Washington v. Geico Ins. Co. ( 2014 )

[Cite as Washington v. Geico Ins. Co., 2014-Ohio-4375.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 100527
CANDACE WASHINGTON
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
GEICO INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-12-796511
BEFORE: Keough, J., Rocco, P.J., and Kilbane, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 2, 2014
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
A. Scott Fromson
A. Scott Fromson Attorney at Law
32125 Solon Road
Solon, Ohio 44139
Randy J. Hart
Randy J. Hart, L.L.P.
23600 Commerce Park
Beachwood, Ohio 44122
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Larry C. Greathouse
Richard C. Rezie
Steven D. Strang
Gallagher Sharp
Bulkley Building, Sixth Floor
1501 Euclid Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio 44115-2108
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Candace Washington, appeals the trial court’s decision
granting judgment in favor of GEICO Insurance Company.
{¶2} In 2011, Washington was injured in a hit-and-run accident while riding as a
passenger in an automobile driven by Bonita Burse. At the time of the accident, Burse
had an automobile insurance policy through GEICO, which included coverage for
uninsured/underinsured motorists (“UM/UIM”).
{¶3} In 2013 and after being denied coverage under Burse’s policy, Washington
filed suit against GEICO seeking a declaratory judgment that she is entitled to recover
under Burse’s policy.
{¶4} Washington moved for summary judgment, contending that Burse’s policy
provided coverage for the policy holder and their “passengers” in UM/UIM claims.
Accordingly, because she was injured in a hit-and-run accident while riding as a
passenger in a car that was driven by a GEICO insured, Washington argues that she is
entitled to coverage under the UM/UIM section of Burse’s policy. GEICO opposed
Washington’s motion contending that Washington does not fall under the definition of
“insured” in the UM/UIM section of the policy; therefore, she is not entitled to coverage.
{¶5} The trial court denied Washington’s motion for summary judgment ruling
that Washington “was not a party to the contract and by the terms of this contract, was
excluded from coverage.” The trial court subsequently declared judgment in favor of
GEICO.
{¶6} Washington now appeals, asserting two “statements of assignment of error”;
however, we construe these “statements” to raise one assignment of error — that the trial
court erred in granting judgment in favor of GEICO. Specifically, she contends that
because the UM/UIM section of Burse’s insurance policy contains an ambiguity
regarding coverage for “passengers,” the ambiguity should be construed strictly against
GEICO and judgment was therefore improper.
{¶7} “[A]n appellate court reviewing a declaratory-judgment matter should apply
an abuse-of-discretion standard in regard to the trial court’s holding concerning the
appropriateness of the case for declaratory judgment, * * * and should apply a de novo
standard of review in regard to the trial court’s determination of legal issues in the case.”
Arnott v. Arnott, 132 Ohio St. 3d 401, 2012-Ohio-3208, 972 N.E.2d 586, ¶ 1. With this
standard in mind, we review the decision of the trial court.
{¶8} Section IV of the GEICO insurance policy governs UM/UIM coverage.
The heading of that section provides:
SECTION IV — UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS
COVERAGE — Protection For You and Your Passengers For Injuries
Caused By Uninsured and Hit-And-Run Motorists
(Emphasis added). Washington contends that because the heading in this section uses
the words “your passengers,” all passengers riding in the driver’s automobile are entitled
to coverage for purposes of UM/UIM coverage.
{¶9} However, the language of the policy itself provides that only “insureds” are
entitled to coverage under the UM/UIM portion of the policy. In the section “Losses We
Pay,” the policy expressly states: “Under the Uninsured and Underinsured Motorists
Coverage we will pay damages for bodily injury cause by accident which the insured is
legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured or underinsured
motor vehicle or hit-and-run motor vehicle * * *.” Furthermore, under “Exclusions —
When Section IV Does Not Apply,” the policy expressly excludes coverage for
individuals who are not “insureds” — “9. We do not cover any person suffering bodily
injury, who is not an insured under the policy.”
{¶10} The policy defines an “insured” for purposes of UM/UIM coverage:
3. Insured means:
(a) the individual named in the declarations and his or her spouse if a
resident of the same household;
(b) relatives of (a) above if residents of the household;
(c) any person who is entitled to recover damages because of bodily injury
sustained by an insured under (a) and (b) above.
If there is more than one insured, our limit of liability will not be increased.
{¶11} In this case, Washington admitted in her response for request for admissions
that she did not reside with Burse on the day of the accident or that she was related to
Burse. Accordingly, under the policy, Washington does not satisfy the definition of
“insured,” which would entitle her to coverage under the UM/UIM section of the GEICO
policy. These narrow definitions of an “insured” for UM/UIM coverage have repeatedly
been upheld by Ohio courts. See, e.g., Holliman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 86 Ohio St. 3d 414,
416, 1999-Ohio-116, 715 N.E.2d 532 (nothing prohibits the parties to an insurance
contract from defining who is an insured person under the policy); Shepherd v. Scott, 3d
Dist. Hancock 5-02-22, 2002-Ohio-4417, ¶ 19 (“It is perfectly within the province of an
insurance provider to define who will be an insured”); Johns v. Hopkins, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 99218, 2013-Ohio-2099; Wayne Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mills, 118 Ohio App. 3d
146, 692 N.E.2d 213 (9th Dist.1996).
{¶12} However, it appears that Washington does not dispute that she does not meet
the definition of “insured” as defined under the UM/UIM section of the policy. Rather,
she contends that the policy is ambiguous because the heading of the UM/UIM section of
the policy states “your passengers” and because she was a passenger of the car, she is
entitled to coverage. She claims this ambiguity must be strictly construed against
GEICO and therefore, she is still entitled to UM/UIM coverage. We are not persuaded.
{¶13} First, Washington is not a party to the contract. Thus, she has no standing
to assert ambiguity in her favor. As the Ohio Supreme Court held, “where ‘the plaintiff
is not a party to [the] contract of insurance * * *, [the plaintiff] is not in a position to urge,
as one of the parties, that the contract be construed strictly against the other party;’”
especially “where expanding coverage beyond a policyholder’s needs will increase the
policyholder’s premiums.” Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St. 3d 216,
2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 14, quoting Cook v. Kozell (1964), 176 Ohio St.
332, 336, 199 N.E.2d 566 (1964).
{¶14} Moreover, a heading of a section of the policy is not the controlling
language of a policy or contract. Rather, a heading is merely directional and for the ease
of the reader. No terms or coverage is provided for in a heading. Rather, under Ohio
law, the policy provisions must be read in context with the policy as a whole to avoid
abstract interpretation and presume that the intent of the parties is reflected in the
language used in the policy. King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St. 3d 208, 212, 519
N.E.2d 1380 (1988); Inchaurregui v. Ford Motor Co., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 98CA007187,
2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2380, *8; Galatis at ¶ 11.
{¶15} In construing a prenuptial agreement, the Seventh District found that placing
a contractual provision where compensation arises upon death under the heading
“divorce, dissolution,” did not render the contract ambiguous. Parilla v. Parilla, 165
Ohio App. 3d 802, 2006-Ohio-1286, 848 N.E.2d 881, ¶29. The court concluded that the
placement of the provision under the wrong heading did not make an otherwise plain
agreement ambiguous. Id.
{¶16} Similarly in this case, the heading of Section IV at issue fails to create an
ambiguity that would alter the expressed language of the body of the policy. The
heading does no more than lead the reader to the information they are seeking; it is the
content of the paragraphs below the heading that explains the information, which in this
case, is UM/UIM coverage. To construe the heading in the manner Washington suggests
is unreasonable because it would expand coverage otherwise limited by the plain and
unambiguous definition of who is an insured for UM/UIM coverage under the GEICO
policy.
{¶17} Accordingly, the trial court did not err in declaring judgment in favor of
GEICO. The assignments of error are overruled.
{¶18} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
KENNETH A. ROCCO, P.J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR