Ashley Bell v. State of Indiana , 2014 Ind. App. LEXIS 356 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                        Jul 28 2014, 9:30 am
    FOR PUBLICATION
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    MATTHEW D. ANGLEMEYER                         GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Marion County Public Defender                 Attorney General of Indiana
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    GEORGE P. SHERMAN
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    ASHLEY BELL,                                  )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                    )
    )
    vs.                              )      No. 49A02-1312-CR-1026
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                             )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                     )
    APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Steven J. Rubick, Magistrate
    Cause No. 49F10-1307-CM-45257
    July 28, 2014
    OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
    CRONE, Judge
    Case Summary
    Ashley Bell was the passenger of a vehicle that was stopped by a police officer
    because of an illegally displayed temporary license plate. The officer learned that the driver
    did not have a valid driver’s license and ordered the vehicle’s occupants to exit. As Bell
    exited the vehicle, the officer smelled raw marijuana coming from both the vehicle and Bell’s
    person. The officer handcuffed Bell and conducted a patdown search which revealed ten
    baggies of marijuana. Bell was convicted of class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana.
    On appeal, she claims that the search of her person during the traffic stop violated the
    Fourth Amendment and that the marijuana found during the search should not have been
    admitted at trial. Concluding that the search was permissible under the Fourth Amendment,
    we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    In July 2013, Bell was the front seat passenger of a vehicle that was stopped by
    Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Lorrie Phillips because of an illegally
    displayed temporary license plate. The driver did not have a valid driver’s license. Officer
    Phillips ordered the occupants of the vehicle to exit so the car could be towed. As Bell exited
    the vehicle, Officer Phillips smelled a strong odor of raw marijuana coming from both the
    vehicle and Bell’s person. Officer Phillips handcuffed and conducted a patdown search of
    Bell which revealed ten individual baggies of marijuana in her possession. Bell was charged
    with class A misdemeanor dealing marijuana and class A misdemeanor possession of
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    marijuana. Following a bench trial, Bell was found not guilty of dealing but guilty of
    possession.
    Discussion and Decision
    Bell claims that the trial court erred by admitting the evidence seized by Officer
    Phillips because the search violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United
    States Constitution.
    A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of
    evidence. Accordingly, we will reverse a trial court’s ruling on the
    admissibility of evidence only when the trial court abused its discretion. An
    abuse of discretion involves a decision that is clearly against the logic and
    effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.
    Smith v. State, 
    980 N.E.2d 346
    , 349 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted), trans. denied
    (2013). “We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most
    favorable to the trial court’s ruling.” Overstreet v. State, 
    724 N.E.2d 661
    , 663 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2000), trans. denied. However, we must also consider the uncontested evidence favorable to
    the defendant. 
    Id. Here, Bell
    does not challenge the constitutionality of the investigatory traffic stop, nor
    does she challenge Officer Phillips’s order to exit the vehicle. However, Bell does claim that
    the warrantless patdown search violated the Fourth Amendment, which states,
    The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
    effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
    no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
    affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
    persons or things to be seized.
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    Bell contends that Officer Phillips did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the
    patdown search. A patdown search is justified during an investigatory stop when the officer
    is concerned for her safety; it is not to discover evidence of crime, but rather to allow the
    officer to pursue her investigation without fear of violence. Shinault v. State, 
    668 N.E.2d 274
    , 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). A patdown search for weapons may be conducted if the
    officer is “justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is
    investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others.”
    Jackson v. State, 
    669 N.E.2d 744
    , 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 24 (1968)). In a patdown search for weapons, an officer may seize nonthreatening
    contraband if while patting down a suspect’s outer clothing she feels an object whose identity
    is immediately apparent. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 
    508 U.S. 366
    , 375 (1993). Bell asserts,
    and we agree, that Officer Phillips had no reason to believe that Bell was armed and
    dangerous.
    We note however, that a patdown search would have been permissible if Officer
    Phillips had probable cause to arrest Bell. “Probable cause to search exists where the facts
    and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer making the search, based on
    reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution
    in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Meek v. State, 
    950 N.E.2d 816
    ,
    819 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. One of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s
    warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Arizona v. Gant, 
    556 U.S. 332
    ,
    338 (2009). When probable cause exists to make an arrest, the fact that a suspect was not
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    formally placed under arrest at the time of the search incident will not invalidate the search.
    Moffitt v. State, 
    817 N.E.2d 239
    , 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. A police officer’s
    subjective belief concerning whether she had probable cause to arrest a defendant has no
    legal effect. Fentress v. State, 
    863 N.E.2d 420
    , 423 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The ultimate
    determination of probable cause is reviewed de novo. Burkett v. State, 
    691 N.E.2d 1241
    ,
    1244 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied.
    Here, Officer Phillips conducted a patdown search of Bell after she smelled a strong
    odor of raw marijuana coming from both the vehicle and Bell’s person. In a case involving
    the Indiana Constitution, we concluded that a warrantless search of the defendant driver was
    reasonable under the totality of the circumstances when the officer smelled raw marijuana
    coming from the vehicle after a lawful traffic stop. 
    Meek, 950 N.E.2d at 820
    . In Shinault,
    we noted the possibility that the detection of a strong marijuana odor coming from the
    defendant driver could have given the officer probable cause to arrest and further search the
    
    defendant. 668 N.E.2d at 278
    n.5. And we have previously held that the odor of burnt
    marijuana from a person’s vehicle and breath yields probable cause to believe that she
    possesses marijuana. Edmond v. State, 
    951 N.E.2d 585
    , 591 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
    We agree with the State’s argument that, like the smell of burnt marijuana, the smell
    of raw marijuana on a person is sufficient to provide probable cause that the person possesses
    marijuana. We note that the odor of raw marijuana indicates that it has not been smoked and
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    therefore still may be in the defendant’s possession.1 As such, we conclude that Officer
    Phillips had probable cause to arrest Bell and conduct a search incident to arrest. Therefore
    we also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence
    seized during the search. Consequently, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    BAKER, J., and BARNES, J., concur.
    1
    We note that a defendant may challenge the qualifications of the officer in determining the nature of
    the odor. State v. Hawkins, 
    766 N.E.2d 749
    , 752 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. Here, Bell does not
    challenge Officer Phillips’s training and experience in detecting the odor of raw marijuana.
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