State v. Alhajjeh ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Alhajjeh, 
    2011-Ohio-2160
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 93077
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    MARWAN ALHAJJEH
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    APPLICATION FOR REOPENING
    GRANTED (MOTION NO. 438002)
    VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-512675
    BEFORE: Celebrezze, J., Stewart, P.J., and Rocco, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 4, 2011
    FOR APPELLANT
    Marwan Alhajjeh
    Inmate No. 563-427
    Richland Correctional Institution
    1001 Olivesburg Road
    P.O. Box 8107
    Mansfield, Ohio 44901
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    William D. Mason
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    BY: T. Allan Regas
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys
    The Justice Center
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.:
    {¶ 1} On September 30, 2010, the applicant, Marwan Alhajjeh,
    pursuant to App.R. 26(B) and State v. Murnahan (1992), 
    63 Ohio St.3d 60
    ,
    
    584 N.E.2d 1204
    , applied to reopen this court’s judgment in State of Ohio v.
    Marwan Alhajjeh, Cuyahoga App. No. 93077, 
    2010-Ohio-3179
    , in which this
    court affirmed Alhajjeh’s convictions and sentences for murder, felonious
    assault, and tampering with evidence. Alhajjeh argues that his appellate
    counsel was ineffective for failing to assign as error that postrelease control
    sanctions were improperly imposed. On October 29, 2010, the State of Ohio
    filed its brief in opposition. For the following reasons, this court grants the
    application to reopen, reinstates Alhajjeh’s appeal, vacates his sentence as to
    postrelease control, and remands this case for resentencing on postrelease
    control consistent with this opinion.
    {¶ 2} In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate
    counsel, the applicant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was
    deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. That is,
    but for the unreasonable error, there is a reasonable probability that the
    results of the proceeding would have been different.             Strickland v.
    Washington (1984), 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 
    104 S.Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L.Ed.2d 674
     ; State v.
    Bradley (1989), 
    42 Ohio St.3d 136
    , 
    538 N.E.2d 373
    , cert. denied (1990), 
    497 U.S. 1011
    , 
    110 S.Ct. 3258
    , 
    111 L.Ed.2d 768
    ; and State v. Reed (1996), 
    74 Ohio St.3d 534
    , 
    660 N.E.2d 456
    .
    {¶ 3} In the present case, Alhajjeh pleaded no contest and was found
    guilty of murder; felonious assault, a second-degree felony; and tampering
    with evidence, a third-degree felony.    On March 23, 2009, the trial court
    sentenced Alhajjeh to 15 years to life on the murder charge; eight years on
    the felonious assault charge, which the trial court merged into the murder
    charge for sentencing; and five years on the tampering with evidence charge
    consecutive to the other two counts.        The trial court then ordered: “
    Postrelease control is part of this prison sentence for 5 years for the above
    felony(s) under R.C. 2967.28. (No reduction) on Counts 2 and 3 only.”1 The
    trial court did not include in the sentence that if Alhajjeh violated any
    sanction imposed as part of postrelease control, then the parole board could
    impose a prison term of up to one-half of the stated prison term originally
    imposed upon him.
    {¶ 4} R.C. 2967.28(B) and (C) provide in pertinent part:                     “a period of
    post-release control required by this division for an offender shall be one of
    the following periods: (1) For a felony of the first degree or for a felony sex
    offense, five years; (2) For a felony of the second degree that is not a felony
    sex offense, three years; (3) For a felony of the third degree that is not a
    felony sex offense and in the commission of which the offender caused or
    threatened physical harm to a person, three years. (C) Any sentence to a
    prison term for a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree that is not subject
    to division (B)(1) or (3) of this section shall include a requirement that the
    offender be subject to a period of post-release control of up to three years * * *
    if the parole board * * * determines that a period of post-release control is
    necessary for that offender.”
    {¶ 5} The imposition of five years of postrelease control for the second-
    and third-degree felonies was reversible error.                           In State v. Douglas,
    Cuyahoga         App.       No.      88367,       
    2007-Ohio-2625
    ,           reopening   allowed
    Postrelease control does not apply to murder; rather, parole applies.
    1
    
    2007-Ohio-5941
    , this court granted an App.R. 26(B) application to reopen and
    then vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing because the trial
    court had imposed five years of postrelease control for felonious assault,
    which is a second-degree felony that is not a sex offense. State v. Wolford,
    Cuyahoga App. No. 92607, 
    2010-Ohio-434
    , and State v. Norris, Cuyahoga
    App. No. 95485, 
    2001-Ohio-1251
    . Had appellate counsel raised this issue,
    this court would have vacated the postrelease control sentence and remanded
    for resentencing.   This court further notes that in State v. Singleton, 
    124 Ohio St.3d 173
    , 
    2009-Ohio-6434
    , 
    920 N.E.2d 958
    , the Ohio Supreme Court
    ruled that informing the defendant-prisoner that a violation of postrelease
    control would allow the parole board to impose a prison term as part of his
    sentence up to one-half of the stated prison term originally imposed upon him
    is a necessary part of imposing postrelease control.
    {¶ 6} Accordingly,   this court grants the application to reopen,
    reinstates this appeal to the docket of this court, then vacates the sentence as
    to the imposition of postrelease control, and remands to the trial court for the
    proper imposition of postrelease control. State v. Fischer, 
    128 Ohio St.3d 92
    ,
    
    2010-Ohio-6238
    , 
    942 N.E.2d 332
    , and State v. Street, Cuyahoga App. No.
    85020, 
    2005-Ohio-1976
    , reopening granted 
    2006-Ohio-21
    .
    It is, therefore, ordered that appellant recover of the appellee his costs
    herein taxed.
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this
    judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
    Rule 27, of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE
    KENNETH A. ROCCO, P.J., and
    MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 93077

Judges: Celebrezze

Filed Date: 5/4/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014