Mooney v. State ( 2014 )

Cite as 2014 Ark. 453
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-08-1207
SONYA NATE MOONEY Opinion Delivered October 30, 2014
PETITIONER
PRO SE PETITION TO REINVEST
V. JURISDICTION IN THE TRIAL
COURT TO CONSIDER A PETITION
FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS
STATE OF ARKANSAS AND AMENDMENT TO PETITION
RESPONDENT [CRAIGHEAD COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT, NO. 16CR-06-378]
PETITION WITH AMENDMENT
DENIED.
PER CURIAM
In 2008, petitioner Sonya Nate Mooney was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder
and sentenced to 420 months’ imprisonment. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. Mooney
v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 622, 331 S.W.3d 588.
On September 2, 2014, petitioner filed the instant pro se petition, seeking to reinvest
jurisdiction in the circuit court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the case.1
Subsequently, petitioner filed an amendment to the petition. The petition, as amended, is
denied because petitioner has failed to raise any claim that would support issuance of a writ of
error coram nobis.
A petition for leave to proceed in the circuit court is necessary because the circuit court
can entertain a petition for writ of error coram nobis after a judgment has been affirmed on
1
The petition is assigned the same docket number as the direct appeal from the judgment
of conviction.
Cite as 2014 Ark. 453
appeal only after we grant permission. Pitts v. State, 2014 Ark. 132 (per curiam). A writ of error
coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy more known for its denial than its approval.
Cromeans v. State, 2013 Ark. 273 (per curiam) (citing Howard v. State, 2012 Ark. 177, 403 S.W.3d
38). Coram-nobis proceedings are attended by a strong presumption that the judgment of
conviction is valid. Greene v. State, 2013 Ark. 251 (per curiam). The function of the writ is to
secure relief from a judgment rendered while there existed some fact that would have prevented
its rendition if it had been known to the circuit court and which, through no negligence or fault
of the defendant, was not brought forward before rendition of the judgment. Id. The petitioner
has the burden of demonstrating a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record. Williams
v. State, 2011 Ark. 541 (per curiam).
The writ is allowed only under compelling circumstances to achieve justice and to address
errors of the most fundamental nature. Cromeans, 2013 Ark. 273 (citing McDaniels v. State, 2012
Ark. 465 (per curiam)). We have held that a writ of error coram nobis is available to address
certain errors that are found in one of four categories: (1) insanity at the time of trial, (2) a
coerced guilty plea, (3) material evidence withheld by the prosecutor, or (4) a third-party
confession to the crime during the time between conviction and appeal. Greene, 2013 Ark. 251.
Petitioner first asserts that coram-nobis relief is warranted because Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 82 (1963) was violated based on the concealment of evidence by the prosecuting attorney
and defense counsel. Failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defense is a Brady violation,
and such an allegation falls within one of the four categories of coram-nobis relief. Bannister v.
State, 2014 Ark. 59 (per curiam). The United States Supreme Court held in Brady that “the
2
Cite as 2014 Ark. 453
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999),
the Court revisited Brady and declared that evidence is material “if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” 527 U.S. at 280 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682
(1985)). There are three elements of a Brady violation: (1) the evidence at issue must be
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) the
evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; (3) prejudice
must have ensued. Strickler, 527 U.S. 263; Watts v. State, 2013 Ark. 485 (per curiam).
Petitioner contends that Brady was violated because the prosecution and defense counsel
concealed from the jury an unrelated incident report of the shooting of a third party. The
incident report, which is appended to the petition, names petitioner’s victim, Veronica Jenkins,
as an arrestee and witness in the incident. Petitioner alleges that she did not become aware of
the report until after her trial and that the jury’s request to examine a copy of the report shows
prejudice. The trial record shows that defense counsel approached the bench and stated outside
the hearing of the jury that he had a copy of the incident report and that he intended to
introduce evidence of the incident to show that petitioner was afraid of Jenkins. The
prosecuting attorney responded that the report was filed as part of an investigation and that
characterizing Jenkins as a “suspect” in the shooting was not accurate. Defense counsel then
stated that he was not introducing the report into evidence. The trial court found that petitioner
3
Cite as 2014 Ark. 453
could testify as to her belief that Jenkins was dangerous but that the report did not show that
Jenkins was charged with the shooting. Referring to the incident, Officer Angela Meredith later
testified that Jenkins was not a suspect in the shooting but had been arrested for hindering
apprehension because she was withholding information about the incident.2 In testifying about
her knowledge of Jenkins’s propensity for violence, petitioner also addressed the incident that
was the subject of the report. Petitioner admits in her petition that defense counsel was aware
of the existence of the report, and the trial record is clear that the information was available at
the time of trial. Accordingly, petitioner fails to demonstrate the existence of a Brady violation
as necessary to provide cause to grant the writ.
Petitioner also alleges that she has tried to obtain documents to “bolster her claims,”
including evidence that Jenkins was attempting to find her for the purpose of attacking her on
the day of the murder. To the extent that petitioner is again attempting to allege a Brady
violation, she is not entitled to relief because she fails to offer any factual support for a claim that
evidence favorable to her was suppressed by the prosecuting attorney or that the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different had any such evidence been provided to the defense. See
Weekly v. State, 2014 Ark. 365, ___ S.W.3d ___ (per curiam); Pitts, 2014 Ark. 132. The burden
is on the petitioner to show that the writ is warranted, and a bare assertion with no factual
2
In the amendment to the petition, petitioner contends that she is entitled to coram-nobis
relief based on prosecutorial misconduct stemming from the bald allegation that, because the
incident report named Jenkins, Officer Meredith committed perjury apparently based on her
testimony that Jenkins was not a suspect in the shooting. Because the trial record does not
support petitioner’s allegation and she provides no factual substantiation for the perjury claim,
petitioner fails to demonstrate a meritorious claim to present in the proposed petition for writ
of error coram nobis. Bare assertions do not justify issuance of the writ. See Charland v. State,
2013 Ark. 452 (per curiam).
4
Cite as 2014 Ark. 453
support does not justify reinvesting jurisdiction in the circuit court to consider a petition for writ
of error coram nobis. Charland, 2013 Ark. 452. In an apparent attempt to support her claim that
evidence was withheld by the prosecutor, petitioner appended to her petition an October 3, 2013
letter from the prosecuting attorney’s office stating that petitioner’s request for “work product”
must come through her attorney. The letter does not indicate that the prosecutor withheld or
refused to disclose any evidence to the defense at the 2008 trial, and it is unclear from the letter
what specific evidence the petitioner was seeking.
Petitioner next contends that she is entitled to relief apparently based on an allegation of
bias by the trial judge, who presided over both petitioner’s first trial that ended with a mistrial
and her second trial, and “judge-shopping” by the prosecuting attorney. Petitioner alleges that
she was told prior to her second trial that the trial judge was no longer hearing criminal cases in
Craighead County at the time of her second trial. She states that, after her second trial, she
learned that the prosecuting attorney had expressed a desire that her second trial be presided
over by the same judge, and she “concludes” that the prosecuting attorney’s request was a result
of the trial judge’s “history of favorable rulings for the State.” In a related claim, petitioner
alleges bias of the trial judge based on a letter from the judge to the prosecuting attorney and
defense counsel after the mistrial in which the judge wrote that a change of venue might be
necessary due to the media coverage of the trial. Because petitioner provides no factual basis
for her allegations and does not show the type of fundamental error addressed by coram-nobis
proceedings, she fails to state a claim sufficient to support permitting an application for the writ
to go forward for consideration of a petition for writ of error coram nobis.
5
Cite as 2014 Ark. 453
Petitioner also contends that grounds exist for reinvesting jurisdiction for consideration
of the petition because the trial court allowed three witnesses to testify despite violations of
Arkansas Rule of Evidence 615 (2008). Rule 615 provides that “the court shall order witnesses
excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses.” A trial court has very
narrow discretion to exclude the testimony of a witness for noncompliance with an exclusion
order pursuant to Rule 615. Blaylock v. Strecker, 291 Ark. 340, 724 S.W.2d 470 (1987). On direct
appeal, the court of appeals addressed petitioner’s same argument regarding violations of Rule
615 and affirmed the trial court’s decision to allow the witnesses to testify. Mooney, 2009 Ark.
App. 622, 331 S.W.3d 588. When the merits of a claim were addressed and adjudicated in a
prior appellate decision, that issue is settled and may not be revisited in a subsequent appeal.
Cooper v. State, 2014 Ark. 243 (per curiam); Strong v. Hobbs, 2013 Ark. 376 (per curiam).
Furthermore, petitioner’s claim arises from facts that were not extrinsic to the record and were
known at trial. As a consequence, the claim is not cognizable in a coram-nobis proceeding, will
not support issuance of the writ, and provides no basis to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court
to pursue the writ. See Jackson v. State, 2014 Ark. 347, 439 S.W.3d 675 (per curiam); Hoover v. State,
2012 Ark. 136 (per curiam).
Finally, petitioner claims that she is entitled to coram-nobis relief because she was unable
to aid in her defense or understand what was happening at trial because defense counsel had
given her mind-altering sedatives that sometimes cause insanity. Petitioner’s bald allegation that
she was under the influence of sedatives during trial does not amount to a demonstration of
insanity. Petitioner provides no evidence to support her claim, and such conclusory statements
6
Cite as 2014 Ark. 453
fall far short of meeting petitioner’s burden of showing that she was not competent to stand trial.
See Whitham v. State, 2011 Ark. 28 (per curiam).
Petition with amendment denied.
Sonya Nate Mooney, pro se petitioner.
Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for respondent.
7