Euclid v. Jones , 2012 Ohio 3960 ( 2012 )

[Cite as Euclid v. Jones, 2012-Ohio-3960.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 97868
CITY OF EUCLID
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
KRISTEN JONES
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Euclid Municipal Court
Case No. 11-TRC-01503
BEFORE: Blackmon, A.J., Boyle, J., and Jones, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 30, 2012
-i-
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Paul Mancino, Jr.
75 Public Square, Suite 1016
Cleveland, Ohio 44113-2098
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Jason L. Carter
Assistant Law Director
City of Euclid
585 East 222nd Street
Euclid, Ohio 44123
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, A.J.:
{¶1} Appellant Kristen Jones appeals the trial court’s decision denying her
motion to suppress and assigns the following error for our review:
I. Defendant was denied due process of law when the trial court
overruled her motion to suppress.
{¶2} Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we affirm the trial court’s
decision. The apposite facts follow.
{¶3} On April 21, 2011, the city of Euclid charged Jones with driving under the
influence of alcohol, driving with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration, improper
backing, and hit and skip. On April 28, 2011, Jones pleaded not guilty at the arraignment
and subsequently filed a motion to suppress. On November 1, 2011, the trial court held a
suppression hearing.
Suppression Hearing
{¶4} At the hearing, Kelly Parton, of the Euclid Police Department, testified that
she is the supervisor of Records and Communications. Parton identified three dispatch
calls that were played in open court. In the first call, a woman identified as Channel
Washington, indicated that she was pursuing a motorist who had just hit her car, and fled
the scene. Washington indicated that the motorist struck her car, while backing out of
the parking lot at the Olive Twyst Bar located at East 250th Street and Euclid Avenue.
{¶5} Washington stated that she believed the motorist was driving either a Dodge
Cobalt or Dodge Caliber, that the license plate was ESU7626, and that she believed she
was somewhere near the Euclid police station. Washington also indicated that she was
driving a 2005 Dodge Stratus.
{¶6} In the second call, Washington indicated that the motorist who hit her car
was driving too fast and she was unable to keep pace. Washington indicated that she was
now at a Sunoco gas station located on Lakeshore Boulevard and East 242nd Street. The
dispatcher informed Washington that the license plate reported did not match the vehicle
she described.
{¶7} In the third call, the dispatcher asked Washington to remain at the Sunoco
gas station. Washington informed the dispatcher that her car was dented, had paint
transfer, and that part of the vehicle was dangling. During the third call, the dispatcher
informed Washington that the motorist had been stopped by the police.
{¶8} Officer Mickey Atchley, of the Euclid Police Department, testified that in
the early morning of April 21, 2011, he initiated a traffic stop of a Dodge Caliber
automobile based on information relayed by dispatch. Officer Atchley testified that he
initiated the traffic stop because he observed a vehicle matching Washington’s
description and with the license plates that matched the information provided, except for
the last two digits.
{¶9} Officer Atchley, testified that he was certified in accident reconstruction
and had investigated thousands of accidents, and that the suspect, who was later identified
as Jones, admitted being involved in an accident. Officer Atchley compared the damage
on Jones’s car with that of Washington’s and found a perfect match.
{¶10} Officer Atchley testified that upon stopping the vehicle, he noticed the
aroma of alcohol emanating from the vehicle and observed Jones’s bloodshot eyes.
Officer Atchley subsequently conducted a field sobriety test, that Jones failed.
{¶11} On November 14, 2011, the trial court denied Jones’s motion to suppress.
Thereafter, Jones pleaded no contest to driving under the influence of alcohol. The city’s
prosecutor dismissed the remaining charges.
{¶12} On December 7, 2011, the trial court fined Jones $1,000, but suspended
$500, sentenced her to 45 days in jail, but suspended 42, and ordered her to attend a
72-hour driver intervention program in lieu of jail. In addition, the trial court placed
Jones on one year of community control and suspended her driver’s license for nine
months.
Motion to Suppress
{¶13} In the sole assigned error, Jones argues the trial court erred by denying her
motion to suppress.
{¶14} An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Campbell, 9th Dist. No.
05CA0032-M, 2005-Ohio-4361, ¶ 6. The trial court acts as the trier of fact during a
suppression hearing, and is therefore best equipped to evaluate the credibility of witnesses
and resolve questions of fact. Id. This Court will accept the factual findings of the trial
court if they are supported by some competent, credible evidence. See State v. Balog, 9th
Dist. No. 08CA0001-M, 2008-Ohio-4292, ¶ 7, citing State v. Searls, 118 Ohio App.3d
739, 741, 693 N.E.2d 1184 (5th Dist.1997). However, the application of the law to those
facts will be reviewed de novo. Id.{¶15} At issue in the case sub judice is whether Officer Atchley had reasonable,
articulable suspicion to stop Jones’s vehicle. It is well-settled that “[a] traffic stop
constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). “However, an
investigative stop of a motorist does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the officer has a
reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal activity.” Campbell at ¶
10, citing Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 299, 1999-Ohio-68, 720 N.E.2d 507(1999). “To justify a particular intrusion, the officer must demonstrate ‘specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” Weisner at 299, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
{¶16} In evaluating the facts and inferences supporting the stop, a court must
consider the totality of the circumstances as “viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and
cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training.” State v.
Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 179, 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988). Thus, “if the specific and
articulable facts available to an officer indicate that a driver may be committing a
criminal act, which includes the violation of a traffic law, the officer is justified in
making an investigative stop.” State v. Hoder, 9th Dist. No. 03CA0042, 2004-Ohio-3083,
¶ 8, quoting State v. Shook, 9th Dist. No. 93CA005716, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2631(June 15, 1994).
{¶17} Here, Officer Atchley had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Jones’s
vehicle, because he was pursuing a suspect of a crime in progress. Washington, the
victim of a hit/skip, contacted the Euclid police to indicate that a motorist had hit her car,
had fled the scene, and Washington was in pursuit. Washington described the suspect’s
vehicle, gave license plate information, and tried to relay the current location as the
pursuit ensued.
{¶18} While Washington was contemporaneously relaying information and
pursuing the suspect, the police department broadcasted said information, Officer Atchley
pinpointed the location of the suspect’s vehicle, and began pursuit. Officer Atchley
stopped Jones’s vehicle because it matched Washington’s description and the license
plate information matched except for the last two digits.
{¶19} We conclude, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Atchley had
reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Jones’s vehicle. As such, the trial court properly
denied Jones’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we overrule the sole assigned error.
{¶20} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is
terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, J., and
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR