State v. Setty , 2014 Ohio 2340 ( 2014 )

[Cite as State v. Setty, 2014-Ohio-2340.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
CLERMONT COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
CASE NOS. CA2013-06-049
Plaintiff-Appellee, : CA2013-06-050
: OPINION
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:
JASON CHRISTOPHER SETTY, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case Nos. 2012-CR-0068 and 2012-CR-0731
D. Vincent Faris, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, Judith A. Brant, 76 South Riverside
Drive, 2nd Floor, Batavia, Ohio 45103, for plaintiff-appellee
Michaela M. Stagnaro, 810 Sycamore Street, 6th Fl., Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for defendant-
appellant
HENDRICKSON, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Jason Christopher Setty, appeals from his convictions and
sentence in the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas for rape, attempted rape, sexual
battery, disseminating matter harmful to juveniles, and felonious assault.
I. FACTS
{¶ 2} Following allegations of sexual abuse by appellant's two minor stepdaughters,
Lo.R. and Li.R., charges were brought against appellant. Specifically, on January 25, 2012,
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appellant was indicted in Case No. 2012-CR-0068 on six counts of rape in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(b), with three of those counts specifying that the victim was less than 10 years
of age, one count of attempted rape in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b),
six counts of sexual battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(5), and one count of disseminating
matter harmful to juveniles in violation of R.C. 2907.31(A)(1), where the juveniles involved
were under the age of 13. The charges arose out of allegations that between March 2011
and September 2011, appellant orally, anally, and vaginally raped or attempted to rape Lo.R.
and Li.R. and showed them pornographic videos depicting sexual acts that he later asked
them to perform. At the time of the sexual abuse, Lo.R. was ten years old and Li.R. was
eight and nine years old.
{¶ 3} On September 26, 2012, appellant was indicted a second time in Case No.
2012-CR-0731 on two counts of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). These
charges arose out of allegations that between March 2011 and September 2011, appellant
engaged in sexual contact and conduct with Lo.R. and Li.R., which caused the children to
suffer serious physical harm, including posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
{¶ 4} The two cases were consolidated for trial. Prior to trial commencing, the state
filed a motion in limine, seeking to prohibit appellant from introducing several pieces of
evidence at trial. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court issued a preliminary ruling
that appellant was precluded from introducing evidence of the victims' mother's sexual history
and any past accusations of sexual assault she may have made against others, evidence
that Lo.R. had previously been hospitalized for mental health issues, and evidence pertaining
to abuse allegations Lo.R. and Li.R. had made against appellant while the girls lived in
Kentucky and Kansas.
{¶ 5} A four-day jury trial commenced in May 2013. At trial, the state presented the
testimony of the two minor victims. Lo.R. testified she was born on January 29, 2001, and
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between March 2011 and mid-October 2011, she lived in Milford, Clermont County, Ohio with
her sisters, Li.R. and H.S., her brother, M.R., her mother, N.S. ("Mother"), and appellant.
She stated appellant was the disciplinarian in the household, and he would punish her by
punching her in the arm or hitting her with a belt on her bottom hard enough to leave red
marks and small bruises. Lo.R. testified she was afraid of appellant and felt she had to follow
his rules and commands or he would spank her with the belt. She described several
instances where appellant inappropriately touched her, which usually occurred in the master
bedroom when Mother was not at home. Lo.R. described one instance where appellant, who
was naked, called her into the master bedroom and ordered her to take off her clothes and
get on the bed. Lo.R. testified appellant then "touch[ed] his private, and he * * * put it up and
down" before he made her put her mouth on his penis and go "up and down."1 Appellant
then had Lo.R. get on her hands and knees. Lo.R. testified that after appellant put
something "sticky" on his private to "make it fit," he put his private in her bottom. Lo.R.
testified appellant then pulled out his private and he started touching it "up and down again. *
* * Really fast." Lo.R. stated "white stuff came out * * * [o]f his private" and into her mouth.
She described the white stuff as "yucky" and "nasty" and testified it was like "clumpy milk."
{¶ 6} Lo.R. described another occasion where appellant called her into the master
bedroom when Mother was not at home. Lo.R. testified appellant was again naked and
touching his private "up and down." Lo.R. stated appellant had already put the "sticky stuff"
on his private and he made her put her mouth on his private. He then told her to get on her
knees and hold on to the bars at the footboard of the bed, placed one of his socks in her
mouth, and put his private in her bottom. Lo.R. testified that appellant put "more" of his
private into her bottom than he had before, and that "it hurt." She testified that when
1. On anatomical diagrams of both the male and female human body, Lo.R. identified a male's penis as his
"private" and a female's vagina as her "private."
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appellant was done, she went to the bathroom and discovered blood in her stool.
{¶ 7} Lo.R. then described an incident that occurred in the bathroom she shared with
her siblings. She explained appellant came into the bathroom and pulled down his pants. At
this time, she was not wearing any pants, and appellant tried to put his private in her private,
or vagina, but it "wouldn't fit."
{¶ 8} In addition to these incidents, Lo.R. described an instance where appellant
showed her a video on a laptop. Lo.R. testified that in the video, a man and woman were
naked. She stated the video showed a hole in the wall or on the floor with a man's private
sticking through the hole and a woman standing by the hole trying to "put her private into it"
and "sucking on it."
{¶ 9} Lo.R. testified she asked appellant why he did these things to her and he told
her it was because "it made him feel good." He also threatened to spank her with his belt if
she told anyone about what was happening. Lo.R. eventually disclosed the abuse after she,
her siblings, and Mother left appellant and moved to North Carolina. On the evening of
Halloween 2011, Lo.R. told her mom about the abuse "because [she] knew [they] were safe
and he couldn't hurt [her] anymore." Lo.R. testified that while she was telling Mother about
the abuse, Li.R. entered the room and started telling Mother that she too was abused.
Mother called the police and Lo.R. went to the hospital to be examined. Lo.R. also testified
she had been seeing a psychotherapist for about a year to discuss nightmares and other
problems she was experiencing.
{¶ 10} On cross-examination, Lo.R. admitted that prior to Halloween, she had told
Mother and an aunt that appellant had hit her, but she had not disclosed the sexual abuse.
Lo.R. also admitted that months before her family had moved to North Carolina, they had
gone on a two-week trip to Pennsylvania. Appellant was not present for this trip, yet Lo.R.
did not disclose the abuse during this time.
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{¶ 11} Li.R. also testified at trial. Li.R testified she was born on April 17, 2002, and
had previously lived with Mother, appellant, and her siblings in Milford, Ohio. Li.R. stated that
when she lived with appellant, he would punish her by spanking her with a belt, which left
bruises and red marks on her side and buttocks. She testified appellant would also touch her
on her "private" when Mother was not at home.2 Appellant threatened to spank her "red,
blue, and black" if she told anyone about what he was doing. Li.R. described instances in the
master bedroom where appellant forced her to bend over so that he could put his private in
her butt and in her "potty area." She testified that appellant sometimes used a cream on his
private, and that he got the cream from the master bathroom. She also described instances
where he made her touch his private with her hands and mouth. She testified she had to cup
her hands around his private and "shake it." She also had to put his private in her mouth and
suck until "white stuff came out" of his private and into her mouth. She testified that the
"white stuff" looked "like yogurt."
{¶ 12} Li.R. also testified that appellant had her watch a video on a laptop in the living
room. The video was of a "boy who had his private part * * * in the wall." She testified that
after the boy put his private part through the hole in the wall, a girl began "touching it and
doing stuff to it. * * * Like rubbing it, like putting it in her mouth."
{¶ 13} Following Lo.R. and Li.R.'s testimony, Detective Greg Jenkins from the Miami
Township Police Department testified. Jenkins stated he began investigating appellant after
he received a facsimile report from Cumberland County Children's Services in North
Carolina, which detailed the sexual abuse. As part of his investigation, he obtained a warrant
to search appellant's residence in Milford, Ohio. The warrant was executed on November 3,
2011. At this time, a black light was used to look for bodily fluids and samples of carpet were
2. On anatomical diagrams of both the male and female human body, Li.R. identified a male's penis as his
"private" and a female's vagina as her "private" where she "goes potty."
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collected from the home. According to Jenkins, neither the black light nor the carpet samples
"yield[ed] any result." During the search, numerous computers and electronics were
collected and were sent to Hamilton County to be forensically examined. Jenkins testified
that although multiple computers, phones, and cameras had been seized, only one laptop
contained evidence of value.
{¶ 14} John Ruebusch, an expert in computer forensics with the Hamilton County
Sheriff's Office, Regional Electronic Computer Investigation Section, also testified. Ruebusch
examined the items seized from appellant's home and discovered evidence on a MacBook
Silver Pro laptop. The laptop was not password protected and contained only one user
profile, which was attributed to "Jason Setty." On July 29, 2011 at 1:12 a.m., a webpage
about "glory holes" was visited. An image recovered from the laptop depicted a video of a
penis sticking through a hole in a wall and a naked female preparing to engage in fellatio on
the other side of the wall. While Ruebusch could not determine if the video was or was not
viewed, he testified that he believed the website about "glory holes" was visited as a result of
an active search, and not a result of an internet "pop-up." He testified that a search of
appellant's hard drive revealed numerous references to "glory holes," and that various "glory
holes" videos and stories about incest had been accessed on the computer.
{¶ 15} Ruebusch further testified that prior to the "glory holes" website being visited on
July 29, 2011, at 12:20 a.m., a Culinary Art's student schedule for "Jason Setty" was sent to
an email account for "JSetty1985." Around 1:36 a.m., after the "glory holes" website was
visited, a search for a "china cap" cooking instrument was conducted. At 1:53 a.m., a
confirmation of sale was sent to the account for "JSetty1985." This confirmation of sale
indicated that the "bill to" purchaser of a "China Cap/Strainer" was "Jason Setty" and that the
item would be "Shipped to" "Jason Setty" at his address in Milford, Ohio. Given the time the
various websites were visited, Ruebusch's opined that the same person that had actively
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searched for china cap strainers had also actively searched for "glory holes" on July 29,
2011.
{¶ 16} Phyllis K. Marion, a pediatric nurse practitioner, testified at trial as an expert in
the field of child abuse pediatrics. Marion testified she is a child medical examiner in the
child abuse clinic at the Southern Regional Health Education Center in Fayetteville, North
Carolina, and in her practice she sees only patients that have disclosed abuse. As a nurse
practitioner, Marion takes a history from the patient, conducts a physical examination of the
patient, decides a course of treatment, and prescribes medication for the patient. A
supervising physician then reviews and signs off on her reports. Marion testified that on
November 16, 2011 and on November 17, 2011, she performed medical evaluations of Lo.R.
and Li.R., respectively, which included pre-medical interviews and physical examinations.
{¶ 17} During the pre-medical interview with Lo.R., Lo.R. informed Marion that "bad
things" had happened to her because of her stepfather. Marion stated Lo.R. disclosed that
she had been abused and such abuse included anal intercourse and oral sex. Marion
testified Lo.R. showed advanced sexual knowledge for a child her age and was able to
describe ejaculation, describe appellant's use of a lubricant during anal sex, and demonstrate
taking appellant's private part in her hands and rubbing it to masturbate appellant. After
obtaining this information from Lo.R., Marion conducted a physical examination of the child.
Marion did not observe any abnormalities to Lo.R.'s vagina, but did notice that the rugae
around Lo.R.'s anus was flat, which was consistent with a large object being inserted into the
anus. Marion testified that she believed to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that
Lo.R. had been abused physically, sexually, and psychologically.
{¶ 18} Marion testified that during Li.R.'s pre-medical interview, Li.R. also talked about
and demonstrated sexual knowledge beyond her years. Li.R. was able to describe French
kissing, "humping," and ejaculation and gave vivid details about appellant putting his private
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in her "front" and her butt. A physical examination of Li.R. revealed no abnormalities to
Li.R.'s vagina, but Marion observed flattening of the rugae around Li.R.'s anus, which was
consistent with a large object entering the anal cavity. Marion testified that she believed to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that Li.R. had been abused sexually, physically, and
psychologically.
{¶ 19} On cross-examination, Marion testified she only spent 45 minutes to an hour
with each child during the course of her examination. She also testified that in addition to
sexual abuse, flat rugae around the anus can result from chronic constipation and the
passing of very large, hard stool. She testified that both Lo.R. and Li.R. denied having hard
stool.
{¶ 20} Following Marion's testimony, Judith Rose testified as an expert in
psychotherapy. Rose testified that in addition to being a psychotherapist with Cape Fear
Valley Behavior Healthcare in North Carolina, she is a licensed clinical social worker and a
certified trauma-focused cognitive behavioral therapist and forensic interviewer. Rose
testified that she has conducted diagnostic testing for PTSD on over 100 children. She
explained that using the PTSD index created by the University of California, Los Angeles
(UCLA PTSD index) she is able to determine whether a child falls within one of the following
three ranges for PTSD: highly significant range, moderate range, or not significant range. In
May 2012, Rose conducted diagnostic testing of Lo.R. and Li.R, and both girls tested in the
highly significant range for PTSD. Rose testified that as a result of the physical and sexual
abuse they suffered, Lo.R. and Li.R. experienced psychological disturbances and
impairments serious enough to impact almost every aspect of their life, including their health,
school, home, and social development. Rose explained Lo.R. and Li.R. had symptoms of
avoidance, hypervigilance, and numbing and suffered from somatic symptoms. She testified
Lo.R. and Li.R. had undergone psychotherapy treatment for the ten months prior to trial and,
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as a result, their condition had been downgraded from PTSD to an adjustment disorder with
anxiety.
{¶ 21} Following Rose's testimony, the state rested and appellant made a Crim.R. 29
motion for acquittal, which was denied by the trial court. Thereafter, appellant called Mother
as his sole witness, seeking to elicit testimony demonstrating that Lo.R. and Li.R. had
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fabricated their testimony in an effort to help Mother keep custody of H.S. Mother testified
that she and her children had lived with appellant in a home in Milford, Ohio from March 2011
to mid-October 2011 and, during this time, appellant was attending culinary school. Mother
explained that on October 17, 2011, she and her kids, including appellant's biological
daughter H.S., left appellant and moved to Fayetteville, North Carolina to live with her family.
Shortly thereafter she was served with a protection order appellant obtained from the
Clermont County Domestic Relations Court, and on October 29, 2011, she received an order
granting temporary custody of H.S. to appellant and denying her parenting time. Mother
stated there were several phone calls between herself and appellant while they tried to work
out custody of H.S. that caused her to become upset. Mother testified that on October 31,
2011, prior to Lo.R. and Li.R revealing the abuse, she had talked to her aunt and uncle about
her concerns of losing custody of H.S. She explained that later that evening, while she was
sitting in the living room watching TV, Lo.R. and Li.R. told her about the abuse.
{¶ 22} Mother also testified that while appellant was serving overseas in Afghanistan,
she fabricated a story to mislead the military and get appellant sent back home. Mother
explained that her fabrication did not involve the children.
{¶ 23} Following Mother's testimony, the defense renewed its Crim.R. 29 motion for
3. Appellant also sought to introduce the testimony of several other individuals who knew of appellant's
relationship with Mother and his relationships with Lo.R. and Li.R. The trial court precluded these witnesses from
testifying on the basis of Evid.R. 801. Appellant's counsel proffered the testimony of these witnesses for the
record.
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acquittal. The trial court denied the motion, closing arguments were held, and the case was
submitted to the jury. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts under both indictments.
With respect to Case No. 2012-CR-0068, appellant was sentenced on May 31, 2013, to life
without parole on the three rape convictions relating to Li.R. (counts one through three) and
on the three rape convictions relating to Lo.R (counts four through six). The three rape
counts relating to Li.R. were ordered concurrent to one another. The three rape counts
relating to Lo.R. were ordered concurrent to one another, but consecutive to the rape
sentences relating to Li.R. Appellant was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment for the
attempted rape of Lo.R. (count seven), which was run consecutively to appellant's sentences
on the rape convictions. Appellant was sentenced to 18 months in prison for disseminating
matter harmful to juveniles (count 14), which was run consecutively to the rape and
attempted rape sentences. The trial court determined that appellant's convictions for sexual
battery (counts eight through 13) were allied offenses of similar import and the convictions
were merged with the rape convictions. With respect to Case No. 2012-CR-0731, the trial
court determined that appellant's two convictions for felonious assault were allied offenses of
similar import and merged the convictions with the six counts of rape in Case No. 2012-CR-
0068. Appellant was classified as a Tier III sex offender.
{¶ 24} Appellant timely appealed his convictions and sentence, raising six
assignments of error.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Motion in Limine
{¶ 25} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 26} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY GRANTING THE
STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE AND PRECLUDING APPELLANT'S ABILITY TO ADMIT
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WHICH DENIED HIM THE RIGHT TO FULLY DEFEND HIS CASE AT
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TRIAL.
{¶ 27} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred by granting
the state's motion in limine to preclude him from admitting certain evidence at trial. Appellant
contends the trial court's decision granting the state's motion in limine had the same effect of
a motion to suppress, as it essentially precluded him from making any reference to the
evidence throughout "all phases of the trial." Specifically, appellant claims he was improperly
denied the right to present evidence of the following: (1) Mother's childhood rape by her
father (Grandfather), and the fact that Grandfather may have lived with Lo.R. and Li.R. during
their childhood; (2) Mother's rape by her ex-husband, and whether or not the rape occurred in
front of Lo.R. and Li.R.; (3) abuse allegations Lo.R. and Li.R. made about appellant while the
children lived in Kentucky and Kansas; and (4) hospitalization records of Lo.R. for mental
health issues. Appellant contends the aforementioned evidence was essential to his defense
and the trial court's exclusion of such evidence precluded him from challenging the children's
credibility.
{¶ 28} At the outset, we note that the trial court's decision to grant the state's motion in
limine was a "tentative, interlocutory, precautionary ruling by the trial court reflecting its
anticipatory treatment of the evidentiary issue[s]." State v. Grubb, 28 Ohio St.3d 199, 201-
202 (1986). While the trial court initially ruled appellant was precluded under Evid.R. 401,
402, 404(B), and 608(B) from admitting evidence of Mother's past sexual history and
experiences, Lo.R.'s hospitalization records, and statements made by the minor victims
about abuse that occurred in Kentucky and Kansas, the trial court made it clear that its ruling
was tentative and interlocutory in nature. In its entry granting the state's motion in limine, the
trial court specifically stated:
A ruling on such a motion reflects the court's anticipated
treatment of an evidentiary issue at trial and is tentative,
interlocutory and precautionary in nature. [The] court is at liberty
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to change its ruling on disputed evidence in the actual context at
trial.
***
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the procedure to be followed
during the course of this trial regarding these evidentiary matters
is as follows:
First, if either counsel believes that an inquiry into any of these
areas should be reconsidered by the Court, he must initially alert
the Court to such a request by simply indicating that an issue has
arisen that needs to be addressed at the bench and he shall
make no other reference to any stated reason for such a request.
Second, counsel will approach the bench for a sidebar
conference to discuss the particular issue sought to be
reconsidered. Third, if the Court deems it necessary, a hearing
will be conducted pursuant to Evid.R. 104, out of the presence of
the jury.
{¶ 29} As the trial court's ruling was interlocutory, it was incumbent upon appellant "to
seek the introduction of the evidence by proffer or otherwise [at trial] in order to enable the
court to make a final determination as to its admissibility and to preserve any objection on the
record for purposes of appeal." Grubb at 203. The initial ruling on the motion in limine did
not, in and of itself, preserve the record on appeal. Id.; State v. Hensley, 12th Dist. Warren
No. CA2009-11-156, 2010-Ohio-3822, ¶ 29. Rather, "any claimed error regarding a trial
court's decision on a motion in limine must be preserved at trial by objection, proffer, or a
ruling on the record." State v. Harris, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2007-11-280, 2008-Ohio-4504,
¶ 27.
{¶ 30} The record reflects that the only evidentiary issue preserved at trial was the
issue of the admissibility of Li.R. and Lo.R.'s allegations of abuse while they resided in
Kentucky and Kansas. Other than the Kentucky and Kansas abuse allegations, appellant did
not seek to introduce the other pieces of evidence he now complains were excluded in error
at trial. As appellant did not seek to introduce such evidence or proffer the contents of such
evidence at trial, we conclude, consistent with Evid.R. 103, that he has waived his right to
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object to the evidentiary issues on appeal. See Grubb at 203.
{¶ 31} With respect to the Kentucky and Kansas abuse allegations, the trial court's
preliminary ruling indicated appellant was precluded under Evid.R. 404(B) and 608(B) from
introducing statements Li.R. and Lo.R. made indicating appellant had abused them in 2007,
2008, and 2009 while they lived in Kentucky and Kansas. Appellant argued these
statements were critical to his case because on some of the dates of the alleged abuse he
was deployed by the military oversees, making it impossible for him to have abused Li.R. and
Lo.R. at such times. He argued that such evidence was critical in demonstrating the victims'
statements lacked credibility. The court indicated it would preclude such evidence as
appellant was seeking to use the statements as proof of the victims' character for
misrepresenting the truth to show that the victims were now acting in conformity with that
character by falsely accusing him. In reaching this decision, the trial court acknowledged that
in cases involving child sex abuse charges, children often cannot determine with precision
and specificity the dates and times of an act or acts of abuse, and that a child-victim's
inability to precisely and specifically determine dates and times does not necessarily mean
that the child has falsified the events. The trial court, therefore, granted the state's motion in
limine on this issue.
{¶ 32} At trial, both Li.R. and Lo.R. testified about the sexual abuse that occurred in
Ohio. According to both Li.R. and Lo.R., they did not reveal the abuse until they felt safe
after moving away from appellant to North Carolina. On cross-examination, appellant did not
seek to introduce the Kentucky and Kansas allegations as a means of impeaching Li.R. or
Lo.R., but rather waited until his direct examination of Mother before attempting to introduce
the evidence. During a sidebar conference, defense counsel indicated he wanted to ask
Mother about the Kentucky and Kansas abuse allegations as a means of impeaching Li.R.
and Lo.R. Defense counsel also wanted to question Mother about why the victims did not
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disclose the abuse when they lived in Kentucky and Kansas and appellant was overseas.
The trial court did not permit defense counsel to question Mother about the Kentucky and
Kansas abuse allegations, holding that such evidence could not be used to impeach the
children through their mother's testimony and that the evidence was inadmissible under
Evid.R. 613. The trial court informed defense counsel that if he wanted to impeach Li.R. and
Lo.R. with the Kentucky and Kansas abuse allegations, the appropriate time to have done so
would have been on cross-examination of the two victims.
{¶ 33} We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Boles, 12th Dist. Brown CA2012-06-012, 2013-Ohio-5202, ¶ 14. "A
reviewing court should not disturb evidentiary decisions in the absence of an abuse of
discretion that has created material prejudice." Id., citing State v. Smith, 12th Dist. Fayette
No. CA2007-10-035, 2008-Ohio-5931, ¶ 33. An abuse of discretion connotes more than an
error of law or judgment; it implies that the trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary,
or unconscionable. Id.{¶ 34} We find no error in the trial court's exclusion of the Kentucky and Kansas abuse
allegations. Pursuant to Evid.R. 613, extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a
witness is admissible only if both of the following apply: (1) if the statement is offered solely
for the purpose of impeaching the witness, the witnesses is afforded a prior opportunity to
explain or deny the statement and the opposing party is afforded an opportunity to
interrogate the witness on the statement and (2) the subject matter of the statement is a fact
of consequence or a fact that may be shown by extrinsic evidence, either under the common
law of impeachment or Evid.R. 608(A), 609, or 616(A) or (B). Here, appellant did not seek to
impeach Lo.R. or Li.R. while they were on the stand. Appellant failed to ask either Lo.R. or
Li.R. about statements they made regarding the abuse that took place in Kentucky or Kansas
or why they did not disclose the abuse while appellant was overseas. As the topics were
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never broached with the victims, neither Lo.R. or Li.R had the opportunity to explain or deny
the statements as required by Evid.R. 613(B)(1). Any attempt to impeach Lo.R. or Li.R.'s
testimony by asking Mother about statements the children made is improper and prohibited
by Evid.R. 613. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
evidence.
{¶ 35} Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
B. Expert's Qualifications and Testimony
{¶ 36} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 37} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY PRECLUDING APPELLANT FROM
CHALLENGING MS. MARION'S QUALIFICATIONS AS AN EXPERT DURING CROSS-
EXAMINATION THUS PRECLUDING HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL.
{¶ 38} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred by
precluding him from challenging Marion's qualifications to testify as an expert. Appellant
further contends Marion was improperly permitted to testify at trial "as if she were a pediatric
medical doctor even though she was only a registered nurse." Appellant asserts that if he
had been given the ability to attack her credibility as a medical expert, the outcome of trial
would have been different.
{¶ 39} Initially, Marion was designated as an expert in the field of child abuse
pediatrics without objection. However, the trial court indicated her expertise was "subject to
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cross." During Marion's direct examination, defense counsel objected to her ability to testify
4. {¶ a} Marion was made an expert as follows:
{¶ b} [STATE]: Your Honor, the State would move under Rule 702 to request the
Court accept Dr. Marion as an expert in the field of child abuse pediatrics.
{¶ c} THE COURT: Subject to cross. You can proceed.
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as an expert, and the following discussion was held at sidebar:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: There's going to be an objection as to
the ability of this particular person to make a diagnosis. And then
we're going to have, I'm sure - - I'm trying to play - - I'm trying to
do this exactly the way you've instructed us, and that is to come
up here. The problem is, I anticipate an answer - - an answer to
the question, an opinion that these children indeed were sexually
abused - - sexually and physically abused. I believe that is a
diagnosis.
[STATE]: Uh-huh
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: At least that's the way I'm treating it as.
[STATE]: It's her opinion.
THE COURT: She's a doctor.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: She is not a medical doctor
[STATE]: She's - - it's the subject of cross examination.
THE COURT: She's a doctor. What's the difference? She - - the
only one you're doing - - and I set this up before. I said if there
are any motion in limine. What you're doing is - - you can
question her about her diagnosis, but I'm not going to go through
with [a] Daubert hearing at this point in the stage because you're
challenging her expertise. This should have been done long ago.
And candidly, she is a doctor. She's, you know, she has the
expertise, the education. The State or you are not necessarily
entitled to the best expert, and you can - - you can explore those
questions with her about her diagnosis and things such as that.
You - - you can ask her about that. When you get to that point if
you want to make an objection, you know, bring it up at this point
in time, but she's got the expertise.
{¶ 40} From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the trial court did not permit
appellant to further cross-examine Marion's qualifications as an expert. Given the method in
which the trial court admitted Marion as an expert, in which the trial court specifically stated
that Marion was deemed an expert "subject to cross," we find the trial court's refusal to allow
appellant to later cross-examine Marion as to her qualifications to be error. However, we find
that the error was harmless as the record demonstrates Marion was qualified to testify as an
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expert in the field of child abuse pediatrics, pursuant to Evid.R. 702.5
{¶ 41} Evid.R. 702 provides that a witness may testify as an expert if all of the
following apply:
(A) The witness' testimony either relates to matters beyond the
knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a
misconception common among lay persons;
(B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the
subject matter of the testimony;
(C) The witness' testimony is based on reliable scientific,
technical, or other specialized information. * * *
Additionally, an expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact in the search for the truth.
State v. Cartwright, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2012-03-003, 2013-Ohio-2156, ¶ 34. "[T]he
question of whether a witness possesses the necessary knowledge, skill, experience, or
training to testify as an expert [on] a given subject matter is a question left to the trial court's
sound discretion." Id.{¶ 42} Marion testified that she is a pediatric nurse practitioner who has obtained a
Bachelor of Science degree in nursing, a Master of Science degree with a concentration in
maternal and child health nursing, and a Doctorate of Science degree in nursing. She is a
member of the American Professional Society of the Abuse of Children, and has served as a
clinical instructor on the issue of child abuse to pediatric residents, medical students and
master of nursing students. She testified that in her current position with the South Regional
Area Health Education Center in Fayetteville, North Carolina she serves as a child medical
examiner in the child abuse sub-specialty clinic. She explained that 50 percent of her
practice consists of evaluations of children who have disclosed abuse. She has completed
5. Appellant did not proffer any evidence on the record to demonstrate how Marion was not qualified to give an
expert opinion in this matter. As such, our review as to whether Marion was qualified to render an opinion in
child abuse pediatrics is limited to the evidence actually presented at trial.
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over 1,000 child abuse evaluations, which involves taking the history from a patient and
conducting a physical examination of the patient. She further testified that she has been
qualified as an expert witness over 50 times and has testified as an expert in numerous
courts, including various district courts throughout New York and North Carolina. She further
testified that she remains current in her field by attending at least 50 hours of continuing
education each year.
{¶ 43} Based on the foregoing, it is evident that Marion possessed the qualifications,
training, and experience necessary to qualify as an expert in the field of child abuse
pediatrics. While the trial court should have permitted appellant to cross-examine Marion's
qualifications more fully, we find that the court's failure to do so was harmless given Marion's
education, training, and experiences.
{¶ 44} Moreover, we find no merit to appellant's contention that his inability to attack
Marion's qualifications permitted the jury to place undue weight on her testimony. While the
trial court prohibited appellant from cross-examining Marion about her qualifications, the trial
court expressly ruled that defense counsel could question Marion about the diagnosis she
rendered. The record reflects that defense counsel did in fact challenge Marion about her
diagnosis that the children had been physically, sexually, and psychologically abused. In
determining what weight, if any, to give to Marion's testimony, the jury was permitted to reject
or discredit those portions of her testimony that it did not find credible. See In re S.C.T., 12th
Dist. Butler No. CA2004-04-095, 2005-Ohio-2498, ¶ 24 (finding jurors, as the trier of fact, are
"free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of each witness").
{¶ 45} Finally, we find no merit to appellant's contention that the trial court improperly
allowed Marion to testify at trial "as if she were a pediatric medical doctor even though she
was only a registered nurse." Marion's status as a pediatric nurse practitioner was made
abundantly clear to the jury. Marion was specifically asked if she was a medical doctor, and
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she responded, "No, I'm not." Furthermore, she clarified that she was referred to as "Dr.
Marion" because she had received her doctorate degree in nursing. She further testified that
her findings as a nurse practitioner were subject to review by a supervising physician. Given
such testimony, it is clear Marion did not hold herself out to be a medical doctor, but rather
informed the jury of her position and duties as a pediatric nurse practitioner.
{¶ 46} Having found no merit to appellant's arguments, his third assignment of error is
overruled.
C. Prosecutorial Misconduct
{¶ 47} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶ 48} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY PERMITTING THE
PROSECUTOR TO MAKE IMPROPER REMARKS TO THE JURY THUS PREJUDICING
APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.
{¶ 49} In his third assignment of error, appellant contends the prosecutor made
statements during closing arguments that prejudiced his right to a fair trial. Appellant has
cited to only one instance where an alleged improper statement was made. Specifically,
appellant argues the following comment by the prosecutor was improper:
[STATE]: And, in order for you to believe - - at least in my
opinion from what I could glean from this - - in order for you to
believe that the Defendant is innocent of these crimes, you have
to believe that these two little girls concocted these stories about
being orally, vaginally, and anally raped because they on their
own were worried that their mom was worried about custody of
[H.S.]. That's it. That's it in a nutshell. It took 45 minutes to get
there, but that's it in a nutshell. That's it.
Those two girls heard mom being distraught about custody issues
with [H.S.], so they said let's see what's the best way for mom to
keep [H.S.]? I know, I know what I'm going to do. I'm going to
talk about having a penis in my mouth at 9 and 10 years of age. I
know I'm going to talk about someone putting their penis in my
bottom. I know, I'm going to talk about having someone put their
penis into the - - in the area where I go to the bathroom. Those
are the types of lies that are typical of children of that age, aren't
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they? Aren't they? Really? In a nutshell, 45 minutes to get to
that. That's what it took. That's what that just was. (Emphasis
added.)
Appellant contends that by asking, "Those are the types of lies that are typical of children of
that age, aren't they? Aren't they? Really?" the prosecutor improperly vouched for the
children's testimony and personally attacked opposing counsel and his theory of the case by
effectively telling the jury not to believe anything presented in appellant's defense.
{¶ 50} For a conviction to be reversed on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct, a
defendant must prove that the prosecutor's comments were improper and that they
prejudicially affected the defendant's substantial rights. State v. Elmore, 111 Ohio St.3d 515,
2006-Ohio-6207, ¶ 62. "The focus of an inquiry into allegations of prosecutorial misconduct
is upon the fairness of the trial, not upon culpability of the prosecutor." State v. Olvera-
Guillen, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2007-05-118, 2008-Ohio-5416, ¶ 27, citing State v. Hill, 75
Ohio St.3d 195, 203 (1996). "Prosecutorial misconduct is not grounds for error unless the
defendant has been denied a fair trial." Id., citing State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 266
(1984).
{¶ 51} At trial, appellant's counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's alleged improper
statements. Accordingly, our review is limited to plain error. State v. Vanloan, 12th Dist.
Butler No. CA2008-10-259, 2009-Ohio-4461, ¶ 33. Plain error exists where there is an
obvious deviation from a legal rule that affected the outcome of the proceeding. Crim.R.
52(B); State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002). "Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the
level of plain error if it is clear the defendant would not have been convicted in the absence of
the improper comments." Olvera-Guillen at ¶ 33, citing State v. Tumbleson, 105 Ohio App.3d
693, 700 (12th Dist.1995).
{¶ 52} Having reviewed the prosecutor's closing argument, we find the prosecutor's
statements to be proper. The remarks complained of by appellant were presented in the
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form of a question to the jury, essentially asking the jurors to determine if they "really" found
appellant's version of events credible or if they found the testimony of the two minor victims
credible in light of the evidence presented. "A prosecutor does not express an opinion about
witness credibility by asking jurors to decide for themselves whether the witnesses were
being truthful." Id. at ¶ 37, citing State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, ¶ 235. "It
is not improper to make comments in the context of explaining why a witness' testimony is or
is not credible in light of the circumstances of the evidence, [where] the prosecutor neither
implies knowledge of the facts outside the record nor places his or her personal credibility in
issue by making such argument." Id., citing Davis at ¶ 244-247. Here, the prosecutor merely
referred to evidence contained in the record and asked the jury to determine whether such
evidence was credible. The prosecutor did not improperly vouch for the minor victims by
implying knowledge of facts outside the record or placing his personal credibility at issue.
Furthermore, the prosecutor did not attack opposing counsel personally. Rather, the
prosecutor's statements were limited to and directed at the evidence presented at trial, and
how such evidence could be interpreted by the jury.
{¶ 53} Even if we assumed the prosecutor's statements were improper, we find that
the outcome of the proceeding would not have been different absent such statements. In
light of the evidence presented at trial, including the testimony of the minor victims, Rose,
and Marion, appellant would have been convicted in the absence of the prosecutor's
remarks.
{¶ 54} Appellant's third assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶ 55} Assignment of Error No. 4:
{¶ 56} APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS THUS PREJUDICING HIS RIGHT TO A
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FAIR TRIAL.
{¶ 57} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant contends his trial counsel committed
an array of errors which prejudiced his right to a fair trial. Specifically, appellant contends his
trial counsel erred by failing to (1) challenge Marion's qualifications and diagnoses, (2)
sufficiently cross-examine Rose, (3) impeach Li.R. and Lo.R., (4) object to the state's use of
leading questions, and (5) adequately prepare for trial.
{¶ 58} To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellant must
establish (1) that his trial counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that such deficiency
prejudiced the defense to the point of depriving the appellant of a fair trial. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Vore, 12th Dist. Warren
Nos. CA2012-06-049 and CA2012-10-106, 2013-Ohio-1490, ¶ 14. Trial counsel's
performance will not be deemed deficient unless it "fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness." Strickland at 688. To show prejudice, the appellant must prove there
exists "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. An appellant's failure to satisfy one prong
of the Strickland test negates a court's need to consider the other. State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio
St.3d 378, 389 (2000).
1. Testimony of Marion
{¶ 59} Appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in a variety of ways for
failing to object to Marion's testimony at trial. Appellant initially contends counsel was
ineffective for failing to adequately question Marion about her qualifications to make the
diagnosis that Li.R. and Lo.R. had been physically, sexually, and psychologically abused. He
further contends his trial counsel should have retained a doctor to independently review
Marion's findings to determine if the findings were medically supported.
{¶ 60} As an initial matter, we note that trial counsel is strongly presumed to have
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rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of
reasonable professional judgment. State v. Hendrix, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-05-109,
2012-Ohio-5610, ¶ 14. It is not the role of the appellate court to second guess the strategic
decisions of trial counsel. State v. Lloyd, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2007-04-052 and
CA2007-04-053, 2008-Ohio-3383, ¶ 61. "[T]he scope of cross-examination falls within the
ambit of trial strategy, and debatable trial tactics do not establish ineffective assistance of
counsel." State v. Murphy, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2009-05-128 and 2009-Ohio-6745, ¶ 32,
citing State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815, ¶ 101.
{¶ 61} As discussed during our resolution of the second assignment of error,
appellant's counsel was precluded by the trial court from cross-examining Marion about her
qualifications. Counsel was not, however, precluded from questioning Marion about her
ability to render a diagnosis, and the record demonstrates that counsel did, in fact, question
Marion about the diagnosis she made in this case. Specifically, counsel questioned Marion
about the amount of time she spent with the children, and whether such time was sufficient
for her to render an opinion in the matter. Counsel also questioned Marion about whether
her training in the area of sexual abuse was current so as to allow her to render a diagnosis
in this case. As counsel did question Marion about her ability to render a diagnosis, we find
that counsel's performance was not deficient in this instance. Further, as the scope of cross-
examination falls within the ambit of trial strategy, we find that counsel's decision not to
further cross-examine Marion as to her ability to render a diagnosis in the present case was
reasonable. See Murphy at ¶ 32; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
{¶ 62} Moreover, we find no merit to appellant's contention that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to hire a doctor to independently review Marion's findings to see if her
findings were medically supported. Not hiring a separate expert, and, instead, relying upon
the cross-examination of a state's expert to rebut evidence of a crime is a legitimate trial
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strategy. See State v. Hendrix, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2000-03-054, 2001 WL 1078967, *3
(Sept. 17, 2001). "[S]uch a decision by trial counsel is unquestionably tactical because such
an expert might uncover evidence that further inculpates the defendant" or render an opinion
that substantiates and corroborates the findings of the state's expert. Id. See also State v.
Jones, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-577, 2003-Ohio-952, ¶ 15.
{¶ 63} Finally, appellant argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
Marion's testimony about statements Li.R. and Lo.R made to her as such statements were
not offered for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. Appellant argues that by
failing to object, his trial counsel permitted impermissible hearsay statements to be admitted
at trial, including statements which implicated appellant as the perpetrator of his
stepdaughters' abuse.
{¶ 64} Contrary to appellant's argument, the record reveals that his trial counsel did
object to Marion's testimony on the basis that it contained impermissible hearsay statements
by the children. The trial court overruled counsel's objection, finding that the statements
were admissible under Evid.R. 803(4) as they were made for the purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment. Thereafter, the trial court granted defense counsel a continuing
6
objection to such testimony. As defense counsel did object to such testimony by Marion, we
6. {¶ a} The following discussion occurred at trial with respect to Marion's testimony:
{¶ b} [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I'm going to object to a portion of the answer
that indicates that bad things at the hands of her stepfather. I think
that her answer is appropriate up to the point of her stepfather.
However, identifying a particular perpetrator is not necessary for
medical diagnosis. Obviously, the other - - the other things discussed,
you know, about pain, or where it hurt, or how it felt - - all those are
necessary for a medical diagnosis and I think clearly come in.
However, to extend it to a specific individual, I think - -
{¶ c} [STATE]: I would disagree.
{¶ d} DEFENSE COUNSEL]: - - goes beyond - - goes beyond the inherent
credibility that we're looking for in terms of medical diagnosis.
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find no merit to appellant's argument that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to object.
{¶ 65} We therefore conclude that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to
question Marion about her ability to make medical diagnoses, for not having her findings
independently reviewed, or for "failing" to object to Marion's testimony about statements
Lo.R. and Li.R. made to her that identified appellant as the perpetrator of the children's
abuse.
2. Cross-Examination of Rose
{¶ 66} Appellant also asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-
examine Rose about the seven-month lapse of time between the children's disclosure of
abuse on October 31, 2011, and the time they sought treatment with Rose in May 2012.
Appellant contends this lapse of time was crucial to his defense that "[M]other coached these
children."
{¶ 67} The record discloses the seven-month lapse of time that occurred between the
children's initial disclosure and their treatment with Rose. The jury heard Li.R. and Lo.R.
testify that they disclosed the abuse on October 31, 2011. The jury also heard Rose testify
{¶ e} ***
{¶ f} THE COURT: The - - the Rule 803(4) is the exception, "statement
made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment." And to me
a course of treatment is clearly necessary to determine who the
perpetrator is. And clearly they're not going to take this diagnosis and
not know who it is, and put them right back in the same environment
for treatment. * * * So, I'm going to overrule the objection and let them
- - she can identify who the child noted. I'm sure she's going to do that
with [Li.R], and I'll just note for the record that you have a continuing
objection to her testimony as to the identity of the perpetrator, and
you'll not need to make that. * * *
{¶ g} [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: An ongoing objection?
{¶ h} [STATE]: Yeah.
{¶ i} THE COURT: * * * [A]n ongoing objection to her testimony as to what
the children told her based upon your objection at this point to, you
know, the identity of the child [sic].
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that she did not diagnostically test or begin treating Li.R. and Lo.R. for PTSD until May 2012.
Defense counsel's decision not to further cross-examine Rose about this time-lapse falls
within the realm of trial strategy, and we will not second guess trial counsel's strategic
decision. See Lloyd, 2008-Ohio-3383 at ¶ 61.
{¶ 68} Additionally, we find that appellant's contention that he was prejudiced by his
counsel's failure to cross-examine Rose on this issue to be without merit. Although appellant
contends that the children were "coached" by Mother into making the abuse allegations
during the seven-month time lapse, the record reveals that Lo.R. and Li.R.'s initial disclosure
of abuse in October 2011 was substantially similar to their trial testimony.
{¶ 69} We, therefore, reject appellant's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for
not questioning Rose more thoroughly about the time-lapse between the children's disclosure
and treatment.
3. Impeachment of Li.R. and Lo.R.
{¶ 70} Next, appellant argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to "follow
through with important questions regarding the children to impeach their testimony."
Appellant contends defense counsel was in possession of a video which could have been
used to impeach Lo.R. and Li.R. by showing that they made prior inconsistent statements
7
about the abuse. Appellant does not provide any specific examples of how Li.R. and Lo.R.'s
trial testimony was inconsistent with prior statements they made.
{¶ 71} The scope of cross-examination falls within the ambit of trial strategy. Murphy,
2009-Ohio-6745 at ¶ 32. Moreover, counsel's decisions regarding the presentation of
evidence is within the realm of trial tactics. State v. Edwards, 12th Dist. Clermont CA97-04-
7. The only reference to a "video" occurs during a sidebar conference with the judge during cross-examination of
Li.R. During this time, defense counsel indicated that he "probably will use" a "Mayerson" video to cross-
examine Li.R. on some anticipated inconsistent statements.
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035, 1998 WL 65685, *8 (Feb. 17, 1998). Here, appellant has not demonstrated how
counsel's alleged errors in failing to play the video at trial or further question Li.R. and Lo.R.
about prior statements they made were "so serious as to deprive [appellant] of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. From the record, it is apparent that
trial counsel did cross-examine each victim as to their specific abuse allegations, asking the
children about the order of events leading up to the abuse, where the abuse occurred in the
home, and whether anyone else was present in the home in an effort to impeach the
children's testimony. Trial counsel's performance did not, therefore, fall below an objective
standard of reasonableness. Thus, we conclude that appellant has failed to demonstrate
that his trial counsel was ineffective for not impeaching Li.R. and Lo.R. with prior inconsistent
statements.
4. Leading Questions
{¶ 72} Appellant also asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
"countless times" the prosecutor led the children and Marion through their testimony. He
contends the children were improperly "led through questions about the time frame,
spanking, nightmares, and the alleged abuse" and, without these leading questions, the jury
would not have convicted him of the charged offenses.
{¶ 73} "It is within the trial court's discretion to allow leading questions on direct
examination." State v. Baird, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2003-09-034, 2004-Ohio-6664, ¶ 40,
citing State v. D'Ambrosio, 67 Ohio St.3d 185, 190 (1993). Moreover, trial counsel is not
ineffective for choosing, for tactical reasons, not to pursue every possible trial objection.
State v. Steele, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2003-11-276, 2005-Ohio-943, ¶ 100. "Objections
tend to disrupt the flow of a trial and are considered technical and bothersome by a jury." Id.,citing State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 211 (1996).
{¶ 74} Accordingly, the absence of objections when the prosecutor posed leading
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questions was a strategic choice by counsel. We therefore find that appellant has failed to
demonstrate counsel was deficient for failing to object to the leading questions posed to
Li.R., Lo.R., and Marion.
5. Preparation for Trial
{¶ 75} Finally, appellant contends he received ineffective assistance as his trial
counsel was unprepared for trial. Appellant does not cite to any specific examples of
counsel's alleged unpreparedness, but rather makes the broad assertion that counsel "did
not ask important questions or * * * otherwise prepare for the testimony from the State's
witnesses or even his own."
{¶ 76} Having reviewed the record, we find no merit to appellant's argument.
Appellant's complaint that counsel failed to ask "important questions" or "prepare" for
witnesses' testimony are claims that involve trial tactics employed by counsel. "[T]he end
result of tactical trial decisions need not be positive in order for counsel to be considered
'effective.'" State v. Awkal, 76 Ohio St.3d 324, 337 (1996). Further, appellant has not
demonstrated how he was prejudiced or how the outcome of trial would have been different
had counsel "prepared' or asked the "important questions."
{¶ 77} As appellant has not demonstrated how any of the complained of actions by his
trial counsel were so serious as to deprive appellant of a fair trial, we reject his argument that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
{¶ 78} Appellant's fourth assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
E. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight
{¶ 79} Assignment of Error No. 5:
{¶ 80} THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATER OF LAW AND/OR
AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN APPELLANT'S
CONVICTIONS.
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{¶ 81} In his fifth assignment of error, appellant argues his convictions for rape,
felonious assault, and disseminating matter harmful to juveniles were not supported by
sufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 82} Whether the evidence presented at trial is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict
is a question of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997); State v. Grinstead,
194 Ohio App.3d 755, 2011-Ohio-3018, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.). When reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence underlying a criminal conviction, an appellate court examines the evidence in
order to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Paul, 12th Dist. Fayette No.
CA2011-10-026, 2012-Ohio-3205, ¶ 9. Therefore, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt."
State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 83} A manifest weight of the evidence challenge, on the other hand, examines the
"inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support one side
of the issue rather than the other." State v. Barnett, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-09-177,
2012-Ohio-2372, ¶ 14. To determine whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of
the evidence, the reviewing court must look at the entire record, weigh the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether in
resolving the conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a
manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
State v. Graham, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2008-07-095, 2009-Ohio-2814, ¶ 66. "While
appellate review includes the responsibility to consider the credibility of witnesses and weight
given to the evidence, 'these issues are primarily matters for the trier of fact to decide.'"
State v. Barnes, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2010-06-009, 2011-Ohio-5226, ¶ 81, quoting State
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v. Walker, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2006-04-085, 2007-Ohio-911, ¶ 26. An appellate court,
therefore, will overturn a conviction due to the manifest weight of the evidence only in
extraordinary circumstances when the evidence presented at trial weighs heavily in favor of
acquittal. Id., citing Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. Furthermore, "[a] determination that a
conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence will also be dispositive of the
issue of sufficiency." State v. Jones, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-03-049, 2013-Ohio-150, ¶
19.
1. Rape
{¶ 84} Appellant argues the state failed to prove he engaged in sexual conduct with
Li.R. and Lo.R, as the state failed to introduce evidence of penetration. He also contends
there is no physical evidence linking him to the rape of Li.R. and Lo.R., and that the
allegations of rape stem from Mother's "coaching" of the children to have them fabricate the
abuse so that Mother could obtain custody of H.S.
{¶ 85} Appellant was convicted on six counts of rape in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(b), which provides that "[n]o person shall engage in sexual conduct with
another who is not the spouse of the offender * * * when * * * [t]he other person is less than
thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of the other person."
Sexual conduct is defined as "vaginal intercourse between a male and female; anal
intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and, without
privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of the body or any instrument,
apparatus, or other object into the vaginal or anal opening of another. Penetration, however
slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse." R.C. 2907.01(A).
{¶ 86} After reviewing the entire record, weighing inferences, and examining the
credibility of witnesses, we find that appellant's convictions for rape were not against the
manifest weight of the evidence and were supported by sufficient evidence. The state
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presented testimony and evidence from which the jury could have found all the elements of
rape, including the challenged "penetration" element, proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
{¶ 87} With respect to the three rape counts relating to Lo.R., Lo.R. testified at trial
that she was currently 12 years old and had never been married to appellant. She also
testified appellant forced her to engage in fellatio and he anally raped her on two separate
occasions. Specifically, Lo.R. stated she had to suck appellant's penis by going "up and
down" on it. She described appellant ejaculating into her mouth, saying that "white stuff
came out * * * [o]f his private" and it "yucky," "nasty," and tasted like "clumpy milk." She
testified that on one occasion appellant made her get on her hands and knees and he used a
lubricant, or something "sticky," on his penis to "make it fit" in her bottom. Lo.R. described
another time when appellant shoved a sock in her mouth and forced her to hold onto the bars
on the footboard of the bed while he put his penis in her bottom. Lo.R. specifically stated
appellant was able to put "more" of his penis into her bottom on this occasion then he had in
the past. Such testimony is evidence of penetration.
{¶ 88} With respect to the three rape counts relating to Li.R., Li.R. testified at trial she
was born on April 17, 2002, and she had never been married to appellant. She further
testified appellant forced her to engage in fellatio and he anally and vaginally raped her.
Li.R. stated appellant forced her to touch his penis with her hands and mouth. After she put
her hands around his penis and "shook it" she had to put her mouth on his penis and suck
until "white stuff came out." She stated that the "white stuff" looked "like yogurt." She also
testified appellant called her into the master bedroom where he forced her to bend over so
that he could put his penis in her butt and in her "potty area." She testified appellant used a
cream to make his penis fit. Again, such testimony is evidence of penetration.
{¶ 89} Li.R. and Lo.R.'s testimony was corroborated by Marion's findings during her
examination of the children. Marion testified during her pre-medical interview of Lo.R. and
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Li.R., both girls described instances of physical and sexual abuse. Lo.R. had disclosed that
appellant had anally raped her and forced her to perform oral sex. Li.R. had described
appellant putting his private in her "front" and in her bottom. Moreover, both girls had
demonstrated sexual knowledge beyond their years, describing ejaculation, French kissing,
lubricant, and "humping." Finally, during Marion's physical examination of Lo.R. and Li.R.,
she observed flattening of the rugae around each child's anus, which Marion testified was
consistent with a large object entering the anal cavity.
{¶ 90} Appellant argues the flattening of the rugae can be attributed other events,
including constipation, and it is not proof that he anally raped Lo.R. and Li.R. He further
argues that as Marion's physical examination revealed no abnormalities in the children's
vaginas and the search of his home yielded no bodily fluids, there is no evidence connecting
him to the rape offenses. He contends the children's allegations were nothing more than
fabrications arising out of Mother's manipulations in an effort to keep custody of her youngest
daughter, H.S. Appellant claims the children's abuse allegations are "extremely suspicious"
given that the allegations were not disclosed until Mother and appellant were in the middle of
a custody dispute over H.S.
{¶ 91} "Although a reviewing court looks at the record anew when considering whether
a verdict at trial is against the manifest weight of evidence, the trier of fact, not the appellate
court, is in the best position to evaluate testimony and determine the credibility of witnesses."
State v. Thomas, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2003-10-025, 2004-Ohio-6244, ¶ 12. Here, the
jury found Li.R. and Lo.R.'s testimony credible and chose to believe their version of events
over appellant's proffered version. It is well-established that when "conflicting evidence is
presented at trial, a conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply
because the trier of fact believed the prosecution testimony." State v. Williams, 12th Dist.
Warren No. CA2012-08-080, 2013-Ohio-3410, ¶ 35.
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{¶ 92} Accordingly, we find appellant's convictions for rape were not against the
manifest weight of the evidence and were, therefore, also supported by sufficient evidence.
See Jones, 2013-Ohio-150 at ¶ 19.
2. Felonious Assault
{¶ 93} Appellant also challenges his convictions for felonious assault, arguing the state
failed to prove he caused "serious physical harm" to Li.R. and Lo.R. In support of his
position that the children did not suffer serious physical harm, appellant relies on the fact that
neither Li.R. or Lo.R. were hospitalized, prescribed medication, or saw a "psychiatrist." He
further argues that because the children were not diagnosed as suffering from PTSD until
seven or more months after the abuse ended, it "is questionable whether the children's
alleged PTSD was at the hands of [a]ppellant" or resulted from their time with Mother.
{¶ 94} Appellant was convicted of two counts of felonious assault in violation of R.C.
2903.11(A)(1), which provides that "[n]o person shall knowingly * * * [c]ause serious physical
harm to another or to another's unborn." Serious physical harm is defined as "[a]ny mental
illness or condition of such gravity as would normally require hospitalization or prolonged
psychiatric treatment." R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(a).
{¶ 95} Contrary to appellant's arguments, the state presented evidence at trial to allow
the jury to conclude appellant's sexual abuse of the children caused them serious physical
harm. While the children were not hospitalized as a result of appellant's abuse, the jury
heard testimony that appellant's physical and sexual abuse of the children caused them to
suffer from the mental condition PTSD. Rose specifically testified appellant's physical and
sexual abuse of Lo.R. and Li.R. caused the children to experience psychological
disturbances and impairments that affected nearly every aspect of their life. She further
testified the children had undergone psychotherapy treatment with a psychotherapist for
more than ten months to treat their PTSD. That Li.R. and Lo.R. did not undergo diagnostic
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testing or receive treatment for their PTSD until seven months after the initial disclosure of
the abuse was a fact presented to the jury. The jury had the ability to consider and weigh this
evidence when deciding whether appellant knowingly caused Li.R. and Lo.R serious physical
harm. The fact that the jury chose to believe the prosecution testimony over appellant's
version of events does not mean that appellant's convictions were against the manifest
weight. See Williams at ¶ 35.
{¶ 96} Accordingly, we find that appellant's convictions for felonious assault were not
against the manifest weight of the evidence and were, therefore, also supported by sufficient
evidence. See Jones, 2013-Ohio-150 at ¶ 19.
3. Disseminating Matter Harmful to Juveniles
{¶ 97} Finally, appellant challenges his conviction for disseminating matter harmful to
juveniles, a felony of the fourth degree, arguing the state failed to prove that any pornography
was actually viewed on the recovered laptop or that appellant was the individual who showed
the pornography to Li.R. and Lo.R.
{¶ 98} Appellant was convicted on one count of disseminating matter harmful to
juveniles in violation of R.C. 2907.31(A)(1), which provides that "[n]o person, with knowledge
of its character or content, shall recklessly * * * [d]irectly sell, deliver, furnish, disseminate,
provide, exhibit, rent, or present to a juvenile * * * any material or performance that is
obscene or harmful to juveniles." Pursuant to R.C. 2907.31(F), if the material disseminated
or presented to the juvenile is obscene, as opposed to merely harmful, and if the victim is
less than 13 years of age, the violation of R.C. 2907.31 is a felony of the fourth degree.
Material or a performance is considered "obscene" if any of the following apply:
(1) Its dominant appeal is to prurient interest;
(2) Its dominant tendency is to arouse lust by displaying or
depicting sexual activity, masturbation, sexual excitement, or
nudity in a way that tends to represent human beings as mere
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objects of sexual appetite;
(3) Its dominant tendency is to arouse lust by displaying or
depicting bestiality or extreme or bizarre violence, cruelty, or
brutality; * * *
R.C. 2907.01(F).
{¶ 99} After reviewing the record, we find appellant's conviction for disseminating
matter harmful to juveniles was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and was
supported by sufficient evidence. The state presented testimony and evidence from which
the jury could have found all the elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Specifically, the jury heard testimony from both Li.R. and Lo.R. that appellant showed them
videos on a laptop of a man's penis sticking through a hole in the wall and a woman standing
on the other side of the wall near the hole, preparing to masturbate and perform oral sex on
the penis. Lo.R. testified the woman standing by the hole tried to "put her private onto it" and
"suck on" the penis sticking out of the hole. Similarly, Lo.R. testified that there was a girl
"touching it [the private] and doing stuff to it. * * * Like rubbing it, like putting it in her mouth."
{¶ 100} Lo.R. and Li.R.'s testimony was corroborated by the findings of Ruebusch,
who testified that during an examination of the laptop seized form appellant's home he found
numerous references to a website about "glory holes." Ruebusch testified he recovered an
image from July 29, 2011, on the laptop which depicted a video of a penis sticking through a
hole in a wall and a naked female preparing to engage in fellatio on the other side of the wall.
While Ruebusch could not definitively say the video had been viewed, he testified that a
search of appellant's hard drive revealed numerous references to "glory holes" and indicated
that various "glory hole" videos and stories about incest had been accessed on the computer.
Furthermore, while Ruebusch could not definitively say appellant was the specific individual
who accessed the "glory hole" website on July 29, 2011 at 1:12 a.m., he opined that the
same person who visited the "glory holes" website had also emailed a student schedule
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belonging to "Jason Setty" to the email account for "JSetty1985" at 12:20 a.m., had searched
for a china cap cooking instrument around 1:36 a.m., and had purchased a china cap
strainer, which was being "shipped to" and "billed to" "Jason Setty," around 1:53 a.m. on July
29, 2011.
{¶ 101} Ruebusch's testimony, taken in combination with Li.R. and Lo.R.'s testimony,
was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that appellant recklessly presented obscene
material to Lo.R. and Li.R., minors under the age of 13. We therefore find that appellant's
conviction for disseminating matter harmful to juveniles was not against the manifest weight
of the evidence and was supported by sufficient evidence. See Jones, 2013-Ohio-150 at ¶
19.
{¶ 102} Accordingly, appellant's fifth assignment of error is overruled.
F. Sentencing
{¶ 103} Assignment of Error No. 6:
{¶ 104} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY IMPROPERLY
SENTENCING APPELLANT.
{¶ 105} In his sixth assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court committed
several errors in imposing his sentence. Appellant contends the trial court failed to consider
the principles and purposes of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 and
failed to make the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before imposing consecutive
sentences. He further contends the trial court erred by imposing life without parole on the
rape counts involving Lo.R., as the requirements of R.C. 2907.02(B) were not met. Finally,
appellant argues the trial court erred by failing to inform him that he would not be eligible for
earned days of credit based upon his conviction.
{¶ 106} As previously stated, appellant was sentenced to life without parole on the
three rape convictions relating to Li.R. and on the three rape convictions relating to Lo.R.
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The three rape sentences relating to Li.R. were ordered concurrent to one another, and the
three rape sentences relating to Lo.R. were ordered concurrent to one another, but
consecutive to the sentences against Li.R. Appellant was sentenced to 8 years
imprisonment for the attempted rape of Lo.R., which was run consecutively to his sentence
on the rape convictions. He received an 18-month prison sentence for disseminating matter
harmful to juveniles, which was run consecutively to the rape and attempted rape sentences.
Appellant did not receive a sentence on his convictions for sexual battery and felonious
assault, as the trial court found the convictions constituted allied offenses of similar import
and merged such offenses with his rape convictions.
{¶ 107} We review the imposed sentence under the standard of review set forth in
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), which governs all felony sentences. State v. Crawford, 12th Dist.
Clermont No. CA2012-12-088, 2013-Ohio-3315, ¶ 6. "When considering an appeal of a trial
court's felony sentencing decision under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), '[t]he appellate court may
increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may
vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing.'" Id. at
¶ 7, quoting R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). However, an appellate court's review of an imposed
sentence is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. Id.; State v. Warren, 12th
Dist. Clermont No. CA2012-12-087, 2013-Ohio-3483, ¶ 6. Rather, an appellate court may
take any action authorized by R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) only if the court "clearly and convincingly
finds" that either: (1) "the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under
division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or
division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;" or (2)
"[t]hat the sentence is otherwise contrary to law." R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a)-(b). An appellate
court will not find a sentence clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial court
considers the purposes and principles of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed in R.C.
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2929.12, properly applies postrelease control, and sentences appellant within the permissible
statutory range. Warren at ¶ 7; State v. Sturgill, 12th Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2013-01-002
and CA2013-01-003, 2013-Ohio-4648, ¶ 37.
1. Principles and Purposes of Sentencing
{¶ 108} Appellant contends the trial court failed to consider the principles and
purposes of sentencing before imposing "significant, consecutive prison sentences."
Specifically, appellant contends the trial court failed to consider the factors set forth in R.C.
2929.11(B) and R.C. 2929.12(A)-(E).
{¶ 109} Contrary to appellant's claim, the judgment entry of conviction specifically
states that the trial court considered "the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C.
2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12." Furthermore, the record of appellant's sentencing hearing
demonstrates the trial court gave careful and substantial deliberation to the sentencing
provisions prior to imposing appellant's sentence. The trial court discussed appellant's
criminal history, which included a delinquency adjudication for the rape of his 12-year-old
brother when appellant was 16 years old, and the fact that treatment did not rehabilitate or
prevent appellant from abusing other children. The court considered the need to protect the
public from appellant, concluding that "society absolutely needs to be protected" from
appellant for the rest of his life. The court also considered the serious mental and
psychological harm caused to Li.R. and Lo.R., and specifically found that the offenses
committed against the minor victims were the "most serious of offenses." The trial court
further discussed appellant's lack of remorse for the crimes and his assertions that he was
found guilty only because the state, Mother, the children, and Rose lied and conspired with
one another to convict him of the offenses.
{¶ 110} Given the foregoing considerations by the trial court, and the language utilized
by the court in its sentencing entry, we find that the trial court clearly considered the purposes
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and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 prior to imposing
appellant's sentence.
2. Consecutive Sentences
{¶ 111} Next, appellant argues the trial court erred by failing to make the findings
required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before imposing consecutive sentences. We disagree.
{¶ 112} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a trial court must engage in a three-step
analysis and make certain findings before imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Dillon,
12th Dist. Madison No. CA2012-06-012, 2013-Ohio-335, ¶ 9. First, the trial court must find
that the consecutive sentence is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to
punish the offender. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Second, the trial court must find that consecutive
sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the
danger the offender poses to the public. Id. Third, the trial court must find that one of the
following applies:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a
sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or
2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control
for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part
of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two
or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or
unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses
committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately
reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from
future crime by the offender.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c).
{¶ 113} "A trial court satisfies the statutory requirement of making the required
findings when the record reflects that the court engaged in the required analysis and selected
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the appropriate statutory criteria." Sturgill, 2013-Ohio-4648 at ¶ 48, citing State v. Smith,
12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2012-01-004, 2012-Ohio-4523, ¶ 26. In imposing consecutive
sentences, "the trial court is not required to state any talismanic language" or otherwise give
reasons explaining its findings. Id.; State v. Oren, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2012-05-010,
2013-Ohio-531, ¶ 25. Nevertheless, the record must reflect that the court made the requisite
findings. Id.{¶ 114} Here, the record reflects that the trial court made the findings required by R.C.
2929.14(C)(4) before imposing consecutive sentences. Specifically, the trial court stated that
consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime by appellant.
The trial court also found that consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the
seriousness of appellant's conduct and that his course of conduct caused such harm to Lo.R.
and Li.R. that no single prison term adequately reflected the seriousness of his conduct.
Specifically, the trial court stated:
THE COURT: [T]hese are multiple offenses. They're multiple
victims. You should not get a free pass simply because there
were two victims. Each victim deserves to be - - to have justice
for the crimes that were committed against them as well. And it
clearly is not disproportionate to the nature of the offenses.
I truly believe that a single sentence - - even though it's life
without parole, would diminish the seriousness of each offense as
to each separate victim in this case, and consequently these will
be served - - the groups, if you will, will be served consecutively
to one another. * * *
The trial court later memorialized these findings within its sentencing entry.
{¶ 115} From the trial court's statements at the sentencing hearing and the language
utilized in the sentencing entry, it is clear that the trial court complied with the dictates of R.C.
2929.14(C)(4). See Crawford, 2013-Ohio-3315 at ¶ 17; Sturgill at ¶ 50. The trial court,
therefore, did not err by imposing consecutive sentences in this matter.
3. Permissible Statutory Range: Life without Parole for Rape of Lo.R.
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{¶ 116} Appellant also argues the trial court erred by imposing life without parole on
the rape counts involving Lo.R., as the requirements of R.C. 2907.02(B) were not met.
Specifically, appellant contends he could not be sentenced to life without parole for the rape
of Lo.R. as Lo.R. was not less than ten years old at the time of the rapes, he had not been
previously convicted of raping a person less than 13 years of age, and there was "no
allegation that he caused serious physical harm to Lo.R. during or immediately after the
commission of the offense."
{¶ 117} A defendant who is convicted under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) for the rape of a
person under age 13 is guilty of a first-degree felony and shall be sentenced as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this division, notwithstanding
[R.C. 2929.11 to R.C. 2929.14], an offender under division
(A)(1)(b) of this section shall be sentenced to a prison term or a
term of life imprisonment pursuant to [R.C. 2971.03]. * * * If an
offender under division (A)(1)(b) of this section previously has
been convicted or pleaded guilty to violating division (A)(1)(b) of
this section or to violating an existing or former law of this state,
another state, or the United States that is substantially similar to
division (A)(1)(b) of this section, if the offender during or
immediately after the commission of the offense caused serious
physical harm to the victim, or if the victim under division (A)(1)(b)
of this section is less than ten years of age, in lieu of sentencing
the offender to a prison term or term of life imprisonment pursuant
to [R.C. 2971.03], the court may impose upon the offender a term
of life imprisonment without parole.
(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2907.02(B). Or, stated another way, a defendant may be
sentenced to life without parole under R.C. 2907.02(B) if convicted of violating R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(b) and one of the following applies: (1) the defendant was previously
convicted or pleaded guilty to raping a person under the age of 13; (2) the defendant caused
serious physical harm to the victim, who was less than 13 years of age, during or immediately
after the rape; or (3) the defendant raped a victim who was less than ten years of age. If
none of the above apply, the defendant shall be sentenced in accordance with R.C. 2971.03
to a prison term or a term of life. R.C. 2971.03(B)(1) provides:
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[I]f a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of [R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(b)] * * * and if the court does not impose a
sentence of life without parole when authorized pursuant to [R.C.
2907.02(B)], the court shall impose upon the person an indefinite
prison term consisting of one of the following:
(a) Except as otherwise required in division (B)(1)(b) or (c) of
this section, a minimum term of ten years and a maximum
term of life imprisonment.
(b) If the victim was less than ten years of age, a minimum
term of fifteen years and a maximum of life imprisonment.
(c) If the offender purposely compels the victim to submit by
force or threat of force, or if the offender previously has
been convicted of or pleaded guilty to violating [R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(b)] or to violating an existing or former law
of this state, another state, or the United States that is
substantially similar to [R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b)], or if the
offender during or immediately after the commission of the
offense caused serious physical harm to the victim, a
minimum term of twenty-five years and a maximum of life
imprisonment.
The maximum sentence a defendant may receive pursuant to R.C. 2971.03(B)(1) is,
therefore, life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.
{¶ 117} In the indictment for Case No. 2012-CR-0068, the rape counts relating to
Lo.R. do not contain a specification that Lo.R. was less than ten years old at the time of the
offense, that appellant has previously been convicted or pleaded guilty to the rape of a minor
under age 13, or that appellant caused serious physical harm to Lo.R. during or immediately
after the rapes. Furthermore, the verdict forms finding appellant guilty of raping Lo.R. in
counts four through six of Case No. 2012-CR-0068 were general verdict forms finding
appellant "guilty of the offense of Rape, Section R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) of the Ohio Revised
Code, as to Lo.R. who was more than 10 years of age but less than thirteen years of age."
Nonetheless, the trial court, at the sentencing hearing and in its sentencing entry, specifically
found appellant caused serious physical harm to Lo.R. during the course of the rapes and
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imposed a sentence of life without parole on counts four through six.8
{¶ 118} On appeal, the state contends that the trial court's actions were proper given
the jury's guilty verdict on the felonious assault conviction. The state argues the jury's finding
that appellant caused serious physical harm in the course of committing the felonious assault
against Lo.R. in Case No. 2012-CR-0731 can be used to enhance the penalty on his rape
convictions in Case No. 2012-CR-0068 to life without parole. The state contends Lo.R.'s
diagnosis of PTSD and her ongoing therapy treatments were sufficient proof that appellant
caused Lo.R. serious physical harm during or immediately after the rapes, and that the trial
court was, therefore, entitled to impose a prison sentence of life without parole. We find no
merit to the state's argument.
{¶ 119} "It is well established that each count of an indictment charges a complete
offense; the separate counts of an indictment are not interdependent but are, and necessarily
must be, each complete in itself." State v. Curran, 166 Ohio App.3d 206, 2006-Ohio-773, ¶
24 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Lovejoy, 79 Ohio St.3d 440, 446 (1997). "A verdict responding to
a designated count will be construed in the light of the count designated, and no other."
Browning v. State, 120 Ohio St. 62 (1929), paragraph four of the syllabus. Just as a verdict
on one count of an indictment cannot be used to construe a separate count within the same
indictment, a verdict on a count in a separate indictment cannot be used to construe a count
in a separate indictment. Accordingly, the fact that the jury found appellant "caused serious
physical harm" in the course of committing a felonious assault in Case No. 2012-CR-0731
does not mean that the jury would have, or did in fact, find that appellant "caused serious
8. {¶ a} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court made the following statement with respect to rape convictions
involving Lo.R.:
{¶ b} THE COURT: As to [Lo.R.] in Counts 4, 5, and 6, she suffered serious
physical harm. I believe the statute provides the option there as well that the
serious physical harm was caused during your ongoing sexual abuse of
[Lo.R.], and it will be life without parole on those three as well. * * *
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physical harm" to Lo.R. during or immediately after the commission of the rapes in Case No.
2012-CR-0068.9 As previously mentioned, the verdict forms submitted to the jury on counts
four through six were general verdict forms asking the jury to determine appellant's guilt or
innocence. The forms did not require the jury to determine whether appellant caused Lo.R.
serious physical harm during or immediately after the commission of the rape offenses.10 As
the jury did not specifically find appellant caused Lo.R. serious physical harm during or
immediately after the commission of the rapes, appellant could not be sentenced to life
without parole pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(B).
{¶ 120} We further find that the trial court's statement in its sentencing entry and its
determination at the sentencing hearing that appellant caused Lo.R. "serious physical harm"
during the course of the rapes was an improper basis to enhance the penalty on counts four
through six. While the trial court unquestionably believed appellant caused Lo.R. serious
physical harm during the course of the rapes, the trial court was not permitted to make this
additional finding, independent from the jury, to enhance the statutory maximum penalty
9. {¶ a} The jury was specifically instructed by the trial court as follows:
{¶ b} THE COURT: The charges set forth in both 2012-CR-68 and 2012-CR
constitute - - excuse me - - 2012-CR-731 constitute a separate and
distinct matter. You must consider each count and each indictment
and the evidence applicable to each count separately, and you must
state your findings as to each count uninfluenced by your verdict as to
any other count in each indictment.
{¶ c} ***
{¶ d} Again, the charges set forth in each Count constitute a separate and
distinct matter. You must consider each count and the evidence
applicable to each count separately, and you must state your findings
as to each count again uninfluenced by your verdict as to the other
counts.
10. Compare the present case with State v. Alvarado, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-07-14, 2008-Ohio-4411 (holding
that a defendant's sentence of life without parole was proper where appellant was convicted of rape in violation of
R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and the specification that the defendant caused serious physical harm to the victim) and
State v. Hardie, 4th Dist. Washington No. 06CA37, 2007-Ohio-2755 (holding that a defendant's sentence of life
without parole was constitutional as the defendant pleaded guilty to rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and
the accompanying specification that he caused serious physical harm to his victim).
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permitted by R.C. 2907.02(B). See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348(2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004).
{¶ 121} In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require that "any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490. "[T]he
'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose
solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."
(Emphasis sic.) Blakely at 303. "[T]he relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the maximum
sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose
without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone
does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts 'which the law makes essential to the
punishment' * * * and the judge exceeds his proper authority." (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 303-
304. As the maximum penalty permitted under R.C. 2907.02(B) and R.C. 2971.03(B)(1) for a
violation of R.C. 2907.01(A)(1)(b), without any additional findings, was a term of life
imprisonment, we find that the trial court's sentence of life without parole on counts four
11
through six was contrary to law.
{¶ 122} We find this portion of appellant's sixth assignment of error to be well-taken,
and therefore sustain appellant's sixth assignment of error to the extent the trial court erred in
sentencing appellant to life without parole on counts four, five and six in Case No. 2012-CR-
11. As the judgment entry sentencing appellant on counts four through six specifically reflects the trial court's
intent to impose life without parole on the basis that appellant caused "serious physical harm" to Lo.R. during or
immediately after committing the rapes, we need not address whether the "under 10 years of age" or the "prior
convictions" provision of R.C. 2907.02(B) could be used to enhance appellant's sentence. The state has not
argued that either of these provisions support the trial court's imposition of life without parole on counts four
through six. Moreover, the indictment did not contain an allegation specifying that Lo.R. was less than 10 years-
old at the time of the offenses or that appellant had previously been convicted or pleaded guilty to the rape of a
minor under age 13 and the verdict forms did not contain such findings by the jury.
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CA2013-06-050
0068. We reverse the sentence on counts four, five, and six and remand the matter for
resentencing. On remand, the trial court is instructed to sentence appellant on those counts
in accordance with R.C. 2907.03(B)(1), where the maximum penalty authorized under the
specific facts and circumstances of this case is life imprisonment. In all other respects the
sentence imposed by the trial court is affirmed.
4. Earned Days of Credit
{¶ 123} Finally, appellant argues the trial court erred by failing to inform him he was
not eligible for earned days of credit based upon his conviction. Appellant cites no authority
in support of his argument.
{¶ 124} We find no merit to appellant's argument. Pursuant to R.C. 2967.193(C),
appellant was not eligible for earned credit towards an early release from prison. There is no
requirement in R.C. 2967.193, or any other statute, that appellant be advised of his
ineligibility for earned credit. Appellant's argument is, therefore, rejected.
{¶ 125} For the reasons set forth above, appellant's sixth assignment of error is
sustained in part and overruled in part.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 126} Judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the matter is remanded for
the limited purpose of resentencing.
RINGLAND, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.
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