E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Akron ( 2012 )

[Cite as E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Akron, 2012-Ohio-3780.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
EAST OHIO GAS COMPANY C.A. No. 25830
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
CITY OF AKRON COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CV 2009-08-5836
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: August 22, 2012
CARR, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, the City of Akron, appeals the order of the Summit County Court of
Common Pleas that denied its motion for summary judgment asserting immunity under R.C.
Chapter 2744. This Court reverses.
I.
{¶2} On May 13, 2007, a water main at the intersection of Glenwood Avenue and
Gorge Boulevard in Akron ruptured. An employee of the Akron Highway Department who was
on his overnight rounds noticed the water and stopped to investigate. He barricaded the area and
notified the Akron Water Department that it looked like “a bad break.” When he returned to the
intersection with more barricades, however, he concluded that it “[was] not that bad” and called
the Water Department again. Because it was around 2:30 a.m. on a weekend, the Water
Department Dispatcher called the Supervisor on duty, who decided to wait until the morning
shift started at 7:30 a.m. to send an inspector and a crew to the scene. Meanwhile, customers of
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Dominion East Ohio Gas started to complain about interruptions in their natural gas service. A
Dominion employee responded to the intersection after Water Department crews had started
repairing the break later that morning, and he discovered then that there was a hole in the
underside of a natural gas line that lay directly above the split in the effected water main.
{¶3} Dominion sued Akron for damages related to the repair of its natural gas line and
its customers’ delivery systems, alleging that Akron negligently failed to dispatch a repair crew
to the scene of the water main break overnight. Both parties moved for summary judgment.
Akron argued, in part, that it was immune from suit under R.C. Chapter 2744, but Dominion did
not respond to Akron’s arguments regarding immunity other than to characterize them as
“frivolous” and “made only for the purposeful attempt to delay.” The trial court concluded that
there were genuine issues of material fact and denied both motions. Akron appealed, as
permitted by R.C. 2744.02(C), and assigned two errors for review. The second is dispositive of
this appeal, so we address them in reverse order.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE IMMUNITY
DEFENSES OF R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) AND (A)(5) DO NOT APPLY IN THIS
CASE.
{¶4} Akron’s assignment of error argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion
for summary judgment with respect to the immunity described in R.C. 2744.02 and R.C.
2744.03. We agree.
{¶5} This Court reviews an order that grants summary judgment de novo. Grafton v.
Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). Summary judgment is proper if there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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See Civ.R. 56(C). In applying this standard, evidence is construed in favor of the nonmoving
party, and summary judgment is appropriate if reasonable minds could only conclude that
judgment should be entered in favor of the movant. Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp., 73 Ohio
St.3d 679, 686-87 (1995).
{¶6} As a general rule, political subdivisions are “not liable in damages in a civil action
for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the
political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in connection with a
governmental or proprietary function.” R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). This immunity, however, is subject
to the exceptions described in R.C. 2744.02(B). One of these exceptions provides that “political
subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by the negligent
performance of acts by their employees with respect to proprietary functions of the political
subdivisions.” R.C. 2744.02(B)(2). In other words, if the basis for a claim is the performance of
a governmental function, a political subdivision is immune from suit for negligence unless one of
the other four exceptions described in R.C. 2744.02(B) is present. On the other hand, a political
subdivision does not have immunity for negligent acts committed in the performance of a
proprietary function absent the conditions described in R.C. 2744.03.
{¶7} Even if we assume that Akron acted negligently in connection with a proprietary
function, therefore, it is immune from liability if one of the situations described in R.C.
2744.03(A) is present. The City has argued that it is immune under either R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) or
R.C. 2744.03(A)(5). Under R.C. 2744.03(A)(3), a political subdivision is immune when “the
action or failure to act by the employee involved that gave rise to the claim of liability was
within the discretion of the employee with respect to policy-making, planning, or enforcement
powers by virtue of the duties and responsibilities of the office or position of the employee.”
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Under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5), the political subdivision is immune “if the * * * loss to * * * property
resulted from the exercise of judgment or discretion in determining whether to acquire, or how to
use, equipment, supplies, materials, personnel, facilities, and other resources unless the judgment
or discretion was exercised with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless
manner.”
{¶8} R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) and (A)(5) are similar to the extent that they address the
exercise of discretion by employees of a political subdivision. Nonetheless, the provisions have
two different objects in view. R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) addresses the actions of employees whose
work is consistent with “discretion * * * with respect to policy-making, planning, or enforcement
powers[,]” but R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) addresses the actions of employees whose discretion is
exercised at a different level, “from the exercise of judgment or discretion in determining
whether to acquire, or how to use, equipment, supplies, materials, personnel, facilities, and other
resources.” The challenge inherent in these provisions is identifying where the boundary of
discretionary activity that is shielded by immunity lies. Although R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) does not
shield routine decisions from liability, it does provide immunity as provided in the statute for
“‘positive exercise[s] of judgment that portray[] a considered adoption of a particular course of
conduct in relation to an object to be achieved.’” Shumaker v. Park Lane Manor of Akron, 9th
Dist. No. 25212, 2011-Ohio-1052, ¶ 19. This immunity:
operates to protect political subdivisions from liability based upon discretionary
judgments concerning the allocation of scarce resources; it is not intended to
protect conduct which requires very little discretion or independent judgment.
The law of immunity is designed to foster freedom and discretion in the
development of public policy while still ensuring that implementation of political
subdivision responsibilities is conducted in a reasonable manner.
Hall v. Fort Frye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 111 Ohio App.3d 690, 699 (4th Dist.1996),
citing Marcum v. Adkins, 4th Dist. No. 93CA17, 1994 WL 116233 (Mar. 28, 1994).
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{¶9} This Court recently applied R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) in a similar situation. In
Shumaker, the plaintiff alleged that she fell on ice that had accumulated as the result of an
unrepaired water main break. Id. at ¶ 1. The City of Akron scheduled the repair for Saturday,
but the actual repair was postponed until Monday. Id. at ¶ 5. On Monday, before the repair was
made, the plaintiff slipped on a layer of black ice underneath the flowing water. Id. at ¶ 7. The
City’s position was that “its decision to postpone the * * * repair until Monday was a
discretionary allocation of its limited resources.” Id. at ¶ 20. The plaintiff, on the other hand,
argued that “[Akron] was making a routine decision requiring little judgment or discretion[.]”
Id. at ¶ 21. This Court agreed that the decision to postpone the repair reflected a “positive
exercise of judgment” and, accordingly, was a discretionary matter within the meaning of R.C.
2744.03(A)(5). Id.
{¶10} This case presents the same type of decision, albeit under different circumstances,
and it also presents a matter of discretion within the meaning of R.C. 2744.03(A)(5). The Akron
Water Department became aware of the water main break at issue around 2:30 a.m. on a Sunday
morning. Although department inspectors rotate emergency shifts from 3:30 p.m. until midnight,
there are no inspectors on duty from midnight until 7:30 a.m. According to retired supervisor
John Thompson, emergency overtime during the hours from midnight until 7:00 a.m. had to be
offered to each foreman by seniority, and each had the right to refuse the overtime. If no
foreman accepted the overtime, it had to be offered to each inspector by seniority and, again,
each had the right to refuse. Only once every foreman and every inspector refused the overtime
opportunity would Mr. Thompson step in as the supervisor to inspect a suspected break. During
those hours, assembling a crew would require similar time and efforts. According to Mr.
Thompson, he evaluated the call that he received from dispatch regarding the suspected break
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and determined that by the time he initiated the overtime procedure to call in a foreman or
inspector and, again, to assemble a crew, the water main break would receive no earlier attention
than if the inspector on duty at 7:30 a.m. went to the scene immediately.
{¶11} Mr. Thompson’s determination that, based on the information that had been
provided to him, the water main break should receive immediate attention when the 7:30 a.m.
shift began required a “positive exercise of judgment that portrays a considered adoption of a
particular course of conduct in relation to an object to be achieved.’” Shumaker, 2011-Ohio-
1052, at ¶ 19. That decision reflected an “exercise of judgment or discretion in determining * * *
how to use * * * personnel” under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5). Accordingly, Akron is entitled to
immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) unless Mr. Thompson’s “judgment or discretion was
exercised with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” R.C.
2744.03(A)(5).
{¶12} In the trial court and in this Court, Dominion argued that Mr. Thompson acted
recklessly in exercising his judgment. In response to Akron’s motion for summary judgment, for
example, Dominion characterized Mr. Thompson’s actions as “a purposeful and intentional
decision * * * to not get out of bed and investigate the seriousness of the water main break.” In
this respect, Dominion has argued that the affidavits submitted in support of Akron’s motion for
summary judgment should be disregarded because they contradict previous deposition testimony.
We disagree.
{¶13} “[W]hen determining the effect of a party’s affidavit that appears to be
inconsistent with the party’s deposition and that is submitted either in support of or in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment, a trial court must consider whether the affidavit contradicts
or merely supplements the deposition.” Byrd v. Smith, 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 2006-Ohio-3455, ¶
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26. When an affidavit produced by the moving party is inconsistent with the affiant’s deposition
testimony, “summary judgment may not be granted in the movant’s favor” because “when a
movant makes substantive changes to deposition testimony, an issue of credibility of the
deponent is created and summary judgment is inappropriate.” Id., citing Wright v. Honda of Am.
Mfg., Inc., 73 Ohio St.3d 571, 575-576 (1995).
{¶14} Dominion moved the trial court to strike Mr. Thompson’s affidavit, arguing that it
contradicted his deposition testimony. Likewise, Dominion has argued that this Court should not
consider Mr. Thompson’s affidavit and, consistent with Byrd, should find that the contradiction
results in a genuine issue of material fact. Although Mr. Thompson’s affidavit includes some
information that is not included in his deposition testimony, there is no inconsistency between
the two. They are, in fact, easily harmonized. The additional information provides specific
details about what Mr. Thompson considered when he decided not to call in employees for the
incident in question. His deposition testimony described the procedure that the Water
Department followed in the event of a report of a water main break, and he described the events
of the morning in question in response to general questions from Dominion’s counsel. Counsel
did not ask Mr. Thompson for more specific information about his decision-making process on
that occasion, and Mr. Thompson did not volunteer it. His affidavit, rather than providing
contradictory information, fills in that gap and is properly considered in support of Akron’s
motion for summary judgment.
{¶15} Mr. Thompson’s affidavit, in conjunction with his deposition, demonstrates that
his exercise of discretion was not wanton or reckless. Conduct is wanton and reckless when a
person “perversely disregard[s] a known risk, or act[s] or intentionally fail[s] to act in
contravention of a duty, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a
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reasonable person to realize such conduct creates an unreasonable risk of harm substantially
greater than the risk necessary to make the conduct negligent.” Fowler v. Williams Cty.
Commrs., 111 Ohio App.3d 760, 775 (6th Dist.1996), citing Thompson v. McNeill, 53 Ohio St.3d
102, 104-105 (1990). Based on the information available to Mr. Thompson at the time that he
made the decision not to initiate the overtime procedure, which is not in dispute, and the fact that
he determined that no more delay would result, Mr. Thompson did not know or have reason to
know that his decision would create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Fowler at 775.
{¶16} Mr. Thompson’s decision was one that involved the exercise of judgment or
discretion under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5), and he did not act wantonly or recklessly in making the
decision. Consequently, the trial court erred by determining that Akron was not entitled to
immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5), and Akron’s second assignment of error is sustained.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EXCEPTION OF R.C.
2744.02(B)(2) APPLIES TO DEFEAT THE APPELLANT, CITY OF AKRON’S
IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY UNDER R.C. 2744.02(A)
{¶17} Akron’s first assignment of error is moot. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
III.
{¶18} Akron’s second assignment of error is sustained. Its first assignment of error is
moot. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this matter
is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
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We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
MOORE, J.
DICKINSON, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
CHERI B. CUNNINGHAM, Director of Law, and JOHN C. REECE and JANET M. CIOTOLA,
Assistant Directors of Law, for Appellant.
STEPHEN J. PRUNESKI, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.