Cleveland v. Coleman ( 2012 )

[Cite as Cleveland v. Coleman, 2012-Ohio-3942.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 97128
CITY OF CLEVELAND
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
KATHY WRAY COLEMAN
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cleveland Municipal Court
Case No. 2008 CRB 034109
BEFORE: Celebrezze, P.J., Rocco, J., and E. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 30, 2012
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Timothy Young
Ohio Public Defender
By: Kenneth R. Spiert
Assistant State Public Defender
250 East Broad Street
Suite 1400
Columbus, Ohio 43215
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Barbara A. Langhenry
Interim Director
City of Cleveland
Department of Law
601 Lakeside Avenue
Room 106
Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1077
Victor Perez
Chief Assistant City Prosecutor
Lorraine Coyne
Assistant City Prosecutor
City of Cleveland
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ALSO LISTED:
Kathy Wray Coleman
3901 Silsby Road
University Heights, Ohio 44118
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Kathy Wray Coleman, appeals her conviction in the
Cleveland Municipal Court for resisting arrest, in violation of Cleveland Municipal
Ordinances 615.08. Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we affirm appellant’s
conviction.
{¶2} On August 7, 2008, appellant appeared at the Cuyahoga County Common
Pleas Court for a hearing in an unrelated foreclosure action. At the time of the
foreclosure hearing, appellant had an outstanding warrant for her arrest in the Lyndhurst
Municipal Court. At the conclusion of the foreclosure hearing, appellant asked the court
if she could use the restroom and quickly exited the courtroom. However, rather than
using the restroom, she began walking toward the courthouse service elevators. Before
she could exit the building, Deputy Sheriff Eric Mullen and his partner asked her to “halt”
and informed her that they had a warrant for her arrest. Appellant immediately ran from
the deputies, and the deputies followed in pursuit.
{¶3} When appellant discovered that the door to the service elevators was locked,
she attempted to run past the deputies, pushing one of them in the process. Eventually,
the deputies were able to handcuff her as she shouted that the deputies were harassing
her. As the deputies handcuffed her, she dropped to her knees and complained of chest
pain. Deputy Mullen, a certified emergency medical technician, attempted to provide
medical aid, however, appellant resisted his assistance and was combative throughout the
process. Eventually, appellant was transported to the hospital, where she was kept
overnight for monitoring.
{¶4} On September 30, 2008, appellant was charged with resisting arrest, in
violation of Cleveland Municipal Ordinances (“CMO”) 615.08; making false alarms, in
violation of CMO 605.07; obstruction of official business, in violation of CMO 615.06;
and aggravated disorderly conduct, in violation of CMO 605.03(A).
{¶5} On May 8, 2009, a jury found appellant guilty of resisting arrest. On
September 25, 2009, the trial court issued a capias order for her arrest when she failed to
appear for sentencing. On June 28, 2011, the court sentenced appellant to 12 days of
incarceration, with credit for time served, and a fine of $500, suspended.
{¶6} Appellant brings this timely appeal, raising five assignments of error for
review.1
Law and Analysis
I. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight
{¶7} In her first and second assignments of error, appellant contends that her
conviction for resisting arrest was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against
the manifest weight of the evidence.
1 Appellant’s assignments of error are included in the appendix to this
opinion.
{¶8} The test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the prosecution
met its burden of production at trial. State v. Bowden, 8th Dist. No. 92266,
2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 12. An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial
to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541.
{¶9} A manifest weight challenge, on the other hand, questions whether the
prosecution met its burden of persuasion. State v. Ponce, 8th Dist. No. 91329,
2010-Ohio-1741, ¶ 17, citing State v. Thomas, 70 Ohio St.2d 79, 80, 434 N.E.2d 1356(1982). A reviewing court may reverse the judgment of conviction if it appears that the
trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Thompkins at 387. A finding that
a conviction was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a
finding of sufficiency. Id.{¶10} In the case at hand, appellant was convicted of resisting arrest, in violation
of CMO 615.08. To prove resisting arrest, the city was required to prove, pursuant to
CMO 615.08, that appellant did recklessly or by force, resist or interfere with the lawful
arrest of herself or another.
{¶11} In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her resisting arrest
conviction, appellant’s argument focuses on her belief that the city failed to present
sufficient evidence that her underlying arrest was lawful beyond a reasonable doubt.
Specifically, appellant submits that “[b]y failing to produce the purported bench warrant,
the City failed to prove the legality of the arrest.”
{¶12} “A ‘lawful arrest’ is an element of the offense of resisting arrest, and the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the arrest allegedly resisted was
lawful.” State v. Dumas, 8th Dist. No. 89070, 2007-Ohio-5724, ¶ 22, citing State v.
Gilchrist, 4th Dist. No. 02CA26, 2003-Ohio-2601. An arrest is lawful when an officer
who is invested with the power to perform an arrest is authorized by judicial warrant to
make an arrest or, absent a warrant, possesses probable cause of a criminal violation
sufficient to arrest the offender for it. In re Rucker, 2d Dist. No. 15739, 1997 Ohio App.
LEXIS 6087, *6 (Dec. 31, 1997).
{¶13} Despite appellant’s position to the contrary, we find that the city presented
sufficient evidence to establish the legality of appellant’s arrest. During its case in chief,
the city introduced the Lyndhurst Municipal Court’s June 20, 2008 journal entry that
verified the existence of an outstanding judicial warrant for appellant’s arrest at the time
of her August 7, 2008 foreclosure hearing. The journal entry states, in relevant part:
This case was docketed for pretrial and show cause hearing on June 20,
2008, at 10:00 a.m. * * * The Courtroom was observed from 10:00 a.m.
to 10:26 a.m. for signs of the Defendant’s appearance. The matter was
called for hearing at 10:26 a.m. The Defendant made no appearance. This
is the second time that the Defendant has not appeared for a duly scheduled
hearing. Therefore, it is the order of the Court that a bench warrant be
issued for the arrest of the Defendant.
{¶14} At trial, Deputy Mullen identified the journal entry as the document he
relied on to initiate appellant’s arrest. Deputy Mullen testified that once he learned that
appellant had a warrant for her arrest, he contacted the Mayfield Heights Police
Department and verified the warrant. Furthermore, Deputy Mullen testified that he
determined that appellant was the same “Kathy Coleman” identified in the journal entry
before he initiated her arrest.
{¶15} Although the introduction of the arrest warrant itself would have been
preferable, we are aware of no rule of procedure, evidence, or law that requires the
prosecution to introduce a bench warrant into evidence under such circumstances as are
presented here. Accordingly, we conclude that Deputy Mullen’s testimony and the city’s
introduction of the Lyndhurst Municipal Court journal entry was sufficient to establish
the legality of appellant’s arrest. See State v. Sanders, 8th Dist. No. 97120,
2012-Ohio-1540, ¶ 19-20 (affirming the legality of defendant’s arrest despite the state’s
failure to introduce the warrant into evidence).
{¶16} Alternatively, appellant contends that the failure to admit the warrant into
evidence precluded the jury from determining whether the arrest was made in
conformance with Crim.R. 4. Appellant alleges that the deputies did not advise her that
there was a warrant, give her a copy of the warrant, or advise her of the offense charged
in the warrant. See Crim.R. 4(C)(1); Crim.R. 4(D)(3) and (4).
{¶17} We note that appellant failed to challenge the deputies’ compliance with
Crim.R. 4 at trial. Failure to raise an issue at trial acts as a waiver of the issue on appeal
except for plain error. Cleveland v. Ellsworth, 8th Dist. No. 83040, 2004-Ohio-4092.
{¶18} Crim.R. 52(B) provides that “plain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.” The
standard for noticing plain error is set forth in State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27,
2002-Ohio-68, 759 N.E.2d 1240:
By its very terms, the rule places three limitations on a reviewing court’s
decision to correct an error despite the absence of a timely objection at trial.
First, there must be an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule. * * *
Second, the error must be plain. To be “plain” within the meaning of
Crim.R. 52(B), an error must be an “obvious” defect in the trial
proceedings. * * * Third, the error must have affected “substantial
rights.” We have interpreted this aspect of the rule to mean that the trial
court’s error must have affected the outcome of the trial. (Citations
omitted.)
{¶19} An error that satisfies these three limitations may be corrected by the
appellate court. However, notice of plain error should be done “with the utmost caution,
under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.”
State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 97, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978).
{¶20} Given the circumstances of appellant’s arrest, we find it to be disingenuous
to argue that the deputies failed to strictly comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 4. The
record reflects that before the deputies had the opportunity to explain the nature of the
warrant to appellant, she attempted to flee the scene and subsequently experienced chest
pains that required immediate medical attention. Accordingly, we are unable to find
plain error because any deficiencies in the deputies’ strict compliance with Crim.R. 4
were created by appellant’s actions.
{¶21} Next, appellant argues that the city failed to present sufficient evidence of
resistance.2 Specifically, she contends that her arrest did not occur until the moment the
deputies initiated physical contact with her and that, from that point forward, she was
compliant. Thus, appellant submits that her evasive behavior prior to the deputies’
initiation of contact cannot constitute the basis for her resisting arrest conviction. We
disagree.
{¶22} “Arrest” means “‘to stop or stay, as signifies a restraint of a person.’” State
v. Darrah, 64 Ohio St.2d 22, 26, 412 N.E.2d 1328 (1980), quoting State v. Barker, 53
Ohio St.2d 135, 139, 372 N.E.2d 1324 (1978). “An arrest occurs when the following
four requisite elements are involved: (1) an intent to arrest, (2) under a real or pretended
authority, (3) accompanied by an actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person,
and (4) which is so understood by the person arrested.” Id.{¶23} In this case, Deputy Mullen and his partner had a purpose to take appellant
into custody; they were acting on a warrant. They also had the authority; they were in
full uniform and had properly identified themselves as deputy sheriffs. Deputy Mullen
testified that when he encountered appellant in the courthouse hallway, his partner
immediately told appellant to “halt, we have a warrant for your arrest.” The fact that
2 Appellant raises this argument as a challenge to the manifest weight of the
evidence. However, based on the arguments raised in appellant’s brief, we address
this issue as if it challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.
appellant fled despite hearing that command suggests that she understood that they were
there to seize or detain her. The only issue presented is when the “actual or constructive
seizure or detention of her person” took place because that will inform as to whether
appellant resisted arrest.
{¶24} “Resisting,” as it is used for a charge of resisting arrest, is not limited to
situations involving active force; it can also include a reckless act. See CMO 615.08.
“A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, he
perversely disregards a known risk that his conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is
likely to be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(C).
{¶25} In State v. Hicks, 9th Dist. No. 24708, 2011-Ohio-2769, ¶ 18-19, the Ninth
District determined that delaying an arrest by preventing the seizure or detention of a
person may constitute resisting arrest because it constitutes reckless resistance. Id.,citing State v. Thomas, 9th Dist. No. 2910, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 397, at *5 (Feb. 1,
1995). By committing an act giving rise to the delay, a person may be proceeding with
heedless indifference to the consequences and disregarding a known risk that his conduct
will prevent arrest. Id.{¶26} Here, Deputy Mullen testified that once appellant failed to adhere to the
command to stop, he and his partner pursued her. At that time, appellant suddenly ran
toward the deputies and attempted to push them out of her way. Deputy Mullen stated that
appellant was like “a rushing linebacker” trying to knock them down.
{¶27} On consideration of the totality of the circumstances, we find that
appellant’s actions were taken with heedless indifference to the consequences and
disregarded a known risk that her conduct was delaying the deputies’ attempt to seize or
detain her. Deputy Mullen’s testimony, coupled with appellant’s statement during her
cross-examination that she attempted to quickly exit the courthouse because she believed
she was going to be arrested, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that
appellant recklessly resisted or interfered with her arrest.
{¶28} Based on the foregoing, we find that the city presented sufficient evidence
to sustain appellant’s resisting arrest conviction.
{¶29} Furthermore, we are unable to conclude that this is the exceptional case in
which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. State v. Martin, 20 Ohio
App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). We recognize that appellant
adamantly denied the allegations that she resisted her arrest. In fact, appellant
maintained throughout the trial that she was the victim of a violent attack. However, the
jury, as trier of fact, was in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and
was free to believe Deputy Mullen’s testimony that appellant resisted arrest, despite
appellant’s allegations to the contrary. The jury heard all of the testimony at issue,
including the conflicting testimony of appellant and Deputy Mullen, and made a
determination that Deputy Mullen was more credible.
{¶30} Deferring to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses,
as we must, we cannot say that the trier of fact lost its way and performed a miscarriage
of justice in finding appellant guilty of resisting arrest.
{¶31} Appellant’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
II. Admission of Other Acts Evidence
{¶32} In her third assignment of error, appellant argues that she was denied her
constitutional right to a fair trial based on the trial court’s errors in permitting the state to
introduce prejudicial information into evidence, in violation of the Ohio Rules of
Evidence.
{¶33} We review a trial court’s decision regarding the admission of such evidence
under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 510 N.E.2d 343(1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ implies that the
court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” State v. Adams, 62 Ohio
St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).
{¶34} Initially, appellant complains that the trial court erred in permitting the city
to introduce impermissible “other-acts evidence.” Appellant contends that the city
improperly introduced unfairly prejudicial other acts evidence when it cross-examined her
about a previous incident she had at the Lyndhurst Municipal Court in which an EMS
team was called to assist her with her blood-pressure problem and she eventually exited
the ambulance and ran away. Appellant did not object to this testimony, thereby waiving
all but plain error. Crim.R. 52(B); State v. Hornschemeier, 1st Dist. No. C-110466,
2012-Ohio-2860, ¶ 29.
{¶35} Generally, in a criminal prosecution, the state is not permitted to present
evidence of other crimes or acts to prove that the defendant acted in conformity with her
bad character. Id. However, Evid.R. 404(B) and R.C. 2945.59 allow evidence of other
bad acts as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake. Id.{¶36} In response to appellant’s arguments regarding the city’s introduction of
other acts evidence, the city submits that any potential error associated with the discussion
of appellant’s past bad acts was harmless. See Crim.R. 52(A) (“Any error, defect,
irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded”).
In this case, we agree.
{¶37} Even where the admission of evidence is erroneous, the error is harmless
where there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. State v. Williams, 6 Ohio
St.3d 281, 452 N.E.2d 1323 (1983), paragraph six of the syllabus. Here, the city
prosecutor’s discussion of appellant’s previous experience at the Lyndhurst Municipal
Court was intended to bolster the city’s allegations that appellant made false alarms in
violation of CMO 605.07. Ultimately, appellant was found not guilty on that charge, and
the potentially prejudicial other acts evidence did not affect her resisting arrest
conviction. As discussed, appellant’s resisting arrest conviction was supported by
evidence relating to her reckless attempt to delay her seizure. Thus, evidence relating to
appellant’s propensity to feign illness was irrelevant to her resisting arrest conviction.
Accordingly, any potential error associated with the introduction of the other acts
evidence was harmless.
{¶38} Additionally, appellant contends that the trial court erred to her prejudice in
permitting the prosecutor to personally vouch for the truthfulness of the city’s witnesses
during closing arguments. Appellant submits that the prosecuting attorney’s statements
rose to the level of prosecutorial misconduct.
{¶39} In reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, the test is whether the
conduct is improper and whether the conduct prejudicially affected the substantial rights
of the accused. State v. Guade, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-718, 2012-Ohio-1423, ¶ 20, citing
State v. White, 82 Ohio St.3d 16, 22, 1998-Ohio-363, 693 N.E.2d 772. “‘[T]he
touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.’” (Citation omitted.) State v.
Wilkerson, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-1127, 2002-Ohio-5416, ¶ 38. Therefore, prosecutorial
misconduct will not be grounds for reversal unless the accused has been denied a fair
trial. State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 266, 473 N.E.2d 768 (1984).
{¶40} In general, prosecutors are given considerable latitude in opening statements
and closing arguments. State v. Ballew, 76 Ohio St.3d 244, 255, 667 N.E.2d 369 (1996).
Additionally, both parties are entitled to latitude in responding to the arguments made by
opposing counsel, therefore a prosecutor is entitled to rebut statements made by defense
counsel in closing arguments. State v. Isreal, 12th Dist. No. CA2010-07-170,
2011-Ohio-1474, ¶ 62. In closing argument, a prosecutor may comment on “‘what the
evidence has shown and what reasonable inferences may be drawn therefrom.’” State v.
Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 165, 555 N.E.2d 293 (1990), quoting State v. Stephens, 24 Ohio
St.2d 76, 82, 263 N.E.2d 773 (1970). However, a prosecutor may not express his
personal belief or opinion as to the credibility of a witness, the guilt of an accused, or
allude to matters that are not supported by admissible evidence. State v. Smith, 14 Ohio
St.3d 13, 14, 470 N.E.2d 883 (1984).
{¶41} If the accused or his counsel failed to object to the comment, he has
forfeited all but plain error. State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 12, 679 N.E.2d 646(1997). Reversal for prosecutorial misconduct is warranted under the plain error
standard if it is clear that the accused would not have been convicted without the
improper conduct. State v. Saleh, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-431, 2009-Ohio-1542, ¶ 68.
{¶42} Here, appellant failed to raise objections to the complained of portions of
the prosecutor’s closing arguments and has waived all but plain error. The record
reflects that during closing arguments, the prosecution discussed the testimony of
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court staff attorney, Erin O’Malley, who testified that
she heard screams coming from the courthouse hallway after appellant’s foreclosure
hearing ended. Appellant complains that the prosecutor’s statement, “she told you the
truth,” at the conclusion of the summarization of O’Malley’s testimony was improper.
{¶43} We find that the above challenge to the prosecutor’s closing argument fails
to satisfy the prosecutorial misconduct standard. The prosecutor’s summarization of
O’Malley’s testimony, including her testimony that she heard someone screaming while
she was inside the courtroom, did not exceed the prosecutor’s ability to comment on what
the evidence has shown and what reasonable inferences may be drawn therefrom.
{¶44} Considering the latitude granted to prosecutors, and our review of the entire
record, we find that the prosecutor was not attempting to express her personal opinion
regarding O’Malley’s credibility. Rather, the prosecutor was merely rebutting defense
counsel’s statements during closing argument regarding O’Malley’s inability to hear
screaming while she was inside the courtroom. As such, the prosecutor’s comments
were not improper and would not have changed the outcome of appellant’s trial.
{¶45} Likewise, appellant submits that the prosecutor argued at length regarding
matters outside the record, including references to “the overtime that was probably paid to
people because their hours got extended” and to “other people who may have needed an
emergency vehicle that didn’t get it.” On consideration of the prosecutor’s closing
argument in its entirety, we are unable to conclude that the outcome of appellant’s
resisting arrest conviction would have been different absent the statements regarding the
potential collateral effects of appellant’s alleged feigned heart condition.
{¶46} Accordingly, appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled.
III. Privilege from Arrest
{¶47} In her fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court
committed prejudicial error and violated her due process rights by refusing to find that
she was privileged from arrest under R.C. 2331.11.
{¶48} R.C. 2331.11 grants privilege from arrest to witnesses while going to,
attending, or returning from court. However, the privilege granted to witnesses by R.C.
2331.11 relates only to civil arrest while going to, attending, or returning from court,
and such sections do not privilege witnesses from arrest for crimes or misdemeanors at
such times. See State v. Wright, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-470, 2004-Ohio-677, ¶ 6, citing
Akron v. Mingo, 169 Ohio St. 511, 160 N.E.2d 225 (1959), at syllabus.
{¶49} Despite appellant’s argument to the contrary, the warrant issued for her
arrest was criminal in nature. The record reflects that the arrest warrant issued by the
lower court was predicated on appellant’s underlying misdemeanor charges pending in
the Lyndhurst Municipal Court for petty theft. Therefore, appellant’s arrest did not fall
under the privilege from civil arrests granted in R.C. 2331.11.
{¶50} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Admission of Photocopied Document
{¶51} In her fifth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court abused
its discretion by permitting the city to introduce into evidence a photocopy of a certified
copy of the Lyndhurst Municipal Court’s June 20, 2008 journal entry. Appellant
contends that the photocopied document was not properly authenticated in accordance
with the Rules of Evidence.
{¶52} As previously stated, the admission and exclusion of evidence is within the
sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Mays, 108 Ohio App.3d 598, 671 N.E.2d 553(8th Dist.1996).
{¶53} Evid.R. 1003 governs the admissibility of duplicates and states: “A
duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is
raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair
to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.”
{¶54} In the present case, the trial court correctly found that there was no genuine
issue as to the authenticity of the original journal entry. The document was generated by
the Lyndhurst Municipal Court and therefore constituted a certified public record that was
self-authenticated pursuant to Evid.R. 902(4). Furthermore, appellant does not aver that
the information contained in the photocopied document is inaccurate or altered from the
original. Hence, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
duplicated document into evidence. See State v. Pisarkiewicz, 9th Dist. No. 2996-M,
2000-Ohio-6609, *6, citing Akron v. Martin, 9th Dist. No. 17286, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS
32, *4 (Jan. 10, 1996) (finding that a facsimile copy of a municipal court record complied
with the requirements of Evid.R. 902).
{¶55} Appellant’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶56} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cleveland
Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction
having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial
court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
APPENDIX
Appellant’s Assignments of Error:
I. Ms. Coleman’s conviction for resisting arrest is not supported by sufficient
evidence because the City failed to establish that the arrest was made on the authority of a
valid arrest warrant or in the manner prescribed by Ohio Criminal Rule 4. Thus, her
conviction and sentence violate Ms. Coleman’s right to due process under the Ohio and
United States Constitutions.
II. Ms. Coleman’s conviction for resisting arrest is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, because the City failed to prove that she resisted the arrest, and the jury lost its
way as to that element under Cleveland Municipal Code section 615.08(a).
III. The City’s presentation of unfairly prejudicial other acts evidence and its
misconduct in closing arguments was so egregious that it denied Ms. Coleman a fair trial
and deprived her of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16, of the Ohio Constitution.
IV. The trial court committed prejudicial error and violated Ms. Coleman’s due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 16, of the Ohio Constitution by refusing to find that she was privileged
from arrest under R.C. 2331.11.
V. The trial court committed prejudicial error and violated Ms. Coleman’s due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 16, of the Ohio Constitution by overruling her objection to Plaintiff’s
Exhibit 1 and allowing the jury to consider an unauthenticated exhibit to establish proof
of an element of the offense, i.e., that the arrest was legal.