Li v. Yang ( 2012 )

[Cite as Li v. Yang, 2012-Ohio-2491.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 96741
WEIQI VINCENT LI
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
JIHONG YANG
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Domestic Relations Division
Case No. D-243475
BEFORE: Celebrezze, J., Blackmon, A.J., and Rocco, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 7, 2012
FOR APPELLANT
Jihong Yang, pro se
810 Cobblestone Lane
Lancaster, Pennsylvania 17601
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
James S. Cahn
James L. Lane
Hermann, Cahn & Schneider
The Galleria at Erieview
1301 East Ninth Street
Suite 500
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
FOR CUYAHOGA SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Kestra Smith
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
C.S.E.A.
P.O. Box 93923
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jihong Yang (“appellant”), appeals the decision of the
domestic relations court modifying the child support obligation of plaintiff-appellee,
Weiqi Vincent Li (“appellee”).
{¶2} The parties were married on August 31, 1991. During the marriage, they had
one child, a son, born March 2, 1993. On October 19, 1995, appellee filed for divorce in
the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. A divorce
was eventually granted; the remainder of the proceedings in the trial court revolved
around child support and visitation issues.
{¶3} After the parties were divorced, appellee remarried. Appellee’s new wife,
Karen Qin Yuan (“Karen”), owns all of the stock in a Subchapter S corporation, initially
known as American Asian Connection and now known as KQ Yuan Enterprises. The
business involves franchises that make sushi to be placed in area grocery stores for a
California corporation known as Advanced Fresh Concepts Franchise Corporation
(“AFC”). At one point, the sushi business was incorporated in appellee’s name.
According to appellee, the business was in his name because it was a franchise of a
California corporation that required specialized training in order to become a franchisee.
Because appellee’s new wife speaks little English, appellee completed the training in his
wife’s place, and the business was placed in his name. When appellee returned with the
franchise license, Karen operated the sushi business on her own.
{¶4} In 2006, AFC permitted Karen to transfer the ownership of American Asian
Connection into her own name without taking the training course in California. Karen
transferred ownership of her primary sushi-making business into her own name, renaming
the business KQ Yuan Enterprises, L.L.C.
{¶5} Karen owns and operates two other businesses without the assistance of
appellee. The first, Taco Amigo, is a small restaurant in the Galleria Mall in Cleveland,
Ohio. The second is the American Asian Enterprise, which is a small sushi restaurant in
the Galleria Mall. The restaurants were losing money, and so on August 1, 2008, Karen
transferred her ownership interests to a business partner.
{¶6} In April 2006, an administrative hearing was held in the Cuyahoga County
Child Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA”) at the request of appellee, who was
seeking a modification of his child support obligation. As a result of that hearing, CSEA
determined that appellee’s support obligation should be increased from $210 per month to
$1,309.84 per month, plus a two percent processing fee, for a total of $1,336.04 per
month.1
{¶7} On October 13, 2006, appellee requested a hearing in the domestic relations
court to review CSEA’s child support determination. The domestic relations court set a
general hearing for December 18, 2006. On December 19, 2006, appellant filed a
This amount was based on income attributed from the businesses appellee asserts are owned
1
and operated solely by his wife.
motion to modify child support and a motion to show cause alleging that appellee had
failed to pay medical expenses as required by his child support obligation.
{¶8} After several continuances of the hearing date, the trial court scheduled a full
evidentiary hearing for May 20, 2008 and informed the parties that no further
continuances would be granted. At the conclusion of the May 20, 2008 hearing, the
parties notified the court that they had reached a settlement agreement and intended to file
an agreed judgment entry to that effect. The parties were given until June 10, 2008 to
file the agreed judgment entry. However, prior to the June 10, 2008 deadline, appellant
discharged her counsel, who withdrew from the matter.
{¶9} On July 1, 2008, appellant filed a motion requesting a hearing on child
support modification and nonpayment of medical expenses. The trial court set a general
hearing for August 1, 2008. On July 16, 2008, however, the trial court issued a journal
entry that adopted CSEA’s determination and raised appellee’s child support obligation to
$1,336.04 per month. This left nonpayment of medical expenses to be the only issue to
be addressed at the August 1, 2008 hearing.
{¶10} On July 22, 2008, appellee filed a motion to vacate the trial court’s
judgment entry that raised his child support obligation. He also requested a hearing on
his objections to CSEA’s determination.
{¶11} On August 1, 2008, the trial court granted appellee’s motion to vacate and
stated that it was granting appellee’s motion for a hearing before a magistrate on his
objections to CSEA’s administrative modification of his child support obligation. The
trial court held the hearing the same day.
{¶12} On August 8, 2008, the magistrate issued her decision, wherein she lowered
appellee’s child support obligation to $433.64 per month, which included a two percent
processing fee. Appellant filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. Appellant
alleged that appellee had an interest in the sushi businesses and that appellee placed the
sushi businesses in his wife’s name to lower his child support obligation. Appellant
argued that the income from the sushi businesses should be imputed to appellee when
determining his child support obligation.
{¶13} On September 22, 2008, the trial judge overruled appellant’s objections and
adopted the magistrate’s decision. Appellant filed her notice of appeal on October 16,
2008.
{¶14} In Li v. Yang, 8th Dist. No. 92258, 2010-Ohio-6574, this court reversed and
remanded the decision of the trial court on the basis that appellant was not given 30 days
notice, in accordance with R.C. 3119.67, before a hearing was held for the purposes of
calculating child support.
{¶15} On remand, the matter came before the magistrate for hearing on October
18, 2010. The magistrate issued her decision on December 28, 2010. Therein, the
magistrate concluded that CSEA’s recommended child support order was incorrect.
Accordingly, the magistrate prepared revised child support computation worksheets2 and
found that appellee’s child support obligations were as follows:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
commencing 09/01/2004, Obligor WEI QI VINCENT LI shall pay to
obligee, JI HONG YANG or her assignee(s), the sum of $578.42 per month,
plus 2% processing charge; that commencing 01/01/2005, he shall pay her
$317.83 per month, plus 2% processing charge; that commencing
01/01/2006, he shall pay $400.92 per month, plus 2% processing charge per
month, plus 2% processing charge; that commencing 01/01/2007, he shall
pay $354.75 per month, plus 2% processing charge; and that commencing
01/01/2009, he shall pay $527.08 per month, plus 2% processing charge for
the support of minor child: Noah Daniel Li — dob: 03/02/1993 ($537.62
per month including 2% charge).
***
Obligor WEI QI VINCENT LI shall pay an additional $105.42 per month
toward the support arrearage which results from the retroactivity of this
modification. The arrearage is undermined, and is owed to Obligee, JI
HONG YANG her assignee(s), and/or the Cuyahoga Support Enforcement
Agency (CSEA). Total monthly support order is $643.04.
{¶16} On April 5, 2011, the trial court issued a judgment entry adopting the
magistrate’s decision in its entirety.
{¶17} Appellant, pro se, brings this timely appeal raising three assignments of
error for review. We note that
“an appellate court will ordinarily indulge a pro se litigant where there is
some semblance of compliance with the appellate rules.” However, pro se
litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures
and are held to the same standards as litigants who are represented by
The magistrate found that appellee’s income for child support purposes was $36,866 in
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2004, $19,562.78 in 2005, $25,003.50 in 2006, $30,289 in 2007, $30,703 in 2008, and $48,190 in
2009. The magistrate found that appellant’s income for child support purposes was $44,884 in 2004,
$47,157 in 2005, $47,479 in 2006, $52,661 in 2007, $48,248 in 2008, and $57,680 in 2009.
counsel. Thomas McGuire Bail Bond Co. v. Hairston, 8th Dist. No. 89307,
2007-Ohio-6648, at ¶ 6, quoting Delaney v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth.,
8th Dist. No. 65714, 1994 WL 326097 (July 7, 1994).
Law and Analysis
Standard of Review
{¶18} A trial court’s ruling on objections to a magistrate’s decision will not be
reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Gobel v. Rivers, 8th Dist. No. 94148,
2010-Ohio-4493, ¶ 16. Furthermore, when reviewing the propriety of a trial court’s
determination in a domestic relations case, an appellate court generally applies an abuse
of discretion standard. Gray v. Gray, 8th Dist. No. 95532, 2011-Ohio-4091, at ¶ 7, citing
Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 541 N.E.2d 1028 (1989). This includes a trial
court’s decision regarding a child support obligation. Jarvis v. Witter, 8th Dist. No.
84128, 2004-Ohio-6628, at ¶ 8, overruled on other grounds; Siebert v. Tavarez, 8th Dist.
No. 88310, 2007-Ohio-2643, at fn. 2.
{¶19} An abuse of discretion implies that the court’s attitude was unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v.
Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). “Abuse of discretion” is a
term of art, describing a judgment neither comporting with the record, nor reason. See,
e.g., State v. Ferranto, 112 Ohio St. 667, 676-678, 148 N.E. 362 (1925). “A decision is
unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support that decision.”
AAAA Ent., Inc. v. River Place Comm. Urban Redevelopment, 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161,
553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). Further, an abuse of discretion may be found when the trial
court “applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on
clearly erroneous findings of fact.” Thomas v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 401,
2008-Ohio-1720, 892 N.E.2d 454, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.).
I. Calculation of Income
{¶20} In her first assignment of error, appellant raises several arguments relating
to the trial court’s handling of appellee’s income for child support purposes.
{¶21} Initially, appellant contends that the trial court’s child support order
“disregarded” pertinent financial records. When determining a parent’s income for
purposes of calculating child support, R.C. 3119.05(A) provides:
[t]he parents’ current and past income and personal earnings shall be
verified * * * with suitable documents, including, but not limited to, pay
stubs, employer statements, receipt and expense vouchers related to
self-generated income, tax returns, and all supporting documents and
schedules for the tax returns.
{¶22} In this matter, the record is clear that the trial court complied with the
requirements of R.C. 3119.05(A) when calculating appellee’s child support obligation.
The record reflects that when compiling appellee’s child support computation worksheets,
as required by R.C. 3119.022, the trial court relied on numerous financial documents,
including appellee’s 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 joint tax returns; copies of
the 2007 and 2008 1120 S returns for KQ Yuan Enterprises L.L.C.; and a copy of the
franchise agreement between AFC and Karen dated February 23, 2007. Accordingly, we
are unable to conclude that the trial court disregarded pertinent financial records when
calculating appellee’s child support obligation.
{¶23} Additionally, appellant contends that appellee fraudulently under reported
his income. In particular, appellant claims that appellee and his wife overstated their
costs of goods sold, overstated their wages paid to employees, and claimed false and
exaggerated business losses in Taco Amigo and American Asian Enterprise to hide
income. We find no merit to appellant’s broad allegations. Appellant has failed to
present any competent or credible evidence that appellee presented the trial court with
fraudulent financial information. As stated by the magistrate, “there is no convincing
evidence presented by an accountant or other expert or any other forensic evidence that
the figures contained in the tax returns were incorrect.” Appellant, through her attorney,
had the opportunity to cross-examine appellee and Karen about their financial records and
failed to present any testimony to substantiate her claim of fraud.
{¶24} Finally, appellant contends that appellee and Karen mislead the magistrate
by providing false testimony during the October 18, 2010 hearing. Appellant submits
that appellee has continuously controlled the day-to-day operations of the sushi business
and has fraudulently placed the business under Karen’s name to minimize his child
support obligation.
{¶25} At the October 18, 2010 hearing, appellee testified that he has been
employed full time at Case Western Reserve University (“CWRU”) since 2005, presently
earning approximately $16,985 annually. It is the highest paying job he can find in the
current job market. Appellee testified that he has a masters degree in Industrial
Engineering, but has been unsuccessful in obtaining an engineering job in his field.
{¶26} During his direct testimony, appellee explained that in 2004, AFC informed
Karen that she was required to take a test in order to obtain a sushi franchise. Appellee
testified that, based on Karen’s difficulties with the English language, he took the
mandated test and obtained the franchise in his name. However, he has almost no
involvement in the day-to-day operations of the sushi business. He stated that the most
involvement he has had with any of her businesses has been delivering sushi a few hours
per week. The AFC franchise was held in appellee’s name until AFC allowed Karen to
transfer the sushi franchises into her name in 2006. The franchise agreements between
Karen and AFC were offered into evidence as plaintiff’s exhibit Nos. 12 and 13.
{¶27} Karen testified that she has been married to appellee for 13 years.3 When
she initially started the sushi business, no training was required and appellee was not
involved. She stated that when AFC began to require training in 2002, she did not know
enough English to pass the course. Therefore, appellant took AFC’s mandated training
courses and obtained the franchise under his name. Karen testified that in 2002, 2003,
and 2004, appellee was in school and did not participate in the sushi business. In 2005,
appellee worked for free at CWRU until he obtained a full-time position as a research
assistant. Karen admitted that appellee occasionally assists the business in making sushi
deliveries and completing miscellaneous tasks, such as faxing sales reports and sending
emails. Appellee fills in at the sushi business approximately once a week and receives an
Karen does not speak fluent English, and Maichen Mao was sworn to interpret her
3
testimony to the court.
hourly wage of $8 per hour for his work. Karen testified that she is the sole owner of the
stock in KQ Yuan Enterprises, and appellee has never been an owner or operator of her
business.
{¶28} Based on the testimony of appellee and Karen, the magistrate attributed all
income earned by the AFC franchise to appellee for the years the franchise was in his
name. However, the trial court concluded that since 2006, Karen has been the sole
owner and operator of the sushi business. Therefore, the magistrate concluded, “there
was no convincing or persuasive evidence that all sushi business income from KQ Yuan
Enterprises should be imputed to Obligor.”4
{¶29} We find no evidence that the magistrate was misled or that appellee and
Karen presented false testimony. The trial court, as the trier of fact, was in the best
position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses, and we cannot substitute our judgment
for that of the trial court in ruling on witness credibility. Gerijo, Inc. v. Fairfield, 70
Ohio St.3d 223, 226, 638 N.E.2d 533 (1994), citing Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10
Ohio St.3d 77, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). Furthermore, the testimony of appellee and
Karen was supported by the various financial documents submitted at the October 2010
hearing, including joint tax returns, 1120 S tax returns for KQ Yuan Enterprises L.L.C.,
and signed franchise agreements.
Although the magistrate concluded that appellee was not involved in the day-to-day
4
operations of the sushi business, she imputed one-fourth of the net income from the businesses to
appellee for child support purposes based on his minimal contributions to the business. Additionally,
the magistrate imputed certain business expenses to appellee’s total yearly income.
{¶30} Accordingly, we find the arguments raised within appellant’s first
assignment of error to be without merit. Appellant’s first assignment of error is
overruled.
II. Fraudulent Testimony
{¶31} In her second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred
by revising a CSEA determined support order based on the allegedly fraudulent testimony
of Karen.
{¶32} As stated, on April 18, 2006, CSEA determined that appellee’s support
obligation should be increased from $210 per month to $1,309.84 per month, plus a two
percent processing fee, for a total of $1,336.04 per month. Following the
recommendation of CSEA, appellee exercised his statutory right to a court hearing.
{¶33} Following the receipt of such a request, R.C. 3119.64 requires the court to
conduct a hearing in accordance with R.C. 3119.66. R.C. 3119.66, in turn, requires the
court to “conduct a hearing to determine whether the revised amount of child support is
the appropriate amount and whether the amount of child support being paid under the
court child support order should be revised.” The court must provide the parties notice
of the hearing and, if necessary, require the parties to provide copies of various records,
including W-2 statements, pay stubs, and proof of health insurance. See R.C. 3119.67
and 3119.68.
{¶34} Finally, pursuant to R.C. 3119.70, if a court conducts a hearing pursuant to
R.C. 3119.66 and determines that the revised child support amount is appropriate, the
court must issue a revised court child support order requiring the obligor to pay the
revised amount. But, if the court finds that the revised child support amount is not
appropriate, then the court must “determine the appropriate child support amount and, if
necessary, issue a revised court child support order requiring the obligor to pay the child
support amount determined by the court.” R.C. 3119.70(B); see also Staugler v.
Staugler, 160 Ohio App.3d 690, 2005-Ohio-1917, 828 N.E.2d 673, ¶ 12-14 (3d Dist.).
{¶35} Under the plain language of both R.C. 3119.66 and 3119.70(B), before
revising an obligor’s amount of child support pursuant to an administrative
recommendation, the trial court must first determine whether the revised amount of child
support as recommended is appropriate. Only if the trial court first finds that the amount
of revised child support, as calculated by CSEA, is inappropriate may it then make an
independent determination concerning the appropriateness of the amount of child support
currently being paid.
{¶36} In this matter, the magistrate reviewed the CSEA child support order and
determined that CSEA had used an incorrect business income for appellee in the tax year
2004. Specifically, the magistrate stated:
CSEA’s findings from the 2004 joint tax return were incorrect when it used
$252,245 as total business expenses for the two entities AFC franchise and
Asia Cuisine and found $108,105 to be the net income from the two
businesses for year 2004 and used this amount on the guidelines. The total
expenses including cost of goods sold for the two entities in 2004 were
$310,792 not $252,245. Business income from the two entities in 2004
after deducting cost of goods sold and business expenses was $49,558 as
shown on line 12 of the tax return and line 31 of the two Schedule C’s.
Net profit for AFC that year was $25,624 and net profit for Asiana was
$23,934.
{¶37} Based on the perceived errors in CSEA’s child support calculation, the
magistrate conducted its own independent review to determine the appropriate amount of
child support pursuant to R.C. 3119.70(B). At that point, the magistrate utilized the
submitted financial records and the testimony of appellee and Karen to complete new
child support computation worksheets and determined that the appropriate amount of
child support in this matter equated to $643.04 per month.
{¶38} Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the
magistrate’s decision because the magistrate’s decision to revise the CSEA child support
obligation was impermissibly based on the untruthful and fraudulent testimony of Karen.
As discussed in appellant’s first assignment of error, appellant has failed to present
evidence to support her allegations of fraud. Moreover, the testimony of Karen was
irrelevant to the magistrate’s initial decision to revise CSEA’s child support
recommendation. Rather, the magistrate’s decision to revise the child support order was
based solely on the court’s observed errors in the CSEA calculation.5 Karen’s testimony
that she was the sole owner and operator of the sushi business only became relevant once
the magistrate began its own independent determination of appellee’s child support
obligation. Appellee’s and Karen’s testimony was particularly relevant because the trial
court “shall not” include income earned by a parent’s current spouse in the calculation of
Our review of appellee’s 2004 joint tax return and the attached Schedule C documents
5
confirms the errors in the CSEA child support calculation.
the parent’s gross income for child support. R.C. 3119.05(E); see also Quinn v. Paras,
8th Dist. No. 82529, 2003-Ohio-4952.6
{¶39} Finding no error in the magistrate’s child support analysis, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the magistrate’s decision to revise
CSEA’s recommended child support order.
{¶40} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
III. Perjury
{¶41} In her third assignment of error, appellant argues that appellee, Karen, and
their attorney each lied to the court while under oath. As stated, the magistrate was in
the best position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses, and there is nothing in the
record to support appellant’s broad allegations of perjury.
{¶42} Appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶43} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
execution.
There may exist limited circumstances when imputing the income of a current spouse to a
6
party should be considered, such as when the party has intentionally diverted income to the current
spouse to make the party’s gross income appear less and thereby reduce the child support obligation.
Cameron v. Cameron, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-793, 2007-Ohio-3994, ¶ 6. However, as discussed
throughout this opinion, the trial court was in the best position to weigh the credibility of the
witnesses, and we find no abuse of discretion in its conclusion that appellant failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish such an intention by appellee in this matter.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, A.J., CONCURS;
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., DISSENTS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., DISSENTING:
{¶44} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion plaintiff-appellee Weiqi
Vincent Li did not fraudulently transfer the sushi business to Karen Qin Yuan to
minimize his child support obligation. In 2006, Advanced Fresh Concepts Franchise
Corporation (AFC) allowed Li to transfer the ownership of American Asian Connection
into Karen’s name. In the same year, Li sought modification of his child support
obligation. When CSEA increased his obligation from $210 to $1,336.04 following a
hearing, Li continued to seek a reduction in the obligation based on the transfer of the
sushi business to Karen. Li ultimately prevailed in 2011 when the trial court accepted
Li’s and Karen’s explanation about the transfer and failed to impute the business’s
income in calculating Li’s monthly child support obligation.
{¶45} Li argued his wife’s business is an independent and separate asset from his
own assets and cannot be used by the trial court to support a finding of his ability to pay
additional child support. A woman maintains ownership rights over property she owned
at the time of the marriage. See R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a). “Marital property” includes,
however, property that is acquired by either spouse or both spouses during marriage. See
R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a).
{¶46} The majority states, “[a]ppellee’s and Karen’s testimony was particularly
relevant because the trial court ‘shall not’ include income earned by a parent’s current
spouse in the calculation of the parent’s gross income for child support. R.C.
3119.05(E); see also Quinn v. Paras, 8th Dist. No. 82529, 2003-Ohio-4952.” The
majority nonetheless recognizes, but fails to find here, there are “[c]ircumstances when
imputing the income of a current spouse to a party should be considered, such as when the
party has intentionally diverted income to the current spouse to make the party’s gross
income appear less and thereby reduce the child support obligation * * *.” See, e.g.,
Jaroch v. Madalin, Summit App. No. 21681, 2004-Ohio-1982, ¶ 3 (father paid a salary to
his new wife in an attempt to divert money and reduce his gross income from his medical
practice and, in turn, to reduce his child support obligation). Cameron v. Cameron, 10th
Dist. No. O6-AP-793, 2007-Ohio-3994.
{¶47} R.C. 3119.22 provides further that a court may deviate from the amount of
child support indicated in the child support guidelines if, after considering the factors and
criteria set forth in R.C. 3119.23, the court determines that the amount calculated would
be unjust or inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the child. R.C.
3119.23 lists 16 factors a trial court may consider in deviating from the amount of child
support that otherwise results from the use of the basic child support schedule and
worksheet, including “(H) [b]enefits that either parent receives from remarriage or
sharing living expenses with another person[.]” See Inscoe v. Inscoe, 121 Ohio App.3d
396, 426, 700 N.E.2d 70, (4th Dist.1997).
{¶48} Before considering the benefits a parent receives from remarriage or from
sharing living expenses with another person, the trial court must first make findings that
the amount calculated pursuant to the child support schedule (1) would be unjust or
inappropriate and (2) would not be in the best interest of the child. See R.C. 3119.22.
Inscoe at 426.
{¶49} A voluntary act that limits earnings does not comport with the basic rules of
fairness and may not be utilized as a means to escape the responsibility of providing child
support. See Roski v. Roski, 8th Dist. No. 62370, 1992 WL 62728 (Mar. 26, 1992),
appeal dismissed, 65 Ohio St.3d 1408, 598 N.E.2d 1161 (1992), citing Haynie v. Haynie,
19 Ohio App.3d 288, 484 N.E.2d 750 (8th Dist.1984), and Fox v. Fox, 8th Dist. No.
43636, 1982 WL 2311 (Jan. 28, 1982). Obligor parents should not be permitted to avoid
child support obligations by liquidating or transferring their businesses or other property.
We would not allow such transfers to defraud creditors; therefore, the trial court should
not have allowed a reduction in Li’s child support obligation to his child through Li’s
transfer of the sushi business to Karen. See generally R.C. 1336.04; Dinu v. Dinu, 8th
Dist. No. 91705, 2009-Ohio-2879.
{¶50} Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court erred in calculating Li’s
income by not including all of the income from the sushi business transferred to Karen.
The trial court’s calculation was unjust, and in the best interest of Li and Karen, and not
in the best interest of the child. The majority’s acceptance of the trial court’s decision
sets a dangerous precedent that will be relied on by other child support obligors in their
attempt to reduce their child support obligations by transferring assets, property, business
holdings, etc. to their current spouse, and then seeking a reduction in their obligations. I
would, therefore, reverse and remand with direction to recalculate Li’s child support
obligation consistent with this opinion.