State v. Triplett , 2012 Ohio 3804 ( 2012 )

[Cite as State v. Triplett, 2012-Ohio-3804.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 97522
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
WALTER TRIPLETT
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-554247
BEFORE: Rocco, J., Jones, P.J., and S. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 23, 2012
-i-
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Rick L. Ferrara
2077 East 4th Street
Second Floor
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Gregory Mussman
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Walter Triplett appeals from his convictions for
involuntary manslaughter and felonious assault with notices of prior convictions (“NPCs”)
and repeat violent offender specifications (“RVOs”).
{¶2} Triplett presents ten assignments of error. He claims that (1) his right to a
speedy trial was violated, (2) and (3) his convictions are not supported by either sufficient
evidence or the manifest weight of the evidence, (4) and (8) the trial court provided
confusing jury instructions and improperly refused to provide jury instructions on lesser
included offenses, (5) the trial court permitted the state to introduce improper evidence, (6)
retrial in this case violated his right against successive prosecutions, (7) the trial court did
not make the necessary findings before imposing sentence on the RVOs, (9) the trial court
improperly permitted the state to remove one of the prospective jurors, and (10) the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument.
{¶3} Upon a review of the record, this court cannot find any reversible error occurred
in the trial court. Triplett’s convictions and sentences, consequently, are affirmed.
{¶4} This is the second time this court has considered an appeal filed by Triplett
based upon the underlying incident, which took place in the early morning of April 30,
2009. At that time, Michael Corrado died outside a downtown Cleveland bar called the
Barley House after Triplett punched him in the face. Based upon the incident, Triplett
was indicted on one count of involuntary manslaughter and one count of felonious assault,
both with NPCs and RVOs. The original jury convicted Triplett of felonious assault but
could not arrive at a verdict on the remaining charge, so the trial court declared a mistrial
on that count.
{¶5} After the trial court imposed sentence and the state dismissed the involuntary
manslaughter charge without prejudice, Triplett appealed from his original conviction.1
In State v. Triplett, 192 Ohio App.3d 600, 2011-Ohio-816, 949 N.E.2d 1058 (8th Dist.)
(“Triplett I”), finding that the trial court gave improper jury instructions, this court
reversed Triplett’s original conviction for felonious assault and remanded the case for a
new trial.
{¶6} Triplett I was issued on February 24, 2011. In July 2011, the supreme court
declined to accept any further appeal, so the case returned to the trial court. In August
2011, Triplett’s defense counsel notified the trial court that he would not be available for
retrial until October 11, 2011.
{¶7} On September 9, 2011, the state issued a new indictment against Triplett; he
was again charged with involuntary manslaughter and felonious assault with NPCs and
RVOs. The first case was dismissed. Triplett’s retrial commenced on October 11, 2011.
1Pursuant to this court’s previous decisions, a question should have arisen
concerning whether Triplett’s original appeal should have been dismissed for lack of
a final appealable order, but the issue was not raised either by the parties or by this
court sua sponte. See, e.g., State v. Cole, 8th Dist. No. 88722, 2007-Ohio-3076;
compare State v. Manns, 5th Dist. No. 11-CA-28, 2012-Ohio-234. The matter will
be further considered later in this opinion.
{¶8} At the conclusion of the proceedings, the jury found Triplett guilty on both
counts, and subsequently also found Triplett guilty on the NPCs and RVOs. Triplett
ultimately received a twenty-year prison sentence.
{¶9} He presents ten assignments of error that will be addressed in logical order and
together when appropriate. Triplett’s first assignment of error states:
“I. Defendant was denied due process of law by lapse of speedy trial time.”
{¶10} As he did in his previous appeal, Triplett claims his second trial in this case
did not commence within the time limitations set by R.C. 2945.71. He asserts that he “sat
in prison” from the date of his “appellate victory” in the first appeal on March 1, 2011 to
the time his second trial commenced on October 11, 2011, and that this time counted in
addition to the time expended before his first trial commenced.
{¶11} Triplett raised a speedy trial issue in his prior appeal, and this court found that
his failure to raise the speedy trial issue in the trial court precluded any consideration of it
on appeal. Triplett I, ¶ 6. Although he presented the issue to the trial court in his retrial,
the speedy trial provisions of R.C. 2945.71 do not apply to retrials following an appeal.
State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); State v. Hull, 110 Ohio St.3d
183, 2006-Ohio-4252, 852 N.E.2d 706, paragraph one of the syllabus. Because Triplett’s
retrial commenced on the exact date that his defense counsel became available, his retrial
took place within a reasonable time. Id., paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶12} Triplett’s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶13} Triplett’s sixth assignment of error states:
“VI. Defendant was twice placed in jeopardy by means of successive
indictments for involuntary manslaughter.”
{¶14} Triplett argues that the state’s reindictment of him on the charge upon which
the trial court declared a mistrial, and that the state previously dismissed without prejudice,
violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This
court disagrees.
{¶15} The Double Jeopardy Clause bars successive prosecutions for the same
offense. State v. Brewer, 121 Ohio St.3d 202, 2009-Ohio-593, 903 N.E.2d 284, ¶ 16.
The clause does not bar retrial of a defendant who on direct appeal successfully overturns
his conviction on the basis of trial error. Id. Moreover, if a mistrial was properly granted
on a charge, jeopardy on that charge does not attach. State v. Glover, 35 Ohio St.3d 18,
517 N.E.2d 900 (1988); State v. Bobby, 8th Dist. No. 50455, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 6699(May 8, 1986).
{¶16} Identical to this case, the indictment in Triplett I carried two counts, viz.,
involuntary manslaughter and felonious assault. 2 Because the jury could not reach a
verdict on Count 1, the charge of involuntary manslaughter, the trial court properly granted
a mistrial on that count.
{¶17} The record of Triplett I reflects that Triplett wanted to appeal from his
conviction on Count 2, the felonious assault charge. In order to expedite Triplett’s right
2 This
court granted Triplett’s motion to supplement the record with the
record in Triplett I.
to appeal, the state dismissed Count 1 “without prejudice” pending the outcome of
Triplett’s appeal. Compare State v. Sims, 8th Dist. No. 85608, 2005-Ohio-5846, fn. 1
(Rocco, J., dissenting) (the two counts of the indictment were “allied offenses,” therefore,
the state’s dismissal of one count without prejudice allowed the defendant’s appeal of her
other conviction to proceed).
{¶18} Thus, when this court reversed Triplett’s conviction and remanded the case
for a new trial, the matter “proceed[ed] from the point at which the error occurred.” State
ex rel. Douglas v. Burlew, 106 Ohio St.3d 180, 2005-Ohio-4382, 833 N.E.2d 293, ¶ 11,
quoting State ex rel. Stevenson v. Murray, 69 Ohio St.2d 112, 113, 431 N.E.2d 324 (1982).
Triplett’s overturned conviction was the underlying offense for the involuntary
manslaughter charge. This court’s decision in Triplett I, i.e., that the jury received
improper instructions prior to convicting Triplett on the felonious assault count, permitted
a new trial on both counts. Under these circumstances, the state’s dismissal of the entire
prior case and reindictment of Triplett on both counts did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. State v. O’Neill, 6th Dist. No. WD-10-029, 2011-Ohio-5688; Bobby, 8th Dist.
No. 50455 (May 8, 1986).
{¶19} Accordingly, Triplett’s sixth assignment of error also is overruled.
{¶20} In his ninth assignment of error, Triplett states:
“IX. The trial court erred when it overruled defendant’s Batson challenge.”
{¶21} Triplett argues that the trial court failed to adequately address the issue of
whether the state used a peremptory challenge to a juror intentionally in order to exclude
members of his race. This argument is without merit.
{¶22} The state cannot use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors either solely on
account of their race or on the assumption that minority jurors as a group are unable to
impartially consider the state’s case against the defendant. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Thus, if the defendant can make a prima facie
showing that the prosecutor used his peremptory strikes against potential jurors in a
racially discriminatory fashion, the burden shifts to the state to come forward with a
neutral explanation for the exclusion. Id., at 96-98.
{¶23} The record reflects that, although the state’s first peremptory challenge was
not utilized to excuse a juror of Triplett’s race, Triplett raised this issue when the state
used its second peremptory challenge. The record further reflects Triplett himself already
had used a peremptory challenge to a member of his own race. Under these
circumstances, Triplett failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination. State v.
Brown, 8th Dist. No. 52593, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 3020 (July 28, 1988).
{¶24} Moreover, Triplett’s defense counsel questioned the prosecutor’s action, so
the prosecutor explained that the juror seemed to be “opinionated” and thus unable to
decide the case in an impartial manner. The trial court accepted the explanation. A
review of the record fails to support a conclusion that the trial court’s decision was
“clearly erroneous.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114
L.Ed.2d 395 (1991).
{¶25} Consequently, Triplett’s ninth assignment of error also is overruled.
{¶26} Triplett’s third and second assignments of error state:
“III. Insufficient evidence supported a conviction for involuntary
manslaughter or felonious assault.
“II. The manifest weight of the evidence did not support a conviction for
involuntary manslaughter or felonious assault.”
{¶27} In these assignments of error, Triplett challenges the sufficiency and the
manifest weight of the evidence adduced to support his convictions.
{¶28} A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction
requires a court to determine whether the state has met its burden of production at trial.
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). In a review the evidence
for sufficiency, courts are to assess whether, after viewing the state’s evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶29} The test for manifest weight requires the appellate court to determine whether
the state has met its burden of persuasion. Thompkins, at 390. When a defendant asserts
that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court sits as
a “thirteenth juror.” Id. at 387. The court reviews the entire record, weighs the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, and considers the credibility of the witnesses. Id.,
citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1983).
{¶30} The appellate court must be mindful, however, that the weight of the evidence
and the credibility of witnesses are matters primarily for the trier of fact to assess. State v.
DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1987), paragraph one of the syllabus.
Therefore, a reviewing court will not reverse a verdict when the trier of fact could
reasonably conclude from substantial evidence that the prosecution proved the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Moreover, in reviewing a claim that a conviction is
against the manifest weight of the evidence, the conviction cannot be reversed unless it is
obvious that the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of
justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Garrow, 103
Ohio App.3d 368, 659 N.E.2d 814 (4th Dist. 1995).
{¶31} In this case, Triplett argues in his third assignment of error that he acted in
defense of his sister and that the state provided no evidence to rebut the claim. This court
advises Triplett, however, that a self-defense argument is inappropriate in considering
sufficiency of the evidence. A defendant’s claim of defense of another does not negate
any element of the offenses of involuntary manslaughter or felonious assault, but rather
affirmatively seeks to relieve the defendant of culpability. State v. Dykas, 185 Ohio
App.3d 763, 2010-Ohio-359, 925 N.E.2d 685, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), citing Cleveland v.
Williams, 8th Dist. No. 81369, 2003-Ohio-31.
{¶32} In this case, viewing the evidence presented by the state in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, the test for sufficiency was met. The testimony established
that Triplett and his group had been forced to leave the Barley House because of an
altercation with a group of white males. Triplett was “agitated” by the situation.
Because the white males followed Triplett’s group out into the street a fight commenced.
Triplett removed his shirt in preparation to engage in it; his sister inserted herself into it.
The victim was standing behind Triplett’s sister. To her front, another man made an
aggressive move toward her. Although Triplett’s sister “ducked,” thus remaining
unharmed, Triplett ran up to the scene. Triplett immediately punched the victim with
such force as to fracture his facial bones and lift him off his feet, causing the victim to fly
backward. When the victim fell, the back of his head slammed against the concrete curb.
Only after hitting the victim did Triplett turn to strike the man who had “threatened” his
sister. Although the second man lost consciousness briefly, he quickly recovered and ran
from the scene.
{¶33} From this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could find that Triplett intended
to cause serious physical harm to the victim, and that the victim’s death proximately
resulted from Triplett’s act. State v. Brown, 9th Dist. No. 17421, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS
1150 (Mar. 27, 1996). The evidence was thus sufficient to establish the elements of
felonious assault and involuntary manslaughter. Dykas, ¶ 17.
{¶34} The jury also acted within its prerogative to reject Triplett’s claim of “defense
of another.” The testimony proved Triplett’s sister put herself in harm’s way but was
never hurt during the melee. Moreover, all of the witnesses, and Triplett himself,
conceded that while the victim had not made any threatening gestures toward his sister,
Triplett attacked the victim first, and did so with enough force to fracture the victim’s
facial bones. Dykas, at
¶ 20; State v. Franklin, 11th Dist. No. 2010-G-2979, 2012-Ohio-1267. Indeed, one of the
defense witnesses testified Triplett’s punch was the hardest she had ever seen. Only when
the victim was fully incapacitated did Triplett turn to strike at the man who had actually
caused his sister to duck.
{¶35} Based upon the record, Triplett’s third and second assignments of error lack
merit. They are consequently overruled.
{¶36} Triplett’s fifth assignment of error states:
“V. The trial court erred by allowing to [sic] the state to repeatedly elicit
evidence of defendant’s stale convictions.”
{¶37} In this assignment of error, Triplett argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when it overruled his objection to the prosecutor’s questions of him on
cross-examination about to his prior criminal record. Because the prosecutor began with
convictions dating from 1998, Triplett asserts the questions and his answers violated
Evid.R. 609(B).
{¶38} Evid.R. 609 addresses impeachment of a witness by evidence of conviction of
a crime, stating in relevant part:
(A)(2) * * * [E]vidence that the accused has been convicted of a
crime is admissible if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year pursuant to the law under which the accused was
convicted and if the court determines that the probative value of the
evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the
issues, or of misleading the jury.
(B) Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more
than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness
from the confinement, or the termination of probation, or shock probation * * * unless the
court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction
supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial
effect. (Emphasis added.)
{¶39} Therefore, Evid.R. 609(B) requires a trial court to set forth “specific facts” on the record that
reflect the facts and circumstances justifying the admission of the “stale” conviction. State v. Shepherd,
8th Dist. No. 81926, 2003-Ohio-3356, ¶ 23, citing State v. Fluellen, 88 Ohio App.3d 18, 623 N.E.2d 98(4th Dist. 1993). Stale convictions, moreover, should be admitted only in rare circumstances. Id.Nevertheless, a trial court has discretion to determine whether the evidence should be admitted. State v.
Maddox, 8th Dist. No. 72765, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2408 (June 4, 1998); State v. Waldon, 8th Dist.
No. 59596, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 5303 (Nov. 7, 1991).
{¶40} In this case, the evidence of Triplett’s convictions dating from 1998 and 1999 was
inadmissible without a determination by the trial court that the probative value of this evidence
outweighed its prejudicial effect. Evid.R. 609(B). Because the trial court did not make such specific
findings before permitting the state to introduce the evidence, the court clearly erred. Fluellen.
{¶41} Error in the admission of evidence is harmless, however, if there is no
reasonable possibility that exclusion of the evidence would have affected the result of the
trial. State v. Boczar, 11th Dist. No. 2007-A-0034, 2008-Ohio-834, ¶ 50, citing State v.
Webb, 70 Ohio St.3d 325, 335, 638 N.E.2d 1023 (1994), for the premise that
“nonconstitutional error is harmless if there is substantial other evidence to support the
guilty verdict.” In order to determine whether the admission of testimony on the prior
convictions is prejudicial, the appellate court must review that evidence in light of the
totality of other evidence properly introduced by the prosecution at trial. Id. The
admission of the testimony regarding past convictions will be deemed harmless error if
there is overwhelming evidence of guilt. Id.; see also State v. Walker, 8th Dist. No.
94875, 2011-Ohio-1556, ¶ 38.
{¶42} A review of the entire record in this case demonstrates the error was
harmless. The jury could hardly have considered that Triplett was likely to have
committed the offenses in the instant case based upon convictions in 1998 for promoting
prostitution and in 1999 for possession of drugs. In addition, as previously stated, there
was overwhelming evidence of Triplett’s guilt.
{¶43} The prosecutor’s aim in bringing up Triplett’s past, in context, clearly was in
order to impeach Triplett’s credibility, as permitted by Evid.R. 609(A); the prosecutor
mentioned this during closing argument. Moreover, the trial court twice provided a
limiting instruction to the jury about the appropriate use of the evidence. The jury is
presumed to follow the court’s instructions. State v. Ahmed, 103 Ohio St.3d 27,
2004-Ohio-4190, 813 N.E.2d 637, ¶ 93.
{¶44} Based upon the foregoing, this court declines to find reversible error occurred
in this matter; consequently, Triplett’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶45} Triplett’s tenth assignment of error states:
“X. The state committed prosecutorial misconduct by making statements not
supported by the law or the facts during closing arguments.”
{¶46} In this assignment of error, Triplett argues that the prosecutor’s comments
during a portion of his closing argument deprived him of his right to a fair trial. This
court does not agree.
{¶47} The prosecution is normally entitled to a certain degree of latitude in its
concluding remarks. State v. Woodards, 6 Ohio St.2d 14, 26, 215 N.E.2d 568 (1966);
State v. Liberatore, 69 Ohio St.2d 583, 589, 433 N.E.2d 561 (1982). In analyzing a claim
of prosecutorial misconduct, the test is “whether remarks were improper and, if so,
whether they prejudicially affected substantial rights of the accused.” State v. Jones, 90
Ohio St.3d 403, 420, 739 N.E.2d 300 (2000), citing State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14,
470 N.E.2d 883 (1984). Therefore, the focus of the analysis is not on the “culpability of
the prosecutor,” but, rather, the impropriety of the remarks and, if improper, their effect on
the jury. Id.{¶48} Triplet complains that the prosecutor improperly characterized his “punch” at
the victim as “deadly.” However, the prosecutor’s remarks clearly were based upon
evidence that Triplett’s size and weight were significantly greater than the victim’s, and
that the force of Triplett’s blow fractured several bones in the victim’s face. Regardless
of the evidence adduced at trial in Triplett I, the prosecutor’s remarks constituted fair
comments on the evidence presented in this case. State v. Tufts, 8th Dist. No. 94276,
2011-Ohio-73, ¶ 23; State v. Almashni, 8th Dist. No. 92237, 2010-Ohio-898, ¶ 29-30.
{¶49} Because the prosecutor’s comments, therefore, did not rise to the level of
misconduct, Triplett’s tenth assignment of error also is overruled.
{¶50} Triplett’s fourth and eighth assignments of error state:
“IV. The trial court denied Appellant due process of law by issuing
incomplete and confusing jury instructions.
“VIII. The trial court erred in failing to instruct on lesser included offenses.”
{¶51} Triplett argues that the trial court’s instructions to the jury were flawed in
several respects. Because he did not object to the instructions on some of the grounds that
he asserts herein, Triplett claims the trial court committed plain error in instructing the
jury.
{¶52} Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost
caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of
justice. State v. Long 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), at paragraph three of the
syllabus. Appellate review of a trial court’s jury instructions is limited to whether the
lower court abused its discretion. State v. Bagwell, 8th Dist. No. 96419, 2011-Ohio-5841,
¶ 20. Furthermore, jury instructions “may not be judged in artificial isolation but must be
viewed in the context of the overall charge.” State v. Price, 60 Ohio St.2d 136, 398
N.E.2d 772 (1979), paragraph four of the syllabus. When viewed in context, the jury
instructions the trial court provided in this case do not rise to the necessary level to
constitute either plain error or an abuse of discretion.
{¶53} Triplett first asserts the trial court gave an improper definition of the
culpability required to establish his guilt of the offense of felonious assault. “Knowingly”
is defined by R.C. 2901.22(B) as follows:
(B) A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is
aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably
be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he
is aware that such circumstances probably exist.
{¶54} A review of the instructions the trial court provided in this case shows the
trial court essentially tracked the statutory language. Consequently, the trial court
committed no error, plain or otherwise.
{¶55} Triplett next asserts the trial court acted against this court’s mandate in
providing an instruction on “deadly force.” In Triplett I, this court stated in pertinent part:
The record shows that the trial court was concerned that the victim had died and felt
that it was incorrect to instruct on nondeadly force. However, a failure to instruct on
nondeadly force when the death is the result of one punch places the focus on the death
and not the force used (one punch).
***
* * * The ultimate result of death is not the proper focal point when determining
whether to instruct on nondeadly force. [Citations omitted]. When “there is sufficient
evidence on the issue of self-defense involving non-deadly force * * * the trial court must
instruct the jury on that defense.” [Citations omitted.] In this case, the appropriate
instruction would be the defense of another using nondeadly force. We do not agree that
one punch, even when a death occurs, is comparable to deadly force.
* * * [D]eadly force [is defined] in R.C. 2901.01(A)(2) as “any force that carries a
substantial risk that it will proximately result in the death of any person.” [K]nowingly
causing serious harm does not automatically equate to deadly force.
***
In conclusion, the facts of the case should dictate whether the nondeadly-force
instruction is required. In this case, Triplett’s single punch caused the victim to fall, hit
his head, and die. As tragic as this was, even some of the jurors believed that there was
no intent to kill; consequently, on remand the trial court should give the instruction on
nondeadly force as well as the appropriate instructions on defense of another, burden of
proof, and duty to retreat. * * * . (Emphasis added.)
{¶56} The foregoing directive from this court permitted the trial court to consider whether the
evidence warranted an instruction on deadly force as well as nondeadly force. Based upon the evidence
presented from both the prosecution and the defense on retrial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in determining that, depending on which version of the incident was believed, both instructions were
appropriate. State v. Williford, 49 Ohio St.3d 247, 251, 551 N.E.2d 1279 (1990).
{¶57} Triplett next asserts that the trial court gave “confusing” instructions on the defense of
another. This assertion also is rejected for two reasons. First, the record reflects that the trial court
crafted the wording so as to satisfy both the prosecutor and the defense attorney. Second, the
instructions the trial court provided adequately informed the jury that the law permitted Triplett to use the
amount of force in defense of his sister that was justified by the circumstances. Id., paragraph one of the
syllabus.
{¶58} Triplett further asserts that the trial court acted improperly in listing his convictions while
instructing the jury. He acknowledges, however, that 2 Ohio Jury Instructions, Section 401.25 (2011)
provides the trial court with the discretion to do so. In light of the jury instructions as a whole, this court
cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard.
{¶59} Triplett claims in his eighth assignment of error that the evidence warranted a jury
instruction on the lesser included offense of reckless homicide. This claim is rejected.
{¶60} A charge on a lesser included offense is required only when the evidence
presented at trial would reasonably support both an acquittal on the crime charged and a
conviction upon the lesser included offense. State v. Collins, 8th Dist. No. 95415,
2011-Ohio-3241, ¶ 35, citing State v. Thomas, 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 286 (1988),
paragraph two of the syllabus. The court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the defendant when deciding whether to instruct the jury on a lesser included
offense. State v. Campbell, 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 630 N.E.2d 339 (1994). An instruction is
not warranted, however, every time “some evidence” is presented on a lesser included
offense. State v. Trimble, 122 Ohio St.3d 297, 2009-Ohio-2961, 911 N.E.2d 242, ¶ 192.
A trial court has discretion in determining whether the record contains sufficient
evidentiary support to warrant a jury instruction on a lesser included offense; therefore,
this court will not reverse that determination absent an abuse of discretion. State v.
Henderson, 8th Dist. No. 89377, 2008-Ohio-1631, ¶ 10.
{¶61} A conviction for reckless homicide requires proof only that the accused acted
recklessly. R.C. 2903.041(A). “A person acts recklessly when, with heedless
indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that his conduct is
likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(C).
{¶62} Triplett’s defense was that he acted only to defend his sister with the
appropriate amount of force under the circumstances as he perceived them. See, e.g.,
State v. Moss, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-610, 2006-Ohio-1647. Thus, an instruction on the
offense of reckless homicide would have been in contradiction of the evidence adduced at
trial. State v. Kleekamp, 2d Dist. No. 23533, 2010-Ohio-1906, ¶ 61. The trial court,
therefore, did not abuse its discretion in declining to give such an instruction.
{¶63} Triplett’s fourth and eighth assignments of error, accordingly, also are
overruled.
{¶64} In his seventh assignment of error, Triplett states:
“VII. The trial court erred when it failed to make statutorily necessitated
findings before imposing an enhanced penalty for repeat violent offenders.”
{¶65} Triplett argues that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Oregon v.
Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (2009), had the effect of reinstating the
sentencing scheme that was declared unconstitutional by the Ohio Supreme Court in State
v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, paragraph three of the
syllabus. Triplett fails to mention that the Ohio Supreme Court held otherwise in State v.
Hodge, 128 Ohio St.3d 1, 2010-Ohio-6320, 941 N.E.2d 768, at paragraph two of the
syllabus.
{¶66} The Ohio Supreme Court set forth the standard for reviewing felony
sentencing applicable to Triplett’s case in State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23,
2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124. Appellate courts must apply a two-step approach
when analyzing alleged error in a trial court’s sentencing, i.e., they examine the
sentencing court’s compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the
sentence to determine whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law,
then, if the first prong is satisfied, the trial court’s decision is reviewed under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Richmond, 8th Dist. No. 96155, 2011-Ohio-6450, ¶
77.
{¶67} In this case, Triplett’s sentence is within the statutory range, so it does not
violate the first prong of Kalish. Furthermore, the court acted within its discretion in
sentencing Triplett to an additional ten years for the RVOs. Richmond, ¶ 80.
Consequently, Triplett’s seventh assignment of error also is overruled.
{¶68} Triplett’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been
affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for
execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_____________________________________
KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE
LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR