State v. Townsend , 2012 Ohio 496 ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Townsend, 
    2012-Ohio-496
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 97214
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    MARLON TOWNSEND
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-443923
    BEFORE: Keough, J., Cooney, P.J., and E. Gallagher, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 9, 2012
    FOR APPELLANT
    Marlon Townsend, pro se
    Inmate No. 502-596
    Lake Erie Correctional Institution
    501 Thompson Road
    P.O. Box 8000
    Conneaut, OH 44030
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    William D. Mason
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    BY: Mary McGrath
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
    The Justice Center, 8th Floor
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, OH 44113
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
    {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Marlon Townsend, pro se, appeals the trial court’s
    judgment denying his motion to vacate a void sentence. Because the issue is barred by
    the doctrine of res judicata, we affirm.
    I. Procedural History
    {¶ 2} In February 2006, Townsend was convicted of two counts of drug
    trafficking and one count of possession of drugs, all counts carrying a major drug
    offender specification. The trial court sentenced him to a ten-year prison term on each
    count, and ordered the terms to run concurrently with each other and the prison terms
    imposed in two other cases.
    {¶ 3} This court affirmed Townsend’s convictions on appeal. State v. Townsend,
    8th Dist. No. 88065, 
    2007-Ohio-2370
    , 
    2007 WL 1445951
    . The Supreme Court of Ohio
    denied Townsend’s motion for leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal as not involving
    any substantial constitutional question.     State v. Townsend, 
    115 Ohio St.3d 1442
    ,
    
    2007-Ohio-5567
    , 
    875 N.E.2d 103
    .            This court subsequently denied Townsend’s
    application for reopening. State v. Townsend, 8th Dist. No. 88065, 
    2007-Ohio-6638
    ,
    
    2007 WL 4340866
    .
    {¶ 4} In January 2010, Townsend filed a motion to vacate a void judgment, which
    the trial court denied. This court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Townsend’s motion.
    State v. Townsend, 8th Dist. No. 94754, 
    2010-Ohio-5147
    , 
    2010 WL 4181612
    .
    {¶ 5} On June 23, 2011, Townsend filed a motion to vacate a void sentence,
    which the trial court subsequently denied. Townsend now appeals from the trial court’s
    judgment denying the motion to vacate a void sentence.
    II. Allied Offenses
    {¶ 6} Townsend argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion
    to vacate a void sentence because drug trafficking and drug possession are allied offenses
    that should have merged for sentencing and, therefore, the trial court erred in imposing a
    sentence on each count.      Townsend’s argument is barred by res judicata, however,
    because he did not raise the issue on direct appeal.
    {¶ 7} It is well established that res judicata bars the consideration of issues that
    could have been raised on direct appeal.          State v. Saxon, 
    109 Ohio St.3d 176
    ,
    
    2006-Ohio-1245
    , 
    826 N.E.2d 824
    , ¶ 16-17. This court has recognized that the issue of
    whether two offenses constitute allied offenses subject to merger must be raised on direct
    appeal from a conviction, or res judicata will bar a subsequent attempt to raise the issue.
    State v. Poole, 8th Dist. No. 94759, 
    2011-Ohio-716
    , 
    2011 WL 578564
    , ¶ 13 (“[T]he
    question of whether the verdicts on all counts can be used to support separate convictions
    for all offenses charged is decided by the trial court prior to its determination of a
    defendant’s sentence. Thus, we now consider the issue settled and hold that the time to
    challenge a conviction based on allied offenses is through a direct appeal * * *.”).
    {¶ 8} Consequently, where a defendant has not raised the issue on direct appeal,
    this court has rejected subsequent claims of improper sentencing on allied offenses as
    barred by res judicata.        See, e.g., State v. Goldsmith, 8th Dist. No. 95073,
    
    2011-Ohio-840
    , 
    2011 WL 676167
    , ¶ 11 (“Because [defendant] failed to raise on direct
    appeal from his conviction the issue concerning whether the offenses challenged herein
    are allied offenses of similar import subject to merger, we find that the issue is barred by
    the doctrine of res judicata.”); State v. Padgett, 8th Dist. No. 95065, 
    2011-Ohio-1927
    ,
    
    2011 WL 1584084
    , ¶ 8, citing State v. Perry, 
    10 Ohio St.2d 175
    , 180, 
    226 N.E.2d 104
    (1967) (“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars the
    convicted defendant from raising and litigating in any proceedings, except an appeal from
    that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could
    have been raised by the defendant at the trial that resulted in that judgment of conviction
    or on an appeal from that judgment. * * * [T]he proper avenue for appellant’s merger
    challenge would have been a direct appeal from his 1999 sentencing.”). See also State v.
    Woods, 8th Dist. No. 96487, 
    2011-Ohio-5825
    , 
    2011 WL 5506095
    ; State v. Franklin, 8th
    Dist. No. 95991, 
    2011-Ohio-4953
    , 
    2011 WL 4485925
    ; State v. Ballou, 8th Dist. No.
    95733, 
    2011-Ohio-2925
    , 
    2011 WL 2436504
    .
    {¶ 9} Here, Townsend argued on direct appeal that the evidence was not
    sufficient to support his convictions and that the verdict was against the manifest weight
    of the evidence.     He raised no issue regarding his sentence or allied offenses.
    Accordingly, any argument with respect to allied offenses is barred by the doctrine of res
    judicata. Thus, the court did not err in denying Townsend’s motion to vacate a void
    sentence and his assignment of error is overruled.
    Affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
    COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, P.J., and
    EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR