State v. Carey , 2012 Ohio 3359 ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Carey, 
    2012-Ohio-3359
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 97444
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    KIRK CAREY
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-536537
    BEFORE:          Jones, J., Blackmon, A.J., and Keough, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                     July 26, 2012
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Thomas A. Rein
    Leader Building
    Suite 940
    526 Superior Avenue
    Cleveland, Ohio 44114
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    William D. Mason
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    BY: Carrie Heindrichs
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    The Justice Center, 8th Floor
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    LARRY A. JONES, SR., J.:
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Kirk Carey, appeals from the trial court’s decision to
    deny his request to withdraw his plea.     Carey also appeals his 13-year sentence.     We
    affirm.
    Procedural History and Facts
    {¶2} In April 2010, Carey was indicted on several charges.   In September 2011,
    after he was found competent to stand trial, Carey pleaded guilty to amended Counts 1
    and 8 of the indictment, aggravated robbery each with one-year firearm specifications.
    As part of the plea agreement, the state and defense agreed that the two counts would not
    merge for the purpose of sentencing.       The remaining counts of the indictment were
    nolled.
    {¶3} Sentencing took place on October 5, 2011. During the hearing, prior to the
    trial court imposing sentence, Carey requested that he be allowed to withdraw his plea.
    The trial court denied his request.    The court sentenced him to a 13-year prison term,
    which consisted of five years on Count 1, six years on Count 8, one year on each of the
    firearm specifications, with both counts and specifications to run consecutively.
    {¶4} The facts that gave rise to the charges involved two robberies Carey
    committed four days apart, in broad daylight.     The first robbery occurred in Lakeview
    Cemetery and involved a family.        The parents, along with their 7- and 12-year old
    daughters, were visiting the cemetery and the mother was taking photographs.          Carey
    approached the husband and asked if he could use his phone. The husband told him that
    his phone was dead; Carey then demanded the husband’s money. Carey had a gun in his
    waistband and told the husband “don’t make me use this.” After the husband gave
    Carey all his money, Carey demanded the keys to the family’s vehicle.       Carey drove off
    in the family’s car, which had in it approximately $12,000 worth of photography
    equipment, as well as other personal effects belonging to the family.
    {¶5} The second robbery occurred on Coventry Road in Cleveland Heights.
    Carey approached the victim, robbed him at gunpoint, got his car keys, and fled the scene
    in the victim’s vehicle.
    {¶6} Carey now assigns the following errors for our review:
    [I.] The trial court erred in not allowing Appellant to withdraw his guilty
    plea prior to sentencing.
    [II.] Appellant did not enter his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, or
    voluntarily because the trial court failed to properly inform him of his rights
    as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b), as it did not specifically inform that the
    court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed to with judgment and
    sentence.
    [III.] Appellant’s sentences are contrary to law.
    Law and Analysis
    {¶7} For his first assigned error, Carey contends that the trial court’s denial of his
    request to withdraw his plea was an abuse of discretion. For his second assigned error,
    Carey contends that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made
    because the trial court did not inform that upon acceptance of the plea, the court may
    proceed with judgment and sentence.     We disagree.
    {¶8} Under Crim.R. 32.1, “[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest
    may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court
    after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to
    withdraw his or her plea.”    This court has treated a motion to withdraw a plea made at
    the sentencing hearing, prior to the court imposing a sentence, as a presentence motion.
    See, e.g., State v. Clere, 
    187 Ohio App.3d 682
    , 
    2010-Ohio-2884
    , 
    933 N.E.2d 333
     (8th
    Dist.), ¶ 15-16; State v. Nicholson, 8th Dist. No. 91652, 
    2009-Ohio-3592
    , ¶ 26, 29; State
    v. Nicholson, 8th Dist. No. 82825, 
    2004-Ohio-2394
    , ¶ 6-7. This court has further held
    that a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea need not be written. Nicholson, at ¶
    8 (“Defendant’s oral motion on the day of sentencing was * * * adequate.”)
    {¶9} The general rule is that motions to withdraw guilty pleas before sentencing
    are to be freely and liberally allowed. State v. Peterseim, 
    68 Ohio App.2d 211
    , 214, 
    428 N.E.2d 863
     (8th Dist.1980), citing Barker v. United States, 
    579 F.2d 1219
    , 1223 (10th
    Cir.1978). However, a defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty
    plea prior to sentencing. State v. Xie, 
    62 Ohio St.3d 521
    , 
    584 N.E.2d 715
     (1992),
    paragraph one of the syllabus.   In ruling on a presentence motion to withdraw a plea, the
    court must conduct a hearing and decide whether there is a reasonable and legitimate
    basis for withdrawal of the plea. 
    Id.
     The decision to grant or deny such a motion is
    within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
    Id.
     at paragraph two of the syllabus.
    {¶10} The record here demonstrates that at the beginning of the sentencing hearing
    the trial court asked the parties if there was any reason not to proceed.   Carey’s attorney
    responded “no.”    The trial court then allowed the state to proceed, and the assistant
    prosecuting attorney discussed the severity of the crimes and Carey’s extensive criminal
    history. Carey’s attorney then spoke on his behalf. One of the victims spoke next
    about the impact of the crime on himself and his family. Carey then had the opportunity
    to address the court and began by apologizing for his actions. Carey then disputed one
    of his prior convictions, and after the court told him that “[i]t’s uncontroverted that you
    have that robbery conviction in Summit County,” Carey asked to withdraw his plea; the
    court denied his request.
    {¶11} On this record, we find that Carey merely had a change of heart, which is
    not a sufficient ground to withdraw a plea. State v. Deloach, 2d Dist. No. 21422,
    
    2006-Ohio-6303
    , ¶ 17.       The record here demonstrates that Carey was represented by
    counsel who competently advocated on his behalf throughout the proceedings. Further,
    our review of the record shows that the trial court complied with the constitutional and
    procedural safeguards contained within Crim.R. 11. We overrule Carey’s argument that
    his plea was invalid because the trial court failed to inform him that upon acceptance of
    his plea the court could immediately proceed to judgment and sentence.       Carey was not
    immediately sentenced; rather sentencing occurred approximately two weeks after the
    plea, after a presentence investigation report had been completed.    Carey, therefore, was
    not prejudiced by the court’s omission.         See State v. Johnson, 11th Dist. No.
    2002-L-024, 
    2004-Ohio-331
    , ¶ 20.
    {¶12} In light of the above, the first and second assignments of error are overruled.
    {¶13} In his final assignment of error, Carey contends that the trial court erred in
    sentencing him to consecutive terms.
    {¶14} We review felony sentences under the standard set forth in State v. Kalish,
    
    120 Ohio St.3d 23
    , 
    2008-Ohio-4912
    , 
    896 N.E.2d 124
    . First, we examine the sentencing
    court’s compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to
    determine whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law.     If this first
    prong is satisfied, the trial court’s decision is then reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion
    standard.
    {¶15} Through the enactment of H.B. 86, the General Assembly recently amended
    Ohio’s sentencing statutes.   H.B. 86 became effective on September 30, 2011, and Carey
    was sentenced on October 5, 2011; therefore, the amendments were applicable to him.
    Relative to this appeal, the revisions under H.B. 86 now require a trial court to make
    specific    findings   when   imposing   consecutive    sentences.     Specifically,   R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4) provides as follows:
    (4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of
    multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison
    terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is
    necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender
    and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of
    the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,
    and if the court also finds any of the following:
    (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
    offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
    pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or
    was under post-release control for a prior offense.
    (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or
    more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
    multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
    prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
    of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
    (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
    consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
    by the offender.
    {¶16} In sentencing Carey, the trial court stated in relevant part the following:
    You have a long criminal history. And it’s surprising in some respects to
    see that it looks like it’s escalating with your age rather than de-escalating.
    You do have an extensive record. I believe you’ve been to prison on at
    least 8 separate occasions. You have violated supervision when placed on
    supervision. I take exception to the fact that you say that they have been
    all petty — I think is the word you used — offenses.
    ***
    This is bad conduct. You’ve been sent to prison for years and years.
    ***
    But this is a public safety issue. And after doing that to this family and
    taking their car, 4 days later another robbery with a gun on a public busy
    street. You’re dangerous. You have a high risk of re-offending. * * *
    ***
    And I know that your attorney is begging for concurrent time. I’m making
    a finding that I do not believe, given the factors I’ve stated on the record
    here today, such as the seriousness of the offense [and] the danger posed by
    you, that that is an appropriate sentence to impose. And that is the finding
    that I make and I’ve given reasons for it, as well.
    {¶17} On this record, we find that the trial court made the statutorily mandated
    findings for the imposition of consecutive sentences. The third assignment of error is
    therefore overruled.
    {¶18} Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
    been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.     Case remanded to the trial court
    for execution of sentence.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    LARRY A. JONES, SR., JUDGE
    PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, A.J., and
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 97444

Citation Numbers: 2012 Ohio 3359

Judges: Jones

Filed Date: 7/26/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016