State v. Shabazz ( 2013 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Shabazz, 
    2013-Ohio-267
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 98601
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    JAMIL ABDUL SHABAZZ
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-495551
    BEFORE: E.A. Gallagher, J., Boyle, P.J., and Kilbane, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                     January 31, 2013
    FOR APPELLANT
    Jamil Abdul Shabazz, pro se
    Inmate No. 541-031
    Allen Correctional Institution
    P.O. Box 4501
    Lima, Ohio 45802
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    BY: T. Allan Regas
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    The Justice Center, 9th Floor
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
    {¶1} Jamil Adbul Shabazz appeals from the Cuyahoga County Court of
    Common Pleas’ denial of his motion for a new trial. For the following reasons, we
    affirm.
    {¶2} A brief account of appellant’s lengthy history before this court is necessary.
    Appellant was indicted on April 26, 2007, charged with one count of aggravated murder
    with a three-year firearm specification, a notice of prior conviction and a repeat violent
    offender specification. Prior to the commencement of trial, appellant executed a jury
    waiver as to the notice of prior conviction and repeat violent offender specification.
    {¶3} Appellant was found guilty of the lesser-included offense of murder as well
    as the attached three-year firearm specification by a jury verdict rendered on November
    19, 2007. The trial court found appellant guilty of the notice of prior conviction and
    repeat violent offender specifications. Appellant was sentenced to a prison term of 15
    years to life on the murder charge to run consecutively to a three-year prison term for the
    firearm specification.
    {¶4} Appellant brought a direct appeal of his conviction in State v. Shabazz
    Abdul, 8th Dist. No. 90789, 
    2009-Ohio-225
     (“Shabazz I”). Appellant asserted two
    assignments of error: ineffective assistance of counsel and the trial court’s denial of his
    Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. We rejected both assignments of error and affirmed the
    conviction.
    {¶5} On May 7, 2009, appellant applied to reopen our judgment in Shabazz I
    based on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In State v. Shabazz
    Abdul, 8th Dist. No. 90789, 
    2009-Ohio-6300
     (“Shabazz II”), we denied appellant’s
    application.
    {¶6} While Abdul II was pending, appellant filed a petition for post-conviction
    relief in the trial court. The state filed a motion for summary judgment, which was
    granted by the trial court. On appeal in State v. Abdul Shabazz, 8th Dist. No. 94738,
    
    2010-Ohio-5789
     (“Shabazz III”), appellant asserted seven assignments of error. We
    rejected all seven of appellant’s errors and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.1
    {¶7} On May 17, 2012, appellant filed the motion for a new trial that is the
    subject of the present appeal. The trial court denied appellant’s motion in a journal entry
    dated May 24, 2012. Appellant appealed presenting four assignments of error. In his
    first and second assignments of error, appellant argues that his indictment was not
    presented to a grand jury and not signed by the foreman of a grand jury. In his third
    assignment of error, appellant argues that his due process rights were violated by the
    amendment of the indictment at trial to include lesser-included offenses. In his fourth
    Five of appellant’s assignments of errors were rejected pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.
    1
    assignment of error, appellant argues that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to
    present jury instructions on certain lesser-included offenses.
    {¶8} Motions for a new trial are governed by the framework provided in Crim.R.
    33. Crim.R. 33(B) requires a motion for a new trial to be made within 14 days after a
    verdict is rendered. If a motion for a new trial is made on grounds of newly discovered
    evidence, the motion must be filed within 120 days after the day the verdict is rendered.
    
    Id.
     A defendant may file a motion for a new trial outside the 120-day deadline only by
    leave of court and only if “it is made to appear by clear and convincing proof that the
    defendant was unavoidably prevented from the discovery of the evidence upon which
    he must rely[.]” 
    Id.
    {¶9} Although not raised in appellant’s motion for a new trial before the trial
    court, appellant now asserts that his motion is based on newly discovered evidence.
    However, none of appellant’s assignments of error pertain to newly discovered evidence.
    Appellant did not seek leave of the court to file a motion for a new trial outside the
    Crim.R. 33(B) period and appellant’s motion for a new trial is devoid of any newly
    discovered evidence. It is undisputed that appellant filed his motion for a new trial
    outside the 120-day window established by Crim.R. 33(B). In order to obtain leave to
    file his motion for a new trial, he had to establish, by clear and convincing proof, that he
    was unavoidably prevented from discovering new evidence. State v. Clement, 8th Dist.
    No. 97930, 
    2012-Ohio-3818
    , ¶ 4-5. As appellant’s motion failed to offer proof of any
    kind to show why he was unavoidably prevented from the discovery of any new evidence
    that would entitle him to a new trial, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
    discretion in denying his motion. Id. at ¶ 6.
    {¶10} Even if appellant’s motion was not time barred pursuant to Crim.R. 33(B),
    we note that appellant’s assignments of error are also barred by the doctrine of res
    judicata. As stated by the Ohio Supreme Court, under the doctrine of res judicata
    a final judgment of conviction bars the convicted defendant from raising
    and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that judgment, any
    defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have
    been raised by the defendant at the trial that resulted in that judgment of
    conviction or on an appeal from that judgment.
    State v. Perry, 
    10 Ohio St.2d 175
    , 180, 
    226 N.E.2d 104
     (1967); accord State v. Briscoe,
    8th Dist. No. 98414, 
    2012-Ohio-4943
    , ¶ 13.
    {¶11} Each of appellant’s assignments of error pertain to matters that were
    squarely within the record at the time of appellant’s direct appeal. Because they were
    not raised on direct appeal, appellant is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising
    them in this subsequent action.
    {¶12} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
    been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
    for execution of sentence.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
    MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 98601

Judges: Gallagher

Filed Date: 1/31/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014