State v. Mestre , 2011 Ohio 5677 ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Mestre, 
    2011-Ohio-5677
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 96820
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    RAMON MESTRE
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-535193
    BEFORE:           Sweeney, J., Kilbane, A.J., and Boyle, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                      November 3, 2011
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Nathaniel McDonald, Esq.
    Assistant Public Defender
    310 Lakeside Avenue, Suite 400
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    William D. Mason, Esq.
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By: Daniel T. Van, Esq.
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
    The Justice Center
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    JAMES J. SWEENEY, J.:
    {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Ramon Mestre appeals from the trial court’s denial of
    his motion to withdraw his guilty plea for failure to verify his address predicate upon his
    unlawful reclassification under Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act. For the reasons that follow, we
    reverse and remand.
    {¶ 2} In this case, appellant was charged with violating a provision of Ohio’s
    Adam Walsh Act; failure to verify address pursuant to R.C. 2950.06(F). This violation
    allegedly occurred on or about January 23, 2010. The indictment alleged that appellant
    had been convicted of deviate sexual intercourse under Pennsylvania state law in 1988.
    {¶ 3} On May 21, 2010, appellant pled guilty to attempted failure to verify address
    pursuant to R.C. 2923.02/2950.06, which reduced the offense from a first degree felony, as
    indicted, to a felony of the second degree. The court imposed a two year prison term.
    {¶ 4} On March 29, 2011, appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to
    Crim.R. 32.1 based on the authority of the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Bodyke,1
    which declared that the retroactive reclassification of previously convicted sexual
    offenders under Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act was unconstitutional. Appellant submitted an
    affidavit in support maintaining that he was initially classified under Ohio’s Megan’s Law
    as a sexually oriented offender. However, appellant was indicted under the more stringent
    classification provisions of Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act. The state opposed the motion and the
    trial court denied it. Appellant now appeals and presents a single assignment of error:
    {¶ 5} “The trial court erred when it denied Mr. Mestre’s Motion to Withdraw
    Guilty Plea because Mr. Mestre’s conviction is predicated on an unlawful reclassification
    and he is actually innocent of the charges.”
    {¶ 6} The state concedes that this Court has already resolved this issue in
    appellant’s favor citing State v. Ortega-Martinez, Cuyahoga App. No. 95656,
    2
    
    2011-Ohio-2540
    , ¶17;         Hannah     v. State, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 95883-95889,
    State v. Bodyke, 
    126 Ohio St.3d 266
    , 
    2010-Ohio-2424
    , 
    933 N.E.2d 753
    .
    1
    “This court has held that an unlawful reclassification under Ohio’s AWA
    2
    cannot serve as the predicate for the crime of failure to verify. State v. Smith, 8th
    Dist. No. 92550, 
    2010-Ohio-2880
    , ¶29; State v. Page, 8th Dist. No. 94369,
    
    2011-Ohio-83
    . Because appellant’s indictment was predicated on an unlawful
    reclassification,  he   cannot     be   convicted    of   the     offense   charged.”
    
    2011-Ohio-2930
    ; Speight v. State, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 96041-96405, 
    2011-Ohio-2933
    .
    However, the state continues to defend the trial court’s judgment on appeal in order to
    preserve the issue for further review. Accordingly, this assignment of error is sustained
    pursuant to the precedent in this jurisdiction.
    {¶ 7} Judgment reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.
    It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellee his costs
    herein.
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
    execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
    Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    JAMES J. SWEENEY, JUDGE
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, A.J., and
    MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR