Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. Superior Court , 59 Cal. 4th 1029 ( 2014 )


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  • Filed 8/7/14
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
    TUOLUMNE JOBS & SMALL                )
    BUSINESS ALLIANCE,                   )
    )
    Petitioner,               )
    )                              S207173
    v.                        )
    )                         Ct.App. 5 F063849
    THE SUPERIOR COURT OF                )
    TUOLUMNE COUNTY,                     )                        Tuolumne County
    )                      Super. Ct. No. CV56309
    Respondent;               )
    )
    WAL-MART STORES, INC., et al.,       )
    )
    Real Parties in Interest. )
    ____________________________________)
    When a city council receives a voter initiative petition meeting Elections
    Code requirements, it must do one of three things: (1) adopt the initiative without
    alteration; (2) submit it to a special election; or (3) order an abbreviated report on
    the initiative. Upon receipt of the report, it must then either adopt the initiative or
    hold a special election. (Elec. Code, § 9214.)1 Several cases have held that
    provisions of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources
    Code, § 21000 et seq.) do not apply to land use initiatives proposed by voters and
    adopted at an election. In such cases, the abbreviated report provided for in the
    Elections Code furnishes the exclusive means of obtaining environmental review.
    1      All statutory references are to the Elections Code unless otherwise
    specified.
    1
    (See, e.g., DeVita v. County of Napa (1995) 
    9 Cal. 4th 763
    , 793-795 (DeVita);
    Stein v. City of Santa Monica (1980) 
    110 Cal. App. 3d 458
    , 461-462 (Stein).)
    The question here is whether the result should be different if a city chooses
    to directly adopt a voter-sponsored initiative rather than hold a special election.
    The Court of Appeal distinguished between these two courses of action and held
    that a city may not adopt a voter initiative with potential environmental impacts
    unless it conducts a full CEQA analysis. The language and legislative history
    behind the Elections Code statutes do not support this interpretation. Accordingly,
    the judgment is reversed.
    I. BACKGROUND
    The relevant facts are undisputed. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart)
    operates a 130,166-square-foot store in the City of Sonora (City). In 2007, Wal-
    Mart sought to expand its store by approximately 27,491 square feet. The new
    Wal-Mart “Supercenter” would sell groceries and be open 24 hours every day. In
    December 2009, the City circulated for public comment a draft environmental
    impact report (EIR) for the expansion. After a hearing, the City’s planning
    commission unanimously recommended that the EIR be certified and the project
    approved.
    Less than a week later, before the project was called for a vote, the City
    Council (Council) was served with a notice of intent to circulate an initiative
    petition. The “Wal-Mart Initiative” proposed to adopt a specific plan for the
    contemplated expansion. Its apparent purpose was to streamline approval for
    construction and operation of the Supercenter. The Council postponed its vote
    while the initiative petition circulated. The petition was ultimately signed by over
    20 percent of the City’s 2,489 registered voters.
    On September 20, 2010, the Council ordered that a section 9212 report be
    prepared to examine the initiative’s consistency with previous planning
    commission approvals for the Wal-Mart expansion. At its next meeting, the
    2
    Council considered this report and countervailing arguments. After weighing its
    options, the Council adopted the ordinance.
    The Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance (TJSBA) then sought a writ
    of mandate based on four causes of action. The petition’s first claim, which is the
    subject of this appeal, asserted that the Council violated CEQA by adopting the
    ordinance without first conducting a complete environmental review. TJSBA also
    challenged the validity of the initiative itself, on the grounds that it conflicted with
    the City’s general plan, improperly limited the City’s legislative power, and was
    impermissibly administrative, rather than legislative, in nature.
    Wal-Mart, the City, and initiative proponent James Grinnell demurred. The
    trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend as to all causes of action
    except TJSBA’s claim that the initiative improperly conflicted with the general
    plan. TJSBA challenged these adverse rulings by writ petition in the Court of
    Appeal. That court granted the writ as to the first cause of action, holding that
    when a land use ordinance is proposed in a voter initiative petition, full CEQA
    review is required if the city council adopts the ordinance rather than submitting it
    to an election. It expressly disagreed with the only published authority on point,
    Native American Sacred Site & Environmental Protection Assn. v. City of San
    Juan Capistrano (2004) 
    120 Cal. App. 4th 961
    . We granted review.
    II. DISCUSSION
    This case explores the intersection between the constitutional power of
    voters to enact laws by initiative and the environmental review generally required
    for laws potentially having a significant environmental impact. Because we must
    decide a city government’s obligations in adopting a land use initiative proposed
    by voters,2 we begin our analysis with the laws governing initiatives.
    2      TJSBA urges us to follow our decision in Friends of Sierra Madre v. City
    of Sierra Madre (2001) 
    25 Cal. 4th 165
    , 191, which held that local agencies must
    comply with CEQA before placing a land use initiative on the ballot. However,
    Sierra Madre’s holding was specifically addressed to city-council-generated
    3
    A.     Elections Code Provides the Exclusive Procedures for Voter Initiatives.
    In 1911, Californians amended our Constitution, reserving to themselves
    the powers of initiative and referendum. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1; Associated
    Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 
    18 Cal. 3d 582
    , 591
    (Associated Home Builders).)3 Voter initiatives have been compared to a
    “ ‘legislative battering ram’ ” because they “ ‘may be used to tear through the
    exasperating tangle of the traditional legislative procedure and strike directly
    toward the desired end.’ ” (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State
    Bd. of Equalization (1978) 
    22 Cal. 3d 208
    , 228.) In light of the initiative power’s
    significance in our democracy, courts have a duty “ ‘to jealously guard this right
    of the people’ ” and must preserve the use of an initiative if doubts can be
    reasonably resolved in its favor. (Associated Home Builders, at p. 591; see
    Amador Valley, at p. 248.)
    The Legislature was authorized to establish procedures for city and county
    voters to exercise their right of initiative. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 11; Associated
    Home 
    Builders, supra
    , 18 Cal.3d at p. 591.) It has done so. In contrast to
    statewide initiatives, which may be placed directly on the ballot, the Legislature
    created an indirect process for city and county initiatives. These can only be
    submitted to voters if they have been presented to, but not enacted by, the local
    legislative body. (Thompson v. Board of Supervisors (1986) 
    180 Cal. App. 3d 555
    ,
    initiatives. “There is . . . a clear distinction between voter-sponsored and city-
    council-generated initiatives.” (Id. at p. 189.) Whereas voters may justifiably
    assume that a city council has placed an initiative on the ballot only after careful
    study of its potential environmental impacts, they have no reason to believe a
    voter-sponsored initiative has undergone the same scrutiny. (Id. at p. 190.) Voters
    can therefore be expected to consider the potential environmental impacts of a
    proposal more carefully in deciding whether to support or oppose a voter-
    sponsored measure. (Ibid.) The Sierra Madre opinion is thus inapposite here.
    3       Because this case concerns a voter initiative, we do not discuss the voters’
    related power of referendum except to note its availability as a means to repeal
    initiatives that have been adopted against the majority’s wishes. (See post, at
    p. 14.)
    4
    561.) “The intent of the Legislature in granting solely indirect initiative power to
    voters at the county level was to create the opportunity to spare the expense of a
    public vote. [Citation.]” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
    The procedures for municipal voter initiatives are found in section 9200 et
    seq.4 Under section 9214,5 when a local body receives an initiative petition signed
    by at least 15 percent of the city’s registered voters, it must: (1) adopt the
    initiative, without alteration, within 10 days after the petition is presented;
    (2) immediately submit the initiative to a vote at a special election; or (3) order a
    report pursuant to section 9212. The report may examine the proposed initiative’s
    effects on land use, infrastructure, and “[a]ny other matters the legislative body
    requests” be included. (§ 9212, subd. (a)(8).) If ordered, the report must be
    prepared and presented within 30 days after the petition was certified as satisfying
    the signature requirement. (§ 9212, subd. (b).) Within 10 days after receiving the
    report, the legislative body must either adopt the ordinance or order an election
    pursuant to section 9214(b). (§ 9214(c).)
    It is well established that CEQA compliance is not required before a
    legislative body submits an initiative to voters under section 9214(b). (See
    
    DeVita, supra
    , 9 Cal.4th at pp. 793-795; 
    Stein, supra
    , 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 461.)
    The question here is whether the result should be different in the direct adoption
    context. That is, must the legislative body obtain full CEQA review before it may
    directly adopt a voter initiative under section 9214(a)? The answer is no. Because
    CEQA review is contrary to the statutory language and legislative history
    pertaining to voter initiatives, and because policy considerations do not compel a
    different result, such review is not required before adoption of a voter initiative. A
    4      Other chapters of the Elections Code govern statewide initiatives (§ 9000 et
    seq.) and county initiatives (§ 9100 et seq.).
    5      Hereafter, references to the subdivisions of this statute will be abbreviated
    as sections 9214(a), 9214(b), and 9214(c).
    5
    section 9212 report is the exclusive means for assessing the potential
    environmental impact of such initiatives.
    B.     Statutory Language Precludes Application of CEQA.
    Our primary task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s
    intent, giving effect to the law’s purpose. (In re Greg F. (2012) 
    55 Cal. 4th 393
    ,
    406 (Greg F.).) We consider first the words of a statute, as the most reliable
    indicator of legislative intent. (Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 
    51 Cal. 4th 524
    , 529.) “ ‘ “Words must be construed in context, and statutes must be
    harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.”
    [Citation.] Interpretations that lead to absurd results or render words surplusage
    are to be avoided. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Loeun (1997) 
    17 Cal. 4th 1
    ,
    9.)
    The language of section 9214 makes no mention of CEQA. Although this
    fact alone is not dispositive, the statutory language does not support imposing a
    CEQA requirement on the direct adoption procedures in section 9214(a).
    Requiring CEQA review before direct adoption would essentially nullify
    both subdivisions (a) and (c). The plain language of section 9214 requires that
    city governments act quickly to either adopt a qualified voter initiative or hold a
    special election. (§ 9214(a)-(b).) The only other option is to order a report
    exploring potential impacts of the initiative. (§ 9214(c); see § 9212.) This report
    can only provide an abbreviated review because it must be produced within 30
    days after the initiative’s certification. (§ 9212(b).) Once the city receives the
    report, it must either adopt the initiative within 10 days or immediately order a
    special election. (§ 9214(c).) These short deadlines are consistent with other
    deadlines requiring public officials to act expeditiously on initiatives. For
    example, once a proposed initiative is filed, the city attorney has only 15 days to
    prepare a ballot title and summary (§ 9203), and elections officials have only 30
    days to verify signatures on the petition (§§ 9114-9115, 9211).
    6
    In contrast to these condensed deadlines, CEQA review typically takes
    months. The process starts with a preliminary review, in which the lead agency
    has 30 days to determine whether the proposed activity constitutes a “[p]roject”
    subject to CEQA. (Pub. Res. Code, § 21065; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15060.) If
    the activity is a project, and not exempt from CEQA, the lead agency must next
    conduct an initial study to determine whether the activity may have a significant
    effect on the environment. (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15063.) Depending on the
    extent and significance of potential environmental impacts identified in the initial
    study, the agency must prepare either an EIR, a mitigated negative declaration, or
    a negative declaration. (Pub. Res. Code, §§ 21064, 21064.5, 21080, subds. (c),
    (d); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15063.) Even if the lead agency determines a
    project is unlikely to have a significant environmental effect, CEQA requires
    public notice and a minimum of 20 to 30 days for public comment before a
    negative declaration can be adopted. (Pub. Res. Code, § 21091, subd. (b).) If an
    EIR is required, the lead agency must notify all responsible agencies and the state
    Office of Planning and Research. These agencies then have 30 days to specify the
    scope and content of information to be included. (Pub. Res. Code, § 21080.4; Cal.
    Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15082.) With this input, the lead agency prepares a draft
    EIR (Pub. Res. Code, § 21100) and circulates it for public review and comment
    (Pub. Res. Code, § 21091; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15087). The time required to
    prepare a full EIR varies. The public review period must be at least 30 days.
    (Pub. Res. Code, § 21091, subd. (a).) The lead agency must then prepare written
    responses to the public comments and incorporate the comments and responses
    into a final EIR. (Pub. Res. Code, §§ 21091, subd. (d)(2), 21104, 21153; Cal.
    Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15088.) If significant information is added, the EIR must be
    recirculated for another round of public review and comment before issuance of a
    final EIR. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 15088.5, 15090.)
    Considering the time necessary for agencies to review the potential
    environmental impacts of a project and allow public review and comment, it
    7
    would be impossible for a city to complete CEQA review within 10 days before
    adopting a voter initiative. (§ 9214(a).) Although this period can be extended to
    40 days if the city obtains a section 9212 report, under no circumstances can a city
    delay action on a voter initiative beyond 40 days. The deadlines in section 9214
    are mandatory. As a result, if prior CEQA review is required, a city could never
    adopt a voter initiative under section 9214(a) if that initiative had any potential
    impact on the environment. Direct adoption would be severely curtailed and, for
    many initiatives, no longer an option, because it would be impossible for cities to
    comply with both CEQA and the section 9214 deadlines. (Cf. 
    DeVita, supra
    , 9
    Cal.4th at p. 795 [irreconcilable deadlines make it impossible to conduct CEQA
    review before holding election on a voter initiative].)
    Requiring CEQA compliance before direct adoption would thus effectively
    nullify section 9214(a) for all voter initiatives with potential environmental
    impact. It is a maxim of statutory interpretation that courts should give meaning
    to every word of a statute and should avoid constructions that would render any
    word or provision surplusage. (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of
    Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 
    14 Cal. 4th 627
    , 634; see People v. Shabazz
    (2006) 
    38 Cal. 4th 55
    , 67-69.) “An interpretation that renders statutory language a
    nullity is obviously to be avoided.” (Williams v. Superior Court (1993) 
    5 Cal. 4th 337
    , 357.) Adding CEQA review to the procedures in section 9214(a) would
    render that provision inoperative for a great many voter initiatives. The impact
    also spreads beyond subdivision (a). If full CEQA review were required before an
    initiative could be adopted, the abbreviated report provided for by sections 9212
    and 9214(c) would be superfluous. Cities could still obtain such a report, of
    course. But, despite the plain language of section 9214(c) allowing direct
    adoption, cities’ only practical option after obtaining a report would be to submit
    the initiative to an election. Moreover, if a city undertook full CEQA review of a
    voter initiative, the more cursory review available under section 9212 would be
    duplicative and unnecessary.
    8
    “The Legislature is presumed to be aware of all laws in existence when it
    passes or amends a statute. [Citations.]” (Greg 
    F., supra
    , 55 Cal.4th at p. 407.)
    When the Legislature enacted CEQA in 1970, the statutory procedures for
    enacting voter initiatives were firmly in place, having been codified at
    section 9214(a) for nearly 60 years. If the Legislature had intended to require
    CEQA review before direct adoption, despite the section 9214(a) deadlines, it
    could have easily said so. It did not.
    Moreover, although CEQA is the later enacted and arguably more specific
    statute, a conclusion that CEQA prevails over contrary Elections Code procedures
    would impliedly repeal section 9214(a). There is a strong presumption against
    repeal by implication. (People v. Park (2013) 
    56 Cal. 4th 782
    , 798.) “ ‘Absent an
    express declaration of legislative intent, we will find an implied repeal “only when
    there is no rational basis for harmonizing the two potentially conflicting statutes
    [citation], and the statutes are ‘irreconcilable, clearly repugnant, and so
    inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent operation.’ ” [Citation.]’
    [Citation.]” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 
    26 Cal. 4th 465
    , 487.) “Courts have
    also noted that implied repeal should not be found unless ‘. . . the later provision
    gives undebatable evidence of an intent to supersede the earlier . . . .’ [Citation.]”
    (Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist.
    (1989) 
    49 Cal. 3d 408
    , 420.) Evidence that the Legislature intended CEQA to
    supersede direct adoption procedures is completely lacking. The legislative
    scheme accommodates the concerns underlying CEQA by providing abbreviated
    review under sections 9212 and 9214(c). (See post, at pp. 11-12.) Moreover,
    because the timelines for initiatives and CEQA review are fundamentally
    incompatible, a requirement of CEQA review before direct adoption would leave
    local governments no choice but to submit most initiatives to election. Then, no
    additional environmental review would result.
    Finally, even if time constraints permitted CEQA review, cities would be
    powerless to reject the proposed project or to require alterations in the project that
    9
    would lessen its environmental impact, no matter what the review showed.
    Section 9214 requires that local governments either adopt qualified initiatives or
    submit them to voters “without alteration.” (§ 9214.) Furthermore, initiatives
    adopted by a local government or voters may not be repealed or amended except
    by vote of the people, unless the initiative provides otherwise. (§ 9217.)
    C.     Application of CEQA to Voter Initiatives Is Contrary to Legislative Intent.
    To the extent statutory language is ambiguous or open to more than one
    reasonable interpretation, we may turn to legislative history for guidance.
    (Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 
    40 Cal. 4th 1094
    , 1103-1105.)
    Here, legislative history confirms that ordinances enacted by initiative, either
    directly or by election, are not subject to CEQA review.
    
    DeVita, supra
    , 9 Cal.4th at pages 794-795, discussed two Assembly bills
    that would have subjected initiative measures to environmental review. One
    would have required environmental review after the approval of any initiative that
    proposed activity constituting a project under CEQA. The initiative could then
    take effect only upon filing of an EIR or other CEQA document. (See DeVita, at
    p. 794 [discussing Assem. Bill No. 4678 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.), as introduced
    Mar. 1, 1988].) Another bill would have required an extensive environmental
    review and economic analysis by the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research
    before any local land use initiative could be submitted to voters. (See DeVita, at
    p. 794 [discussing Assem. Bill No. 628 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.)].) Neither bill was
    enacted. (DeVita, at pp. 794-795.)
    Although proposed legislation may fail for many reasons, and only limited
    inferences can be drawn when a bill fails (see Granberry v. Islay Investments
    (1995) 
    9 Cal. 4th 738
    , 746), we found this legislative history telling. The repeated
    “defeat of attempts to impose more stringent environmental review requirements
    on land use initiatives provide[d] . . . corroboration that the Legislature did not
    intend such requirements to obstruct the exercise of the right to amend general
    plans by initiative.” (
    DeVita, supra
    , 9 Cal.4th at p. 795.) Instead, we concluded
    10
    the environmental review available under section 9111, the companion statute of
    section 9212,6 represents the Legislature’s attempt to balance the right of initiative
    with the goal of informing voters and local officials about the potential
    consequences of an initiative’s enactment. (DeVita, at p. 795.) This compromise
    allows local agencies to conduct an abbreviated environmental review and still act
    promptly on the initiative. (See ibid.)
    The Legislature’s treatment of two other Assembly bills directly supports
    the conclusion in DeVita that local initiatives are subject to environmental review
    under sections 9111 or 9212 but not CEQA. Assembly Bill No. 2003 (1987-1988
    Reg. Sess.) (hereafter Assembly Bill 2003) and Assembly Bill No. 2202 (1987-
    1988 Reg. Sess.) (hereafter Assembly Bill 2202) concerned the same subject and
    were introduced on the same day, March 6, 1987. Their different outcomes are
    instructive about the breadth of environmental review the Legislature intends for
    initiatives.
    As originally written, Assembly Bill 2003 would have prevented a city or
    county clerk from “examin[ing]” a land use initiative petition unless it was
    accompanied by an EIR or negative declaration. (Assembly Bill 2003, as
    introduced Mar. 6, 1987, p. 2.) Later amendments required that local agencies
    conduct CEQA review and produce an EIR or negative declaration within 210
    days. (Assembly Bill 2003, as amended May 4, 1987, p. 5.) Only after this
    review could a local government adopt the initiative or submit it to an election.
    (Ibid.) The Assembly Natural Resources Committee opposed the bill because it
    would have imposed time-consuming and costly procedural requirements on land
    use initiatives and potentially inhibited the initiative power. It would also have
    6       Section 9111 is identical to section 9212 except that it applies to initiatives
    at the county, rather than city, level. Just like section 9214, section 9116 requires
    that county boards of supervisors either adopt a qualified initiative, put it before
    voters at a special election, or order an abbreviated report followed by direct
    adoption or election. They are parallel statutory schemes addressing how
    initiatives must be handled at these different levels of government.
    11
    expanded CEQA’s application to encompass measures proposed by citizens.
    (Assem. Natural Resources Com., Analysis of Assembly Bill 2003, as amended
    Jan. 1, 1988, p. 3.) The priority treatment of initiatives contemplated in the bill
    would also have interfered with ongoing local planning. Its timelines for
    environmental review would have been difficult to satisfy, leading to potential
    litigation over the review’s adequacy along with further delay and expense. (Ibid.)
    After this opposition was registered, Assembly Bill 2003 died in committee.
    Assembly Bill 2202, by contrast, passed handily. Among other things,
    Assembly Bill 2202 enacted the predecessor to section 9212. (Former Elec. Code,
    § 4009.5, added by Stats. 1987, ch. 767, § 15, p. 2438 and repealed by Stats. 1994,
    ch. 920 [repealing and reenacting Elections Code].) This provision authorized
    local governments to obtain a report on a proposed initiative measure’s fiscal
    impact, effect on planning, and “[a]ny other matters” of interest. (Former Elec.
    Code, § 4009.5, subd. (a).) The report had to be prepared and presented within 45
    days after initiative certification. (Id., subd. (b).) Legislative committee reports
    consistently observed that current law did not provide for any review of proposed
    initiatives by local agencies. (E.g., Sen. Elections Com., Rep. on Assembly Bill
    2202, as amended June 30, 1987, p. 1; Assem. Com. on Elections,
    Reapportionment and Const. Amends., Rep. on Assembly Bill 2202, as amended
    May 4, 1987, p. 1.) One committee report noted that Assembly Bill 2202 would
    allow cities and counties to obtain information on an initiative’s potential effects
    while they still had time to enact the initiative themselves. (Assem. Ways and
    Means Com., Rep. on Assembly Bill 2202, as amended May 14, 1987, p. 2.)
    Thus, when faced with competing bills, the Legislature enacted the bill that
    gave local governments the option of obtaining an abbreviated review to be
    completed within the short time frame required for action on initiatives. This
    option is now codified for municipal initiatives in sections 9212 and 9214(c). As
    it had done with other similar attempts, the Legislature specifically rejected the
    bill that would have required CEQA review before a land use initiative could be
    12
    directly adopted or submitted to voters. For over 25 years, the Legislature has
    enacted no law extending CEQA to initiatives. This legislative history supports
    the conclusion that CEQA does not apply to any ordinances enacted by initiative,
    whether through an election or direct adoption.
    D.     Direct Adoption Without CEQA Review Does Not Offend Public Policy.
    Finally, if statutory language and legislative history are unclear, courts may
    look to public policy as an aid in determining legislative intent. (Coalition of
    Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 
    34 Cal. 4th 733
    , 737.)
    Direct adoption of a voter initiative without prior CEQA review does not so offend
    public policy that we must reconsider our analysis.
    Ever since the initiative power was added to the Constitution, the
    Legislature has given local governments the option to directly adopt voter
    initiatives rather than hold an election. The original implementing statute stated
    that, when presented with a qualified voter initiative, “the legislative body shall
    either: [¶] (a) [p]ass such ordinance without alteration at the regular session at
    which it is presented and within ten days after it is presented; or [¶] (b) [f]orthwith,
    . . . call a special election at which such ordinance, without alteration, shall be
    submitted to a vote of the electors of the city or town.” (Stats. 1911, Ex. Sess.
    1911, ch. 33, § 1, p. 132.) The government’s option to adopt an initiative without
    holding an election was also provided for in the original ballot measure adding the
    right of initiative to the Constitution. The ballot material for the 1911 election
    explained that, after the Secretary of State transmitted a qualified initiative petition
    to the Legislature,“[t]he law proposed by such petition shall be either enacted or
    rejected without change or amendment by the legislature, within forty days from
    the time it is received,” subject to referendum if the law was enacted. (Ballot
    Pamp., Special Elec. (Oct. 10, 1911) text of Sen. Const. Amend. No. 22, p. 2.) “If
    any law so petitioned for be rejected, or if no action is taken upon it by the
    legislature within said forty days, the secretary of state shall submit it to the people
    for approval or rejection at the next ensuing general election.” (Ibid.)
    13
    Direct adoption has thus been available to local governments from the
    outset of legislation by initiative. The voters who amended the Constitution
    intended to empower their government to enact a qualified initiative immediately,
    without the need for an election and its attendant delay and cost. The Legislature
    has consistently provided that option in statutes implementing the amendment.
    CEQA review is not required before direct adoption of an initiative, just as
    it is not required before voters adopt an initiative at an election. Appellants warn
    that developers could potentially use the initiative process to evade CEQA review,
    and that direct adoption by a friendly city council could be pursued as a way to
    avoid even the need for an election. Of course, the initiative power may also be
    used to thwart development. (See, e.g., Associated Home 
    Builders, supra
    , 18
    Cal.3d at pp. 589-590 [initiative prohibited issuance of residential building permits
    until certain standards were met].) However, these concerns are appropriately
    addressed to the Legislature. The process itself is neutral. The possibility that
    interested parties may attempt to use initiatives to advance their own aims is part
    of the democratic process.
    Finally, voters have statutory remedies if direct adoption of an initiative
    results in the enactment of an undesirable law. Section 9235 stays the effective
    date of most local ordinances for 30 days. During this 30-day period, voters may
    circulate a referendum petition. (See § 9237.) If a city receives a “petition
    protesting the adoption of an ordinance” signed by at least 10 percent of the city’s
    voters, the effective date is suspended and the city must reconsider the ordinance.
    (Ibid.) Upon reconsideration, the city may either repeal the ordinance in its
    entirety or submit the ordinance to voters in an election to be held within 88 days.
    (§ 9241.) The Legislature has outlined clear procedures for voters to overturn an
    ordinance adopted against the majority’s will. Whichever path a city chooses in
    dealing with a voter initiative, voters have the final say.
    14
    III. DISPOSITION
    The judgment of the Court of Appeal issuing a writ of mandate is reversed.
    The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    CORRIGAN, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
    BAXTER, J.
    WERDEGAR, J.
    CHIN, J.
    LIU, J.
    BLEASE, J. *
    *      Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned
    by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    15
    See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
    Name of Opinion Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. Superior Court
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished Opinion
    Original Appeal
    Original Proceeding
    Review Granted XXX 
    210 Cal. App. 4th 1006
    Rehearing Granted
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Opinion No. S207173
    Date Filed: August 7, 2014
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Court: Superior
    County: Tuolumne
    Judge: James A. Boscoe
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Counsel:
    Herum Crabtree, Brett S. Jolley; Dongell Lawrence Finney and John A. Lawrence for Petitioner.
    Briggs Law Corporation, Cory J. Briggs and Mekaela M. Gladden for CREED-21 as Amicus Curiae on
    behalf of Petitioner.
    No appearance for Respondent.
    Trevor A. Grimm, Jonathan M. Coupal and Timothy A. Bittle for Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Foundation as
    Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent and Real Parties in Interest.
    K&L Gates, Edward P. Sangster, Megan Cesare-Eastman, Daniel W. Fox for Real Party in Interest Wal-
    Mart Stores, Inc.
    Roger A. Brown; Rutan & Tucker, John A. Ramirez, Robert S. Bower and Peter J. Howell for Real Party in
    Interest James Grinnell.
    Richard Matranga, City Attorney, for Real Party in Interest City of Sonora.
    Renne Sloan Holtzman Sakai, Randy Riddle and Ivan Delventhal for League of California Cities as Amicus
    Curiae in behalf of Real Party in Interest City of Sonora.
    Benbrook Law Group, Bradley A. Benbrook and Stephen M. Duvernay for Citizens in Charge as Amicus
    Curiae in behalf of Real Parties in Interest.
    M. Reed Hopper and Anthony L. Francois for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in behalf of Real
    Parties in Interest.
    Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
    John A. Lawrence
    Dongell Lawrence Finney
    707 Wilshire Boulevard, 45th Floor
    Los Angeles, CA 90017
    (213) 943-6100
    Edward P. Sangster
    K&L Gates
    Four Embarcadero Center, Suite 1200
    San Francisco, CA 94111
    (415) 882-8200
    John A. Ramirez
    Rutan & Tucker
    611 Anton Boulevard, Suite 1400
    Costa Mesa, CA 92626-1931
    (714) 641-5100