State v. Jones ( 2013 )

[Cite as State v. Jones, 2013-Ohio-4915.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 99538
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
LAUREN JONES
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-561064
BEFORE: E.A. Gallagher, J., Rocco, P.J., and Blackmon, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 7, 2013
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Mary Weston
Kristen L. Sobieski
Assistant County Prosecutors
The Justice Center, 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Joseph C. Patituce
Megan M. Patituce
Jennifer Scott
Patituce & Associates, L.L.C.
26777 Lorain Road
Suite 708
North Olmsted, OH 44070
Reuben J. Sheperd
11510 Buckeye Road
Cleveland, OH 44104
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶1} The state of Ohio appeals the decision of the trial court granting the
defendant-appellant’s motion to suppress. The state argues that the trial court erred
when it concluded that a single trash pull did not supply sufficient probable cause to
support the issuance of a search warrant. For the following reasons, we affirm the
decision of the trial court.
{¶2} Cleveland police narcotics detective Matthew Baeppler learned from a
confidential reliable informant that a female named Lauren, whom the informant
described as African American and overweight, was manufacturing methamphetamine in
the Cleveland area. Detective Baeppler also learned that Jennifer Chappel, known as
“Jen Jen,” cooks methamphetamine and that she had moved her cooking operation to
Rowley Avenue.
{¶3} On December 4, 2011, a burglary was reported at 1116 Rowley Avenue.
Officers responded and arrested Ilya Shpilman, a person known to have involvement
with methamphetamine, in connection with the burglary.
{¶4} Approximately three months after the burglary, Detective Baeppler and
other narcotics detectives were in the Cuyahoga County Justice Center on a matter
unrelated to the Rowley Avenue burglary. While there, Detective Baeppler observed
Jennifer Chappel, who was known to him, sitting next to an overweight, black female
who had been speaking with an assistant county prosecutor. Believing that this
unidentified female could be the “Lauren,” Detective Baeppler asked the prosecutor the
identity of the woman with Chappel. The prosecutor informed Detective Baeppler that
the female sitting with Jennifer Chappel was Lauren Jones and that Jones lived at 1116
Rowley Avenue. Jones was present at the Justice Center that day because she was the
victim of the December 4, 2011 burglary at her home.
{¶5} Armed with Jones’ name, address and physical description, Detective
Baeppler and investigators decided to conduct a trash pull from the tree lawn at 1116
Rowley. On March 22, 2012, the detectives collected the trash and recovered the
following: mail addressed to Jones at 1116 Rowley, empty chemical bottles, plastic
tubing, used coffee filters and a plastic bottle containing methamphetamine oil. Field
tests conducted on the items yielded positive results for methamphetamine.
Immediately after conducting the trash pull, Detective Baeppler drafted a search warrant
which was signed by a judge.
{¶6} On March 23, 2012, the officers executed the search warrant and recovered
several dishes with methamphetamine residue, white pills, coffee filters with
methamphetamine residue, a scale with methamphetamine residue and
methamphetamine. The Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Jones with illegal
manufacture of drugs, assembly or possession of chemicals used to manufacture a
controlled substance, two counts of trafficking, three counts of drug possession and
possessing criminal tools. Jones filed a motion to suppress the evidence in which she
challenged the validity of the search warrant. The trial court conducted a hearing on the
motion and, on February 11, 2013, the court granted the suppression concluding that the
search warrant was not supported by probable cause.
{¶7} The state appeals, raising the following assignment of error:
The trial court committed reversible error in granting defendant’s motion to
suppress.
{¶8} In State v. Preztak, 181 Ohio App.3d 106, 2009-Ohio-621, 907 N.E.2d
1254 (8th Dist.), this court outlined the standard of review on a motion to suppress.
Our standard of review with respect to motions to suppress is whether the
trial court’s findings are supported by competent, credible evidence. See
State v. Winand, 116 Ohio App.3d 286, 688 N.E.2d 9 (7th Dist. 1996),
citing City of Tallmadge v. McCoy, 96 Ohio App.3d 604, 645 N.E.2d 802(9th Dist. 1994). * * * This is the appropriate standard because “in a
hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role
of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and
evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d
521, 679 N.E.2d 321 (2d Dist.1996).
{¶9} Once we accept those facts as true, however, we must independently
determine, as a matter of law and without deference to the trial court’s conclusion,
whether the trial court met the applicable legal standard. See also State v. Lloyd, 126
Ohio App.3d 95, 709 N.E.2d 913 (7th Dist.1998); State v. Cruz, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
98264, 2013-Ohio-1889.
{¶10} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applied to the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment, reads in part:
[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
{¶11} In applying this amendment to the issues of the case, we are guided by
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and State v.
George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 544 N.E.2d 640 (1989), in determining whether the search
warrant is valid. As such, we have held that:
Although the United States Constitution requires search warrants to issue
only upon probable cause, Gates requires a reviewing court to defer to an
issuing judge’s discretion when deciding whether a warrant was validly
issued. Thus, even though the existence of probable cause is a legal
question to be determined on the historical facts presented, we will uphold
the warrant if the issuing judge had a substantial basis for believing that
probable cause existed.
State v. Reniff, 146 Ohio App.3d 749, 2001-Ohio-4353, 768 N.E.2d 667 (8th Dist.).
{¶12} A reviewing court affords great deference to a judge’s determination of
the existence of probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant. State v.
Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 1995-Ohio-168, 656 N.E.2d 623. Such a determination
should not be set aside unless it was arbitrarily exercised. See United States v. Spikes,
158 F.3d 913 (4th Cir.1999), certiorari denied.
{¶13} In this case, the trial court ruled that the single trash pull that immediately
preceded the issuance of the search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause.
The court noted the following:
There was no evidence that [Jennifer] Chappell was ever seen at the 1116
Rowley address, that any controlled buys were made, that any sustained
surveillance resulted in any unusual activity associated with a drug house,
that the house was in a high drug crime area or that numerous people were
entering and leaving the house for short periods.
{¶14} Further, the court stated that
[A]dditional investigation including, multiple trash pulls over a period of
time; surveillance, the details of which are set forth in an affidavit that
gives facts of usage, trafficking and other circumstances giving rise of drug
activity, controlled buys, observation of CRI from inside the house etc.,
was necessary for probable cause to be established — one trash pull is not
necessarily sufficient. The detective should have taken additional steps,
instead of cutting off the investigation prematurely.
{¶15} We see no reason to conclude otherwise. In State v. Weimer, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 92094, 2009-Ohio-4983, this court analyzed a single trash pull of a Euclid
residence that revealed evidence of recent drug activity. The court, while
acknowledging the legality of the trash pull, noted that the discovery of the discarded
contraband must be viewed in isolation. Specifically, the court stated that when viewed
in isolation, “it [did] not necessarily render the continued presence of suspected cocaine
in her home probable, and [did] not, of itself, give rise to probable cause to issue a search
warrant.” See also United States v. Elliot, 576 F.Supp. 1579 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
{¶16} This court, in reaching its decision, acknowledged the line of cases
upholding warrants based upon evidence garnered from single trash pulls. Weimer.
This court noted that in those cases, the facts underlying probable cause were much
stronger and included extensive and continuous surveillance by police and heavy foot
traffic to and from the known target residence of the suspected drug dealer that is
indicative of drug transactions. Id.; see also State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
98100, 2013-Ohio-368.
{¶17} In the present case, the only evidence that Jones was involved in illegal
drug activity were reports of a woman named Lauren “cooking meth on Rowley,” that
Jones matched the vague description of an overweight African American female and the
evidence seized from a single trash pull. The contraband recovered from the trash,
while indicative of recent criminal activity, does not necessarily render the continued
presence of methamphetamine in her home probable. See Weimer, Williams. We
agree with the trial court’s conclusion that this, without more, is insufficient to support
the issuance of a warrant.
{¶18} In the present case, the trial court granted Jones’ motion to suppress
because it concluded the single trash pull failed to provide sufficient probable cause to
support the issuance of a search warrant. Based on the facts and case law outlined
above, we hold that the trial court’s conclusion was supported by competent, credible
evidence and that the trial court correctly applied the legal standard. Thus, we overrule
the state’s sole assignment of error and affirm the decision of the trial court.
{¶19} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said lower court to carry this
judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
KENNETH A. ROCCO, P.J., and
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR