Frank Novak & Sons, Inc. v. A-Team, L.L.C. , 2014 Ohio 1730 ( 2014 )

[Cite as Frank Novak & Sons, Inc. v. A-Team, L.L.C., 2014-Ohio-1730.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 100393
FRANK NOVAK & SONS, INC.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
A-TEAM, L.L.C., D.B.A. SERVICEMASTER
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Civil Appeal from the
Berea Municipal Court
Case No. 13 CVF 01074
BEFORE: E.A. Gallagher, J., Keough, P.J., and McCormack, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 24, 2014
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Kevin J. Kelley
Porter Wright Morris & Arthur
925 Euclid Avenue
Suite 1700
Cleveland, Ohio 44115
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Keith R. Kraus
Grant J. Keating
Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A.
60 South Park Place
Painesville, Ohio 44077
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, A-Team L.L.C., appeals the denial of its motion to
dismiss by the Berea Municipal Court. For the following reasons, we reverse and
remand.
{¶2} On March 18, 2013, a judgment was rendered by the Cuyahoga County
Court of Common Pleas in favor of plaintiff-appellee Frank Novak & Sons, Inc. and
against A-Team L.L.C. in the amount of $37,158.82, plus costs of $497. The certified
judgment was transferred to Berea Municipal Court on May 13, 2013. Frank Novak &
Sons, Inc. filed a praecipe for levy seeking execution on all equipment, fixtures,
furnishings, antiques, inventory, cash and three motor vehicles located at A-Team
L.L.C.’s place of business. The municipal court held an exemption hearing on July 24,
2013, and issued a magistrate’s finding that A-Team L.L.C. was not entitled to any
exemptions and that Frank Novak & Sons, Inc. was to proceed with levy according to
law. On August 5, 2013, A-Team L.L.C. filed a motion to dismiss the case and stay the
magistrate’s finding on the grounds that Berea Municipal Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to proceed with the action.1 The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on
August 8, 2013, and A-Team L.L.C. appeals presenting the following sole assignment of
error:
A-Team L.L.C. also filed an objection to the magistrate’s finding on the same grounds.
1
The Berea Municipal Court erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss
as the Berea Municipal Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this
matter.
{¶3} We review a trial court’s decision on a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under a de novo standard of review. Bank of Am.
v. Macho, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96124, 2011-Ohio-5495, ¶ 7, citing Crestmont
Cleveland Partnership v. Ohio Dept. of Health, 139 Ohio App.3d 928, 936, 746 N.E.2d
222 (10th Dist.2000).
{¶4} A municipal court’s monetary jurisdiction is statutorily defined in R.C.
1901.17, which provides in relevant part:
A municipal court shall have original jurisdiction only in those cases in
which the amount claimed by any party, or the appraised value of the
personal property sought to be recovered, does not exceed fifteen thousand
dollars, except that this limit does not apply to the housing division or
environmental division of a municipal court.
{¶5} In regards specifically to the collection of judgments, R.C. 1901.18(A)(5)
provides that “subject to the monetary jurisdiction of municipal courts set forth in section
1901.17 of the Revised Code,” a municipal court has original jurisdiction “[i]n any
action or proceeding to enforce collection of * * * judgments rendered by any court
within the territory to which the municipal court has succeeded * * *.”
{¶6} The question of whether R.C. 1901.17 denies a municipal court jurisdiction
to order execution on a certified judgment that exceeds fifteen thousand dollars has been
answered in the negative by at least three other districts. In a situation analogous to this
case, the First District Court of Appeals held that “[a] municipal court has the power to
enforce a certified judgment of a common pleas court only in instances where the
judgment certified or transferred does not exceed the municipal court’s monetary
jurisdiction as set forth in R.C. 1901.17.” Bowling v. Stafford & Stafford Co., L.P.A.,
1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-070606 and C-070648, 2008-Ohio-3768, ¶ 7.
{¶7} Similarly, the Second District analyzed the issue in great detail in Aselage
v. Lithoprint Ltd., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23527, 2009-Ohio-7036. The Aselage court
noted that R.C. 2329.02 allows for any judgment issued in a court of record to be
transferred to any other court of record and for proceedings for collection to be had on
such judgment the same as if it had been issued by the transferee court. Aselage further
noted that R.C. 1901.17 and 2329.02 were both adopted in the same legislative bill in
1953. Id. at ¶ 21. The Aselage court found that R.C. 1901.17 is a “special provision,”
being limited to the municipal courts, while R.C. 2329.02 being applicable to all courts
of record, is a “general provision.” Id. at ¶ 21. The Second District concluded that
R.C. 2329.02 contains no manifest intent that it prevail over R.C. 1901.17. Therefore,
to the extent that both sections may apply to the issue concerned and in that respect
present an irreconcilable conflict, R.C. 1901.17, the more specific provision prevails
over the more general pursuant to R.C. 1.51. Id. at ¶ 21; see also Transamerica
Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-America Marine, Inc., 11th Dist. Ashtabula No.
92-A-1720, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3583 (July 16, 1993) (holding that R.C. 2390.02
confers upon municipal courts the power in aid of execution proceedings to issue all
necessary orders for the benefit of judgment creditors as well as the power to receive
transfer of judgments for these purposes from other courts of record, but only in those
instances where the judgment transferred does not exceed the monetary jurisdiction of
R.C. 1901.17).
{¶8} We agree with the above authority and find that the Berea Municipal Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the certified judgment in this instance.
{¶9} The judgment of the Berea Municipal Court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the Berea Municipal Court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and
TIM McCORMACK, J., CONCUR