State v. Hatchett , 2014 S.D. LEXIS 14 ( 2014 )


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  • #26664-a-DG
    
    2014 S.D. 13
    IN THE SUPREME COURT
    OF THE
    STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
    ****
    STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA,                      Plaintiff and Appellee,
    v.
    CHRISTOPHER HATCHETT,                       Defendant and Appellant.
    ****
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
    THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
    PENNINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
    ****
    THE HONORABLE JANINE KERN
    Judge
    ****
    MARTY J. JACKLEY
    Attorney General
    JOHN M. STROHMAN
    Assistant Attorney General
    Pierre, South Dakota                        Attorneys for plaintiff
    and appellee.
    JEREMIAH J. DAVIS
    Pennington County Public
    Defender’s Office
    Rapid City, South Dakota                    Attorneys for defendant
    and appellant.
    ****
    CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
    ON JANUARY 14, 2014
    OPINION FILED 03/12/14
    #26664
    GILBERTSON, Chief Justice
    [¶1.]         Defendant Christopher Hatchett was convicted of first-degree burglary
    in violation of SDCL 22-32-1 and obstructing a law enforcement officer in violation
    of SDCL 22-11-6, after fleeing from a police officer into an occupied apartment and
    forcing the door closed against the officer. Hatchett appeals, alleging that
    obstructing law enforcement is not a sufficient predicate offense to support the
    charge of first-degree burglary. Hatchett also claims the trial court erred by
    allowing the State to exercise a peremptory strike motivated by race and that the
    trial court abused its discretion by not allowing Hatchett to admit into evidence at
    trial a letter written by Hatchett to the victims of the burglary. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [¶2.]         On April 3, 2012, at approximately 3:45 a.m., Rapid City police officer
    Fred Baxter responded to a call directing him to an incident at 402 Denver Street,
    apartment 103. The call stated that there was a male wearing a brown jacket and
    blue shirt kicking the apartment door and trying to light the door on fire. When
    Officer Baxter arrived at the apartment building, he saw Defendant Christopher
    Hatchett standing on the other side of an interior staircase doorway. Hatchett
    matched the description of the suspect. The two made eye contact through a
    window in the door and Hatchett immediately ran toward apartment 104. 1 Officer
    Baxter followed after Hatchett, but was unable to apprehend him before he
    disappeared inside apartment 104.
    1.      Testimony indicates that apartment 104 was across the hall from apartment
    103, where the emergency call originated. Later inspection revealed scorch
    marks on the door of apartment 103.
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    [¶3.]         Brittnie and Brandon Schrier lived in apartment 104. As Brittnie
    opened her door to leave for work that morning, Hatchett—a complete stranger to
    Brittnie—was standing outside the door. Hatchett pushed his way inside the
    apartment. Brittnie screamed and ran to the other side of the room. The screaming
    awakened Brandon, who came to Brittnie’s aid. As Brittnie yelled at Hatchett to
    get out, the Schriers observed Hatchett push against the door and bolt the deadlock.
    Brittnie then called 911 to report the intrusion. After bolting the lock, Hatchett
    entered a nearby closet and attempted to conceal himself with clothes, blankets,
    and other items.
    [¶4.]         From outside of apartment 104, Officer Baxter heard Brittnie
    screaming. Officer Baxter tried to follow Hatchett into the apartment, but could not
    force the door open against Hatchett’s resistance. Once the deadbolt locked, Officer
    Baxter stepped back and kicked in the door. Inside the apartment, Officer Baxter
    saw Brittnie pointing to the entryway closet, where Officer Baxter found Hatchett
    lying on the floor. Officer Baxter placed Hatchett under arrest and escorted him out
    of the apartment. At the time of the arrest, Officer Baxter noted a strong odor of
    alcohol on Hatchett, but observed that Hatchett could talk clearly and could walk on
    his own. 2 Hatchett was charged with first-degree burglary in violation of SDCL 22-
    32-1 and obstructing a law enforcement officer in violation of SDCL 22-11-6.
    [¶5.]         A jury trial commenced February 8th, 2013. During jury selection,
    each side exercised its ten peremptory strikes. The State used one peremptory
    2.      Officer Baxter testified that Hatchett seemed intoxicated, but not to a level
    which required placement in detox.
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    strike to remove J.D.S., the only Native American member of the jury pool. During
    voir dire J.D.S. was asked, “Why do you think we have a law to prevent obstructing
    law enforcement?” He answered, “I don’t know . . . I didn’t really pay attention to
    the laws. The common intention ones, but just not—I never had to deal with that.”
    In his jury questionnaire, J.D.S. also indicated that an immediate family member
    had been convicted of a crime other than a traffic offense. Hatchett raised a Batson
    challenge to the strike. The State explained that its strike was based on the jury
    questionnaire answer and because J.D.S. “stated that he doesn’t pay attention to
    the laws or doesn’t follow the laws except for the big ones[.]” The trial court
    accepted this race-neutral explanation, and J.D.S. was struck from the jury.
    [¶6.]         While in jail awaiting trial, Hatchett wrote a letter to the Schriers. In
    the letter, Hatchett apologized for breaking into the apartment. He also mentioned
    his past criminal history and offered the Schriers tattoo work in exchange for the
    Schriers’ refusal to testify against Hatchett. 3 Prior to trial, Hatchett filed a motion
    in limine to prevent the letter from being introduced into evidence. The State in
    response argued that the letter should be admissible, because it was highly relevant
    to the issue of guilt. After arguments by both sides, the trial court found that
    portions of the letter discussing Hatchett’s prior convictions and imprisonment were
    too prejudicial. The trial court granted Hatchett’s motion in part, approving only a
    3.      Hatchett was separately convicted of witness tampering based on these
    actions.
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    redacted and typed version of the letter in which references to prior crimes and
    imprisonment were removed.
    [¶7.]        At trial, the State did not offer the redacted letter into evidence.
    Hatchett sought to call Brittnie Schrier to the stand as a witness and offer the letter
    through her. However, the State objected to the evidence as hearsay. The trial
    court found that the letter did not fit any hearsay exception when offered by
    Hatchett and sustained the State’s objection.
    [¶8.]        At the close of the State’s case, Hatchett moved for a judgment of
    acquittal, contending as a matter of law that obstructing law enforcement was an
    inappropriate predicate crime upon which to base the first-degree burglary charge.
    The motion was denied. Because the trial court denied admission of the letter as
    offered by Hatchett, the defense rested without calling any witnesses. The jury
    found Hatchett guilty on both charges. Hatchett was sentenced to seven years in
    the penitentiary for the first-degree burglary conviction, and 90 days in the county
    jail for obstructing law enforcement, concurrent with the burglary sentence.
    [¶9.]        Hatchett appeals his conviction, raising three issues:
    1.     Whether obstructing a police officer is a sufficient predicate
    offense to support a charge of first-degree burglary.
    2.     Whether the State engaged in purposeful discrimination by
    striking the only Native American member of the jury pool.
    3.     Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow Hatchett to
    admit his own written statement into evidence.
    Analysis
    [¶10.]       1.     Whether obstructing a police officer is a sufficient predicate
    offense to support a charge of first-degree burglary.
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    [¶11.]       Hatchett first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion
    for judgment of acquittal. He asserts that obstructing a police officer is not a
    sufficient predicate offense to support a charge of first-degree burglary under SDCL
    22-32-1. We review issues of statutory interpretation and application as questions
    of law under the de novo standard of review. State v. Miranda, 
    2009 S.D. 105
    , ¶ 14,
    
    776 N.W.2d 77
    , 81 (citation omitted). When engaging in statutory interpretation,
    “[w]e give words their plain meaning and effect, and read statutes as a whole, as
    well as enactments relating to the same subject.” AEG Processing Ctr. No. 58, Inc.
    v. S.D. Dep’t of Revenue & Regulation, 
    2013 S.D. 75
    , ¶ 17, 
    838 N.W.2d 843
    , 849
    (citation omitted). “When the language in a statute is clear, certain and
    unambiguous, there is no reason for construction, and this Court’s only function is
    to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    [¶12.]       SDCL 22-32-1 provides:
    Any person who enters or remains in an occupied structure, with
    intent to commit any crime, unless the premises are, at the time,
    open to the public or the person is licensed or privileged to enter
    or remain, is guilty of first degree burglary if:
    (1) The offender inflicts, or attempts or threatens to
    inflict, physical harm on another;
    (2) The offender is armed with a dangerous weapon; or
    (3) The offense is committed in the nighttime.
    First degree burglary is a Class 2 felony.
    [¶13.]       The language of SDCL 22-32-1 is clear and unambiguous that the
    intent to commit any crime is sufficient. In this case, Hatchett was found by the
    jury to have entered or remained in the apartment with the intent to obstruct a
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    police officer, a crime under SDCL 22-11-6. 4 The facts presented to the jury support
    this finding. Hatchett ran when he saw Officer Baxter, disappeared into apartment
    104 to avoid apprehension, and used physical force and the door of the apartment to
    prevent Officer Baxter from apprehending him.
    [¶14.]         Hatchett argues that obstructing a police officer is a passive or reactive
    offense, and it would therefore lead to an absurd or unreasonable result to allow it
    to serve as a predicate offense for first-degree burglary. Hatchett asks this Court to
    hold that a purely reactive offense cannot serve as a sufficient predicate offense to
    charge first-degree burglary. However, when this Court interprets legislation, it
    “cannot add language that simply is not there.” Rowley v. S.D. Bd. of Pardons &
    Paroles, 
    2013 S.D. 6
    , ¶ 12, 
    826 N.W.2d 360
    , 365 (citation omitted). A plain reading
    reveals the Legislature unambiguously intended to include all crimes as predicate
    offenses for first-degree burglary. The Legislature did not carve out any exception
    4.       SDCL 22-11-6 provides:
    Except as provided in §§ 22-11-4 and 22-11-5, any person who,
    by using or threatening to use violence, force, or physical
    interference or obstacle, intentionally obstructs, impairs, or
    hinders the enforcement of the criminal laws or the preservation
    of the peace by a law enforcement officer or jailer acting under
    color of authority, or intentionally obstructs, impairs, or hinders
    the prevention, control, or abatement of fire by a firefighter
    acting under color of authority, or intentionally obstructs
    emergency management personnel acting under color of
    authority, is guilty of obstructing a law enforcement officer,
    firefighter, or emergency medical technician. Obstructing a law
    enforcement officer, jailer, firefighter, or emergency medical
    technician is a Class 1 misdemeanor.
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    in SDCL 22-32-1 for what Hatchett labels “reactive crimes” and we therefore will
    not read that exception into the statute. 5
    [¶15.]         Hatchett cites to two opinions where this Court upheld burglary
    convictions on appeal, noting that in both cases the underlying crimes were
    volitional in nature, rather than reactive. See State v. Jucht, 
    2012 S.D. 66
    , 
    821 N.W.2d 629
    (malicious intimidation or harassment); State v. Burdick, 
    2006 S.D. 23
    ,
    
    712 N.W.2d 5
    (theft). However, these cases do not give any indication that
    obstructing law enforcement is or should be excluded from the broad term “any
    crime” under SDCL 22-32-1. Nor does Hatchett cite to any other case law which
    would lead us to believe that it was absurd or unreasonable for the Legislature to
    intend on punishing the entry with intent to commit the crime of obstructing a law
    enforcement officer. As is evident from the facts of this case, breaking into
    another’s home with the intent to obstruct a law enforcement officer “creates
    elements of alarm and danger to persons who may be present in a place where they
    should be entitled to freedom from intrusion.” See State v. Wentz, 
    68 P.3d 282
    , 289
    n.1 (Wash. 2003) (Madsen, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Hatchett gives us no
    reason to conclude that the Legislature did not intend to protect against this harm.
    [¶16.]         The cases cited by Hatchett from other jurisdictions are similarly
    unpersuasive. Hatchett first cites State v. Raines, 
    706 N.E.2d 414
    (Ohio Ct. App.
    1997), in which an Ohio appellate court reversed a conviction for burglary based on
    5.       Hatchett gives no standard under which to evaluate whether a crime is
    “reactive or passive” or “volitional.” Forcefully pushing a door closed against
    a police officer and then bolting the lock seems to take some degree of
    volition.
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    the predicate offense of resisting arrest. However, the burglary conviction in Raines
    was not reversed because of the reactive nature of the crime of resisting arrest, but
    instead on the fact that the defendant was not under arrest, nor was there probable
    cause to arrest the defendant. 
    Id. at 432.
    Under Ohio law, the elements of the
    predicate offense of resisting arrest were therefore not satisfied. See 
    id. In this
    case, Hatchett does not allege that the elements of the underlying offense were not
    met.
    [¶17.]          Hatchett also cites State v. Devitt, 
    218 P.3d 647
    (Wash. Ct. App. 2009),
    which reversed a conviction based on similar facts as the case at bar. However, the
    court in Devitt relied on Washington’s definition of residential burglary that
    required the predicate crime to be “a crime against a person or property,” and the
    court found that Devitt had instead committed a crime against the government by
    obstructing an officer. See 
    id. at 648-49.
    The scope of predicate crimes in
    Washington’s burglary statute is clearly narrower than in South Dakota’s statute,
    and thus leads to a different result. See 
    id. at 648;
    SDCL 22-32-1.
    [¶18.]          Under the plain language of SDCL 22-32-1, obstructing law
    enforcement fits within the scope of “any crime” and is thus an appropriate
    predicate offense to support the charge of first-degree burglary. We therefore
    conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Hatchett’s motion for judgment
    of acquittal.
    [¶19.]          2.    Whether the State engaged in purposeful discrimination by
    striking the only Native American member of the jury pool.
    [¶20.]          Hatchett next alleges that the trial court erred in allowing the State to
    use a peremptory strike against potential juror J.D.S. He asserts the State
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    exercised the strike based on J.D.S.’s race, violating Hatchett’s equal protection
    rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 
    476 U.S. 79
    , 
    106 S. Ct. 1712
    , 
    90 L. Ed. 2d 69
    (1986).
    [¶21.]       We engage in a three-part test to determine whether a peremptory
    strike was improperly based on purposeful racial discrimination:
    First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case by
    showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an
    inference of discriminatory purpose. Second, once the defendant
    has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the State
    to explain adequately the racial exclusion by offering
    permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. Third, if a
    race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then
    decide whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful
    racial discrimination.
    State v. Guthmiller, 
    2014 S.D. 7
    , ¶ 12, __ N.W.2d __ (quoting State v. Scott, 
    2013 S.D. 31
    , ¶ 16, 
    829 N.W.2d 458
    , 465-66). “The finding of intentional discrimination is
    a factual determination. Accordingly, we review an appeal alleging a Batson
    violation for the State’s use of peremptory challenges for clear error.” State v. Ryan,
    
    2008 S.D. 94
    , ¶ 6, 
    757 N.W.2d 155
    , 158 (citations omitted).
    [¶22.]       The trial court found in the first step of the analysis that Hatchett
    established a prima facie case of discrimination because Hatchett is a Native
    American and J.D.S. was the only Native American in the jury pool. The burden
    then shifted to the State to offer a permissible race-neutral explanation for striking
    the juror. Scott, 
    2013 S.D. 31
    , ¶ 
    16, 829 N.W.2d at 465
    (citations omitted). Here,
    the State explained that it moved to strike J.D.S. because his juror questionnaire
    indicated that J.D.S. had family members or friends that have faced prior criminal
    convictions other than a traffic offense. The State also explained that during
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    questioning J.D.S. indicated that “he doesn’t pay attention to the law or doesn’t
    follow the laws except for the big ones[.]”
    [¶23.]       Presented with a prima facie case by Hatchett and a race-neutral
    explanation by the State, the trial court was then required to “assess the veracity of
    the State’s race-neutral reasons and determine whether [Hatchett] met his burden
    of proving purposeful discrimination.” 
    Id. ¶ 21
    (citation omitted). Under the third
    part of the Batson analysis, the “court’s findings are afforded great deference, as the
    analysis depends highly on credibility.” 
    Id. ¶ 18
    (citing United States v. Maxwell,
    
    473 F.3d 868
    , 872 (8th Cir. 2007)). Under this step, the trial court determined that
    the State struck J.D.S. based on race-neutral reasons. Specifically, the court noted
    that J.D.S.’s jury questionnaire answer indicating family members being convicted
    of crimes and his answer about not paying attention to the laws were both
    acceptable race-neutral explanations.
    [¶24.]       Hatchett argues that these reasons were clearly pretextual excuses to
    remove the only Native American member of the venire, and the trial court’s finding
    to the contrary was clearly erroneous. He asserts that the exclusion of J.D.S. was
    the product of a “surgical effort to pose a technical legal question to the only Native
    American member of the venire.” Hatchett argues J.D.S. was singled out in this
    technical legal questioning. However, the record reflects otherwise. At least one
    other juror was asked about why there would be a law preventing the obstruction of
    a law enforcement officer. Other jurors were asked about the meaning of burglary
    and intent. Thus, J.D.S. does not appear to have been singled out in what Hatchett
    describes as technical legal questioning.
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    [¶25.]       Hatchett also contends that J.D.S.’s answers reflected at most a
    disinterest or lack of knowledge of the law and that the State’s concerns over his
    answers are nothing more than a sham to hide discriminatory intent. However,
    J.D.S.’s answer went beyond lack of technical legal knowledge. He stated, “I didn’t
    really pay attention to the laws. The common intention ones, but just not—I never
    had to deal with that.” From a cold record, it appears that “not paying attention to
    the laws” could mean, as Hatchett contends, that J.D.S. simply acknowledged that
    he was not law trained. However, it could also show some degree of lack of respect
    for, or disregard of the law. The State claimed concern with the latter explanation,
    and the trial court accepted this explanation for the peremptory strike. This Court
    gives deference to the trial court’s determination that the explanation was credible.
    See State v. Roach, 
    2012 S.D. 91
    , ¶ 34, 
    825 N.W.2d 258
    , 267-68.
    [¶26.]       Hatchett also argues that there was no showing by the State that any
    non-Indians were removed from the venire because of family members or friends
    being convicted of crimes. However, under the final step of the Batson analysis,
    “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and
    never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” Rice v. Collins, 
    546 U.S. 333
    , 338,
    
    126 S. Ct. 969
    , 974, 
    163 L. Ed. 2d 824
    (2006) (citation omitted). See also Ryan, 
    2008 S.D. 94
    , ¶ 
    14, 757 N.W.2d at 159
    . Hatchett did not make this argument below when
    opposing the State’s use of its peremptory strike, nor does he direct this Court to
    any place in the record where such a discrepancy exists. Hatchett therefore fails to
    prove purposeful discrimination based on this alleged discrepancy.
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    [¶27.]       Giving deference to the trial court’s determinations of credibility, we
    conclude that Hatchett has not carried his burden of proving that the State’s use of
    its peremptory strike against J.D.S. was racially motivated. Accordingly, we
    conclude that Hatchett’s equal protection rights were not violated.
    [¶28.]       3.     Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow Hatchett to
    admit his own written statement into evidence.
    [¶29.]       Last, Hatchett argues that the trial court erred in denying the
    admission of Hatchett’s letter to the Schriers into evidence. “The trial court’s
    evidentiary rulings are presumed correct and will not be overturned absent a clear
    abuse of discretion.” State v. Yuel, 
    2013 S.D. 84
    , ¶ 8, 
    840 N.W.2d 680
    , 683 (citation
    omitted). To overturn an evidentiary ruling, any error demonstrated must be
    shown to be prejudicial error. 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    [¶30.]       On appeal, Hatchett asserts that the State should have been judicially
    estopped from arguing against the admission of the redacted version of Hatchett’s
    letter to the Schriers, because the State had previously fought to allow the letter
    into evidence. Hatchett argues that by not allowing Hatchett to introduce the letter
    into evidence, he was denied the due process of law, because the actions of the State
    amounted to unfair surprise. Hatchett’s arguments fail to convince this Court that
    the trial court abused its discretion and committed prejudicial error.
    [¶31.]       First, although the court found the evidence was relevant, Hatchett
    offers no hearsay rule exception under which he should be allowed to offer the letter
    into evidence. Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the
    declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
    truth of the matter asserted.” SDCL 19-16-1(3) (Rule 801(c)). The term “statement”
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    includes both oral and written assertions. SDCL 19-16-1(1) (Rule 801(a)). Hearsay
    is generally not admissible. SDCL 19-16-4 (Rule 802).
    [¶32.]         Hatchett’s letter to the Schriers, if offered by the State, would have
    been admissible as an admission of a party opponent. See SDCL 19-16-3 (Rule
    801(d)(2)). However, the same letter offered by Hatchett did not fit into that
    exception. Instead, it fell squarely within the definition of inadmissible hearsay
    because it was being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 6 The trial
    court explained this distinction, and correctly sustained the State’s objection to the
    evidence as offered by Hatchett.
    [¶33.]         Second, judicial estoppel does not apply to this controversy. Judicial
    estoppel is applied only when four elements are present:
    (1) A party’s inter-proceeding inconsistency must be about a
    matter of fact, not law.
    (2) The position the party took in the prior proceeding must have
    been a significant factor there.
    (3) The two positions must be absolutely irreconcilable.
    (4) The prior position must not have been taken as a result of
    mistake, inadvertence or fraud upon the party taking the
    position.
    State v. St. Cloud, 
    465 N.W.2d 177
    , 180 (S.D. 1991). In this case, Hatchett fails to
    satisfy the first element, because he has not demonstrated any inconsistency by the
    State regarding a matter of fact. The only inconsistency alleged is in the State’s
    trial strategy. The State initially wanted the entire letter admitted into evidence,
    6.       See United States v. White Horse, 
    177 F. Supp. 2d 973
    , 977 (D.S.D. 2001)
    (stating that prior statements consistent with not guilty plea are hearsay);
    United States v. Chard, 
    115 F.3d 631
    , 635 (8th Cir. 1997) (defendant’s
    attempt to introduce out-of-court exculpatory statements excluded as
    hearsay); United States v. Waters, 
    194 F.3d 926
    , 931 (8th Cir. 1999) (same).
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    but it ultimately lost that battle. Hatchett cites no authority that would prevent
    the State from adjusting its trial strategy after the unfavorable evidentiary ruling
    required significant redaction. 7
    [¶34.]         Hatchett cites State v. Blem, 
    2000 S.D. 69
    , 
    610 N.W.2d 803
    , to support
    his proposition that the State should be estopped from arguing for exclusion of the
    letter after fighting to have the letter deemed admissible. However, Hatchett’s
    reliance on Blem is misplaced. In Blem, the court granted a motion in limine
    preventing the defense from offering any testimony or evidence of defendant’s
    mental illness. 
    Id. ¶ 61.
    The defense complied with the ruling, but the State then
    questioned the defendant about his mental illness during cross-examination. 
    Id. ¶ 62.
    The Court concluded that “the State’s violation of its motion in limine and its
    conduct during closing argument constitute[d] prejudicial error resulting in an
    unfair trial.” 
    Id. ¶ 69.
    The Court’s decision in Blem was not based on a theory of
    estoppel, as advanced by Hatchett, but it was instead based on the State’s direct
    violation of its own motion in limine prohibiting discussion of a certain issue at
    trial. 
    Id. No such
    violation occurred in this case. Because the letter constituted
    hearsay not within any exception and judicial estoppel does not apply, the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion by preventing Hatchett from introducing this
    hearsay evidence to the jury.
    7.       Hatchett argues generally that the State cannot “have it both ways”—
    fighting for inclusion then fighting for exclusion of the letter. Under this
    theory, however, we see no reason why Hatchett should instead be able to
    “have it both ways.” It was Hatchett who first moved to exclude the letter
    from evidence.
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    Conclusion
    [¶35.]       Under the clear and unambiguous language of SDCL 22-32-1, the
    intent to commit “any crime” includes the intent to commit the crime of obstructing
    a police officer. The trial court therefore did not err in denying Hatchett’s motion
    for judgment of acquittal. Furthermore, we conclude there was no clear error in the
    trial court’s determination that the State struck juror J.D.S. for race-neutral
    reasons. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Hatchett’s
    letter to the Schriers as hearsay evidence. For these reasons, we affirm.
    [¶36.]       KONENKAMP, ZINTER, SEVERSON, and WILBUR, Justices, concur.
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