State v. Hughes , 2013 Ohio 1037 ( 2013 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Hughes, 
    2013-Ohio-1037
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 98666
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    JAMES E. HUGHES
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-557648
    BEFORE:          E.T. Gallagher, J., S. Gallagher, P.J., and Kilbane, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                     March 21, 2013
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Michael V. Heffernan
    75 Public Square
    Suite 700
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    BY: Brad S. Meyer
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
    The Justice Center
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
    {¶1}   Appellant James Hughes (“Hughes”) appeals his petty theft conviction
    following a guilty plea. We find no merit to the appeal and affirm.
    {¶2} Hughes was charged with breaking and entering and petty theft. Pursuant to a
    plea agreement, Hughes pleaded guilty to petty theft, and the breaking and entering
    charge was nolled.
    {¶3} Shortly before reaching the plea agreement, when Hughes was contemplating
    representing himself at trial, the trial court explained to him on the record that if he
    pleaded guilty to petty theft, he “could not be sentenced to the institution.” The court
    further explained that he could still be subject to six months of local incarceration for the
    petty theft conviction.
    {¶4} Hughes pleaded guilty to petty theft, and the court sentenced him to six
    months in the Cuyahoga county jail. This appeal followed.
    {¶5} In his sole assignment of error, Hughes argues that he did not enter his plea
    knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and that the trial court failed to substantially
    comply with Crim.R. 11.1
    {¶6} Although Crim.R. 11(E) governs a defendant’s rights when entering a plea to
    a petty offense, this court has held that the trial court must nevertheless advise the
    1 Although Hughes did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea with the
    trial court, he “may dispute the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of the
    plea either by filing a motion to withdraw the plea or upon direct appeal.” State v.
    Sarkozy, 
    117 Ohio St.3d 86
    , 
    2008-Ohio-509
    , 
    881 N.E.2d 1224
    , paragraph one of the
    syllabus.
    defendant of his constitutional rights under Civ.R. 11(C). Cleveland v. Wanzo, 
    129 Ohio App.3d 664
    , 
    718 N.E.2d 982
     (8th Dist.1998).
    {¶7} Under Crim.R. 11(C)(2), before accepting a guilty plea in a felony matter, a
    trial court must personally address the defendant and (1) determine that the defendant is
    making the plea voluntarily, with an understanding of the nature of the charges and the
    maximum penalty; (2) inform the defendant of and determine that the defendant
    understands the effect of the plea and that the court may proceed with judgment after
    accepting the plea; and (3) inform the defendant and determine that the defendant
    understands that he is waiving his constitutional rights to a jury trial, to confront the
    witnesses against him, to call witnesses in his favor, and to require the state to prove his
    guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial where the defendant cannot be forced to testify
    against himself.
    {¶8} A trial court must strictly comply with the mandates of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)
    regarding the waiver of constitutional rights, meaning the court must actually inform the
    defendant of the constitutional rights he is waiving and make sure the defendant
    understands them. State v. Veney, 
    120 Ohio St.3d 176
    , 
    2008-Ohio-5200
    , 
    897 N.E.2d 621
    , ¶ 27. Failure to fully advise a defendant of his Crim.R. 11(C)(2) rights renders a
    plea invalid. Id. at ¶ 29.
    {¶9} For nonconstitutional rights, scrupulous adherence to Crim.R. 11(C) is not
    required and “substantial compliance” is sufficient.      Veney at ¶ 14, citing State v.
    Stewart, 
    51 Ohio St.2d 86
    , 
    364 N.E.2d 1163
     (1977); State v. Clark, 
    119 Ohio St.3d 239
    ,
    
    2008-Ohio-3748
    , 
    893 N.E.2d 462
    , ¶ 31. “Substantial compliance means that under the
    totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of
    his plea and the rights he is waiving.” State v. Nero, 
    56 Ohio St.3d 106
    , 108, 
    564 N.E.2d 474
     (1990).
    {¶10} If the trial judge partially complied with the rule with respect to
    nonconstitutional rights, the plea may be vacated only if the defendant demonstrates a
    prejudicial effect. Veney at ¶ 17. The test for prejudice is “‘whether the plea would
    have otherwise been made.’” Clark at ¶ 32, quoting Nero at 108.
    {¶11} Hughes contends that he did not enter his plea knowingly, voluntarily, or
    intelligently because the trial court failed to accurately inform him of the potential
    penalties he would face upon conviction. The right to be informed of the potential
    penalties prior to entering a plea is a nonconstitutional right. State v. Dunn, 8th Dist. No.
    93640, 
    2010-Ohio-5000
    , ¶ 8. Therefore, we review the plea proceedings to determine if
    the court substantially complied with the rule. 
    Id.
    {¶12} At the plea hearing, the court advised Hughes:
    THE COURT: It’s proposed you’re going to plead guilty to Count 2, petty
    theft, in violation of 2913.02, a misdemeanor of the first degree. That’s
    punishable by six months in a local facility, a thousand dollar fine or both.
    Do you understand that?
    THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
    Although the court did not use the word “jail,” the phrase “six months in a local facility”
    obviously means a local institution such as the county jail. Moreover, Hughes indicated
    that he understood that he was subject to a possible six month jail term in addition to a
    $1000 fine.
    {¶13} Hughes was also awaiting sentencing on his felony convictions in three
    other cases. Although the trial court stated that he could not be sentenced to prison on
    his misdemeanor conviction in this case, it advised Hughes that he could be subject to
    prison sentences in the felony cases. The trial court informed Hughes that because
    misdemeanor and felony sentences run concurrently, he may serve his misdemeanor
    sentence in a state prison if he is sentenced to the penitentiary on the felony convictions.
    Thus, the court substantially complied with its obligation to inform Hughes of the
    potential penalties he could be subjected to as a result of his guilty plea.
    {¶14} Hughes also argues the trial court failed to substantially comply with
    Crim.R. 11(C) because it failed to advise him that he could plead no contest rather than
    guilty. However, Crim.R. 11(E) governs pleas for petty offenses. In State v. Jones, 
    116 Ohio St.3d 211
    , 
    2007-Ohio-6093
    , 
    877 N.E.2d 677
    , the Ohio Supreme Court held that
    “[i]n accepting a plea to a misdemeanor involving a petty offense, a trial court is required
    to inform the defendant only of the effect of the specific plea being entered.” (Emphasis
    added.) 
    Id.
     at paragraph one of the syllabus. The rule does not require the trial court to
    advise the defendant that he has the option of pleading no contest.            Therefore, the
    court’s failure to provide such advice does not violate the rule.
    {¶15} We find the trial court substantially complied with its obligation to inform
    Hughes of the potential penalties he would face as a result of his guilty plea. And
    because the court was not required to provide advice about pleading no contest, we find
    that it complied with all applicable rules when it accepted Hughes’s guilty plea.
    Therefore, we find that Hughes entered his guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily, and
    intelligently.
    {¶16} The sole assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶17} Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
    been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
    for execution of sentence.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCURS;
    SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 98666

Citation Numbers: 2013 Ohio 1037

Judges: Gallagher

Filed Date: 3/21/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014