State v. Carney , 2011 Ohio 2280 ( 2011 )

[Cite as State v. Carney, 2011-Ohio-2280.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 95343
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
MICHAEL CARNEY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-516762
BEFORE: Keough, J., Kilbane, A.J., and Cooney, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 12, 2011
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Russell S. Bensing
1350 Standard Building
1370 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
Michael H. Peterson
The Hoyt Block – Suite 214
700 St. Clair Avenue
Cleveland, OH 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Katherine Mullin
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Michael Carney (“Carney”), appeals his
sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶ 2} In November 2008, Carney was charged with 64 counts of
pandering sexually-oriented material involving a minor and one count of
possession of criminal tools. These charges stemmed from child pornography
media discovered on Carney’s computer, some of which was available to the
general public via the LimeWire file-sharing network. Carney pled guilty to
20 counts of pandering sexually-oriented material involving a minor and the
single count of possession of criminal tools. The trial court sentenced him to
a total of 24 years in prison. Carney now raises two assignments of error
regarding his sentence.
{¶ 3} In his first assignment of error, he claims that his sentence is
contrary to law and was an abuse of discretion.
{¶ 4} We review felony sentences using the Kalish framework. State v.
Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124. In its plurality
opinion, the Kalish court declared that in applying State v. Foster, 109 Ohio
St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, to the existing statutes, appellate
courts “must apply a two-step approach.” Kalish at 4. Appellate courts
must first “examine the sentencing court’s compliance with all applicable
rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the
sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law.” Id. at 26. See, also,
R.C. 2953.08(G). If this first prong is satisfied, then we review the trial
court’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 4 and 19.
{¶ 5} In the first step of our analysis, we review whether Carney’s
sentence is contrary to law as required by R.C. 2953.08(G). As the Kalish
court noted, post-Foster “‘trial courts have full discretion to impose a prison
sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to make
findings and give reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than
the minimum sentence.’” Id. at 11, quoting Foster at paragraph seven of the
syllabus; State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1,
paragraph three of the syllabus. The Kalish court held that although Foster
eliminated mandatory judicial fact-finding, it left R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12
intact. Kalish at 13. Therefore, the trial court must still consider those
statutes when imposing a sentence. Id., citing Mathis at 38.
{¶ 6} R.C. 2929.11(A) provides that: “[A] court that sentences an
offender for a felony shall be guided by the overriding purposes of felony
sentencing[: ] * * * to protect the public from future crime by the offender and
others and to punish the offender. To achieve those purposes, the sentencing
court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the
offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and
making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.”
{¶ 7} R.C. 2929.12 provides a nonexhaustive list of factors a trial court
must consider when determining the seriousness of the offense and the
likelihood that the offender will commit future offenses.
{¶ 8} R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are not fact-finding statutes. Instead,
they “serve as an overarching guide for trial judges to consider in fashioning
an appropriate sentence.” Kalish at 17. Thus, “[i]n considering these
statutes in light of Foster, the trial court has full discretion to determine
whether the sentence satisfies the overriding purposes of Ohio’s sentencing
structure.” Id.{¶ 9} We do not find Carney’s sentence contrary to law. Carney pled
guilty to a total of 20 counts of pandering sexually-oriented matter involving
a minor pursuant to R.C. 2907.322(A)(1) and (2), second degree felonies,
where the maximum prison term on each count is eight years. A statutory
presumption existed that Carney be sentenced to prison. The charge of
possession of criminal tools is a fifth degree felony and is punishable by a
maximum of 12 months in prison. R.C. 2923.24(C) and 2929.14(A)(5).
Carney could have received a total prison sentence of 161 years if the trial
court imposed consecutive maximum prison sentences. Therefore, a sentence
of 24 years is within the statutory range allowed by law.
{¶ 10} Furthermore, the sentencing journal entry reflects that the trial
court considered all required factors of law and found that prison was
consistent with the purposes of R.C. 2929.11. See State v. El-Berri,
Cuyahoga App. No. 92388, 2010-Ohio-146. Accordingly, we find that the
sentence is not contrary to law.
{¶ 11} We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion.
Kalish at 4 and 19. “An abuse of discretion is “‘more than an error of law or
judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or
unconscionable.”’” Id. at 19, quoting Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio
St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140, quoting State v. Adams (1980) 62 Ohio St.2d
151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144.
{¶ 12} Carney argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it
did not articulate any reasons for imposing the sentence other than “the trial
court’s belief that Carney was not sufficiently remorseful.” We note that
post-Foster, a trial court does not have to state its reasons on the record.
Nevertheless, we find nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court’s
decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
{¶ 13} At sentencing, the trial court had the benefit of sentencing
memoranda from Carney and the State, a presentence investigation report,
and multiple court psychological clinic reports, including a mitigation of
penalty report and a neuropsychological evaluation. Additionally, the trial
court heard statements from Carney’s family.
{¶ 14} In sentencing Carney, the trial judge noted that she considered
Carney’s allocution, apology to his family, and the substantial mitigation
arguments by his attorney and family. However, the trial judge felt that
Carney lacked an understanding of the seriousness and gravity of his actions.
Due to the lack of remorse and responsibility, and the mere depravity of
Carney’s actions, the trial court determined that a term of incarceration was
necessary. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.
{¶ 15} We make these above findings while recognizing that a 24-year
sentence is a lengthy, and possibly harsh, sentence, considering the crimes
committed. An argument could be made that his sentence is
disproportionate to the crimes committed, such that had he actually
committed the acts that were depicted in the sexually graphic media he
possessed, he possibly would have received a lesser sentence.
{¶ 16} In its sentencing memoranda, the State cited two cases where the
defendants were charged with engaging in identical conduct as Carney, yet
received substantially lesser sentences. See United States v. Stults (C.A.8,
2009), 575 F.3d 834 (defendant with prior conviction of attempted sexual
assault of a child received a total sentence of 144 months after being
convicted of one count of possession child pornography); United States v.
Christy (2007), 65 M.J. 657 (military defendant convicted of distributing and
possessing child pornography received 12 months confinement and a
“bad-conduct discharge.”) Nevertheless, we find it incumbent upon the party
challenging the sentence to demonstrate error by the trial court and point to
authority comparing cases and guiding this court to find such
disproportionality. See State v. Geddes, Cuyahoga App. No. 91042,
2008-Ohio-6489, 13.
{¶ 17} Carney’s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 18} Consecutive Sentence Findings
{¶ 19} Carney contends in his second assignment of error that the trial
court erred in sentencing him to consecutive terms of imprisonment without
making the findings required under R.C. 2929.14(E)(4), in violation of his
right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Carney asserts that the holding in Foster that R.C.
2929.14(E)(4) and 2929.41(A) were unconstitutional, is no longer valid in light
of Oregon v. Ice (2009), 555 U.S. 160, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517.
{¶ 20} The Ohio Supreme Court recently rejected this argument in State
v. Hodge, 128 Ohio St.3d 1, 2010-Ohio-6320, 941 N.E.2d 768. The court
concluded that Ice did not require it to depart from its holding in Foster
because “there is no constitutional requirement that a judge make findings of
fact before imposing consecutive sentences” and requiring resentencing to
include findings of fact would “disrupt reasonable and settled expectations of
finality,” and impose an “undue burden on the judicial system.” Hodge at
30-32.
{¶ 21} Accordingly, Carney’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, A. J., and
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., CONCUR