State v. Carano , 2013 Ohio 1633 ( 2013 )

[Cite as State v. Carano, 2013-Ohio-1633.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 26544
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
JOHN M. CARANO COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR 11 08 2145
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: April 24, 2013
WHITMORE, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, John Carano, appeals from his convictions in the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I
{¶2} At approximately 10:30 p.m., Summit County Sheriff’s Deputy Wesley Dobbins
observed a white van weave and cross the double yellow center line on Manchester Road. He
continued to follow the van and observed it make a wide, slow turn onto Hyfield Avenue. When
the van did so, it crossed onto the left-hand side of the road and continued to travel partially on
that side of the road. Deputy Dobbins then decided to follow the van and stop it.
{¶3} Deputy Dobbins stopped the van just as it pulled into a driveway on Lake Vista
Road and soon identified the driver as Carano. When he spoke with Carano, Deputy Dobbins
observed that Carano’s eyes were watery and bloodshot. He also detected a strong odor of
alcohol about Carano. Carano admitted to Deputy Dobbins that he had been drinking, failed the
2
first field sobriety test that he took, and refused to submit to any more testing after he was unable
to complete the second test. Carano also refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.
{¶4} A grand jury indicted Carano on each of the following counts: (1) operating a
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (“OVI”), in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a); (2)
OVI, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2); and (3) lanes of travel/weaving, in violation of R.C.
4511.25. The first OVI count also contained an attendant specification based on Carano’s
previously having been convicted of five or more OVI offenses in the last 20 years, in violation
of R.C. 2941.1413. Carano filed a motion to suppress, and the trial court held a suppression
hearing. Subsequently, the court denied Carano’s motion and the matter went to trial. A jury
found Carano guilty on both OVI counts, including the attendant specification, and the trial court
found him guilty of the lanes of travel/weaving count. The court merged Carano’s OVI
convictions and sentenced him to three and a half years in prison.
{¶5} Carano now appeals and raises seven assignments of error for our review. For
ease of analysis, we combine several of the assignments of error.
II
Assignment of Error Number One
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. CARANO’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS.
{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Carano argues that the trial court erred by denying
his motion to suppress. Specifically, he argues that Deputy Dobbins lacked reasonable suspicion
to stop his van. We disagree.
{¶7} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that:
[a]ppellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and
fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of
trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and
3
evaluate the credibility of witnesses. State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366
(1992). Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of
fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Fanning, 1
Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then
independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court,
whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. McNamara, 124
Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997).
State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. Accord State v. Hobbs, 133 Ohio
St.3d 43, 2012-Ohio-3886, ¶ 6 (Burnside applied). Accordingly, this Court reviews the trial
court’s factual findings for competent, credible evidence and considers the court’s legal
conclusions de novo. State v. Conley, 9th Dist. No. 08CA009454, 2009-Ohio-910, ¶ 6, citing
Burnside at ¶ 8.
{¶8} To justify an investigative stop, an officer must point to “specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.” Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 299 (1999), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 21 (1968). In evaluating the facts and inferences supporting the stop, a court must consider
the totality of the circumstances as “viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police
officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training.” State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177,
179 (1988), quoting United States v. Hall, 525 F.2d 857, 859 (D.C.Cir.1976). A totality of the
circumstances review includes consideration of “(1) [the] location; (2) the officer’s experience,
training or knowledge; (3) the suspect’s conduct or appearance; and (4) the surrounding
circumstances.” State v. Biehl, 9th Dist. No. 22054, 2004-Ohio-6532, ¶ 14, citing Bobo at 178-
179. “Where an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a
motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally
valid * * *.” (Internal quotations, citations, and emphasis omitted.) State v. Campbell, 9th Dist.
No. 05CA0032-M, 2005-Ohio-4361, ¶ 11.
4
{¶9} Deputy Dobbins, a 17-year veteran, testified that he first observed Carano’s van
while traveling south on Manchester Road at approximately 10:25 p.m. He testified that he was
a member of his department’s OVI Task Force and was specifically on the lookout for
intoxicated drivers that night as part of an OVI saturation patrol. Deputy Dobbins was following
a line of several cars when he observed a white van drifting within its lane. He then saw the van
“hit the double line a couple of times” before “drift[ing] out to the left, just over the double
yellow line and then back into the lane.” The van then turned right onto Hyfield Avenue with
the vehicle directly behind it making the same turn and following closely. Deputy Dobbins
stated that he found the presence of the second vehicle significant because, in his experience,
intoxicated drivers often have people drive behind them to make sure that they get home safely
and those people “[g]enerally follow them pretty close[ly].”
{¶10} As the van turned right onto Hyfield Avenue, Deputy Dobbins observed it turn
widely so that it crossed onto the left-hand side of the road. He decided to pursue the van and
executed a U-turn on Manchester Road. After he turned onto Hyfield Avenue, he saw the van
was still traveling outside of its lane. Deputy Dobbins admitted that Hyfield Avenue does not
have a center line painted on the road, but testified that, if it did, the van would have been
traveling about half a car width over the line. Meanwhile, the car following closely behind the
van stayed within its lane of travel. Deputy Dobbins activated his lights as the van pulled into a
driveway. He then identified the driver as Carano.
{¶11} Carano argues that Deputy Dobbins lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his van
because he drove it down Hyfield Avenue in a reasonable manner. According to Carano,
because his lane of travel was obstructed by ruts within the road, he was permitted to travel onto
the left-hand side of Hyfield Avenue to avoid the ruts. See R.C. 4511.25(A)(2). There was no
5
testimony at the suppression hearing, however, about ruts in the road. See State v. Jackson, 9th
Dist. No. 26234, 2012-Ohio-3785, ¶ 14 (“Our review of a trial court’s suppression ruling is
limited to the testimony produced at the suppression hearing.”). Deputy Dobbins was the only
witness to testify. Moreover, he testified that he observed Carano’s van weaving before Carano
even got to Hyfield Avenue.
{¶12} In his recitation of the facts, Carano insists that Deputy Dobbins only saw him
make a wide turn onto Hyfield Avenue and travel left of center while on that road. Carano
attributes Deputy Dobbins’ testimony about the weaving he observed on Manchester Road to
another vehicle. According to Carano, Deputy Dobbins saw that vehicle weave, not Carano’s
van, but then decided to follow Carano’s van when he observed it make a wide turn. We do not
agree with Carano’s reading of the record.
{¶13} Deputy Dobbins’ testimony was that, while traveling southbound on Manchester
Road, he saw two different vehicles ahead of his cruiser weave. One of those vehicles was
Carano’s van. Deputy Dobbins specifically testified that he “observed a vehicle that was
weaving a bit[,] [s]o [he] decided to stop him and see what happens.” He explained that by
“weaving a bit,” he meant that he saw the vehicle going back and forth to the double yellow line
and then to the fog line. Carano’s van was the only vehicle that Deputy Dobbins stopped.
Accordingly, the weaving he described pertained to Carano’s van, not the other vehicle. Deputy
Dobbins then saw the van drift outside its lane again. In describing his observations, Deputy
Dobbins testified:
I [saw] a vehicle, want to see what I have. I have a van, white van, it was
probably two to three vehicles ahead of me, probably behind that vehicle. I [saw]
a van southbound. Again, it drifted out to the left, just over the double yellow line
and then back into the lane.
6
Deputy Dobbins described having to decide which vehicle to pursue, given that both had
weaved. The van then “took a wide, slow turn on the wrong side of the road.” At that point,
Deputy Dobbins chose to pursue the van.
{¶14} Deputy Dobbins’ testimony was such that he observed Carano’s van weave and
leave its lane of travel on both Manchester Road and Hyfield Avenue. On Manchester Road, in
particular, Deputy Dobbins testified that he observed the van cross over the double yellow line.
There was competent, credible evidence in the record, therefore, to support the trial court’s
finding that Deputy Dobbins saw Carano weave outside his lane of travel; an act that constituted
a traffic violation. See R.C. 4511.25(A) (requiring vehicles to be driven on the right half of the
roadway). This Court has held that “[a] police officer’s observation of a person violating a
traffic law is sufficient to give rise to the officer’s reasonable conclusion that the person is
engaged in criminal activity.” Campbell, 2005-Ohio-4361, at ¶ 11. Because Deputy Dobbins
observed Carano commit a minor traffic violation, he performed a constitutionally valid stop of
his van. Id. Carano’s argument that the court erred by denying his motion to suppress lacks
merit. Consequently, his first assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error Number Two
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT HIS CONVICTION FOR WEAVING.
{¶15} In his second assignment of error, Carano argues that his lanes of travel/weaving
conviction is based on insufficient evidence. We disagree.
{¶16} In order to determine whether the evidence before the trial court was sufficient to
sustain a conviction, this Court must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991).
7
An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind
of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus; see also State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997).
“In essence, sufficiency is a test of adequacy.” Thompkins at 386.
{¶17} The lanes of travel/weaving statute provides, in relevant part:
Upon all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle * * * shall be driven upon the
right half of the roadway, except * * * [w]hen an obstruction exists making it
necessary to drive to the left of the center of the highway; provided, any person so
doing shall yield the right of way to all vehicles traveling in the proper direction
upon the unobstructed portion of the highway within such distance as to constitute
an immediate hazard * * *.
R.C. 4511.25(A)(2). Carano argues that he was forced to leave his lane of travel when turning
onto and traveling down Hyfield Road because the road was in poor condition. According to
Carano, “deep ruts” in the road constituted obstructions for purposes of R.C. 4511.25(A)(2).
Therefore, he argues that he was justified in driving partially on the left-hand side of the road and
his conviction is based on insufficient evidence.
{¶18} Much like he did at the suppression hearing, Deputy Dobbins testified at trial that
he observed Carano’s van cross the double yellow center line on Manchester Road before
coming back into its lane. Only after Deputy Dobbins saw the van weave on Manchester Road
did he then see it make a wide turn onto Hyfield Avenue and decide to follow it. It is not
necessary for us to discuss the testimony about the road conditions on Hyfield Avenue because
there was testimony that Carano crossed the double yellow line on Manchester Road. Viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the trial court could have concluded that the
State proved Carano’s lanes of travel/weaving conviction based strictly on that testimony.
8
Carano’s argument that his conviction is based on insufficient evidence lacks merit and his
second assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error Number Three
MR. CARANO WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL DUE TO PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT BY IMPROPER REFERENCE TO THE LAW OF WEAVING.
{¶19} In his third assignment of error, Carano argues that he was denied a fair trial due
to prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, he argues that he was prejudiced when the prosecutor
misstated the law on weaving in her closing argument. We disagree.
{¶20} In deciding whether a prosecutor’s conduct rises to the level of prosecutorial
misconduct, a court determines if the prosecutor’s actions were improper, and, if so, whether the
defendant’s substantial rights were actually prejudiced. State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14
(1984). “[A] judgment may only be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct when the improper
conduct deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” State v. Knight, 9th Dist. No. 03CA008239, 2004-
Ohio-1227, ¶ 6, citing State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 557 (1995). The defendant must show
that, but for the prosecutor’s misconduct, the jury would not have convicted him. State v. Lollis,
9th Dist. No. 24826, 2010-Ohio-4457, ¶ 24. “The touchstone of the analysis ‘is the fairness of
the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.’” State v. Diar, 120 Ohio St.3d 460, 2008-Ohio-
6266, ¶ 140, quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982).
{¶21} “[W]hen the defendant fails to object to [] purported acts of prosecutorial
misconduct, he limits appellate review to that of plain error.” State v. Veal, 9th Dist. No. 26005,
2012-Ohio-3555, ¶ 18. Under Crim.R. 52(B), “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.” “As notice
of plain error is to be taken with utmost caution and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of
justice, the decision of a trial court will not be reversed due to plain error unless the defendant
9
has established that the outcome of the trial clearly would have been different but for the alleged
error.” Veal at ¶ 18.
{¶22} Carano concedes that a plain error standard applies here because he failed to
object to the statements he now argues were improper. Carano argues that the prosecutor
engaged in misconduct during two segments of her closing argument. In the first segment, the
prosecutor discussed Deputy Dobbins’ decision to follow Carano onto Hyfield Avenue after he
observed Carano make a wide turn. The prosecutor argued:
And it doesn’t matter if you’re fully in the other person’s lane, you’re half in the
lane, you’re a quarter in the lane; you’re not to drive in the oncoming lane of
traffic, bottom line, for a good reason; right?
It’s not your lane and other cars could be coming.
In the second segment, the prosecutor addressed the testimony Carano set forth in his case-in-
chief wherein he and one of his neighbors testified about the poor road conditions on Hyfield
Avenue and how they commonly caused residents to leave their lanes of travel while driving on
that road. The prosecutor argued:
Deputy Dobbins said, not only did he watch Mr. Carano make the turn [onto
Hyfield Avenue], but he saw him straighten [the van] out and continue down
partially the other lane.
***
And you know what, what did your mom used to say to you? Hey, if your friends
jump off a building, does that mean you do, too; right?
No is the right answer. No.
I don’t care, just because Mr. Carano, [his neighbor] and whoever else in that
neighborhood wants to drive on the wrong side of the road, doesn’t make it right.
It doesn’t not make it a traffic violation.
It doesn’t not make it one of the several things this deputy observed on this night
about Mr. Carano’s impairment.
10
And Mr. Carano tells you he can drive on the correct side. He can.
He’s done it and he can, right?
If there’s a car there, what’s he do, does he just plow into it?
No. He stays on his side.
So, it can be done.
Carano argues that the prosecutor’s statements were improper because they (1) categorized
leaving one’s lane as a per se violation of R.C. 4511.25 when, in fact, the statute allows a driver
to do so in the event of an obstruction, and (2) they somehow led the jury “to believe that the
OVI charge was conclusively established.”
{¶23} Initially, we note that, due to its status as a minor misdemeanor, Carano’s lanes of
travel/weaving charge was tried to the bench, not the jury. “There is a presumption in a bench
trial that the trial judge knows and follows the law, and only considers matter properly before it.”
State v. Pleban, 9th Dist. No. 10CA009789, 2011-Ohio-3254, ¶ 45. Carano has not pointed to
anything in the record that would overcome that presumption. Further, even assuming that the
prosecutor’s statements were somehow improper, he has not shown that he was prejudiced by
them. Nothing in the record supports the conclusion that Carano’s lanes of travel/weaving
conviction arose strictly from his drive down Hyfield Avenue. Deputy Dobbins also testified
that Carano weaved and left his lane of travel on Manchester Road. Carano never claimed that
there were any obstructions on Manchester Road that kept him from staying within his lane of
travel. By weaving and crossing the double yellow line on Manchester Road, therefore, Carano
violated R.C. 4511.25. Carano has not shown that, but for the prosecutor’s statements, he would
not have been convicted of that offense.
{¶24} This Court also finds no merit in Carano’s assertion that, absent the prosecutor’s
allegedly improper statements, the jury might not have found him guilty on his OVI counts.
11
Apart from his testimony about Carano’s weaving, Deputy Dobbins testified that he detected a
strong odor of alcohol when speaking with Carano, his eyes were watery and bloodshot, and he
admitted to having “a couple” of drinks. Deputy Dobbins performed a horizontal gaze
nystagmus test on Carano and testified that the results of the test indicated Carano was
intoxicated. He then attempted to perform the walk and turn test on Carano, but Carano quit in
the middle of the test and told Deputy Dobbins to just arrest him. Carano refused to complete
any further field sobriety testing and later refused to submit to a breathalyzer. Deputy Dobbins
also testified that the police found two open containers of beer in Carano’s van; one on the
driver’s side floorboard and one in the console’s cup holder on the driver’s side. The record,
therefore, contains a wealth of evidence in support of Carano’s OVI convictions. Carano has not
shown that, but for the prosecutor’s arguments about weaving, the jury would not have convicted
him on his OVI counts. His third assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error Number Four
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO GRANT
A MISTRIAL BASED UPON INFLAMMATORY REMARKS CONCERNING
MR. CARANO’S PRIOR CONVICTIONS MADE BEFORE THE JURY AND
FOR FAILING TO CONDUCT A HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER
SAID REMARKS AFFECTED THE JURY.
{¶25} In his fourth assignment of error, Carano argues that the trial court erred by
refusing to grant his two motions for a mistrial. We disagree.
{¶26} “Mistrials need be declared only when the ends of justice so require and a fair
trial is no longer possible.” State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 127 (1991). “The essential
inquiry on a motion for mistrial is whether the substantial rights of the accused are adversely
affected. Great deference is afforded to a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for mistrial.
Accordingly, this Court reviews the denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion.”
12
(Internal citations, alterations, and quotations omitted.) State v. Howes, 9th Dist. No. 24665,
2010-Ohio-421, ¶ 11. An abuse of discretion means that the trial court was unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219
(1983).
{¶27} Carano moved for a mistrial on two separate occasions. The first motion
stemmed from the testimony of Deputy Randall Cunningham, the officer in charge of intake and
booking at the Summit County Jail. Deputy Cunningham testified that he routinely records any
statements suspects make during booking and, when booking Carano, he had noted one of
Carano’s statements. Before Deputy Cunningham testified, the State agreed that it would limit
his testimony to Carano’s actual statement. When Deputy Cunningham read his recorded
recollection into the record, however, he read:
Inmate states he had a few beers tonight at a friend’s house in Medina and still
seeing --
The transcript does not reflect the remainder of Deputy Cunningham’s statement because defense
counsel immediately objected and the prosecutor interjected “[t]hat’s it.” Defense counsel later
proferred at sidebar, however, that he heard Deputy Cunningham say Carano “still seems
intoxicated.”
{¶28} Directly after defense counsel objected, the trial judge sustained the objection.
She ordered that Deputy Cunningham would “repeat the relevant portion [of his testimony]” and
instructed the jury that “if [they] heard anything else, * * * to disregard everything except for
what the Deputy is going to repeat at this time.” Deputy Cunningham then testified solely as to
Carano’s statement.
{¶29} Before cross-examination, defense counsel moved for a mistrial because the State
had agreed to limit Deputy Cunningham’s testimony to Carano’s recorded statement, not his
13
personal observation of Carano at the time of booking. The trial judge noted that she had
sustained defense counsel’s objection because she was aware of the parties’ agreement to limit
Deputy Cunningham’s testimony, but she personally “did not hear anything that was
decipherable” after defense counsel and the prosecutor both interjected. The judge also reviewed
the transcript and noted that the court reporter had not heard the remainder of the testimony.
After receiving arguments from both sides, the court overruled the motion for a mistrial.
{¶30} Carano first argues that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial because
the court never gave a corrective instruction to the jury. The record reflects, however, that the
court gave a corrective instruction to the jury immediately after she sustained defense counsel’s
objection. The court had no reason to issue another corrective instruction after denying Carano’s
first motion for a mistrial. Moreover, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion by
refusing to grant Carano’s motion. Carano has not explained how Deputy Cunningham’s
statement that he “still seem[ed] intoxicated,” assuming the jury even heard it, deprived him of a
fair trial. Deputy Dobbins testified at length about his observations of Carano, and his testimony
clearly supported the conclusion that Carano was intoxicated. At most, Deputy Cunningham’s
bare statement that Carano “still seem[ed] intoxicated” corroborated Deputy Dobbins’ testimony.
Further, the statement was brief and isolated, and the court specifically instructed the jury to
disregard it. See State v. Witcher, 9th Dist. No. 26111, 2012-Ohio-4141, ¶ 33 (“It is well settled
that juries are presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions.”). Given our review of the
record, the court’s decision to deny Carano’s first motion for a mistrial was not unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable.
{¶31} Carano’s second motion for a mistrial stemmed from a video recording the State
played. The recording depicts Carano’s interactions with the deputies at the police station after
14
his arrest and his refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test. In one portion of the recording, the
deputies briefly discuss Carano’s prior convictions. Specifically, one deputy asks whether
Carano has nine or eight, and the other deputy responds that he has seven. When that portion of
the recording was played at trial, defense counsel immediately objected and the court spoke with
the attorneys outside the presence of the jury. Carano then moved for a mistrial on the basis that
the State had only charged him with having five prior convictions and any reference to seven,
eight, or nine prior convictions unduly prejudiced him.
{¶32} Once again, there was discussion as to whether the jury even heard the
conversation between the two deputies due to the quality of the sound in the courtroom. The trial
judge then noted that she had “just watched [the video] three or four times and [she] wasn’t
exactly clear what was said.” The State ultimately asked the court to grant defense counsel’s
motion to strike and give a curative instruction. After further discussion, the court instructed the
jury as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, prior to our break we were watching this tape
and we were at the point where Deputy Dobbins was reading a form to Mr.
Carano, there may have been a few statements that got in following that and my
instruction to you is that * * * I’m going to strike any of those statements from the
record and instruct you if you heard any of that, to disregard any statements that
were made after Deputy Dobbins finished reading Mr. Carano the form and the
time that we are going to pick up the tape now.
The remainder of the recording was then played for the jury.
{¶33} This Court has upheld a trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial when an improper
reference to a prior conviction was fleeting and promptly followed by a curative instruction. See
State v. Gary, 9th Dist. No. 12CA0014, 2012-Ohio-5813, ¶ 29-31. Further, the Supreme Court
has held that it is not necessary to declare a mistrial in such circumstances when “overwhelming
evidence” establishes the defendant’s guilt. State v. Trimble, 122 Ohio St.3d 297, 2009-Ohio-
15
2961, ¶ 175. The reference to Carano’s prior convictions was fleeting. It also was unclear
whether the jury even heard the reference due to the sound quality of the recording in the
courtroom. Moreover, the court immediately issued a curative instruction and there was an
overwhelming amount of evidence to establish Carano’s guilt. There was testimony that
Carano’s van weaved several times, his eyes were watery and bloodshot, he smelled strongly of
alcohol, he admitted to having “a couple” of drinks, he failed the first field sobriety test and
refused to complete the others, and two open containers were found in his van. It is also
noteworthy that the jury was aware that Carano had prior convictions, as the State had to prove
the existence of five prior convictions as part of its case-in-chief. Given the facts and
circumstances here, we must conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Carano’s second motion for a mistrial. Carano’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error Number Five
MR. CARANO’S CONVICTIONS ARE BASED ON INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE OF FIVE PRIOR CONVICTIONS USED TO ENHANCE THE
CURRENT CHARGES FROM MISDEMEANORS TO FOURTH-DEGREE
FELONIES.
Assignment of Error Number Six
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE SPECIFICATION CONCERNING OPERATING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE[.]
{¶34} In his fifth and sixth assignments of error, Carano challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence in support of his OVI convictions. Specifically, he argues that the Stated failed to
prove his five prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.
{¶35} We incorporate the sufficiency standard of review set forth in Carano’s second
assignment of error. R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) provides that “[n]o person shall operate any vehicle
* * * within this state, if, at the time of the operation, * * * [t]he person is under the influence of
16
alcohol.” If a person has previously been convicted of or has pleaded guilty to five or more
equivalent offenses within twenty years of the offense, that person is guilty of a fourth-degree
felony OVI. R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d). The offense is a misdemeanor if the State does not set forth
evidence of any prior convictions. R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(a).
{¶36} “When a prior conviction actually ‘transform[s] the crime itself by increasing its
degree [,] * * * [t]he prior conviction is an essential element of the crime and must be proved by
the state.’” State v. Patterson, 9th Dist. No. 09CA0014-M, 2009-Ohio-6953, ¶ 6, quoting State
v. Allen, 29 Ohio St.3d 53, 54 (1987). R.C. 2945.75 governs prior convictions and provides as
follows:
(B)(1) Whenever in any case it is necessary to prove a prior conviction, a certified
copy of the entry of judgment in such prior conviction together with evidence
sufficient to identify the defendant named in the entry as the offender in the case
at bar, is sufficient to prove such prior conviction.
The State here relied upon R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) and introduced certified copies of judgment
entries from five different cases.
{¶37} Initially, we note that Carano has not separately challenged the admission of the
five judgment entries the State relied upon in a separate assignment of error. He has only
challenged the sufficiency of his OVI convictions.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence, an appellate court is to consider all of the evidence admitted at trial,
even if the evidence was improperly admitted. State v. Brewer, 121 Ohio St.3d
202, 2009-Ohio-593, ¶ 19. See also State v. Denny, 9th Dist. No. 08CA0051,
2009-Ohio-3925, ¶ 12 (“[T]he administration of justice dictates that the appellate
court review the issue of sufficiency in consideration of all the evidence presented
by the State in its case in chief, whether such evidence was properly admitted or
not.”). Thus, [Carano] may not base his sufficiency argument on the contention
that the judgment entries were improperly admitted. To the extent that [Carano]
attempts to make such an argument, we overrule it.
17
State v. Ward, 9th Dist. No. 09CA009720, 2011-Ohio-518, ¶ 20. We limit our review to
Carano’s argument that the State failed to produce evidence sufficient to identify him as the
defendant in the five judgment entries. See id. at ¶ 21-22.
{¶38} Carano argues that the five judgment entries the State introduced were
insufficient to identify him because several of them listed different residential addresses for him.
Specifically, State’s Exhibits 36 and 38 contained a Tallmadge address while Exhibit 39
contained a Garfield Heights address and Exhibit 40 contained a Cuyahoga Falls address. He
further argues that Exhibit 40 did not identify him because it did not contain any personal
identifiers, such as a birthdate or social security number.
{¶39} Deputy Dobbins testified at trial as to Carano’s date of birth and his social
security number. State’s Exhibits 36, 37, 38, and 39 all contain Carano’s name as well as the
date of birth and social security number that Deputy Dobbins attributed to him at trial. State’s
Exhibit 40 contains Carano’s name and date of birth, but not his social security number, as that
space is blacked out with marker. In addition to the certified copies of the judgment entries,
Deputy Dobbins also testified that, through his investigation, he had confirmed Carano had five
prior OVI convictions in the last 20 years.
{¶40} In relying upon certified copies of judgment entries, the State is required to
produce “evidence sufficient to identify the defendant named in the entry as the offender.” R.C.
2945.75(B)(1). Deputy Dobbins’ testimony sufficed to identify Carano as the defendant in each
of the certified judgment entries. See Ward at ¶ 21-22 (defendant’s full name and date of birth
on certified judgment entries constituted sufficient identifiers for purposes of R.C.
2945.75(B)(1)). All of the entries matched Carano’s name and date of birth and four of them
also matched his social security number. Additionally, Deputy Dobbins testified that, through
18
his own investigation, he had confirmed the fact that Carano had five prior OVI convictions in
the last 20 years. Carano’s argument that the State failed to set forth sufficient evidence of his
prior convictions lacks merit. His fifth and sixth assignments of error are overruled.
Assignment of Error Number Seven
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY GIVING AN
INPROPER (sic) INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY ON THE OFFENSE OF
OPERATING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL OR DRUGS AS
ALLEGED IN COUNT ONE OF THE INDICTMENT.
{¶41} In his seventh assignment of error, Carano argues that the trial court committed
plain error in its instructions to the jury. We disagree.
{¶42} Generally, a defendant’s failure to object to an allegedly erroneous jury
instruction limits any review of the alleged error to a review for plain error. State v. Johnson, 9th
Dist. No. 25525, 2011-Ohio-3941, ¶ 20. Under Crim.R. 52(B), “[p]lain errors or defects
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the
court.” “Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution, under
exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long,
53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶43} Carano takes issue with the following jury instruction:
In Count One of the indictment [Carano] is charged with operating under the
influence of alcohol or drugs.
Before you can find [Carano] guilty, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt
that on or about the 6th day of August, 2011, * * * [Carano] operated a vehicle, to
wit, a van on Lake Vista Drive, while under the influence of alcohol, * * * and
[Carano] was previously convicted of or pled guilty, within the past 20 years, to 5
or more violations of Division (A) or (B) of Section 4511.10 of the Revised Code,
a municipal ordinance related to [OVI], * * *, a municipal ordinance relating to
operating a vehicle with a prohibited concentration of alcohol in the blood, breath,
or urine, Section 2903.04 of the Revised Code in a case in which the offender was
subject to the sanctions described in Division (D) of that Section, or Section
2903.06, 2903.07, or 2903.08 of the Revised Code or a municipal ordinance that
19
is substantially similar to Section 2903.07 of the Revised Code in a case in which
the jury or judge found that the offender was under the influence of alcohol * * *,
in violation of Section 4511.19(A)(1)(a) of the Revised Code.
(Emphasis added.) R.C. 4511.10 pertains to the placement and maintenance of traffic control
devices on state highways.
{¶44} Carano’s argument is confusing at best. First, he appears to argue that the court’s
instruction prejudiced him because the State “presented no evidence relating to traffic control
devices at trial.” Although the court referred to R.C. 4511.10 in its jury instruction, the reference
was clearly a mistake. R.C. 4511.10 does not have any subsections, so it would be impossible to
have a violation of Division (A) or (B) of that section. Moreover, the entirety of the court’s
instruction makes clear that the court was discussing prior alcohol- or drug-related offenses, not
the placement or maintenance of traffic control devices. The court also reviewed the verdict
forms with the jury. Both OVI verdict forms, as completed, read:
We, the Jury, further find that Defendant, JOHN M. CARANO, was previously
convicted of, within the past twenty years, five or more violations of Operating
Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs.
The jury specifically found, therefore, that Carano had five prior OVI or drug-related
convictions. Carano has not shown that the court’s erroneous reference to R.C. 4511.10 in its
instruction prejudiced his substantial rights.
{¶45} Next, Carano appears to argue that the court’s instruction prejudiced him
because, when combined with the testimony the State presented about his refusal to submit to a
breathalyzer test, it somehow created a presumption that he was guilty of violating R.C.
4511.19(A)(1)(a). A court may issue a refusal instruction when a person is arrested for OVI,
refuses to take a chemical test of his breath, and “the reason given for the refusal is conditional,
unequivocal, or a combination thereof.” State v. Simin, 9th Dist. No. 26016, 2012-Ohio-4389, ¶
20
42, quoting Maumee v. Anistik, 69 Ohio St.3d 339 (1994), syllabus. The court here did issue a
refusal instruction, but Carano has not challenged that instruction in his assignment of error. The
only portion of the court’s instruction that he challenges is the portion quoted above. We fail to
see how that portion of the court’s instruction created any type of presumption of guilt.
Therefore, we reject Carano’s second argument. Carano’s seventh assignment of error is
overruled.
III
{¶46} Carano’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
21
Costs taxed to Appellant.
BETH WHITMORE
FOR THE COURT
MOORE, P. J.
BELFANCE, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
DAVID M. WATSON, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.