Sorensen v. DeFranco ( 2013 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as Sorensen v. DeFranco, 2013-Ohio-5829.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    LAKE COUNTY, OHIO
    ROBERT L. SORENSEN,                               :     OPINION
    Plaintiff-Appellant,             :
    CASE NO. 2013-L-038
    - vs -                                    :
    ORLANDO DEFRANCO, et al.,                         :
    Defendant-Appellee.              :
    Civil Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 12 CV 000463.
    Judgment: Affirmed.
    Earl F. Ghaster, Kubyn & Ghaster, 8373 Mentor Avenue, Mentor, OH 44060 (For
    Plaintiff-Appellant).
    James T. Tyminski, Jr., Stephen M. Beaudry, and Holly Olarczuk-Smith, Gallagher
    Sharp, Sixth Floor, Bulkley Building, 1501 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44115 (For
    Defendant-Appellee).
    COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J.
    {¶1}     Appellant, Robert L. Sorensen, appeals from the April 8, 2013 judgment of
    the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, granting appellee, Orlando DeFranco’s,
    motion for summary judgment.
    {¶2}     Fifty-nine-year-old Sorensen, a California resident, and 82-year-old
    DeFranco, an Ohioan, had been friends for 30 years. DeFranco, now deceased, was
    the owner of a home in Concord Township, Lake County, Ohio. Sorensen, a self-
    described “beach bum,” would stay at DeFranco’s residence whenever visiting Ohio.
    DeFranco allowed Sorensen to borrow his car and never charged Sorensen any rent
    during his stay.
    {¶3}   On one occasion, Sorensen stayed at DeFranco’s home while DeFranco
    vacationed in Las Vegas. Sorensen agreed to house-sit and watch DeFranco’s two
    dogs, without compensation. On October 18, 2010, at around 6:00 p.m., Sorensen felt
    a chill in the air and turned on the furnace at the thermostat. The furnace had not been
    used since the previous spring.
    {¶4}   According to Sorensen, about an hour later, the house became too hot
    and he opened the front door for some fresh air. Around 10:45 p.m., Sorensen arose
    from lying on the couch and felt dizzy. He attributed his dizziness to low blood sugar
    due to his diabetic condition. He walked to the kitchen to get something to eat, passed
    out, fell, broke his left leg, and tore the medial meniscus of his left knee.
    {¶5}   When Sorensen came to, he realized he needed to get out of the house
    and began crawling.      He vomited in the living room.         Sorensen was able to call
    DeFranco’s daughter, Elizabeth, who called 9-1-1.           Sorensen crawled outside, but
    because it was too cold, he crawled back indoors.
    {¶6}   The fire department and paramedics arrived, finding Sorensen semi-
    conscious in the living room. First responders noticed a strong smell of natural gas and
    their eyes burned when they entered DeFranco’s home. Positive readings for carbon
    monoxide were detected throughout the residence.
    {¶7}   Sorensen was transported to the hospital, treated for carbon monoxide
    poisoning, and underwent surgery on his leg. Sorensen’s relationship with DeFranco
    2
    after the incident was not damaged. In fact, he later stayed with DeFranco’s daughter
    while recovering.
    {¶8}   Although the fire report indicates that the furnace inspection showed a
    “deteriorated condition,” no firemen could explain who made that statement or why it
    was made. The fireman who authored the report neither went in the basement, where
    the furnace was located, nor looked at the furnace. Two other firemen, who went in the
    basement, looked at the furnace and monitored it for carbon monoxide. They did not
    disassemble the furnace.     Using helmet lights, they saw some darkness inside the
    furnace, which may have been soot. However, neither fireman was a furnace expert
    and could not comment on whether the furnace was well-maintained.
    {¶9}   The fire department never determined the cause of the carbon monoxide
    leak and never attributed it to a lack of furnace maintenance. No photographs of the
    furnace were taken. DeFranco was not charged in connection with the leak.
    {¶10} According to DeFranco, he had a carbon monoxide detector mounted on
    his kitchen wall but the alarm did not sound because his son, Tom, did not replace the
    batteries. DeFranco was not aware that the detector was not working properly until
    after the incident at issue. DeFranco had the furnace newly installed when he moved
    into his home in 1992. It had been checked and inspected at various times. He never
    had any significant problems with the furnace. Besides air filters routinely replaced
    twice a year, DeFranco had the thermocouple wire replaced in 2000, and a new
    thermostat installed at another time.
    {¶11} Just a few months before the incident, DeFranco’s friend, Richard Zurbola,
    replaced the air filter. Zurbola did not notice any visible defects or deterioration of the
    3
    furnace at the time. DeFranco stated he had no reason to believe that there was
    anything wrong with his furnace or that it was going to leak carbon monoxide.
    {¶12} As DeFranco was still in Las Vegas, his son hired Bryon McCroskey, a
    general handyman of McCroskey Remodeling & Repairs, to replace the furnace.
    According to McCroskey, he has installed approximately 300 to 400 furnaces during his
    career. A reveal of the exterior looked okay and it was not in bad shape. It took
    McCroskey an hour to take DeFranco’s furnace apart in order to determine that it had a
    cracked heat exchanger which caused the carbon monoxide leak. Both DeFranco and
    Sorensen agreed that the carbon monoxide poisoning resulted from the cracked heat
    exchanger.    McCroskey explained that the problem was not detectable by just
    examining the outside of the furnace, even during a routine inspection by a furnace
    company. Thus, McCroskey stated that a homeowner, like DeFranco, would not have
    known that his furnace had a cracked heat exchanger without taking the furnace apart.
    {¶13} On February 22, 2012, Sorensen filed a complaint against DeFranco
    essentially claiming that DeFranco was negligent for failing to have his furnace
    professionally inspected annually with carbon monoxide testing and for failing to have
    an operable carbon monoxide detector in his home. DeFranco filed an answer on April
    3, 2012.
    {¶14} On December 18, 2012, DeFranco filed a motion for summary judgment
    arguing that Ohio case and statutory law does not impose a duty upon homeowners to
    have their furnaces inspected annually for carbon monoxide or to have a working
    carbon monoxide detector.     Sorensen filed a brief in opposition, and submitted an
    affidavit and report from his expert, James Madden, a licensed professional engineer,
    4
    who opined that the incident was proximately caused by the negligent action and
    inaction of DeFranco. Madden opined that a potential cause of the carbon monoxide
    leakage was either a cracked heat exchanger and/or a leak through an un-taped flue
    pipe. By the time that Madden entered the case, however, DeFranco’s old furnace had
    been scrapped and replaced with a new one. DeFranco subsequently filed a reply.
    {¶15} Thereafter, DeFranco passed away from cancer.      His counsel filed a
    suggestion of death on February 15, 2013.
    {¶16} On April 8, 2013, the trial court granted DeFranco’s motion for summary
    judgment. Sorensen timely appealed and asserts the following four assignments of
    error:
    {¶17} “[1.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of Appellant by granting
    summary judgment in favor of the Appellee by requiring a corresponding statutory duty
    in order to maintain a negligence cause of action and ignoring the common law duties
    established by Ohio law.
    {¶18} “[2.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of Appellant by granting
    summary judgment in favor of the Appellee when it failed to analyze and apply the
    common law duties of care between the parties.
    {¶19} “[3.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of Appellant by granting
    summary judgment in favor of Appellee by holding that a defendant-homeowner cannot
    be charged with actual or constructive notice regarding CO emissions within the home.
    {¶20} “[4.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of Appellant by granting
    summary judgment despite the presence of genuine issues of material fact regarding
    5
    whether the Appellee was negligent and breached his common law duties of care
    owed.”
    {¶21} We are called upon to determine whether Ohio law imposes a duty upon
    homeowners to have their furnaces inspected yearly with carbon monoxide testing and
    to have operable carbon monoxide detectors. For the reasons stated below, we find no
    such duty upon homeowners, and in this case, upon DeFranco.               Thus, summary
    judgment was proper.
    {¶22} This court recently stated in Meloy v. Circle K Store, 11th Dist. Portage
    No. 2012-P-0158, 2013-Ohio-2837, ¶5-6:
    {¶23} “Summary judgment is a procedural tool that terminates litigation and thus
    should be entered with circumspection. Davis v. Loopco Industries, Inc., 
    66 Ohio St. 3d 64
    , 66 * * * (1993). Summary judgment is proper where (1) there is no genuine issue of
    material fact remaining to be litigated; (2) the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
    of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one
    conclusion, and, viewing the evidence in the non-moving party’s favor, that conclusion
    favors the movant. See e.g. Civ.R. 56(C).
    {¶24} “When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court may not
    weigh the evidence or select among reasonable inferences.            Dupler v. Mansfield
    Journal Co., 
    64 Ohio St. 2d 116
    , 121 * * * (1980). Rather, all doubts and questions must
    be resolved in the non-moving party’s favor. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 
    65 Ohio St. 3d 356
    , 359 * * * (1992). Hence, a trial court is required to overrule a motion for summary
    judgment where conflicting evidence exists and alternative reasonable inferences can
    be drawn. Pierson v. Norfork Southern Corp., 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2002-A-0061,
    6
    2003-Ohio-6682, ¶36. In short, the central issue on summary judgment is, ‘whether the
    evidence presents sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it
    is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’ Anderson v. Liberty
    Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 251-252 * * * (1986). On appeal, we review a trial court’s
    entry of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 
    77 Ohio St. 3d 102
    ,
    105 * * * (1996).” (Parallel citations omitted.)
    {¶25} In his first assignment of error, Sorensen argues that the trial court erred
    in granting DeFranco’s motion for summary judgment by requiring him to demonstrate a
    corresponding statutory duty in order to maintain a negligence cause of action and
    ignoring the common law duties established by Ohio law.
    {¶26} “‘To establish a claim for negligence, appellant must prove the following:
    “(1) that appellee owed a duty to appellant; (2) that appellee breached that duty; (3) that
    appellee’s breach of duty directly and proximately caused appellant’s injury; and (4)
    damages.”’ McWreath v. Cortland Bank, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2010-T-0023, 2012-
    Ohio-3013, ¶29, citing Wike v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 11th Dist. Portage No. 2002-P-0049,
    2003-Ohio-4034, ¶14, quoting Kornowski v. Chester Properties, Inc., 11th Dist. Geauga
    No. 99-G-2221, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3001, *7 (June 30, 2000).
    {¶27} “Under Ohio law, the existence of a duty depends on the injury’s
    foreseeability. Menifee v. Ohio Welding Products, Inc. (1984), 
    15 Ohio St. 3d 75
    , 77 * *
    *.   ‘The test for foreseeability is whether a reasonably prudent person would have
    anticipated that an injury was likely to result from the performance or nonperformance of
    an act. (Citations omitted).’ 
    Id. The foreseeability
    of harm generally depends on a
    defendant’s knowledge. Thompson v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co. (1967), 
    9 Ohio St. 2d 116
    ,
    7
    119-120 * * *.”   (Parallel citations omitted.)   Masek v. Warren Redevelopment and
    Planning Corp., 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2009-T-0059, 2010-Ohio-819, ¶16.
    {¶28} “‘The existence of a duty is fundamental to establishing actionable
    negligence, without which there is no legal liability.’ (Citation omitted.) Studniarz v.
    Sears Roebuck & Co., 11th Dist. No. 2009-L-159, 2010-Ohio-3049, ¶18. ‘The existence
    of a duty is “a question of law for the court to decide on a case-by-case basis.”’
    (Citation omitted.) Mack v. Ravenna Men’s Civic Club, 11th Dist. No. 2006-P-0044,
    2007-Ohio-2431, ¶15.” Reddick v. Said, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2011-L-067, 2012-Ohio-
    1885, ¶33.
    {¶29} No Ohio case law or statute imposes a duty upon a homeowner to have
    his or her furnace professionally inspected and checked for carbon monoxide leakage
    annually and to have a working carbon monoxide detector. Thus, DeFranco, as a
    homeowner, did not have a duty to have his furnace inspected annually for carbon
    monoxide and to maintain an operable carbon monoxide detector in his home. The
    record reveals, through the testimony of two firemen and McCroskey, that carbon
    monoxide testing is not even part of routine, basic furnace inspections.     The court
    mentioned numerous facts in its April 8, 2013 judgment entry, one of which included
    mention of the fire report.   The facts establish that the harm to Sorensen was not
    foreseeable.   DeFranco had no knowledge that his furnace had a cracked heat
    exchanger (the undisputed cause of the leak) which was only evident after the furnace
    was taken apart by McCroskey.
    {¶30} Although landlords have a duty under R.C. 5321.04(A)(4) to maintain in
    good, safe, and working order and condition all heating and ventilation fixtures and
    8
    appliances, there is no similar duty for homeowners and no requirement for regularly
    scheduled inspections. Even in a landlord/tenant situation, however, liability will not be
    imposed unless the landlord had notice of a defective condition. See Davis v. Tell
    Realty, 11th Dist. Portage Nos. 2000-P-0006 and 2000-P-0007, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS
    1124, *9 (Mar. 9, 2001), citing Burnworth v. Harper, 
    109 Ohio App. 3d 401
    (4th
    Dist.1996).
    {¶31} Sorensen relies on a case from the Second District, Jung v. Davies, 2d
    Dist. Montgomery No. 24046, 2011-Ohio-1134, to support his position that the trial court
    erred here. However, Sorensen’s reliance on that case is misplaced. Jung involves
    negligence per se with respect to violations of county and township building and
    maintenance codes. In our case, there is no violation of any code or statute.
    {¶32} In light of the foregoing, the trial court did not require Sorensen to
    establish a statutory duty in order to pursue his negligence claim. The court properly
    granted summary judgment in favor of DeFranco.
    {¶33} Sorensen’s first assignment of error is without merit.
    {¶34} In his second assignment of error, Sorensen contends that the trial court
    erred in granting DeFranco’s motion for summary judgment because it failed to analyze
    the legal status and apply the common law duties of care between the parties.
    {¶35} In his third assignment of error, Sorensen alleges that the trial court erred
    in granting summary judgment in favor of DeFranco by holding that a homeowner
    cannot be charged with actual or constructive notice regarding carbon monoxide
    emissions within the home.
    9
    {¶36} In his fourth assignment of error, Sorensen maintains that the trial court
    erred in granting summary judgment despite the presence of genuine issues of material
    fact regarding whether DeFranco was negligent and breached his common law duties of
    care owed to Sorensen.
    {¶37} A review of Sorensen’s appellate brief reveals that the arguments
    contained in his second, third, and fourth assignments of error are interrelated. Thus,
    for ease of discussion, we will address them together.
    {¶38} Sorensen claims he was an invitee, or at the very least, a genuine issue of
    fact exists regarding his legal status.    DeFranco argues, on the other hand, that
    Sorensen was a social guest. DeFranco maintains, however, that regardless of whether
    Sorensen was an invitee or a social guest, DeFranco, as a homeowner, owed Sorensen
    no duty to have his furnace inspected and checked for carbon monoxide leakage on a
    yearly basis and to have a working carbon monoxide detector in his home.
    {¶39} “An invitee has been defined as ‘a business visitor (or business invitee),
    that is, one rightfully on the premises of another for the purposes in which the possessor
    of the premises has a beneficial interest.’ Scheibel v. Lipton (1951), 
    156 Ohio St. 308
    , *
    * * paragraph one of the syllabus. The owner of the premises owes an invitee the duty
    to exercise ordinary care and to protect him by maintaining the premises in a safe
    condition. Provencher [v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 
    49 Ohio St. 3d 265
    ,] 266 [(1990)].”
    (Parallel citation omitted.) Monaco v. Red Fox Gun Club, Inc., 11th Dist. Portage No.
    2000-P-0064, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 6008, *21-22 (Dec. 28, 2001).
    {¶40} In Scheibel, the Supreme Court of Ohio defined the duty an occupier of
    land has to a social guest. “A host who invites a social guest to his premises owes the
    10
    guest the duty (1) to exercise ordinary care not to cause injury to his guest by any act of
    the host or by any activities carried on by the host while the guest is on the premises,
    and (2) to warn the guest of any condition of the premises which is known to the host
    and which one of ordinary prudence and foresight in the position of the host should
    reasonably consider dangerous, if the host has reason to believe that the guest does
    not know and will not discover such dangerous condition.”             
    Scheibel, supra
    , at
    paragraph three of the syllabus.
    {¶41} In this case, the trial court did not address the issue of Sorensen’s status
    after holding that the absence of a duty was dispositive of this matter. Based on the
    facts presented, we determine the court did not commit error by not categorizing
    Sorensen as an invitee or as a social guest. Even if it did, the judgment would not have
    changed.
    {¶42} Sorensen filed a negligence action against DeFranco.          The trial court
    applied the proper common law principles to determine whether Ohio law imposes a
    duty upon DeFranco, a homeowner, to have his furnace inspected and checked for
    carbon monoxide leakage on a yearly basis and to have a working carbon monoxide
    detector. Sorensen was not on DeFranco’s property for any business purpose. Thus,
    he was not an invitee. See, e.g., Re v. Kessinger, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2007-02-044,
    2008-Ohio-167, ¶25. Rather, the facts establish that Sorensen was a social guest, as
    he was house-sitting without compensation for his long-time friend.
    {¶43} DeFranco’s only duty to Sorensen, as a social guest, was to warn him of
    any dangerous condition of which he was aware. The undisputed facts establish that
    DeFranco was not aware of any problems with his furnace or with his carbon monoxide
    11
    detector. Sorensen even conceded that DeFranco had no knowledge that anything was
    wrong.
    {¶44} Even if Sorensen were an invitee, there is no evidence that DeFranco had
    actual or constructive notice of any problems with his furnace leaking carbon monoxide.
    {¶45} “‘Actual notice’ is defined as notice ‘given directly to, or received
    personally by, a party.    Black’s Law Dictionary, 1090 (8th Ed.2004).       ‘Constructive
    notice’ is notice ‘arising by presumption of law from the existence of facts and
    circumstances that a party had a duty to take notice of.’ 
    Id. ‘Constructive notice,’
    refers
    to ‘that which the law regards as sufficient to give notice and is regarded as a substitute
    for actual notice or knowledge.’” Swader v. Paramount Property Mgt., 12th Dist. Butler
    No. CA2011-05-084, 2012-Ohio-1477, ¶24, quoting Cox v. Estate of Wallace, 12th Dist.
    Butler No. CA87-06-078, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 10358 (Dec. 31, 1987).
    {¶46} Again, the undisputed facts are as follows: the furnace was installed in
    1992; it was checked and inspected; DeFranco did not experience any significant
    problems with the furnace; he routinely had the air filters replaced twice a year; a new
    thermostat and a new thermocouple wire were replaced; after the incident, McCroskey,
    a general handyman, replaced the furnace; a review of the exterior looked okay and it
    was not in bad shape; it took him an hour to take the furnace apart in order to determine
    that it had a cracked heat exchanger, the cause of the leak; McCroskey explained that
    the problem was not detectable by just examining the outside of the furnace, even
    during a routine inspection by a furnace company; McCroskey stated that a homeowner,
    like DeFranco, would not have known that his furnace had a cracked heat exchanger
    without taking the furnace apart; DeFranco had a carbon monoxide detector mounted
    12
    on his kitchen wall; the alarm did not sound because his son did not replace the
    batteries; and DeFranco was not aware that the detector was not working properly until
    after the incident.
    {¶47} Thus, the facts reveal that DeFranco was not placed on either actual or
    constructive notice that he may have had a problem with his furnace leaking carbon
    monoxide and that his carbon monoxide detector was not working properly before the
    incident at issue occurred. Regardless of whether Sorensen was an invitee or a social
    guest, DeFranco did not owe a duty to have his furnace inspected and checked for
    carbon monoxide leakage on a yearly basis and to have a working carbon monoxide
    detector.
    {¶48} Sorensen further claims the trial court “completely discounted” the
    opinions from his expert, Madden. However, the court’s judgment entry reveals that it
    reviewed and addressed Madden’s expert report, outlined his opinions, and even
    quoted various portions. Madden opined that a duty existed and that DeFranco was
    negligent. We note, however, that an expert report or testimony does not control a
    court’s determination of whether a duty exists. Nicholson v. Turner/Cargile, 107 Ohio
    App.3d 797, 806 (10th Dist.1995). Rather, the existence of a duty is a question of law
    for the trial court to decide on a case-by-case basis. See 
    Reddick, supra
    , at ¶33. In
    this case, the court properly determined that no duty existed.
    {¶49} Madden’s reference to an un-taped flue pipe as a “potential” cause of the
    carbon monoxide leak does not create a genuine issue of material fact nor does it
    establish that DeFranco had knowledge that his furnace was leaking carbon monoxide.
    Madden never saw or inspected the furnace at issue.              His report was based on
    13
    information from McCroskey, who installed a new furnace and scrapped the old one.
    McCroskey established that the cause of the carbon monoxide leak was due to the
    cracked heat exchanger, which was acknowledged in Madden’s report. The cause of
    the leak could not be detected by an outside inspection of the furnace. No genuine
    issue of material fact was created by Madden.
    {¶50} The trial court correctly determined that DeFranco, as a homeowner, did
    not have a duty to have yearly furnace inspections, including carbon monoxide testing,
    and to have a working carbon monoxide detector in his home. The court properly
    granted DeFranco’s motion for summary judgment.
    {¶51} Sorensen’s second, third, and fourth assignments of error are without
    merit.
    {¶52} For the foregoing reasons, appellant’s assignments of error are not well-
    taken. The judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. It is
    ordered that appellant is assessed costs herein taxed.      The court finds there were
    reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
    THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
    concur.
    14
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2013-L-038

Judges: O'Toole

Filed Date: 12/31/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014