State v. Saunders , 2013 Ohio 490 ( 2013 )

[Cite as State v. Saunders, 2013-Ohio-490.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 98379
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
NATHANIEL SAUNDERS
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case Nos. CR-536994, CR-541910, and CR-543492
BEFORE: Stewart, A.J., Kilbane, J., and E.T. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 14, 2013
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Susan J. Moran
55 Public Square, Suite 1616
Cleveland, OH 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Vincent I. Pacetti
Matthew E. Meyer
Assistant County Prosecutors
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street, 8th Floor
Cleveland, OH 44113
MELODY J. STEWART, A.J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Nathaniel Saunders pleaded guilty in three different
cases to charges of robbery, assault, and attempted escape. The court sentenced him to
an aggregate term of ten years. Saunders concedes that the sentences on each count fell
within the applicable statutory limits. He argues, however, that the court abused its
discretion by sentencing him to maximum, consecutive sentences because the sentences
exceeded penalties given for similar offenses and the court failed to state the reasons
supporting the length of the sentences.
{¶2} In CR-536994, Saunders pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery with firearm
specifications for each count. These were third degree felonies and the court sentenced
him to the maximum of five years on each count, to be served concurrently to each other,
but consecutive to the one-year firearm specifications. In CR-541910, Saunders pleaded
guilty to one count of assault. This was a fifth degree felony and the court sentenced him
to the maximum term of 12 months. And in CR-543492, Saunders pleaded guilty to one
count of attempted escape. This was a third degree felony and the court sentenced him to
three years. The sentences in all three cases were ordered to be served consecutively for
an aggregate sentence of ten years.
{¶3} Saunders appealed from his convictions in all three cases. We found that the
appeals in CR-541910 and CR-543492 were untimely because they were not made within
the 30-day period set forth in App.R. 4(A), so we dismissed those appeals. State v.
Saunders, 8th Dist. No. 96643, 2012-Ohio-104, ¶ 4. We then affirmed the guilty plea in
CR-536994, finding that it was voluntarily made under Crim.R. 11 and that Saunders was
not denied the effective assistance of counsel when entering the plea. Id. at ¶ 11 and 17.
Saunders could have, but did not, question the validity of his sentence in CR-536994 on
direct appeal, so his sentence in that case is res judicata. State v. Dozier, 8th Dist. No.
88205, 2007-Ohio-530, ¶ 2. We therefore disregard any argument relating to the
sentence imposed in CR-536994.
{¶4} As for the argument that the court disregarded the applicable statutory factors
when sentencing in CR-541910 and CR-543492, the sentencing entries in both cases state
that “the court considered all required factors of the law.” That statement, without more,
is sufficient to fulfill the court’s obligations under the sentencing statutes. State v.
Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio- 4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 18; State v. Kamleh, 8th
Dist. No. 97092, 2012-Ohio-2061, ¶ 61.
{¶5} Saunders’s argument that the court failed to make the necessary findings
before imposing maximum and consecutive sentences is likewise without merit.
Saunders was sentenced on March 4, 2011, prior to the September 30, 2011 effective date
of H.B. 86, which enacted a number of changes to the sentencing law. The law in effect
at the time Saunders was sentenced did not require the court to give reasons supporting
the imposition of maximum and consecutive sentences and left the matter to the court’s
discretion. See State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, ¶
11; State v. Ward, 8th Dist. No. 97219, 2012-Ohio-1199, ¶ 8.
{¶6} The sentences imposed on Saunders were not an abuse of the court’s
discretion. The three cases comprising the guilty plea were committed at different times
and encompassed a variety of offenses, thus showing that Saunders was not a one-time
offender. To underscore this conclusion, the court noted that Saunders had been
something of a career criminal, a characterization that Saunders himself apparently
encouraged given information showing that he was the “HNIC” of “the Heartless Felon
Gang” and actively recruited members while incarcerated. His criminal record started at
age 15 when he committed aggravated robbery. Over the years, and in addition to the
offenses in the cases presently before us, Saunders had juvenile adjudications and
criminal convictions for criminal activity on school property, felonious assault while
under a weapons disability, theft, extortion, and assault on a police officer. Finally, he
committed some of the offenses while on postrelease control.
{¶7} The only basis for the mitigation of sentence was Saunders’s claim that he
was psychotic and suffered from antisocial personality disorder. This fact did not assist
him. Saunders’s doctor claimed that Saunders refused to take his medication and that he
had a “perversive disregard for the violation and rights of others as you have repeatedly
performed acts that cause you to be arrested. You’re impulsive, fail to plan ahead,
aggressive, and lack remorse. There is a maladaptive pattern of coping that is highly
refractory and difficult to change.” Or as the court aptly put it to Saunders: “You can’t
follow the rules. You don’t care.” The court could rationally conclude that Saunders’s
incarceration was necessary to punish him and to protect the public because he was likely
to commit future crime. The assigned error is overruled.
{¶8} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified
copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
MELODY J. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR