Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Barton Solvents, Inc. ( 2014 )

#26956-a-SLZ
2014 S.D. 70
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
****
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
BARTON SOLVENTS, INC. and
CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Defendants and Appellees.
****
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
LAKE COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
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THE HONORABLE TIM D. TUCKER
Judge
****
MITCHELL A. PETERSON
JUSTIN T. CLARKE of
Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, LLP
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff
and appellant.
MICHAEL F. TOBIN
GARY J. PASHBY of
Boyce, Greenfield, Pashby & Welk, LLP
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant and
appellee Barton Solvents, Inc.
****
ARGUED ON
AUGUST 26, 2014
OPINION FILED 10/01/14
WILLIAM C. GARRY of
Cadwell, Sanford, Deibert & Garry, LLP
Sioux Falls, South Dakota
and
WILLIAM S. BOOTH of
Eimer, Stahl, Klevorn & Solberg, LLP
Chicago, Illinois Attorneys for defendant and
appellee Citgo Petroleum
Corporation.
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ZINTER, Justice
[¶1.] A.H. Meyer & Sons, Inc. (A.H. Meyer) owned and operated a honey and
beeswax processing plant that exploded. The explosion was caused by heptane
vapors that were ignited by an electrical switch in the plant. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance (Nationwide) paid for the damage and filed suit seeking subrogation from
the supplier and the manufacturer of the heptane. Nationwide pleaded causes of
action for strict liability and negligence premised on the theory that the defendants
failed to adequately warn of heptane’s dangers. Nationwide also pleaded causes of
action for breach of express and implied warranties. The circuit court granted the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2.] A.H. Meyer produced honey and beeswax at its plant in Winfred, South
Dakota. A.H. Meyer was owned by Jack Meyer, Jr. (Jack) and J.B. Meyer (J.B.).
J.B. took over operations from his grandfather, Jack Meyer, Sr. Barton Solvents,
Inc. (Barton Solvents) marketed, sold, and distributed heptane, a highly volatile
and combustible solvent manufactured by CITGO Petroleum Corporation (CITGO).
A.H. Meyer used heptane in its beeswax rendering process. Barton Solvents sold
heptane to A.H. Meyer for over twenty years and had observed A.H. Meyer’s plant
on at least one occasion.
[¶3.] Barton Solvents delivered the heptane to a 10,000 gallon tank located
outside the plant. The heptane was then pumped and stored in a “kettle,” a 150-
gallon storage tank, inside the plant. Because liquid heptane would occasionally
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spill from the top of the kettle and vaporize, A.H. Meyer installed a ventilation
system in an attempt remove the heptane vapors from the plant.
[¶4.] Barton Solvents provided A.H. Meyer with CITGO’s Material Safety
Data Sheet (MSDS) with each delivery. 1 The MSDS was a ten-page document that
described the volatile nature of heptane, listed its potential hazards, and provided
other warnings. The MSDS specifically warned that heptane liquid and vapor were
“extremely flammable” and “may cause flash fire[s].” Right beneath that warning,
the MSDS warned that the “[v]apor may travel considerable distance to source of
ignition and flash back.” The MSDS therefore recommended that heptane be used
only with “adequate” ventilation. The MSDS also warned that “[a]ll electric
equipment should comply with the National Electrical Code.” The National
Electrical Code (NEC) referenced many recommended practices of the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 497 contained recommended practices for
flammable liquids, gases or vapors, as well as the location and selection of electrical
installations in chemical process areas. By illustration, NFPA 497 recommended a
five-foot distance between heptane and ignition sources such as standard (non-
explosive proof) electrical switches. The recommended practices were to be applied
with “sound engineering judgment.”
[¶5.] A.H. Meyer suffered two heptane explosions at its plant. The first
explosion occurred in 2004. It was caused when a standard electrical switch,
1. Barton Solvents also provided warning labels that Jack personally affixed to
the 10,000 gallon tank.
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located four feet from heptane, ignited heptane vapors. 2 Jack Meyer, Sr. designed a
new plant following the 2004 explosion. A.H. Meyer contacted Premier
Engineering, Inc., an electrical and mechanical engineering company, for
consultation as to what electrical changes needed to be made to the new facility to
avoid another explosion. Premier Engineering told A.H. Meyer that standard
electrical switches should not be within five feet of heptane. A.H. Meyer also
consulted with the State Fire Marshall regarding risks of fire and explosion.
[¶6.] In the new plant, standard switches were installed a minimum of five
feet from the kettle and five feet above the floor (because heptane vapor is heavier
than air causing it to sink to the floor). Following reconstruction in 2006, a South
Dakota State Electrical Inspector conducted a final inspection of the building. He
indicated the building “was in compliance with South Dakota Laws and Rules and
the National Electric Code.”
[¶7.] The explosion at issue occurred in 2009 when heptane spilled from the
kettle and an A.H. Meyer employee pressed a standard switch to turn off a pump.
Duane Wolf, a mechanical engineer, was retained as Nationwide’s expert witness in
this litigation. He concluded through experimental tests that the ventilation
system A.H. Meyer installed possibly had the opposite effect that was intended: it
stirred up heptane vapors and moved them more than five feet to a point where
they were ignited by the standard electrical switch.
2. As early as 1986, A.H. Meyer was aware that heptane vapors could be ignited
by standard electrical switches.
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[¶8.] Nationwide filed suit against Barton Solvents and CITGO on causes of
action alleging strict liability, negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and breach of implied warranty
of merchantability. All theories were directly or indirectly based on the contention
that Barton Solvents and CITGO provided inadequate warnings of the dangers of
the use of heptane.
[¶9.] Barton Solvents and CITGO moved for summary judgment. They
argued that A.H. Meyer failed to meet its summary judgment burden of identifying
specific facts showing inadequacy of the warnings. The circuit court agreed with
the defendants and granted summary judgment. On appeal, Nationwide contends
that summary judgment was inappropriate because material issues of disputed fact
existed with respect to the adequacy of the warnings.
Decision
[¶10.] Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” SDCL 15-6-56(c). “We view all
reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.” Luther v. City of Winner, 2004 S.D. 1, ¶ 6, 674 N.W.2d 339, 343
(quoting Roden v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 2003 S.D. 130, ¶ 5, 671 N.W.2d 622, 624).
“The nonmoving party, however, must present specific facts showing that a genuine,
material issue for trial exists.” Hass v. Wentzlaff, 2012 S.D. 50, ¶ 11, 816 N.W.2d
96, 101 (quoting Saathoff v. Kuhlman, 2009 S.D. 17, ¶ 11, 763 N.W.2d 800, 804).
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Therefore, “[e]ntry of summary judgment is mandated against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id.
(quoting W. Consol. Coop. v. Pew, 2011 S.D. 9, ¶ 19, 795 N.W.2d 390, 396). A
sufficient showing requires that “[t]he party challenging summary judgment . . .
substantiate his allegations with sufficient probative evidence that would permit a
finding in his favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” Quinn
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2014 S.D. 14, ¶ 20, 844 N.W.2d 619, 624-25 (quoting Stern
Oil Co. v. Brown, 2012 S.D. 56, ¶ 8, 817 N.W.2d 395, 398).
Products Liability
[¶11.] Nationwide argues that the defendants were negligent and strictly
liable because they failed to give adequate warnings of the dangers posed by A.H.
Meyer’s use of heptane. Nationwide contends that the warnings were inadequate
because Barton Solvents knew of A.H. Meyer’s use of heptane, A.H. Meyer complied
with the NFPA 497 five-foot spacing electrical equipment recommendation, but the
explosion still occurred. Nationwide contends that a disputed question of material
fact exists regarding the adequacy of the warning.
[¶12.] Barton Solvents and CITGO concede that the explosion occurred even
though A.H. Meyer complied with the five-foot spacing recommendation. However,
they contend that Nationwide failed to identify expert testimony or any evidence
indicating the MSDS, NEC, and NFPA 497 warnings were inadequate. They
further contend that even though the electrical switch met the five-foot spacing
recommendation, the mere fact of an accident is insufficient to prove negligence or
strict liability.
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[¶13.] Negligence in products liability actions involving inadequate warnings
requires a plaintiff to “show that the manufacturer or seller failed to exercise
reasonable care to inform those expected to use the product of its condition or of the
facts which make it likely to be dangerous.” Jahnig v. Coisman, 283 N.W.2d 557,
560 (S.D. 1979) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965); Dougherty v.
Hooker Chem. Corp., 540 F.2d 174, 177 (3rd Cir. 1976)). “Strict liability arises when
a manufacturer ‘sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer.’” Burley v. Kytec Innovative Sports Equip., Inc., 2007 S.D.
82, ¶ 32, 737 N.W.2d 397, 408 (quoting Peterson v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 400
N.W.2d 909, 912 (S.D. 1987)). A “manufacturer’s failure to adequately warn
render[s] the product unreasonably dangerous without regard to the reasonableness
of the failure to warn judged by negligence standards.” Id. ¶ 35, 737 N.W.2d at 409
(quoting Peterson, 400 N.W.2d at 912). The product does not need to be defective
itself. Id. (quoting Jahnig, 283 N.W.2d at 560). “Where a manufacturer or seller
has reason to anticipate that danger may result from a particular use of [the]
product, and . . . fails to give adequate warning of such a danger, the product sold
without such warning is in a defective condition within the strict liability doctrine.”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jahnig, 283 N.W.2d at 560).
[¶14.] Here, Barton Solvents warned A.H. Meyer of the danger associated
with heptane. The MSDS, NEC, and NFPA 497 collectively warned that heptane
was volatile and explosive. They explained the mechanism and mode of potential
injury. The warnings indicated that heptane vapor could travel a “considerable
distance,” and the warnings related the danger of standard electrical switches
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located near heptane vapors even in a ventilated room. Finally, the warnings
provided recommendations on ways to safely use the product. The warnings
referenced the five-foot spacing recommendation of the NEC and NFPA 497.
[¶15.] Nationwide argues that those warnings were inadequate because A.H.
Meyer complied with the five-foot spacing recommendation but the explosion still
occurred. Nationwide points out its expert established that the accident was caused
by an electrical switch that was five feet from the kettle. Nationwide’s expert
opined that the ventilation system exacerbated vapors from the spilled heptane and
moved the vapors beyond a five-foot radius. Nationwide contends that once the
scientific validity of this theory of causation was established by its expert in testing,
“no further expert testimony [or evidence was] required” to resist summary
judgment. We disagree
[¶16.] In many cases, “the fact that an accident occurred” is insufficient in
and of itself to meet the summary judgment burden of identifying specific facts to
support the elements of a plaintiff’s product liability claim. See id. ¶ 38, 737
N.W.2d at 410. “[T]hose resisting summary judgment must show that they will be
able to place sufficient evidence in the record at trial to support findings on all the
elements on which they have the burden of proof.” Chem-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover,
2002 S.D. 122, ¶ 18, 652 N.W.2d 756, 765 (emphasis added) (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202
(1986)).
[¶17.] In a products liability case premised on alleged inadequate warnings,
both causation and inadequate warnings are separate but necessary elements of
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negligence and strict liability. They are also elements on which Nationwide bore
the burden of proof at trial. Therefore, to successfully resist summary judgment,
Nationwide was required to provide “an evidentiary basis” for both elements. See
Burley, 2007 S.D. 82, ¶ 32, 737 N.W.2d at 409. Furthermore, product liability often
“involves technical issues which do not easily admit to evidentiary proof and which
lie beyond the comprehension of most jurors.” Id. ¶ 28, 737 N.W.2d at 407 (quoting
Peterson, 400 N.W.2d at 913). Therefore, in attempting to establish the elements of
products liability, “unless it is patently obvious that the accident would not have
happened in the absence of a defect, a plaintiff cannot rely merely on the fact that
an accident occurred.” Id. Expert testimony is generally necessary to establish
elements of negligence and strict liability. Id. ¶¶ 28-39, 737 N.W.2d at 407-11.
[¶18.] This is not one of those cases in which it is patently obvious that the
accident would not have happened but for an inadequate warning. Nationwide’s
claims are based on the assumption that the warning must have been inadequate
because the five-foot spacing recommendation was followed yet the explosion
occurred. But Nationwide’s theory is also based on the expert opinion that the
ventilation system A.H. Meyer designed and installed had the opposite effect as
intended as it was a contributing cause of the explosion. 3 Moreover, Nationwide
3. Nationwide’s inadequate warning claim is based on the assumption that the
five-foot spacing recommendation was inadequate because the ventilation
system exacerbated and moved the vapors more than five feet. Therefore, we
reject Nationwide’s argument that the ventilation system is not relevant in
determining whether the product was defective (inadequate warnings).
Nationwide made the ventilation system relevant by basing its theory of
liability on the opinion that the ventilation system made the five-foot spacing
recommendation inadequate.
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identified no evidence or expert testimony indicating that the MSDS, NEC, and
NFPA 497 warnings were inadequate; that the defendants breached any standard
of care; or that the defendants did anything wrong. 4 Therefore, although
Nationwide established a scientific possibility for the cause of the explosion, that
evidence did not establish an evidentiary basis that the MSDS, NEC, and NFPA
497 warnings were inadequate.
[¶19.] Ultimately, Nationwide’s inadequate warning claim is based on
nothing more than the fact of the accident, speculation, and conjecture. Such a
showing is insufficient to resist summary judgment. See Quinn, 2014 S.D. 14, ¶ 20,
844 N.W.2d at 624-25 (“[T]he party challenging summary judgment must
substantiate his allegations with sufficient probative evidence that would permit a
finding in his favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” (quoting
Stern Oil Co., 2012 S.D. 56, ¶ 8, 817 N.W.2d at 398)).
[¶20.] Nationwide, however, also points out that Barton Solvents knew that
A.H. Meyer used a ventilation system, which their expert indicated was a factor
contributing to the explosion. Nationwide further points out that Barton Solvents’s
representatives toured the plant, knew the heptane was used for industrial
purposes, industrial facilities typically have ventilation, and heptane vapors would
respond to the air currents generated by a ventilation system. Nationwide argues
that the defendants failed to adequately warn that because of A.H. Meyer’s
ventilation system, heptane vapors could travel more than five feet.
4. Nationwide admitted at the summary judgment hearing and at oral
argument it did not have experts or other persons who would say that the
warning should have been different.
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[¶21.] The MSDS, however, expressly warned that heptane vapors could
travel long distances. Bold lettering on the front of the MSDS warned that “[v]apor
may travel considerable distance to source of ignition and flash back.” The third
page of the MSDS warned that vapor “may travel long distances along the ground to
an ignition source and flash back.” Thus, although the MSDS and NEC
incorporated the NFPA illustration showing five feet of separation, A.H. Meyer was
also warned that the distance could be greater; i.e. that heptane vapors could travel
considerable and long distances. Moreover, the MSDS specifically warned that
heptane was to be used only with “adequate” ventilation, and NFPA 497 warned
that use of its five-foot illustration should be used with “sound engineering
judgment.” Finally, as the circuit court correctly noted, Nationwide provided no
facts indicating that the Barton employees observed anything specific about the
ventilation system during their tour of the facility. There was no evidence the
employees saw the ventilation system A.H. Meyer designed, saw any particular
risks of a heptane explosion in the plant, or were asked to look for such risks.
[¶22.] The summary judgment evidence indicated that the warnings provided
to A.H. Meyer were the NEC and NFPA standards. Further, although Nationwide
established an affirmative evidentiary basis for proceeding to trial on the question
of causation, it did not produce an expert or identify specific, affirmative evidence
indicating that the MSDS, NEC, and NFPA warnings were inadequate. We
conclude that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment on strict
liability and negligence because Nationwide could not meet its summary judgment
burden of producing evidence that the warnings provided were inadequate.
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Express Warranty
[¶23.] SDCL 57A-2-313(b) provides that “[a]ny description of the goods which
is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the description.” Nationwide points out that the heptane invoices
informed the purchaser to read the MSDS. The MSDS warned buyers that: “[a]ll
electrical equipment should comply with the National Electric Code”; the NEC
refered to NFPA 497; and NFPA 497 illustrated the five-foot spacing between
heptane and standard electrical switches. Therefore, Nationwide argues that the
five-foot requirement became the equivalent of an instruction manual or description
of the goods. Nationwide further argues that because there was an explosion, the
heptane did not conform to that description. See James River Equip. Co. v. Beadle
Cnty. Equip., Inc., 2002 S.D. 61, ¶ 21, 646 N.W.2d 265, 269 (stating that purchase
agreements “may incorporate by reference another document containing technical
specifications for the product, and this will likely create an express warranty by
description.”) (citations omitted).
[¶24.] We first observe that Nationwide does not contend that the heptane
was defective, contaminated, or otherwise anything other than the heptane A.H.
Meyer contracted to receive. Further, the MSDS, NEC, and NFPA 497 did not
expressly warrant the heptane. Those documents warned of the danger associated
with heptane’s use. A warning is the “pointing out of danger.” Black’s Law
Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). In contrast, a warranty is “[a] promise that the thing
being sold is as represented[.]” Id. One is an alert, the other a promise. Although
we agree with Nationwide that a warning could constitute a warranty in some
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cases, NFPA 497 was a recommendation to be used with sound engineering
judgment. It was not an incorrect, affirmative promise.
[¶25.] Nationwide’s reliance on James River Equipment Co. is misplaced.
James River Equipment Co. involved an affirmative representation of the number of
hours certain equipment had been used. 2002 S.D. 61, ¶ 4, 646 N.W.2d at 267.
Because the number of hours represented was inaccurate, this Court found a breach
of express warranty. Id. ¶ 31, 646 N.W.2d at 271. But here, as previously noted,
the warnings did not affirmatively represent that heptane vapors would not explode
if placed five feet from non-explosion proof switches. NFPA 497 expressly stated
that its purpose was to provide the user with a basic understanding of parameters
to determine the location of hazardous liquids, assist in the selection of electrical
equipment, and to be used as a guide to be applied with sound engineering
judgment. Because NFPA 497 did not provide affirmative representations or
instructions indicating heptane would not explode if its recommendations were
followed, 5 James River Equipment Co. is inapposite. There is no evidence that
these defendants made untrue representations of fact regarding heptane. 6
[¶26.] Nationwide, however, also points out that NFPA 497 contained
illustrations of the five-foot spacing between heptane and electrical equipment.
5. Nationwide’s reliance on other language in the NFPA is misplaced.
Nationwide overlooks the language that the NFPA contains recommended
practices to be used as a guide with sound engineering judgment.
6. Nationwide’s reliance on Weinstat v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 614
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010) is misplaced for the same reason. In that case, the
products “Directions for Use” incorrectly stated it could be used for oral
surgery. Id. at 620.
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Nationwide argues those illustrations constituted instructions providing an express
warranty. See Colgan Air, Inc. v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 507 F.3d 270, 279 (4th Cir.
2007) (concluding a jury could find that illustrations and instructions regarding the
installation of airplane cables constituted an express warranty).
[¶27.] Nationwide’s reliance on Colgan Air is misplaced. In Colgan Air an
airplane maintenance manual stated that “[p]roper winding of the cables on the
pedestal and actuator drums, is shown in . . . the Elevator Tab Control Cables
Winding illustration in Chapter 27-30-04 for elevator tabs, ensures against crossing
the cables causing improper trim tab movement.” Id. at 279 (second emphasis
added). Here, the language and illustration in NFPA 497 did not use the word
“ensure” or other similar language affirmatively representing that explosions would
not occur if the illustration was followed. Nationwide failed to identify evidence
suggesting that the defendants’ warnings were an affirmative description,
instruction, or illustration that constituted an express warranty of heptane that
was untrue.
Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose
[¶28.] Nationwide suggests that because of the parties’ lengthy history,
Barton Solvents knew A.H. Meyer’s purpose for using heptane. Nationwide
contends that the defendants had reason to know their buyers would rely upon the
defendants’ expertise, skill, and knowledge in furnishing suitable goods.
Nationwide argues that the heptane was not fit for A.H. Meyer’s particular purpose
because the heptane vapors drifted and caused an explosion.
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[¶29.] “Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on
the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is . . . an
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.” SDCL 57A-2-315.
“When an implied warranty of fitness for purpose is created, the seller must deliver
a product that is fit for the purpose for which it is intended.” Virchow v. Univ.
Homes, Inc., 2005 S.D. 78, ¶ 21, 699 N.W.2d 499, 505. “A perfect product is not
required.” Id. (citing Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 68, 154 N.W.2d
803, 809 (1967)). “The person asserting a violation of the warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose must present sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, to
permit the inference that the product was defective when it left the manufacturer’s
possession or control.” Id. ¶ 21, 699 N.W.2d at 506 (citing Schmaltz v. Nissen, 431
N.W.2d 657, 663 (S.D. 1988); Pearson v. Franklin Labs., Inc., 254 N.W.2d 133 (S.D.
1997)).
[¶30.] In this case, Nationwide does not argue that the heptane was defective
or unfit for rendering beeswax when the heptane left Barton Solvent’s possession. 7
The fact that A.H. Meyer’s ventilation system possibly moved the heptane vapors
more than five feet away from the heptane source did not mean the heptane was not
7. Nationwide does argue that the heptane was defective because it contends
that the defendants failed to warn of a foreseeable danger. All authority
cited for this argument is premised on inadequate warnings. Here, we have
already decided Nationwide failed to identify sufficient affirmative evidence
indicating that the warning was inadequate. Nationwide’s authorities are
also distinguishable because in those cases: (1) there was no warning; (2)
there was evidence indicating the warnings were inadequate; or (3) the
product was physically defective for the actual purpose intended.
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fit for rendering beeswax. Nationwide failed to identify evidence suggesting the
heptane was not fit for rendering beeswax. 8
Implied Warranty of Merchantability
[¶31.] Under SDCL 57A-2-314, if goods are sold by “a merchant with respect
to goods of that kind,” there is an implied contract those goods are merchantable.
SDCL 57A-2-314(1). Merchantable goods are those that, among other things . . . :
(c) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and . . .
(e) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the
agreement may require; and
(f) Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
SDCL 57A-2-314(2).
[¶32.] Nationwide argues that the heptane was not fit for its ordinary
purpose under SDCL 57A-2-314(2)(c) because it caused an explosion. Nationwide
contends that this case is similar to Crandell v. Larkin & Jones Appliance Co., 334
N.W.2d 31, 36 (S.D. 1983) (concluding that by starting a fire, the dryer was not fit
for the purpose for which it was purchased).
[¶33.] Crandell is inapposite. In that case, a used clothes dryer was sold with
a guarantee for workmanship, parts, and labor. Id. at 32. Fourteen days after the
sale, the dryer overheated causing a fire and damage to plaintiff’s home. Id. The
fire was caused by defective thermostats in the dryer. Id. at 34. But in this case,
8. Nationwide also argues that the defect stems from the adequacy of the
warning and product use instructions. But as we have previously explained,
Nationwide failed to identify sufficient evidence to support this theory.
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unlike Crandell, there was no defect in the heptane itself and there was no
affirmative guarantee of the product. 9
[¶34.] Nationwide argues that the heptane was not merchantable under
SDCL 57A-2-314(2)(e) because it contends the heptane was inadequately labeled.
But this is the same argument we have rejected under Nationwide’s other claims.
For the reasons previously discussed, this argument is without merit.
[¶35.] Finally, Nationwide argues that the heptane was not merchantable
under SDCL 57A-2-314(2)(f). Nationwide contends that the heptane did not
conform to the promises or affirmations made by the defendants. Because
Nationwide agrees that this argument is premised on the same contentions we
rejected under express warranty, we affirm on this claim without further
discussion.
[¶36.] We affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment.
[¶37.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP, SEVERSON, and
WILBUR, Justices, concur.
9. Nationwide’s other authority is also distinguishable. The cases cited either
(1) determined the warning was inadequate and the damage was foreseeable,
(2) only recognized the potential of a claim for implied warranty of
merchantability, or (3) affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants on
the issue of causation.
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