’ [was employed] to
    indicate studied care in planning or analyzing the means of the crime as well as a scheme
    encompassing the death of the victim.” See also State v. Taylor, 
    78 Ohio St. 3d 15
    ,
    1997-Ohio-243, 
    676 N.E.2d 82
    .
    {¶17} The existence of prior calculation and design is determined on a
    case-by-case analysis of the facts and evidence.     State v. Jones, 
    91 Ohio St. 3d 335
    , 345,
    2001-Ohio-57, 
    744 N.E.2d 1163
    . Although there is no bright-line rule for determining
    prior calculation and design, the Ohio Supreme Court has found the following factors
    pertinent to determining the existence of prior calculation and design: “(1) Did the
    accused and victim know each other, and if so, was that relationship strained? (2) Did
    the accused give thought or preparation to choosing the murder weapon or murder site?
    and (3) Was the act drawn out or ‘an almost spontaneous eruption of events’?” Taylor at
    19, quoting State v. Jenkins, 
    48 Ohio App. 2d 99
    , 
    255 N.E.2d 825
    (8th Dist.1976).
    “These factors must be considered and weighed together and viewed under the totality of
    all circumstances of the homicide.” Jenkins at 102.
    {¶18} In the instant case, when considering these factors and the totality of the
    circumstances, we find that, even construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
    state, there is insufficient evidence of prior calculation and design.   As to the first factor,
    there is no evidence in the record that Walker knew Shannon, let alone had a strained
    relationship with him.      With respect to the second factor, the evidence fails to
    demonstrate that Walker gave thought in choosing the murder site. The state did not
    have any eyewitness testimony to the shooting, so it relied on the surveillance video to
    present its case. The surveillance video shows Anderson and others fighting on the
    dance floor. Shannon gets caught in the fight while he is trying to break it up. Walker
    walks behind a pillar, which is next to the dance floor. The video then shows the fight
    spilling over to the area by the pillar Walker went behind. The fight could have just as
    easily spilled over into the other direction. Thus, Walker did not choose the murder site
    or pursue Shannon. Rather, the video shows that the murder site came to him instead.
    {¶19} With respect to the third factor, we find that Walker’s actions were the result
    of an almost spontaneous eruption of events.     The evidence demonstrates that after the
    fight erupted, a group of people were tussling on the dance floor.          The fight then
    happens to spill over to the area by the pillar where Walker was observed walking behind.
    Shannon is seen bent forward and one gunshot is fired at his back. The video fails to
    demonstrate that “the act was drawn out.” Rather, the video shows the entire sequence
    of events, which happened within minutes, as a chaotic situation that spiraled out of
    control.
    {¶20} The state argues that because Steele spoke with Walker, Shabazz, and
    Johnson after he spilled champagne on Anderson, there was evidence of prior calculation
    and design. However, there is no audio of what these males were discussing, let alone
    audio of a plan to murder Shannon. The fact that Walker was speaking with the group
    that he came to the nightclub with does not indicate that he planned to kill Shannon. It
    is not unusual for a group to stand together and converse while at a nightclub.
    {¶21} Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to
    demonstrate that Walker planned a scheme to implement a calculated decision to kill.
    Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the act was the result of the sudden eruption of
    Anderson’s fight. Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence to support Walker’s
    conviction for aggravated murder.    There was, however, sufficient evidence that Walker
    committed murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02, which provides that “[n]o person shall
    purposefully cause the death of another[.]”    An individual acts purposefully when “it is
    his specific intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a
    prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to
    accomplish thereby, it is his intention to engage in conduct of that nature.”          R.C.
    2901.22(A).
    {¶22} Walker argues there is no evidence that he fired the shot or that he had a
    gun. While there was no eyewitness testimony identifying Walker as the shooter, such
    evidence is not required in order to sustain a conviction. State v. Lopez, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 94312, 2011-Ohio-182, ¶ 62, citing Jenks.       The surveillance video shows
    Walker pull an object out of his waistband during the fight and walk behind a pillar that is
    right next to the dance floor.   The fight then spills over to the area next to the pillar
    where Walker was standing. Shannon is seen bending forward, with his back to where
    Walker was standing. The video then shows a large flash, which was the gunshot that
    killed Shannon. Within seconds, Walker is the first person who can be observed running
    from behind the other side of the pillar and across the dance floor toward an exit door.
    As Walker was running, the video shows him fumbling with his waistband. When
    viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the state, we find sufficient evidence to
    support Walker’s murder conviction.
    {¶23} Accordingly, Walker’s aggravated murder conviction is vacated and his
    murder conviction is affirmed. The first assignment of error is sustained and the second
    and fourth assignments of error are overruled.
    Felonious Assault
    {¶24} In the third assignment of error, Walker challenges the sufficiency of his
    felonious assault convictions. Walker was convicted of four counts of felonious assault
    in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (A)(2). The indictment lists Shannon as the
    victim in three counts and Anderson as the victim in the remaining count.              R.C.
    2903.11(A)(1) and (A)(2) provide in pertinent part:
    (A) No person shall knowingly do either of the following:
    (1) Cause serious physical harm to another * * *;
    (2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another * * * by means of a
    deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance.
    {¶25} He argues that the convictions were “presumably based on a complicity
    theory based upon the lack of any actual assault by Walker.”     However, the surveillance
    video clearly shows Walker punching Shannon and also hitting him with a bottle before
    he shot Shannon. The video further shows Anderson getting hit in the head with a bottle
    by Steele.   Steele, Johnson, Shabazz, and Walker all participated in the fight.     Under
    R.C. 2923.03(F), an accomplice to a crime is subject to the same prosecution and
    punishment as the principal offender.     The trial court, in the instant case, instructed the
    jury on complicity. Based on the foregoing, when viewing this evidence in a light most
    favorable to the state, we find sufficient evidence to sustain Walker’s felonious assault
    convictions.
    {¶26} Therefore, the third assignment of error is overruled.
    Manifest Weight of the Evidence
    {¶27} In the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth assignments of error, Walker contends
    that his convictions for aggravated murder, murder, and felonious assault are against the
    manifest weight of the evidence.        However, in light of our resolution of the first
    assignment of error, we will consider Walker’s arguments as they relate to his convictions
    for murder and felonious assault.
    {¶28} In contrast to a sufficiency argument, a manifest weight challenge questions
    whether the state met its burden of persuasion. State v. Bowden, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    92266, 2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 13, citing 
    Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d at 390
    , 1997-Ohio-52,
    
    678 N.E.2d 541
    . The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Wilson, 
    113 Ohio St. 3d 382
    ,
    2007-Ohio-2202, 
    865 N.E.2d 1264
    , ¶ 25, has stated:
    [T]he reviewing court asks whose evidence is more persuasive — the
    state’s or the defendant’s? * * * “When a court of appeals reverses a
    judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of
    the evidence, the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees
    with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” [Thompkins
    at 387], citing Tibbs v. Florida (1982), 
    457 U.S. 31
    , 42, 
    102 S. Ct. 2211
    , 
    72 L. Ed. 2d 652
    .
    {¶29} Moreover, an appellate court may not merely substitute its view for that of
    the jury, but must find that “‘in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its
    way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
    reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio
    App.3d 172, 
    485 N.E.2d 717
    (1st Dist.1983). Accordingly, reversal on manifest weight
    grounds is reserved for “‘the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily
    against the conviction.’” 
    Id., quoting Martin.
    {¶30} Walker argues that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the
    evidence because the video shows Walker and his group being patted down for weapons
    before they entered Tavo. The video also shows other patrons who were not searched
    before entering the bar. Therefore, he contends that it is highly probable that someone
    else brought the gun into Tavo.
    {¶31} Despite Walker’s arguments, this is not the exceptional case where the
    evidence weighs heavily against his convictions. The video of the patdown does not
    override Walker’s actions during the fight. As discussed above, the video shows Walker
    punching Shannon and also hitting him with a bottle. The video then shows Walker pull
    an object out of his waistband and walk behind a pillar that is right next to the dance
    floor.    The fight spills over to the area next to the dance floor and the pillar where
    Walker was standing. Shannon is bent forward, with his back to where Walker was
    standing.    There is a large flash, which was the gunshot.      Walker then is seen running
    from behind the other side of the pillar and across the dance floor toward an exit door.
    As Walker was running, the video shows him fumbling with his waistband.
    {¶32} Based on this evidence, we cannot say the jury clearly “lost its way” and
    created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that Walker’s murder and felonious assault
    convictions must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
    {¶33} Therefore, the fifth assignment of error is moot and the sixth, seventh, and
    eighth assignments of error are overruled.
    Jury Instructions
    {¶34} In the ninth and tenth assignments of error, Walker challenges the trial
    court’s jury instructions on complicity and flight. “When reviewing a trial court’s jury
    instructions, the proper standard of review for an appellate court is whether the trial
    court’s issuance of the instruction constituted an abuse of discretion under the facts and
    circumstances of the case.”        State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90845,
    2009-Ohio-2026, ¶ 50, citing State v. Wolons, 
    44 Ohio St. 3d 64
    , 
    541 N.E.2d 443
    (1989).
    Jury instructions are reviewed in their entirety to determine if they contain prejudicial
    error.    State v. Fields, 
    13 Ohio App. 3d 433
    , 436, 
    469 N.E.2d 939
    (8th Dist.1984.)
    {¶35} Walker first argues that the trial court should not have given an instruction
    on complicity because the evidence did not support it.    He contends there is no evidence
    that he conspired with Steele, Shabazz, and Johnson, and he did not have a gun, nor did
    he shoot the gun.
    {¶36} In the instant case, the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to warrant an
    instruction on complicity. Specifically, the video shows Steele, Shabazz, Walker, and
    Johnson all participating in the fight, attacking Shannon and Anderson. This testimony
    was sufficient for the trial court to properly exercise its discretion and give a complicity
    instruction.
    {¶37} Walker next argues the flight instruction was unwarranted because it was a
    natural reaction for people to run out of a bar after a gunshot.
    {¶38} In the instant case, the trial court instructed the jury that:
    Testimony has been admitted indicating that the defendants fled the scene.
    You are instructed that the fact that any one or both of the defendants fled
    the scene does not raise presumption of guilt but it may tend to indicate the
    defendant’s consciousness or awareness of guilt.
    If you find that the facts do not support that any one or both of the
    defendants fled the scene, or if you find that some other motive prompted
    any one or both of the defendant[s’] conduct, or if you are unable to decide
    what any one or both of the defendant[s’] motivation was, then you should
    not consider this evidence for any purpose. However, if you find that the
    facts support that any one or both of the defendants engaged in such
    conduct and if you decide that any one or both of the defendants was
    motivated by a consciousness or an awareness of guilt, you may, but are not
    required to, consider that evidence in deciding whether any one or both of
    the defendants is guilty of the crime charged. You alone will determine
    what weight if any to give to this evidence.
    {¶39} In Taylor, the Ohio Supreme Court held that evidence of flight is admissible
    to show consciousness of guilt.        
    Id., 78 Ohio St.3d
    at 27, 1997-Ohio-243, 
    676 N.E.2d 82
    .     This court has previously defined flight as “some escape or affirmative attempt to
    avoid apprehension.” State v. Wesley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80684, 2002-Ohio-4429,
    ¶ 19.    It has long been recognized that it is not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to
    provide a jury instruction on flight if there is sufficient evidence presented at trial to
    support that the defendant attempted to avoid apprehension.         State v. Kilpatrick, 8th
    Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92137, 2009-Ohio-5555, ¶ 16, citing State v. Benjamin, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 80654, 2003-Ohio-281.
    {¶40} In the instant case, the trial court instructed the jury that it may consider
    Walker’s flight from Tavo after shooting Shannon as consciousness of guilt but that
    “flight does not in and of itself raise the presumption of guilt.”            Therefore, the
    instruction correctly advised the jury not to consider evidence of Walker’s departure from
    the scene if they find that it was not motivated by consciousness of guilt. Because the
    trial court must presume that the jury followed that instruction, we cannot say that the trial
    court abused its discretion.        State v. Hamilton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86520,
    2006-Ohio-1943, ¶ 39, discretionary appeal not allowed, 
    111 Ohio St. 3d 1416
    ,
    2006-Ohio-5083, 
    854 N.E.2d 1094
    .
    {¶41} Therefore, the ninth and tenth assignments of error are overruled.
    Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    {¶42} In Walker’s pro se supplemental assignment of error, he argues that he
    received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to challenge the state’s
    expert witness on ballistics.
    {¶43} In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Walker
    must demonstrate that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient or unreasonable under the
    circumstances; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687, 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
    , 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    (1984). In Ohio, an
    attorney properly licensed is presumed competent. State v. Lott, 
    51 Ohio St. 3d 160
    , 174,
    
    555 N.E.2d 293
    (1990). The defendant has the burden of proof and must overcome the
    strong presumption that counsel’s performance was adequate or that counsel’s action
    might be sound trial strategy. State v. Smith, 
    17 Ohio St. 3d 98
    , 100, 
    477 N.E.2d 1128
    (1985).
    {¶44} Walker argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing “to request a
    suppression hearing” on the state’s second ballistic expert witness’s evidence regarding
    the gun shell casing found at Tavo. We disagree.
    {¶45} In the instant case, two detectives and a forensic scientist testified that they
    observed a spent bullet and a large casing at the crime scene.     The state admitted into
    evidence pictures of both a spent bullet and a large casing.      To establish ineffective
    assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion to suppress, the defendant must prove
    that there was a basis to suppress the evidence in question.    State v. Adams, 103 Ohio
    St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 
    817 N.E.2d 29
    , ¶ 35. Here, there was no basis to suppress
    the evidence in question.
    {¶46} Therefore, Walker’s pro se supplemental assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶47} Accordingly, we vacate his aggravated murder conviction and sentence,
    affirm his remaining convictions, and remand the matter for resentencing.
    It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
    been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, PRESIDING JUDGE
    PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., and
    MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR