Moore v. Cleveland , 2014 Ohio 1426 ( 2014 )

[Cite as Moore v. Cleveland, 2014-Ohio-1426.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 100069
JOANNE MOORE, ET AL.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
CITY OF CLEVELAND, ET AL.
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case Nos. CV-10-743088 and CV-11-764319
BEFORE: Jones, P.J., S. Gallagher, J., and Blackmon, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 3, 2014
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
For Joanne Moore
Christine M. LaSalvia
Jeffrey H. Friedman
Friedman, Domiano & Smith
55 Public Square
Suite 1055
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
Terry H. Gilbert
Friedman & Gilbert Attorneys at Law
55 Public Square
Suite 1055
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
For Latundra Billups
Blake A. Dickson
Jacqueline M. Mathews
Mark D. Tolles, II
The Dickson Firm, L.L.C.
Enterprise Place, Suite 420
3401 Enterprise Parkway
Beachwood, Ohio 44122
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Barbara A. Langhenry
City of Cleveland Director of Law
BY: Awatef Assad
Assistant Law Director
Thomas J. Kaiser
Chief Trial Counsel
601 Lakeside Avenue
Room 106
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J.:
{¶1} The plaintiffs-appellants are as follows: Joanne Moore, individually and as the
administrator of the estate of Janice Webb; Bobbie Lee Dancy, individually and as the
administrator of the estate of Amelda Hunter; Dorothy Pollard, individually and as the
administrator of the estate of Diane Turner; Debra Williams, individually and as the
administrator of the estate of Telacia Fortson; Kyana Hunt, individually and as the
administrator of the estate of Nancy Cobbs; Jim Allen, individually and as the
administrator of the estate of Le-Shanda Long; Mary Mason, individually and as the
administrator of the estate of Michelle Mason, Yvonne Williams-McNeill, individually
and as the administrator of the estate of Tishana Culver; and Latundra Billups.1 They
appeal the trial court’s decision granting defendant-appellee’s, Lorraine Coyne, motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
{¶2} We affirm.
I. Background Facts
{¶3} In 2010 and 2011, the above-named plaintiffs and three additional plaintiffs
(see fn. 1) filed suit in five separate trial court cases against numerous defendants,
Three additional plaintiffs are not named in the notice of appeal and, therefore, are not parties
1
to this appeal: Florence Bray, named individually and as the administrator of the estate of Crystal
Dozier; Donald Smith, named individually and as the administrator of the estate of Kim Smith; and
Gladys Wade.
including the city of Cleveland, the former Cuyahoga County Board of Commissioners,
the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Department, various members of the Cleveland police
department and the City of Cleveland assistant prosecuting attorney Lorraine Coyne. The
trial court consolidated the cases.
{¶4} The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to properly investigate
Anthony Sowell, who, in 2009, was arrested and indicted on 85 counts of murder,
kidnapping, rape, and abuse of a corpse after a search at his house and property revealed
the remains of 11 women. Sowell was convicted of 81 counts and sentenced to death.
State v. Sowell, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-09-530885. He is currently appealing his
conviction and death sentence. See State v. Sowell, 133 Ohio St.3d 1509,
2012-Ohio-5921, 979 N.E.2d 354 (motion and procedural ruling).
{¶5} The plaintiffs alleged, in part, that the defendants were the proximate cause of
death or injury by Sowell because the defendants released him from jail after he was
arrested for rape and assault on December 8, 2008, even though the defendants had more
than sufficient evidence of probable cause to hold and charge him. It was after this
release that many of the women went missing and were murdered by Sowell.
{¶6} The plaintiffs further alleged that on December 8, 2008, a bleeding woman ran
up to a police car and told the police that Sowell had punched and choked her, tried to rip
her clothes off, and kill her. The police arrested Sowell. Two days later, on December
10, members of the Cleveland police met with assistant prosecutor Coyne and they
reviewed the case. Coyne decided there was insufficient evidence to file charges against
Sowell. Sowell was then released from jail. According to the complaints, the
defendants claimed there were no visible signs of injuries to the victim “despite witnesses
seeing her bleeding, and the medical release forms signed by the victim to confirm medical
treatment.”
{¶7} In April and September of 2009, two other women claimed to have been raped
and assaulted by Sowell. In October 2009, Sowell was arrested after witnesses saw a
naked woman falling from a window at his home. It was at this time that a search of the
house and property was conducted, and the bodies of 11 women were found.
{¶8} The plaintiffs represented 10 of the 11 estates of the deceased women as well
as two of the surviving women who had accused Sowell of assaulting them.
{¶9} In response to the complaints, Coyne filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, arguing that she was immune from liability because she was acting in her
position as a prosecutor when she made the decision not to charge Sowell in December
2008. The plaintiffs opposed the motion.
{¶10} The trial court issued a written opinion granting Coyne’s motion, finding that
she was entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability related to her alleged failure to
investigate or prosecute Sowell as a result of the 2008 incident. The trial court dismissed
all claims against Coyne with prejudice.
{¶11} The remaining defendants moved the trial court to stay the case pending the
outcome of the plaintiffs’ appeal; the court granted defendants’ motion.
{¶12} The plaintiffs-appellants raise one assignment of error for our review:
I. The trial court erred in granting defendant Lorraine Coyne’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings * * * because plaintiffs pled a set of facts in their
respective complaints that, if proven, would entitle them to relief and
abrogate defendant Lorraine Coyne’s qualified immunity, relative to the
performance of her investigative and administrative duties.
II. Law and Analysis
Standard of Review
{¶13} A motion for judgment on the pleadings presents only questions of law,
which this court reviews de novo. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79,
2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 5; Dearth v. Stanley, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22180,
2008-Ohio-487, ¶ 24. Determination of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is
restricted solely to the allegations in the pleadings and any writings attached to the
complaint. Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 165, 297 N.E.2d 113 (1973).
Dismissal is appropriate under Civ.R. 12(C) when, after construing all material allegations
in the complaint, along with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in favor of the
nonmoving party, the court finds that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its
claim that would entitle it to relief. State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75
Ohio St.3d 565, 570, 664 N.E.2d 931 (1996).
Statutory Immunity
{¶14} R.C. 2744.03(A)(7) provides as follows:
The political subdivision, and an employee who is a county prosecuting
attorney, city director of law, village solicitor, or similar chief legal officer
of a political subdivision, an assistant of any such person, or a judge of a
court of this state is entitled to any defense or immunity available at common
law or established by the Revised Code.
{¶15} R.C. 2744.03(A)(6), provides that, in addition to any immunity or defense
referred to in R.C. 2744.03(A)(7), an employee, as defined in R.C. 2744.01(B), is immune
from liability unless one of the following applies:
(a) The employee’s acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of
the employee’s employment or official responsibilities; (b) The employee’s
acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton
or reckless manner; [or] (c) Civil liability is expressly imposed upon the
employee by a section of the Revised Code.
{¶16} The plaintiffs’ complaints alleged that Coyne was an assistant city prosecutor
at the time of Sowell’s December 2008 arrest; therefore, R.C. 2744.03(A)(7) would apply.
The next step is to determine whether any defense or immunity available at common law
is applicable.
Common Law Immunity
{¶17} The United States Supreme Court has held that prosecutors are considered
“quasi-judicial officers” entitled to the absolute immunity granted to judges when their
activities are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). The
Imbler Court held that a prosecutor has absolute immunity “in initiating a prosecution and
in presenting the State’s case.” Id. at 431. But absolute immunity does not always
extend to a prosecutor engaged in “essentially investigative or administrative functions.”
Willitzer v. McCloud, 6 Ohio St.3d 447, 449, 453 N.E.2d 693 (1983).
{¶18} To determine whether absolute immunity attaches to a particular
prosecutorial activity, the Imbler Court adopted a “functional analysis.” Imbler at 430.
This approach requires a court to examine “the nature of the function performed, not the
identity of the actor who performed it.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229, 108 S.Ct.
538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988). The Supreme Court has recognized that the duties of the
prosecutor in his or her role “as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the
initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom.” Imbler at 431, fn. 33.
Thus, “[i]mmunity extends to ‘the preparation necessary to present a case,’ and this
includes the ‘obtaining, reviewing, and evaluation of evidence.’” Id. In order for
absolute immunity to attach to a prosecutor’s administrative or investigative acts, such
must be necessary for the “initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings.”
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993).
{¶19} If a court finds that a prosecutor’s actions are not covered by absolute
immunity, then the prosecutor may be entitled to qualified immunity. By way of
example, the United States Supreme Court held that a prosecutor was entitled to absolute
immunity for his testimony at a probable cause hearing but not for giving legal advice to
the police regarding the use of hypnosis as an investigative technique and the existence of
probable cause to arrest. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 496, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d
547 (1991). The prosecutor had told police that they could question the suspect under
hypnosis and after the questioning had been completed, that they “probably” had probable
cause to arrest her. The Court reasoned:
[T]he qualified immunity standard is today more protective of officials than
it was at the time that Imbler was decided. “As the qualified immunity
defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” * * * The [argument]
that giving legal advice is related to a prosecutor’s role in screening cases for
prosecution and in safeguarding the fairness of the criminal judicial process
* * * proves too much. Almost any action by a prosecutor, including his or
her direct participation in purely investigative activity, could be said to be in
some way related to the ultimate decision whether to prosecute, but we have
never indicated that absolute immunity is that expansive. * * * [T]he judicial
process, will not necessarily restrain out-of-court activities by a prosecutor
that occur prior to the initiation of a prosecution, such as providing legal
advice to the police. This is particularly true if a suspect is not eventually
prosecuted. * * * We do not believe [that] advising the police in the
investigative phase of a criminal case is so “intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process,” that it qualifies for absolute
immunity.
(Internal citations omitted). Id. at 493, 494-496.
{¶20} The United States Supreme Court has also pointed out the difference that the
police and prosecutors often take in criminal investigations. In Buckley, 509 U.S. 259,
273, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 125 L. Ed. 2d 209, the Court stated with respect to investigative acts
such as interviewing witnesses:
There is a difference between the advocate’s role in evaluating evidence and
interviewing witnesses as he prepares for trial, on the one hand, and the
detective’s role in searching for the clues and corroboration that might give
him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested, on the other
hand. When a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally
performed by a detective or police officer, it is neither appropriate nor
justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the
other.
Id. (quotation omitted). The Buckley Court held that the prosecutors were therefore only
entitled to qualified immunity for allegedly conspiring to fabricate evidence during the
preliminary investigation of a crime, and for making false statements at a press conference.
Id. at 275, 277.
Appellants’ Claim
{¶21} The appellants argue that Coyne’s failure to conduct a proper preliminary
investigation of the December 8, 2008 incident did not constitute an advocatory function;
therefore, she should not be entitled to absolute immunity for her failure to conduct said
investigation. Specifically, the appellants claim that their complaint “suggests”: (1)
having been made aware of the allegations against Sowell, Coyne failed to conduct any
reasonable investigation by failing to verify and analyze physical evidence, interview
witnesses, or consider Sowell’s past convictions and status as a sex offender; (2) Coyne
prematurely ended the investigation without considering physical evidence, following up
with witnesses, interviewing the victim, or evaluating Sowell’s criminal history; and (3)
Coyne advised the police to release Sowell despite the evidence against him and his
criminal history. Thus, appellants argue, Coyne failed in regard to three non-advocatory
functions.
{¶22} The appellants further argue that Coyne is not entitled to qualified immunity
because her actions, or lack thereof, were done with malicious purpose, in bad faith, and/or
in a wanton or reckless manner. As will be explained in further detail below, however,
we need not consider whether Coyne is entitled to qualified immunity. Once absolute
immunity has been established under R.C. 2744.03(A)(7), it cannot be defeated by
application of the “malicious purpose, bad faith” qualified immunity provisions of R.C.
2744.03(A)(6). Jopek v. Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93793, 2010-Ohio-2356, ¶
36.
Related Federal Case
{¶23} Donnita Carmichael brought suit in federal court, individually and in her
official capacity as administrator of the estate of Tonia Carmichael, against 21 defendants,
including Lorraine Coyne. Sowell also murdered Tonia Carmichael. Donnita
Carmichael alleged Coyne was liable for Coyne’s alleged failure to investigate and
decision not to prosecute the same 2008 case against Sowell.
{¶24} Coyne moved to dismiss the claims against her pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(B)(6). In Carmichael v. Cleveland, 881 F. Supp.2d 833, 845 (N.D.Ohio 2012), the
federal district court held that Coyne was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for
her alleged conduct.
{¶25} The Carmichael court relied on Imbler’s functional approach, noting that the
approach examines the nature of the functions with which a particular officer or class of
officials has been lawfully entrusted, and seeks to evaluate the effect that exposure to
particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those
functions. Carmichael at id. citing Forrester, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d
555. The Carmichael court further noted that
[t]o distinguish between conduct entitled to absolute immunity and conduct
entitled to qualified immunity, “the critical inquiry is how closely related is
the prosecutor’s challenged activity to his role as an advocate ultimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”
Id. at 846, quoting Joseph v. Patterson, 795 F.2d 549, 554 (6th Cir.1986).
{¶26} Although Carmichael had challenged Coyne’s “alleged failure to investigate
the facts of Anthony Sowell’s 2008 case, and her decision to not bring charges against
Sowell,” the court determined that Coyne’s “alleged actions spring from her role as a
quasi-judicial officer. It is clear that the decision to investigate criminal charges is
‘quasi-judicial’ or ‘advocatory,’ and thus is protected by absolute immunity.” Id. at
845, 846. The court continued: “[T]he decision to prosecute, ‘even if malicious and
founded in bad faith, is unquestionably advocatory and at the heart of the holding in
Imbler.’” (Citation omitted.) Id. The court concluded that despite the allegations in
Carmichael’s complaint, Coyne was “absolutely immune from both suit and liability
concerning the alleged failure to investigate Mr. Sowell’s 2008 case, and the decision not
to prosecute that case.” Id.
{¶27} The appellants in this case urge us to ignore the court’s holding in
Carmichael. The appellants claim that the district court’s decision was premised solely
on Coyne’s decision not to file charges against Sowell. Appellants argue that the district
court’s decision did not analyze whether Coyne would be immune from liability for her (1)
failure to investigate, (2) prematurely terminating the investigation, and (3) advice to
police to “straight-release”2 Sowell. Therefore, according to the appellants, Carmichael
is inapplicable to the instant case. But even if this court were to find Carmichael
persuasive, the appellants argue, the district court’s decision was erroneous, is currently
being appealed,3 and Carmichael is not binding upon this court.
{¶28} As an initial matter, we note that the district court in Carmichael specifically
held that the decision to prosecute, the decision to investigate, and the alleged failure to
investigate are all entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at 845-846. As a matter of
common sense, that holding can be extended to include the termination of the
investigation. Thus, the only matter for which the Carmichael court did not specifically
touch upon is the appellant’s allegation on appeal that Coyne advised the police to
“straight-release” Sowell.
Plaintiffs’ Complaints
{¶29} The complaints filed by the plaintiffs-appellants read, in part pertinent to
Coyne, as follows:
 Defendant [Lorraine] Coyne, at all times relevant, was an assistant
City of Cleveland Prosecutor employed by Defendant City of
Cleveland.
Moore Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 11; Billups Complaint, ¶ 6.
 On December 10, 2008, Defendant detectives met with Defendant
Assistant City Prosecutor [Lorraine] Coyne, and upon review of the
According to the plaintiffs’ complaints, “straight-release” is where suspects are released
2
shortly after arrest without being formally charged with a crime.
Carmichael v. Cleveland, 6th Cir. No. 12-3657.
3
case, they decided there was insufficient evidence to file prosecution
papers, and Anthony Sowell was released. They claimed there were
“no visible signs” of injuries despite witnesses seeing her bleeding,
and the medical release forms signed by the victim to confirm
medical treatment.
Moore Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 25.
 On December 10, 2008, the Defendant detectives and/or police
officers met with Defendant Assistant City Prosecutor [Lorraine]
Coyne. Upon review of the case, they decided there was not
sufficient evidence to file charges and decided to release Anthony
Sowell from custody. Specifically, the Defendant detectives and/or
police officers claimed there were “no visible signs” of injuries,
despite witnesses seeing [the victim] bleeding, and the medical
release forms signed by the victim to confirm medical treatment.
[The victim] had clear and obvious injuries after the attack and she
likely had Anthony Sowell’s DNA on her body. [The victim’s]
blood was in Anthony Sowell’s home.
Billups Complaint, ¶ 21.
Prosecutorial Immunity
{¶30} The appellants must allege facts “that establish the functionality test in order
to override the prosecutor’s absolute immunity defense.” Tuleta v. Med. Mut. of Ohio,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100032, 2014-Ohio-930, ¶ 24. We find that the plaintiffs’
complaints failed to allege that Coyne engaged in an investigation separate from her
prosecutorial duties; rather the complaints alleged that she met with Cleveland police
detectives, reviewed their investigation, and subsequently determined there was not
sufficient evidence to file charges against Sowell. The police then released Sowell based
on the prosecutor’s decision not to file charges against him; the complaints do not allege
that Coyne gave police any advice that would rise to the level, for example, that the court
found in Burns, 500 U.S. 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547. Nor do the facts as
alleged in the complaints establish that Coyne acted beyond her role as an advocate for the
state or as an investigator.
{¶31} In Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435 (6th Cir.1997), the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that absolute prosecutorial immunity attaches to acts necessary for a
prosecutor to initiate or maintain a criminal prosecution, which, in Ireland, was extended
to the decision to seek an arrest warrant. The court explained:
A prosecutor’s decision to file a criminal complaint and seek an arrest
warrant and the presentation of these materials to a judicial officer fall
squarely within the aegis of absolute prosecutorial immunity. In this role, a
prosecutor is unquestionably functioning as an advocate for the state in the
judicial process, and absolute immunity is fully justified because the
integrity of the judicial system depends in large part upon a prosecutor’s
ability to exercise independent judgment in deciding whether and against
whom to bring criminal charges.
Id. at 1446.
{¶32} In Ghaster v. Rocky River, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99779, 2013-Ohio-5587,
this court held that the trial court correctly granted the city prosecutor and law director’s
motion to dismiss on immunity grounds. This court found that initiating criminal
proceedings and witness investigation fell within the prosecutor’s advocacy function and,
as such, were entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at ¶ 25-26.
{¶33} In this case, Sowell had already been arrested when Coyne met with
detectives. Coyne made the decision not to initiate a prosecution, finding that there was
insufficient evidence to charge him at that time. There is nothing in the complaint to
indicate that Coyne took part in investigating the incident. According to the factual
allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaints, Coyne reviewed the information that the
Cleveland police detectives presented to her and declined to prosecute based on her review
of the evidence. Based on this, she is entitled to absolute immunity. See Tuleta, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100032, 2014-Ohio-930 (affirming trial court’s decision to grant
prosecutors’ motion to dismiss because prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity for
initiating a prosecution and advocating the state’s position); Jopek, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
93793, 2010-Ohio-2356 (finding prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity when
determining whether to initiate criminal charges); Boone v. Kentucky, 72 Fed.Appx. 306,
307 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that “[t]he decision on whether to prosecute is unquestionably
advocacy and is at the heart of the Imbler holding.”).
{¶34} In light of the above, the trial court did not err when it granted Coyne’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the claims against her with prejudice.
{¶35} The sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶36} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellants costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LARRY A. JONES, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCURS;
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURS IN
JUDGMENT ONLY