State v. Zoeckler , 2013 Ohio 548 ( 2013 )

[Cite as State v. Zoeckler, 2013-Ohio-548.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PORTAGE COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
CASE NO. 2012-P-0092
- vs - :
BRIAN J. ZOECKLER, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
Criminal Appeal from the Portage County Municipal Court, Ravenna Division, Case No.
R2012 TRC 04754.
Judgment: Reversed and remanded.
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Pamela J. Holder, Assistant
Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellant).
J. Chris Sestak, Student Legal Services, Inc., Kent State University, 164 East Main
Street, #203, Kent, OH 44240 (For Defendant-Appellee).
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.
{¶1} Appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals from the judgment of Portage County
Municipal Court, Ravenna Division, granting a motion to suppress the results of the
Intoxilyzer 8000 breath test of appellee, Brian J. Zoeckler. At issue is whether the state
is required to first produce evidence of a breath test machine’s general reliability as a
precondition for admitting breath test results. For the reasons discussed below, we
reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings.
{¶2} During the early hours of April 14, 2012, appellee was stopped for
speeding. Eventually, appellee was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol
(“OVI”), in violation of R.C 4511.19(A)(1)(a), and speeding, in violation of R.C. 4511.21.
At the station, appellee’s breath test revealed a blood-alcohol concentration of .108; he
was consequently cited for OVI pursuant to R.C. 4511.19 (A)(1)(d).
{¶3} Appellee filed a motion to suppress, which included a challenge to the
general reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000. The matter came on for hearing at which the
only matter in issue was the reliability of the breath-testing device. The state, relying
on State v. Vega, 12 Ohio St.3d 185 (1984), maintained appellee could not challenge
the general scientific reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000. The state asserted Vega upheld
the presumption of reliability accorded breath test machines, including the Intoxilyzer
8000. In light of this precedent, the state refused to produce any witnesses regarding
the general reliability of the device.
{¶4} Appellee, alternatively, asked the court to follow the decision of the
Portage County Municipal Court, State v. Johnson, Portage M.C. No. R2011TRC4090.
In Johnson, the court required the state to produce evidence of the general reliability of
the Intoxilyzer 8000. The state refused to do so and the court suppressed the results of
the breath test. Pursuant to Johnson, appellee requested that the court exclude her
breath-alcohol results if the state declined to produce expert testimony regarding the
general reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000.
{¶5} The court, following its ruling in Johnson, concluded the state’s failure to
produce any evidence regarding the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000 rendered the
breath results inadmissible. The court consequently granted appellee’s motion and
stayed the judgment pending the state’s appeal.
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{¶6} The state asserts one assignment of error for our review, which provides:
{¶7} “The Portage County Municipal Court erred in permitting a general attack
on the scientific reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000 contrary to Ohio statutes and well-
established case law.”
{¶8} This court has recently ruled on this exact issue in State v. Rouse, 11th
Dist. No. 2012-P-0030, 2012-Ohio-5584. In that case, this court reversed the trial
court’s decision requiring the state shoulder the initial burden of production for
establishing the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000. This court specifically concluded that
once the state has demonstrated a statutorily approved breath testing device was used,
a presumption of reliability attaches. This presumption, however, does not resolve the
issue of admissibility. Rather, this court held, after the presumption attaches, a
defendant is entitled to make specific challenges to the general reliability of the
Intoxilyzer 8000. And, in light of the evidence adduced at the hearing, a court may
determine whether to admit the breath test evidence. See id., passim.
{¶9} We accordingly hold, on the authority of Rouse, the judgment of the
Portage County Municipal Court, Ravenna Division, is reversed and remanded.
{¶10} Appellee’s sole assignment of error is sustained.
{¶11} The judgment of the Portage County Municipal Court, Ravenna Division, is
hereby reversed and remanded.
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J., concurs,
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., dissents with Dissenting Opinion.
_______________
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THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., dissents with Dissenting Opinion.
{¶12} R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b) does not mandate admissibility of breath test
results derived from the Intoxilyzer 8000. Rather, that statute which, by its plain
language controls the issue in this case, vests the trial court with discretion regarding
admissibility despite approval from the director. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
{¶13} R.C. 3701.143 empowers the director to approve breath testing devices,
and R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b) grants trial courts the discretion to admit the results from
approved devices without further proof of reliability when circumstances warrant.
Although some claim the contrary, nobody is correct all the time. In recognizing human
fallibility, the legislature had the wisdom to vest within the trial court the discretion per
R.C.4511.19(D)(1)(b) to conduct further inquiry when there is an issue as to the
reliability of an approved breath testing device before admitting the results.
{¶14} R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b) states that “[i]n any criminal prosecution or juvenile
court proceeding for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section or for an equivalent
offense that is vehicle-related, the court may admit evidence on the concentration of
alcohol, drugs of abuse, controlled substances, metabolites of a controlled substance,
or a combination of them in the defendant’s whole blood, blood serum or plasma,
breath, urine, or other bodily substance at the time of the alleged violation as shown by
chemical analysis of the substance withdrawn within three hours of the time of the
alleged violation[,]” and “[t]he bodily substance withdrawn under division (D)(1)(b) of this
section shall be analyzed in accordance with methods approved by the director of
health by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the director pursuant to
section 3701.143 of the Revised Code.” (Emphasis added.)
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{¶15} The statute does not use the word “shall,” which would mandate
admission regardless of the circumstances. Rather, the statute uses the word “may.”
For purposes of statutory construction, “use of the word ‘may’ is generally construed to
make the provision in which it is contained optional, permissive, or discretionary * * *.”
Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist., 27 Ohio St.2d 102, 107 (1971); State v. Suchevits,
138 Ohio App.3d 99, 102 (11th Dist. 1999).
{¶16} In this case, the trial court exercised its discretion not to admit the breath
test absent proof from the state that the Intoxilyzer 8000 is generally reliable, a decision
consistent with the discretion it possesses under R.C.4511.19(D)(1)(b). As reliability
presents a threshold admissibility issue, reliability, as opposed to the weight to be
afforded any admitted evidence, is one for the trial court. Knott v Revolution Software
Inc. 181 Ohio App.3d 519, 2009-Ohio-1191, ¶45 (5th Dist.); State v. Riley, 6th Dist. No.
WD-03-076, 2007-Ohio-879, ¶27 (expert testimony must be deemed reliable before it is
deemed admissible.); Saad v. Shimano American Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10974,
*7 (N.D. Ill. 2000)(The Supreme Court has made it clear that the courts must allow into
evidence only expert testimony that meets certain threshold standards of reliability and
usefulness).
{¶17} Moreover, the determination of evidential reliability necessarily implicates
the defendant’s substantive due process rights.
{¶18} “Substantive due process, [although an] ephemeral concept, protects
specific fundamental rights of individual freedom and liberty from deprivation at the
hands of arbitrary and capricious government action. The fundamental rights protected
by substantive due process arise from the Constitution itself and have been defined as
those rights which are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ (* * *) While this is
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admittedly a somewhat vague definition, it is generally held that an interest in liberty or
property must be impaired before the protections of substantive due process become
available.” State v. Small, 162 Ohio App.3d. 375, 2005-Ohio-3813, ¶11 (10th Dist.),
quoting Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F. 2d. 1317, 1328 (6th Cir. 1989).
{¶19} However vague the conceptual parameters of one’s substantive due
process guarantees may be, the following principle is clear; “[substantive] * * * due
process is violated by the introduction of seemingly conclusive, but actually unreliable
evidence.” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 931, fn. 10 (1983).
{¶20} The trial court was aware that other courts had deemed the Intoxilyzer
8000 unreliable even though it was approved. Against the backdrop, the court ordered
the state to establish the general reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000 before admitting the
results. Given the constitutional gravity of admitting unreliable results, however, and its
statutory authority to act as gatekeeper regarding breath test results, the lower court’s
decision to require the state to produce evidence of the machines reliability was an
eminently reasonable and sound legal decision. “[A]n abuse of discretion is the trial
court’s ‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” State v.
Beechler, 2d Dist. No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶62, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary
(8 Ed.Rev.2004) 11.
{¶21} Rather than present evidence of the general reliability of the Intoxilyzer
8000, the state took the position that the trial court could not require it to do so pursuant
to Vega and its progeny. Vega, 12 Ohio St.3d 185 (1984). I do not read Vega as
holding that under no circumstances can a trial court exercise its discretion to require
evidence of general reliability of an approved breath testing device as a condition to
admissibility.
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{¶22} In Vega, the court held “* * * an accused is not denied his constitutional
right to present a defense nor is the state relieved of its burden of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt where a trial judge does not permit expert testimony to attack the
reliability of intoxilyzers in general.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 186.
{¶23} Threshold admissibility was not at issue in Vega. That is, the defendant
made no challenge to the trial court’s admission of his breath test result. Instead, after
the state presented its case and rested, the defendant attempted to present a
“reliability” defense by attacking intoxilyzers in general. See also State v. Vega, 5th
Dist. No. CA-1766, 1993 Ohio App LEXIS 14350, *16 (Nov.22, 1983)(Hoffman, J.,
dissenting). Unlike Vega, 12 Ohio St.3d 185, threshold admissibility is the issue in the
case before us. Moreover, unlike Vega, our case is not about the reliability of
intoxilyzers in general. Our case is limited to whether the Intoxilyzer 8000 is reliable. In
short, the circumstances at issue in Vega were fundamentally distinguishable from
those in our case.
{¶24} Additionally, the rule in Vega does not contemplate a situation where, as
here, an approved device’s general reliability has been assessed by other courts for
both use in and out of this state and the device’s reliability has been found suspect.
See State v. Johnson, Portage County Municipal Court, January 6, 2012. Vega
expressly states that its holding does not involve a situation where there was an
assertion that there was an abuse of discretion by the director in approving the breath
testing device at issue. Vega at 187, fn. 2. Obviously, in our case if the Intoxilyzer
8000 is unreliable, approval would amount to an abuse of discretion and admission of
the test results a violation of substantive due process.
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{¶25} Breath tests are “‘* * * generally recognized as being reasonably reliable
on the issue of intoxication when conducted with proper equipment and by competent
operators.’” (Emphasis added.) Vega at 186, quoting Westerville v. Cunningham, 15
Ohio St.2d 121, 128(1968). Thus, the central issue as presented in the case before us,
does the Intoxilyzer 8000 qualify as “proper equipment”? The answer is “yes” if it is
generally reliable and “no” if it is not. This is a query, however, that, under Ohio law, a
trial court is entitled to resolve pursuant to R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b).
{¶26} In this case, the trial court exercised its discretion to safeguard the
defendant’s right to substantive due process by merely requiring the state to show the
Intoxilyzer 8000 is generally reliable. Under the circumstances, this decision was sound
and reasonable. This is particularly true in light of the fact that a trial court is vested
with broad discretion in the admission or exclusion of evidence and in recognition that it
has inherent power to exclude or strike evidence on its own motion. Caroll v Caroll, 7th
Dist. No. 89-C-1, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1339, *8 (April 5, 1990); Neil v. Hamilton
County, 87 Ohio App.3d 670; Oakbrook Realty Corp. v. Blout, 48 Ohio App.3d 69, 70
(10th Dist. 1988).
{¶27} Given the foregoing point, there is no reason to remand this case to the
trial court based upon perceived inadequacies in the motion to suppress. The trial court
made it abundantly clear that it would not admit the test results absent proof of reliability
of the Intoxilyzer 8000. Requiring the proponent to establish the reliability of scientific
evidence is something that a trial court may require as previously discussed. The state
was well aware of what the trial court required when it ordered it to produce evidence of
the Intoxilyzer 8000’s reliability, independent and irrespective of the contents of the
motion to suppress. Accordingly, there is no procedural due process violation of the
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state’s right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. The trial court’s order was
unambiguous and an exercise of the sound discretion as the gatekeeper of breath test
result admissibility.
{¶28} When an appellate court [**14] is reviewing a pure issue of law, “the mere
fact that the reviewing court would decide the issue differently is enough to find error (of
course, not all errors are reversible. Some are harmless; others are not preserved for
appellate review). By contrast, where the issue on review has been confined to the
discretion of the trial court, the mere fact that the reviewing court would have reached a
different result is not enough, without more, to find error.” Sertz v. Sertz, 11th Dist. No.
2011-L-063, quoting Beechler, 2010-Ohio-1900 at ¶67.
{¶29} This appeal is centered around a discretionary decision made by the trial
court. As I find the court’s decision not only reasonable, but constitutionally astute, I
would affirm the trial court’s exclusion of the breath test in light of the state’s refusal to
present evidence on the issue.
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