In re Estate of Rand ( 2013 )

[Cite as In re Estate of Rand, 2013-Ohio-4709.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 99678
ESTATE OF MARTHA O. RAND
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
[Appeal By Martha J. Skurla
and Robin J. Olds]
JUDGMENT:
DISMISSED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Probate Division
Case No. 11 EST 0166615
BEFORE: Stewart, A.J., Celebrezze, J., and S. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 24, 2013
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
Jonathan F. Sobel
Kabat, Mielziner & Sobel
30195 Chagrin Boulevard, Suite 300
Pepper Pike, OH 44124
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE JUDY JONES, EXECUTOR
Richard A. Hennig
Janet L. Hennig
Baker, Hackenberg & Hennig Co.
77 North St. Clair Street, Suite 100
Painesville, OH 44077
MELODY J. STEWART, A.J.:
{¶1} The will of the late Martha Osborne Rand made specific cash bequests to a
number of beneficiaries, with any remaining assets of her estate bequeathed to the
Andrews Osborne Academy. Two of the will’s beneficiaries, appellants-heirs Martha
Skurla and Robin Olds, filed exceptions to the inventory prepared by the estate’s
executor, appellee Judy Jones. The heirs claimed that the inventory failed to account for
Rand’s ownership interest in a corporation, specifically challenging whether Rand’s gift
of the corporate stock to a family member was completed prior to her death. The
executor asked the court to dismiss the exceptions because the heirs had no standing to
complain about the contents of the inventory — the value of the estate was more than
sufficient to fulfill the cash bequests to the individual heirs, so only the Andrews Osborne
Academy, as the beneficiary of the residual estate, had an interest in the inventory. The
heirs conceded that they had no direct monetary interest in the inventory, but claimed the
right to file objections under R.C. 2115.16 as persons “interested in the estate.” The
court granted the motion to dismiss the exceptions, finding that the heirs had no interest in
pursuing their exceptions and that any dispute over the validity of stock transfer should
have been made in a separate declaratory judgment action. The heirs appealed.
{¶2} Concerned that we lacked a final order, we asked the parties to brief the issue
of whether the court’s decision affected the heirs’ substantial rights in a manner that
would create a “final” order for purposes of R.C. 2505.02. The heirs responded by
claiming that they did not need to have a direct financial interest in the outcome of the
litigation to have standing. They also argued that if a lack of standing did not affect a
substantial right, an order dismissing an action for lack of standing could never be
appealable because the litigant, by definition, would not have standing sufficient to
establish that a substantial right had been violated.
{¶3} Under Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, our jurisdiction
as an appellate court is limited to reviewing “final” orders. R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) states
that an order is “final” if it “affects a substantial right in an action that in effect
determines the action and prevents a judgment.” In Ohio Domestic Violence Network v.
Pub. Util. Comm., 65 Ohio St.3d 438, 605 N.E.2d 13 (1992), the Ohio Supreme Court
stated:
In Ohio Contract Carriers Assn. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1942), 140 Ohio St.
160, 23 O.O. 369, 42 N.E.2d 758, syllabus, we held that “[a]ppeal lies only
on behalf of a party aggrieved by the final order appealed from. Appeals
are not allowed for the purpose of settling abstract questions, but only to
correct errors injuriously affecting the appellant.” We explained that a
“final order” under former G.C. 544, now R.C. 4903.13, is one “affecting a
substantial right” (see R.C. 2505.02; Hall China Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm.
[1977], 50 Ohio St.2d 206, 4 O.O.3d 390, 364 N.E.2d 852), and
characterized the interest necessary to create a substantial right as a
“‘present interest’” and an “‘immediate and pecuniary’” interest. Id., 140
Ohio St. at 161-162, 23 O.O. at 369-370, 42 N.E.2d at 759. Accord East
Ohio Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 295, 530 N.E.2d
875, wherein we also recognized that an order may be final as to one party
but not to another.
Id. at 439.
{¶4} The heirs make no argument that the court’s acceptance of the inventory filed
by the executor will affect any immediate and pecuniary interest they have in the estate.
The estate assets can easily satisfy the cash bequests made to the heirs even if the
corporate stock is not included as part of the estate’s assets. In fact, the heirs candidly
stated that “[i]t is undoubtedly true that neither Robin Olds nor Martha Skurla will obtain
a direct monetary benefit if their exceptions to the Inventory are sustained.” R. 39. This
being the case, the outcome of this appeal will not affect their substantial rights, so it is
not final for purposes of R.C. 2505.02(B)(1).
{¶5} The heirs maintain that they have the statutory right under R.C. 2115.16, as
“interested persons” to the estate, to enter objections to an estate inventory and that the
court’s denial of their right to enter objections affected a substantial right for purposes of
R.C. 2505.02(B)(1). They argue that a finding that the dismissal of their exceptions to
the inventory does not affect a substantial right would make any argument relating to a
lack of standing unreviewable.
{¶6} This argument confuses the jurisdictional prerequisite of standing to sue, see
Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, 979
N.E.2d 1214, at ¶ 22, with the question of whether a judgment affects a substantial right
for purposes of appeal. The heirs admittedly have no pecuniary interest in the outcome
of their challenge to Rand’s gift of stock — only the Andrews Osborne Academy does.
Although R.C. 2115.16 does not limit the class of persons who can raise objections to an
estate inventory to those with a financial interest in the inventory, the heirs offer nothing
on appeal to show that the court’s refusal to permit their objections have resulted in their
being injured or otherwise affected by the court’s decision. While R.C. 2115.16 grants
interested persons the right to object to an estate inventory, the type of substantial right
needed to appeal under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) requires more than merely an intellectual or
curious interest in the outcome of the litigation.
{¶7} Nothing we say in deciding the merits of the appeal will in any way affect the
amount of the inheritance appellants are to receive. Nor will a decision on the merits of
this appeal correct errors injuriously affecting appellants. It follows that we lack a final
appealable order.
{¶8} Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellants its costs herein taxed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MELODY J. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR