State v. Powe , 2014 Ohio 478 ( 2014 )

[Cite as State v. Powe, 2014-Ohio-478.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 27163
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
ORLANDO L. POWE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR 01 06 1516
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: February 12, 2014
WHITMORE, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Orlando Powe, appeals from the judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I
{¶2} In 2002, a jury found Powe guilty of felony murder, felonious assault, and child
endangering. The court declined to sentence Powe on the felonious assault count, as it merged
with the felony murder count. The court sentenced Powe to 15 years to life on the felony murder
count and 8 years on the child endangering count. The court further ordered that the sentences
run consecutively for a total sentence of 23 years to life in prison. Powe appealed from his
convictions, and this Court affirmed. See State v. Powe, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21026, 2002-
Ohio-6034.
{¶3} On September 14, 2012, Powe filed a motion to merge his sentences as allied
offenses of similar import. The State moved to dismiss Powe’s motion as an untimely petition
2
for post-conviction relief (“PCR”), and the trial court denied the motion. Although Powe
attempted to appeal from the court’s denial of his motion, this Court dismissed his appeal due to
his failure to file a brief. See State v. Powe, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26716 (Aug. 13, 2013).
{¶4} After this Court dismissed Powe’s attempted appeal, Powe filed a motion to
vacate or set aside his sentence. Powe argued in his motion that his sentence was contrary to
law, as he had been sentenced to allied offenses of similar import. On October 24, 2013, the trial
court denied Powe’s motion.
{¶5} Powe now appeals from the trial court’s judgment and raises one assignment of
error for our review.
II
Assignment of Error
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN THEY (sic) DENIED THE
APPELLANT’S MOTION TO VACATE OR SET ASIDE ILLEGAL AND
IMPROPER SENTENCE IN VIOLATION OF §2941.25, AND IN VIOLATION
OF APPELLANT’S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT NOT TO BE SUBJECTED
TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY[.]
{¶6} In his sole assignment of error, Powe argues that the trial court erred by denying
his motion to vacate or set aside his sentence. Specifically, he argues that his sentence is void
because the court failed to merge his offenses as allied offenses of similar import. We disagree.
{¶7} This Court has held that “the failure to merge allied offenses of similar import
does not result in a void sentence, but ‘instead results in plain error.’” State v. Bryant, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 26774, 2013-Ohio-4996, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Abuhilwa, 9th Dist. Summit No.
25300, 2010–Ohio–5997, ¶ 8. In Bryant, we rejected the appellant’s argument that his sentence
was void due to its alleged inclusion of allied offenses. Id. We further held that, because the
appellant’s sentence was not void “his motion to vacate [his] sentence [was properly] reclassified
3
as a petition for post-conviction relief.” Id., citing State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 160
(1997).
{¶8} Much like the appellant in Bryant, Powe claims that his sentence is void because
the trial court sentenced him to allied offenses. As previously explained, however, a trial court’s
failure to merge allied offenses does not result in a void sentence. Bryant at ¶ 6. Consistent with
Bryant, Powe’s motion to vacate or set aside his sentence must be reclassified as a PCR petition.
Id.{¶9} Generally, this Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a PCR petition for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Cleveland, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 08CA009406, 2009-Ohio-397, ¶ 11.
When a trial court denies a petition solely on the basis of an issue of law, however, this Court’s
review is de novo. State v. Samuels, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24370, 2009-Ohio-1217, ¶ 3.
Whether a defendant’s PCR petition satisfied the procedural requirements set forth in R.C.
2953.21 and R.C. 2953.23 is an issue of law. Id. at ¶ 3-7. Consequently, a de novo standard of
review applies. Id. at ¶ 3.
{¶10} R.C. 2953.21 establishes procedures for filing a PCR petition. R.C.
2953.21(A)(2) provides, in relevant part, that a PCR petition “shall be filed no later than one
hundred eighty days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in
the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction * * *.” “An exception to the time limit exists if it
can be shown both that (1) ‘the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts
upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief or * * * the United States
Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the
petitioner’s situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on that right;’ and (2) there is clear
and convincing evidence that, but for the constitutional error at trial, no reasonable trier of fact
4
would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense.” State v. Daniel, 9th Dist. Summit No.
26670, 2013-Ohio-3510, ¶ 9, quoting R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) and (b). A trial court lacks the
authority to hear an untimely PCR petition that does not meet the requirements set forth in R.C.
2953.23(A). Daniel at ¶ 9.
{¶11} Powe filed his PCR petition more than 11 years after the filing of the transcript in
his direct appeal. His petition was therefore untimely. Moreover, his petition constituted a
successive petition, as he previously had filed a motion to merge his sentences in September
2012. See Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d at syllabus (post-appeal motion to vacate or correct sentence
based on a constitutional error constitutes a PCR petition). Powe never argued that any of the
exceptions set forth in R.C. 2953.23(A) apply here. Because Powe failed to demonstrate that his
PCR petition satisfied R.C. 2953.23(A)’s requirements for untimely and successive petitions, the
trial court lacked the authority to consider the merits of his petition. See Daniel at ¶ 9-10; State
v. Kyle, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25974, 2012-Ohio-456, ¶ 6-8. Consequently, the court did not err
by denying Powe’s petition. Powe’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
III
{¶12} Powe’s sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
5
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
BETH WHITMORE
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P. J.
CARR, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
ORLANDO L. POWE, pro se, Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and RICHARD S. KASAY, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.