Feathers v. Tasker ( 2012 )

[Cite as Feathers v. Tasker, 2012-Ohio-4917.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
CARLA F. FEATHERS, et al. C.A. No. 26318
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
THOMAS R. TASKER, et al. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellee CASE No. CV 2010 07 5146
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: October 24, 2012
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant Carla Feathers appeals the judgment of the Summit County Court of
Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} After Mrs. Feathers was injured in a car accident, she filed a complaint in which
she alleged a claim of negligence against appellee Thomas Tasker, the driver of the car that hit
her. She further sought a declaration against her own insurance company, Travelers Insurance
Company, that she was entitled to underinsured motorist benefits as a result of the injuries she
sustained. Mrs. Feathers’ husband Eugene also alleged a claim for loss of consortium, although
he did not appeal and is not named as a party to the instant appeal.
{¶3} Travelers answered and filed a cross-claim against Mr. Tasker for
indemnification. The insurance company subsequently moved for and was granted summary
judgment on Mrs. Feathers’ declaratory judgment claim, wherein the trial court declared that the
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plaintiffs were not entitled to underinsured motorist benefits as a result of this accident. Mrs.
Feathers has not challenged that judgment and Travelers is not a party to this appeal.
{¶4} The trial court referred the remaining claims against Mr. Tasker to the court
mediator. On September 19, 2011, the mediator filed a status report of mediation, indicating that
further action was required and that mediation was rescheduled for a later date to allow the
plaintiffs the opportunity to obtain legal representation and conduct further discovery. After a
December 30, 2011 mediation conference, the mediator filed a status report that stated that the
case was settled. Mr. and Mrs. Feathers both signed the status report the same day.
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs filed a motion to “void settlement agreement dated 12-30-11” on
January 3, 2012, in which they alleged that the mediation was “unfair” and “one sided,” that the
settlement was not reasonable in that it would not cover Mrs. Feathers’ medical bills, and that
they felt “pressured” to enter into the settlement agreement. Mr. Tasker filed a memorandum in
opposition and appended several documents arising out of the parties’ mediation.
{¶5} On January 11, 2012, the trial court issued an entry dismissing the matter with
prejudice as it had been fully settled by and between the parties. On January 20, 2012, Mr. and
Mrs. Feathers filed a motion to vacate the entry of dismissal and the “arbitration” award. They
asserted their claims against Mr. Tasker had not been fully resolved by the amount of the
settlement. Moreover, they reminded the trial court that they had previously filed a motion to
vacate the “arbitration award” and they attached their previous motion to “void” the settlement
agreement reached after mediation. Mr. Tasker opposed the motion. The trial court issued an
order in which it denied the plaintiffs’ motion to void the December 30, 2011 settlement
agreement and the motion to vacate the dismissal order and arbitration award. Mrs. Feathers
filed a timely appeal in which she raised one assignment of error.
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II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
[THE] TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND ABUSED
IT[]S DISCRETION TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT, IN NOT
SUSTAINING MOTION TO VOID SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DATED 12-
30-11[.]
{¶6} Mrs. Feathers argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to vacate the
parties’ settlement agreement. Moreover, she argues that the trial court erred by failing to hold a
hearing on her motions. This Court disagrees.
{¶7} Mrs. Feathers first argues that she had the right to renounce the mediated
settlement agreement because the terms were unreasonable and she felt “pressured” into
accepting those terms.
Mediation is, by definition, a procedure by which the parties negotiate a
resolution to their dispute with the assistance of a third party mediator. If the
parties do not reach an agreement, the mediation process is at an end; no
resolution may be imposed on the parties. Nevertheless, although mediation is a
nonbinding process, a settlement agreement reached through a mediation process
is as enforceable as any contractual agreement.
As long as a settlement agreement reached by the parties was not procured by
fraud, duress, overreaching, or undue influence, the court has the discretion to
accept it.
(Internal citations and quotations omitted.) Murray v. Murray, 6th Dist. No. L-09-1305, 2011-
Ohio-1546, ¶ 22-23. This Court has held that parties are bound by the terms of their settlement
agreement as in any other contract where they have manifested the intent to enter into the
agreement. Haas v. Bauer, 156 Ohio App.3d 26, 2004-Ohio-437, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.). Furthermore,
“when the parties agree to a settlement offer, [the] agreement cannot be repudiated by either
party, and the court has the authority to sign a journal entry reflecting the agreement and to
enforce the settlement. (Alterations sic.) Id., quoting Shelter v. Shelter, 9th Dist. No.
00CA0070, 2001 WL 542318 (May 23, 2001).
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{¶8} “To avoid a contract on the basis of duress, a party must prove coercion by the
other party to the contract. It is not enough to show that one assented merely because of difficult
circumstances that are not the fault of the other party.” Blodgett v. Blodgett, 49 Ohio St.3d 243(1990), syllabus. Three common elements of duress include (1) the involuntary acceptance of
terms by one party, (2) no alternative to acceptance under the circumstances, and (3) coercive
acts by the other party gave rise to those circumstances. Id. at 246, citing Urban Plumbing &
Heating Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 382, 389-390 (U.S. Ct. of Claims 1969).
{¶9} Mrs. Feathers did not allege that Mr. Tasker or his attorney coerced her during the
mediation into accepting the terms of the settlement agreement. Instead, she simply alleged that
she and her husband felt “pressured.” Although she and her husband were not represented by
counsel during the mediation, they had the opportunity to discuss the matter and draw support
and counsel from one another. In addition, the mediator continued the mediation conference for
more than three months to allow the couple to obtain counsel. Nevertheless, they appeared at the
second mediation conference without counsel.
{¶10} Mr. Tasker appended four documents to his memorandum in opposition to the
motion to vacate, to wit: the status report of mediation, a proposed order dismissing the matter
with prejudice, a document enunciating the settlement terms, and a release of any and all further
claims arising out of the car accident. Both Mr. and Mrs. Feathers signed all four documents.
Immediately after executing the release, Mr. and Mrs. Feathers received and accepted a draft for
the settlement amount.
{¶11} Based on a review of the record, there is nothing to indicate that Mr. Tasker or his
attorney coerced or pressured Mrs. Feathers to accept the terms of the parties’ settlement
agreement. Instead, it appears that Mrs. Feathers simply regretted her decision to accept the sum
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on which the parties agreed. This Court understands Mrs. Feathers’ frustration and regret after
accepting a sum that will not fully compensate her and her husband for their loss. However,
“[d]issatisfaction with or general remorse about signing a consent agreement do not [] constitute
‘duress.’” Murray at ¶ 26. Moreover, this Court has held that a party’s change of heart
regarding the terms of a settlement agreement does not constitute grounds to set aside the
agreement. Rorick v. Rorick, 9th Dist. No. 09CA009533, 2009-Ohio-3173, ¶ 15.
{¶12} Mr. and Mrs. Feathers did not obtain their ideal settlement, and that is
unfortunate. We understand that a remedy which fails to fully compensate an innocent party
carries an inherent sting of inequity. Simply given the disruptions of normal daily life associated
with the aftermath of such an event, it is impossible to fathom a remedy that can ever make an
injured party whole. Nevertheless, Mrs. Feathers and her husband agreed to the terms of the
settlement and accepted the offered compensation in the absence of any evidence of duress.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying the motion to vacate the settlement agreement.
{¶13} Mrs. Feathers further argues that the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing
prior to ruling on her motion. Only when a party disputes the meaning of terms or the existence
of the agreement must the trial court conduct an evidentiary hearing. Rulli v. Fan Co., 79 Ohio
St.3d 374, 377 (1997). Because Mrs. Feathers disputed neither the existence of the agreement
nor the meaning of any terms therein, but rather merely expressed displeasure with the
negotiated terms, the trial court did not err by ruling on her motion without a hearing. Mrs.
Feathers’ assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶14} Mrs. Feathers’ sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the
Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
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Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, P. J.
DICKINSON, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
CARLA F. FEATHERS, pro se, Appellant.
KIMBERLY K. WYSS, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.