State v. Edmonds , 236 N.C. App. 588 ( 2014 )

NO. COA14-158
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 7 October 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Buncombe County
No. 11 CRS 64716, 64719
JOHN BURTON EDMONDS, JR.
Defendant.
_________________________________
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JAMES RYAN EDMONDS,
Defendant.
Appeal by defendants from judgments entered 25 July 2013 by
Judge James U. Downs in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard
in the Court of Appeals 27 August 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Heather Freeman, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant
Appellate Defender Paul M. Green, for defendant James Ryan
Edmonds.
Russell J. Hollers III, for defendant John B. Edmonds.
ELMORE, Judge.
On 5 March 2012, the Buncombe County grand jury returned
bills of indictment against defendant John Burton Edmonds, Jr.
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(“defendant John”) for robbery with a dangerous weapon in 11 CRS
64719, and against his son, James Ryan Edmonds (“defendant
James”) for robbery with a dangerous weapon in 11 CRS 64716. On
18 April 2013, the State filed a Motion for Joinder, requesting
that the trial court join the cases for trial. The motion was
granted and the case came on for trial on 5 June 2013. The jury
found both men guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon.
Defendant John admitted the aggravating factor that he committed
the offense while on pretrial release, and he was sentenced to
97 to 129 months imprisonment with a 28-day credit. Defendant
James also admitted that he committed the offense while on
pretrial release. He was sentenced to 73 to 100 months
imprisonment with a 10-day credit. Both defendant John and
defendant James (collectively “defendants”) now appeal their
convictions. After careful consideration, we find that
defendant John received a trial free from error and defendant
James received a trial free from prejudicial error. However, we
remand for a correction of clerical errors in defendant John’s
Judgment and Commitment form.
I. Background
At trial, the State called Leslie Pruitt, customer service
manager at Forrest Hills Commercial Bank. Ms. Pruitt testified
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that in September 2011, defendant John opened a bank account at
Forrest Hills Commercial Bank that was funded by loan proceeds
in the amount of $65,000.00. Ms. Pruitt testified that after
this account was opened, large amounts of cash were withdrawn
daily until the account was overdrawn. The bank’s fraud
detection system flagged the account as “a suspect of suspicious
activity.” Ms. Pruitt tracked the account activity and
recommended it be closed. In November 2011, Forrest Hills
Commercial Bank closed the account.
Anne Garrett, customer service representative at Forrest
Hills Commercial Bank, testified that she was familiar with
defendant John because he frequented the bank and called “all of
the time” regarding his account. On 7 December 2011, one day
before the robbery, defendant John and defendant James arrived
together at the bank at 1:33 p.m. Ms. Garrett testified that
the men approached her desk and defendant John took a seat. The
surveillance video showed that defendant James stood to the side
of Ms. Garrett’s desk before moving behind it. Ms. Garrett
testified that she particularly remembered defendant James that
afternoon because he encroached on the personal space behind her
desk.
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On 8 December 2011, the day of the robbery, Ms. Garrett saw
defendant John enter the bank on three separate occasions. At
11:00 a.m., defendant John first entered the bank and paced the
lobby while talking on his cell phone. He did not speak to any
bank employee. According to Ms. Garrett, it was customary for
defendant John to be on his phone when he entered the bank. At
12:20 p.m., defendant John entered the bank once more. He
adamantly asked bank personnel to open an account for him. He
left after being informed that he could not open an account.
Ms. Garrett testified that defendant John entered the bank for a
third time at approximately 1:20 p.m. Defendant approached Ms.
Garrett’s desk, and she opened her cash drawer to put her work
away. Defendant John took a seat despite the fact that Ms.
Garrett was on the phone and there were other customer service
representatives available to assist him. Shortly after
defendant John sat down, Ms. Garrett testified that the bank
door flung open and a masked man brandishing a gun ran directly
to her with “no hesitation at all.” The robber grabbed Ms.
Garrett’s cash drawer—forcing her hands off of it. He took the
cash and ran out the door.
In a statement made to Detective Kevin Briggs after the
robbery, Ms. Garrett noted that the robber wore a blue mask and
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was about 5’7” tall. She also stated she believed the gun was
fake because it had an orange cap. At trial, Ms. Garrett
testified that she no longer thought the gun was fake. Ms.
Garrett testified that the robber’s build resembled defendant
James’. She testified, “[a]s soon as everything happened and we
closed the doors, I said that’s [] John’s son.” Ms. Garrett
also recognized that the robber wore the same shoes that
defendant James had worn to the bank the previous day.
Sergeant Mark Allen with the Town of Biltmore Police
Department testified on behalf of the State at trial. On 8
December 2011, Sergeant Allen responded to a bank robbery at
Forest Hills Commercial Bank at approximately 1:22 p.m. As he
approached the bank, defendant John was leaving. Sergeant Allen
ordered him to stop. Defendant John informed Sergeant Allen
that he was a patron of the bank and that it had just been
robbed. Defendant John stated that he chased the robber out of
the bank, that the robber was Hispanic, wore a black shirt and
black mask, and fled across the parking lot into the wooded area
behind the bank. Based on the information defendant John
provided, Sergeant Allen set up a perimeter and radioed for a
tracking K-9 unit.
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After viewing the surveillance video of the robbery,
Sergeant Allen named defendant John a suspect because (1) the
direction defendant John said the robber fled did not match the
video, (2)the robber’s mask was not black, and (3) defendant
John acted eager to leave the scene.
Jamie Johnson, defendant James’ former girlfriend,
testified for the State over defense counsels’ objections.
Jamie Johnson stated she and defendant James were living
together in December 2011, at which time she was eight months
pregnant with his child. Jamie Johnson testified that she drove
a gold 2001 Mazda Tribute in December 2011, which defendant
James frequently borrowed. This testimony was relevant because
the bank’s surveillance video from 8 December 2011 showed a gold
Mazda Tribute pass defendant John in the bank’s parking lot
after the robbery. The same vehicle was shown on the
surveillance video on 7 December 2011 after the men left the
bank. Jamie Johnson alleged that defendant James frequently
borrowed her vehicle and that he had done so on 8 December 2011.
On 7 December 2011 at 1:15 p.m., defendant James sent Jamie
Johnson the following text message: “Jamie, if you want me to
have money in the morning, I have have [sic] all the gas that’s
in your car to be able to do everything I have to, so if you run
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any gas out we really will be f-----.” Jamie Johnson alleged
that on the evening of 8 December 2011, defendant James and
defendant John arrived at her home with $2,000 cash and pills.
Jamie Johnson admitted that she was addicted to oxycodone.
Jamie Johnson also admitted that she threw defendant James’
shoes into the river the following day per his request. Jamie
Johnson also stated that defendant James kept a black Taurus
revolver in his night stand.
Sergeant John Thomas of the Buncombe County Sheriff’s
Department testified that he obtained search warrants for
defendant James, defendant John, and Jamie Johnson’s cell phone
records. The records evidence multiple calls between defendants
on 8 December 2011, including calls originating at 1:17 p.m.,
1:18 p.m., and 1:19 p.m., each utilizing cell towers near the
bank. The surveillance video shows the robber entering the bank
at 1:22 p.m. The next call between defendants occurred at 1:31
p.m. There were subsequent calls exchanged at 1:36 p.m., 1:46
p.m., 1:52 p.m., and 1:53 p.m.
Beau Dean, a network switch engineer for U.S. Cellular,
testified for the State regarding defendants’ cell phone usage
on the requisite dates. His testimony corroborated Sergeant
Thomas’ in that defendants exchanged numerous calls on 8
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December 2011 while utilizing cell towers in close proximity to
the bank.
II. Analysis
A. Objection to Jamie Johnson’s testimony
Defendant James argues that the trial court erred in
overruling his objection to the hearsay testimony of Jamie
Johnson. Specifically, defendant James argues that Jamie
Johnson’s testimony regarding alleged statements that Detective
Briggs made to her constitutes inadmissible hearsay opinion
testimony of a law enforcement officer regarding defendant
James’ guilt. We disagree.
“The North Carolina Rules of Evidence define ‘hearsay’ as a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 801(c)
(2013). “Out-of-court statements that are offered for purposes
other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted are not
considered hearsay.” State v. Gainey, 355 N.C. 73, 87, 558
S.E.2d 463, 473 (2002). The erroneous admission of hearsay is
not always so prejudicial as to require a new trial. State v.
Sills, 311 N.C. 370, 378, 317 S.E.2d 379, 384 (1984).
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At trial, Jamie Johnson testified on direct examination for
the State as follows:
Q. On December 9th of 2011, did Detective
Briggs attempt to have an interview with
you?
A. I think that he came to my house. I
think that’s the day that he came to my
house with my mother and his partner, and
they told me that I should leave my house,
that it probably wasn’t safe and to come
down—I think that he wanted me to come down
to the station or somewhere and have an
interview with him at that point, yeah. And
I told him that I would rather wait.
Q. You were nervous and upset, anxious at
that time, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Didn’t really want to talk to Detective
Briggs; isn’t that true?
A. No. He had come into my house with my
mom. I had told my mom what was going on
with the bank robbery. And he called her
and, I think, went to her house, and they
rode together over to my house. And he
basically told me that [defendant James]
robbed a bank, that it was for sure; and
that he had opened up my eyes to a very
dangerous man.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Defendant James argues it was error for the trial court to
overrule his objection to the admission of the above testimony,
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particularly the statement made by Detective Briggs “that
[defendant James] robbed a bank, that it was for sure[.]”
Relying on State v. Turnage, 190 N.C. App. 123, 129, 660 S.E.2d
129, 133 (2008), defendant notes that law enforcement witnesses
are prohibited from expressing an opinion as to defendant’s
guilt as that would impermissibly invade the province of the
jury. Defendant James avers, “[b]y overruling [defendant’s]
proper objection to inadmissible evidence, the trial judge
erroneously allowed the jury to consider, without limitation,
the opinion of a Detective with twenty-two years of experience
investigating major crimes[.]”
Defendant James is misguided. Here, it was Jamie Johnson,
not Detective Briggs, who was testifying, and Detective Briggs
did not advance his opinion as to defendant James’ guilt.
Nevertheless, on appeal defendant James cites cases, including,
inter alia, Turnage, supra, State v. White, 154 N.C. App. 598,
572 S.E.2d 825 (2002), and State v. Carrillo, 164 N.C. App. 204,
595 S.E.2d 219 (2004), wherein our courts have held it is
impermissible for a law enforcement officer to express an
opinion as to a defendant’s guilt. These cases are not
applicable to the situation at bar.
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We note that Jamie Johnson’s testimony was not offered for
the truth of the matter asserted—that Detective Briggs believed
defendant James committed the robbery. Thus, Jamie Johnson’s
statement was admissible as it was merely offered to illustrate
how Detective Briggs purportedly influenced her into making a
statement in the case. Assuming arguendo that Jamie Johnson’s
testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay testimony, defendant
James has likewise neglected to argue that he was in fact
prejudiced by the admission of this testimony. See State v.
Hickey, 317 N.C. 457, 473, 346 S.E.2d 646, 657 (1986) (“The
defendant must still show that there was a reasonable
possibility that a different result would have been reached at
trial if the error had not been committed.”). Defendant James’
argument is overruled.
B. Mistrial
Defendant James argues that “the trial court erred by
allowing the State to put prejudicial hearsay before the jury by
means of questions containing facts not in evidence.” More
specifically, the crux of defendant James’ argument is best
summarized as follows: defendant contends that the trial court
erred in failing to declare a mistrial ex mero motu in response
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to acts of prosecutorial misconduct during his trial. We
disagree.
A trial court’s decision not to intervene ex mero motu to
declare a mistrial on the basis of a prosecutor’s questions to a
witness “will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court
clearly has abused its discretion.” State v. Jaynes, 342 N.C.
249, 280, 464 S.E.2d 448, 467 (1995). Where a prosecutor’s
questions are improper, the trial court has the authority to
provide a curative instruction to the jury or to declare a
mistrial. See, e.g., State v. Norwood, 344 N.C. 511, 537, 476
S.E.2d 349, 361 (1996). This is true even where, as here, the
defendant never asked the trial court to declare a mistrial.
See Jaynes, 342 N.C. at 280, 464 S.E.2d at 467 (considering
whether there was error in the trial court’s failure to declare
a mistrial ex mero motu on the basis of alleged improper
questions by the prosecutor despite the fact that the defendant
made no motion for a mistrial).
Here, both defendants joined in a motion in limine prior to
trial, each seeking to exclude “all testimony from Jamie Johnson
relating to a gun being thrown in a river or her hearing a
splash, [and] any mention of the gun in particular[.]” The
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trial court denied the motion in limine. The State questioned
Jamie Johnson as follows:
PROSECUTOR: State whether or not, Ms.
Johnson, you and [Detective Briggs] were
talking about a gun?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Move to strike.
THE COURT: Allowed. Don’t consider that,
members of the jury, without any further
foundation other than what you’ve got now.
. . .
PROSECUTOR: Did you tell [Detective Briggs]
that you had heard the gun being thrown into
the river?
MR. SMITH [Attorney for Defendant John]:
Objection.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.
THE COURT: I can’t hear you talking when
you’re walking with your back –
PROSECUTOR: I’m sorry, Your Honor. The time
that you were speaking to Detective Briggs,
state whether or not you had told him you
had heard a gun being thrown into the river.
MR. SMITH: Objection.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.
PROSECUTOR: So if Detective Briggs would
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have documented that through an audio
conversation with you and him and then also
now a transcription, which would be more
correct about you hearing a gun being thrown
in the river, what you’re saying now or what
you said then?
MR. SMITH: Objection.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained. It hasn’t been
established what she said then.
Defendant James contends that the State’s line of
questioning “appears to have been a deliberate tactic to inform
the jury through questions what could not be proved through
admissible evidence” and “[q]uestions that place inadmissible
information before the jury are improper.”
We disagree. The prosecutor did not place inadmissible
information before the jury. Again, we note that defendants’
motion in limine was denied. Our Supreme Court has held that
“[q]uestions asked on cross-examination will be considered
proper unless the record shows they were asked in bad faith.”
State v. Lovin, 339 N.C. 695, 713, 454 S.E.2d 229, 239 (1995).
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the prosecutor’s
questions were asked in bad faith. In addition, the trial court
sustained the objections, struck one question from the record,
and issued a curative instruction. As such, there was no
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prejudicial evidence introduced in response to the prosecutor’s
questions. The trial judge’s action in sustaining the
objections was sufficient to remedy any harm that resulted from
the asking of the questions. See Jaynes, 342 N.C. at 280, 464
S.E.2d at 467 (holding that the trial court’s actions in
sustaining the defendant’s objections were sufficient to remedy
any possible harm resulting from the mere asking of the three
questions by the prosecutor); cf. State v. McLean, 294 N.C. 623,
634-35, 242 S.E.2d 814, 821 (1978) (holding that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for
mistrial where the trial court sustained defendant’s objections
to a question by the prosecutor containing improper information
and instructed the jury to disregard the question). We overrule
defendant James’ argument. We note that defendant John advances
the same argument on appeal. For the foregoing reasons, we also
overrule defendant John’s argument.
C. Exclusion of evidence of cell phone use
Defendant James next argues that the trial court’s limiting
of his cross-examination of the State’s witness, Beau Dean,
constitutes reversible error. We disagree.
In North Carolina, a “trial court has broad discretion over
the scope of cross-examination.” State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382,
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411, 508 S.E.2d 496, 514 (1998) (citation omitted). The trial
court’s ruling regarding the scope of cross-examination “will
not be held in error in the absence of a showing that the
verdict was improperly influenced by the limited scope of the
cross-examination.” State v. Woods, 307 N.C. 213, 221, 297
S.E.2d 574, 579 (1982).
During Beau Dean’s cross-examination, defendant John
attempted to elicit testimony regarding the total number of cell
phone minutes he and defendant James used during the 28 October
to 27 November 2011 billing cycle. Defense counsel asked Beau
Dean, “how many minutes were used in this billing cycle?” The
State objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. On
appeal, defendant James contends the trial court erred in
sustaining the State’s objection to this question because “the
outstanding feature of the State’s case was the extraordinary
frequency of cell phone communications between [defendant John
and defendant James] at and around the time of the robbery[,]”
and the excluded evidence was therefore relevant to show that
the high level of communication by each defendant was not
peculiar to the day of the robbery.
Here, both the cell phone records entered into evidence and
the testimony of Beau Dean established that defendant James and
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defendant John used their cell phones to communicate with
persons besides each other on 8 December 2011. In addition, two
bank employees, Anne Garrett and Judy Price, testified that it
was not uncommon for defendant John to be on the phone when he
entered the bank. Finally, defendants’ cell phone records
spanning from 5 December 2011 to 9 December 2011 were entered
into evidence. Thus, there was evidence before the jury that
illustrated defendants’ cell phone usage habits. Defendant
James has failed to establish that the trial judge’s limitation
on Beau Dean’s cross-examination improperly influenced the
verdict in his case.
D. Admission of aggravating factor
Defendant James argues he is entitled to a new sentencing
hearing because the trial court failed to address him personally
and comply with the procedures set forth under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
15A-1022.1(b) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022.1(a) (2013). We
agree that the trial court erred. However, we hold that the
error is harmless.
Under North Carolina’s Blakeley Act, codified in N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1022.1 (2013), we recognize that a defendant may
admit to the existence of an aggravating factor or to the
existence of a prior record level point under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
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15A-1340.14(b)(7) before or after the trial of the underlying
felony. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022.1(d). In all cases in which
a defendant admits to the existence of an aggravating factor,
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022.1 provides that the trial court shall
comply with the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(a).
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(a),
a superior court judge may not accept a plea
of guilty or no contest from the defendant
without first addressing him personally and:
(1) Informing him that he has a right to
remain silent and that any statement he
makes may be used against him; (2)
Determining that he understands the nature
of the charge; (3) Informing him that he has
a right to plead not guilty; . . .
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022 (2013). The trial court must also
address the defendant personally and advise the defendant that
he or she (1) is entitled to have a jury determine the existence
of any aggravating factors or points under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
15A-1340.14(b)(7); and (2) has the right to prove the existence
of any mitigating factors at a sentencing hearing before the
sentencing judge. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022.1(b) (2013).
During defendant James’ sentencing hearing, defense counsel
admitted the following statutory aggravator under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1340.16(d)(12): that defendant James committed the
offense while on pretrial release.
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THE STATE: regarding the defendant, James
Ryan Edmonds, in 11-CRS-64716, it’s been
alleged on the indictment returned March the
5th of 2012 for robbery with a dangerous
weapon that occurred on or about December
the 8th of 2011 that Mr. James Ryan Edmonds
committed allegedly the robbery with a
dangerous weapon offense while on pretrial
release on another charge. Does he admit
the existence of the aggravating factor
listed on the indictment beyond a reasonable
doubt or does he deny the existence of the
aggravating factor that he committed--
allegedly committed this offense while on
pretrial release on another charge?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, . . . we would
admit that at the time of the offense
[defendant James] was on pretrial release
for another offense; again, maintain
innocence in terms of this charge, but we
would admit that at the time we were on
pretrial release.
. . .
THE COURT: All right. Does [defendant James]
waive any further notice of that aggravating
factor?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: He would.
THE COURT: Has he had sufficient notice that
it exists?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: He has.
THE COURT: And that the State intended to
proceed on it?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: He has.
THE COURT: And that if admitting it, it
could
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enhance the punishment against him?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And increase the punishment he
could receive?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Does he desire to have a jury determine it?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: No, sir.
The crux of defendant’s argument is that his stipulation or
admission of the aggravating factor was not made knowingly and
voluntarily given that the trial court failed to address him
personally and conduct the colloquy required by N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 15A-1022.1(b) and 15A-1022(a).
We recognize that North Carolina’s Blakely Act requires the
trial court to address defendants personally, advise them that
they are entitled to a jury trial on any aggravating factors,
and ensure that their admission is the result of an informed
choice. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A–1022.1(b), (c) (2013). A review
of the transcript in the instant case shows that the trial court
neglected to follow this procedure. We review such errors for
harmlessness. State v. Blackwell, 361 N.C. 41, 49, 638 S.E.2d
452, 458 (2006). “In conducting harmless error review, we must
determine from the record whether the evidence against the
defendant was so overwhelming and uncontroverted that any
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rational fact-finder would have found the disputed aggravating
factor beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation and quotations
omitted).
The defendant may not avoid a conclusion
that evidence of an aggravating factor is
uncontroverted by merely raising an
objection at trial. See, e.g., Neder, 527
U.S. at 19, 119 S. Ct. 1827. Instead, the
defendant must bring forth facts contesting
the omitted element, and must have raised
evidence sufficient to support a contrary
finding.
Id. at 50, 638 S.E.2d at 458 (citations and quotations omitted).
Here, the aggravating factor found by the trial judge, not
the jury, was that the crime was committed while defendant was
on pre-trial release. Defense counsel specifically admitted
“that at the time of the offense [defendant James] was on
pretrial release for another offense.” Defendant James neither
objected at trial to this admission nor did he present any
argument or evidence contesting the sole aggravating factor. On
appeal, defendant James similarly makes no argument that he was
not in fact on pretrial release on 8 December 2011. Thus, he
has raised no evidence to support a contrary finding of the
aggravating factor. We hold that defendant James’ failure to
object and his failure to present any argument or evidence
contesting the sole aggravating factor constitute uncontroverted
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and overwhelming evidence that defendant committed the present
crimes while on pretrial release for another offense. Should
this case be remanded to the trial court for a jury
determination of this aggravating factor, the State could offer
evidence in support of the aggravator “in the form of official
state documents and the testimony of state record-keepers.” Id.
at 51, 638 S.E.2d at 459. Accordingly, the Blakely error which
occurred at defendant James’ trial was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
E. Defendant John’s argument
Defendant John argues, and the State concedes, that his
Judgment and Commitment form contain clerical errors and must be
remanded for correction. We agree.
The transcript of defendant John’s sentencing hearing shows
that the trial judge sentenced him as a Prior Record Level IV
offender and ordered him to pay $6,841.50 in attorney’s fees.
However, defendant John’s Judgment and Commitment form
incorrectly lists him as a Prior Record Level II offender and
states that defendant John owes $13,004.45 in attorney’s fees.
This sum is the amount of attorney’s fees owed by defendant
James. Defendant concedes that his sentence of a minimum 97
months and a maximum of 129 months is correct.
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Here, the trial court committed a clerical error. See
State v. Taylor, 156 N.C. App. 172, 177, 576 S.E.2d 114, 117-18
(2003) (defining clerical error as “an error resulting from a
minor mistake or inadvertence, esp. in writing or copying
something on the record, and not from judicial reasoning or
determination”). “When, on appeal, a clerical error is
discovered in the trial court’s judgment or order, it is
appropriate to remand the case to the trial court for correction
because of the importance that the record speak the truth.”
State v. Smith, 188 N.C. App. 842, 845, 656 S.E.2d 695, 696-97
(2008) (citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, we
remand for the correction of the clerical errors described above
in the Judgment and Commitment form (correcting defendant’s
Prior Record Level from II to IV and correcting the amount of
attorney’s fees owed from $13,004.45 to $6,841.50).
III. Conclusion
In sum, the sole error the trial court made in defendant
James’ trial was harmless error. The trial court did not err in
defendant John’s trial. However, defendant John’s Judgment and
Commitment form contains a clerical error. Accordingly, we
remand for the correction of the clerical errors described
above.
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No prejudicial error in part; no error in part; remanded
for correction of clerical error.
Judges CALABRIA and STEPHENS concur.