Deutsche Bank National Co. v. Caldwell , 196 Ohio App. 3d 636 ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as Deutsche Bank Natl. Co. v. Caldwell, 
    196 Ohio App.3d 636
    , 
    2011-Ohio-4508
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 96249
    DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL COMPANY,
    APPELLEE,
    v.
    CALDWELL ET AL.,
    APPELLANTS.
    JUDGMENT:
    DISMISSED
    Civil Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CV-697845
    BEFORE: Keough, J., Kilbane, A.J., and Celebrezze, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 8, 2011
    ATTORNEYS:
    Reisenfeld & Associates, L.P.A., L.L.C., Sallie A. Conyers, and Matthew C. Steele,
    for appellees.
    Robert E. Davis, for appellant.
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE.
    {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Robert A. Caldwell, appeals from the judgment of the
    common pleas court granting the motions for default and summary judgment of
    plaintiff-appellee, Deutsche Bank National Company, and a decree of foreclosure for
    Deutsche Bank. We dismiss for lack of a final, appealable order.
    I
    {¶ 2} On July 7, 2009, Deutsche Bank, as trustee for the certificate holders of
    Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc., Trust 2004-NC2, mortgage pass-through certificates
    Series 2004-NC2, filed a complaint in foreclosure against Robert A. and Frances Caldwell,
    Oasis Property and Investment, L.L.C., and the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation,
    relating to the Caldwells’ alleged nonpayment of a note secured by a mortgage on their
    residence. The matter was referred to a magistrate.
    {¶ 3} Deutsche Bank subsequently moved for default against Oasis Property and
    Investment, which failed to answer the complaint. The trial court granted the default
    motion on November 18, 2009. Deutsche Bank then moved for summary judgment
    against the Caldwells, who responded to the motion after conducting discovery. On
    August 10, 2010, the trial court granted Deutsche Bank’s motion for summary judgment
    and ruled that it would enter a foreclosure decree after Deutsche Bank submitted another
    copy of the note and a supplemental final judicial report.
    {¶ 4} The Caldwells appealed, but because no final order of foreclosure had been
    entered, this court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order. Deutsche Bank
    Natl. Co. v. Caldwell (Sept. 23, 2010), Cuyahoga App. No. 95682. Thereafter, the case
    was reactivated in the trial court. Deutsche Bank complied with the trial court’s order to
    submit additional documentation, and on November 5, 2010, the magistrate filed a decision
    ordering foreclosure. On December 2, 2010, the trial court issued a journal entry in which
    it adopted and incorporated the magistrate’s decision and ordered: “Plaintiff’s motions for
    default and summary judgment are granted. Decree of foreclosure for plaintiff.”
    {¶ 5} Robert Caldwell now appeals, asserting two assignments of error, both of
    which challenge the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank.
    We dismiss for lack of a final, appealable order.
    II
    {¶ 6} Appellate courts have jurisdiction to review the final, appealable orders of
    lower courts. Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution; R.C. 2505.02. In the
    absence of a final, appealable order, the appellate court does not possess jurisdiction to
    review the matter and must dismiss the case sua sponte. St. Rocco’s Parish Fed. Credit
    Union v. Am. Online, 
    151 Ohio App.3d 428
    , 
    2003-Ohio-420
    , 
    784 N.E.2d 200
    .
    {¶ 7} A trial court’s judgment entry stating that it is adopting a magistrate’s decision
    is not a final, appealable order. Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Moore, Cuyahoga App. No. 91145,
    
    2008-Ohio-6163
    , ¶ 1. “To constitute a final appealable order, the trial court’s journal
    entry must be a separate and distinct instrument from that of the magistrate’s order and
    must grant relief on the issues originally submitted to the court.” 
    Id.
     “The court’s
    judgment entry should address all issues submitted to the court for determination so that
    the parties may know, by referring to the judgment entry, what their responsibilities and
    obligations may be.” In re Elliott (Mar. 5, 1998), Ross App. No. 97 CA 2313. In short,
    the trial court, “separate and apart from the magistrate’s decision,” must enter its own
    judgment containing a clear pronouncement of the trial court’s judgment and a statement of
    the relief granted by the court. Flagstar Bank at ¶ 8; Ameriquest Mtge. Co. v. Stone,
    Cuyahoga App. No. 89899, 
    2008-Ohio-3984
    , ¶ 3.
    {¶ 8} Here, although the trial court’s entry stated that it was a “separate and distinct
    instrument” from the magistrate’s decision and was “grant[ing] relief on the issues
    submitted to the court,” it failed to adequately do so. Although the entry granted default
    judgment, it did not say against which defendant. Likewise, it granted summary judgment
    for Deutsche Bank but did not say against whom; it also did not enter judgment in favor of
    Deutsche Bank against that defendant. Finally, although the entry granted a “decree of
    foreclosure” for Deutsche Bank, it did not provide any details of that decree. In short, the
    entry did not include a clear pronouncement of the trial court’s judgment and the relief
    granted by the court. The trial court’s entry did not enable the parties to refer to the entry
    and determine their responsibilities and obligations.
    {¶ 9} The trial court’s inclusion in the entry of Civ.R. 54(B) language that “there is
    no just cause for delay” does not overcome these deficiencies. It is well established that in
    a matter in which multiple claims and/or parties are involved, a judgment entry that enters
    final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, of the pending claims is not a final,
    appealable order in the absence of Civ.R. 54(B) language stating that “there is no just
    reason for delay.” However, “the mere incantation of the required language does not turn
    an otherwise non-final order into a final appealable order.” Noble v. Colwell (1989), 
    44 Ohio St.3d 92
    , 96, 
    540 N.E.2d 1381
    .
    {¶ 10} The trial court’s December 2, 2010 entry is not a final, appealable order. We
    therefore lack jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.
    Appeal dismissed.
    KILBANE, A.J., and CELEBREEZE, J., concur.
    ___________________