The Village of Bull Valley v. Zeinz ( 2014 )


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  •                                   Illinois Official Reports
    Appellate Court
    Village of Bull Valley v. Zeinz, 
    2014 IL App (2d) 140053
    Appellate Court              THE VILLAGE OF BULL VALLEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL
    Caption                      K. ZEINZ, Defendant-Appellant.
    District & No.               Second District
    Docket No. 2-14-0053
    Filed                        September 29, 2014
    Held                         Defendant’s convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol and
    (Note: This syllabus         improper lane usage in a prosecution brought by plaintiff village were
    constitutes no part of the   reversed on the ground that the village failed to comply with section
    opinion of the court but     16-102(c) of the Illinois Vehicle Code, which requires the village to
    has been prepared by the     establish that defendant committed the offenses within the village’s
    Reporter of Decisions        corporate limits, since the facts in evidence were insufficient to sustain
    for the convenience of       the village’s burden, especially when the arresting officer testified that
    the reader.)                 defendant’s car “came out of” the village just before he was stopped,
    but he never testified that he saw defendant driving within the
    village’s corporate limits, and the trial court explicitly refused to
    decide whether defendant committed the DUI within the village
    limits.
    Decision Under               Appeal from the Circuit Court of McHenry County, No. 12-DT-444;
    Review                       the Hon. Robert A. Wilbrandt, Judge, presiding.
    Judgment                     Reversed.
    Counsel on               Eric F. Rinehart, of Malia & Rinehart, of Waukegan, for appellant.
    Appeal
    Justin M. Hansen, of Cowlin, Naughton, Curran & Coppedge, of
    Crystal Lake, for appellee.
    Panel                    JUSTICE SPENCE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
    Justices McLaren and Jorgensen concurred in the judgment and
    opinion.
    OPINION
    ¶1          After a bench trial, defendant, Daniel K. Zeinz, was convicted of driving under the
    influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2012)) and improper lane usage
    (ILU) (625 ILCS 5/11-709(a) (West 2012)) and given a year of supervision. On appeal (see
    Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(b) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013)), he argues that his convictions cannot stand, because,
    under section 16-102(c) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/16-102(c) (West
    2012)), plaintiff, the Village of Bull Valley (the Village), could not prosecute him for the
    offenses, because it failed to establish that he committed either one within the Village’s
    corporate limits. We agree, and we reverse.
    ¶2          At defendant’s bench trial, the Village called James Page, who testified on direct
    examination as follows. On May 26, 2012, at about 1:15 a.m., while on patrol as a police
    officer for the Village, he was driving east on Route 120 in the vicinity of Ridge Road. He
    saw a white Pontiac directly in front of him cross over the white fog line and drive partly on
    the shoulder, then drift left and cross over the yellow center line. Page activated his
    emergency lights. The Pontiac drove a short distance, crossed back over the white fog line,
    and stopped.
    ¶3          Page testified that, after the Pontiac stopped, he approached it and saw that defendant, the
    driver, was the only occupant. He then testified as follows:
    “Q. And, Officer, *** as far as the driving and your interaction with the driver,
    did everything happen in the Village of Bull Valley?
    A. Right at the edge. The Village of Bull Valley ends at Ridge Road and 120. So,
    right where I started is where we picked up. So, I would have been in. He might have
    been right out of it when I first picked him up.
    Q. As far as when you observed his–at what point did you first observe Mr. Zeinz
    driving his motor vehicle?
    A. Right at Ridge Road and Route 120. I was still west of the intersection
    traveling eastbound. He had just–I saw him on the other side of the intersection.
    Q. And at the time when Mr. Zeinz–at the time when Mr. Zeinz was on the other
    side of the intersection, was that the west side of the intersection?
    A. The east side.
    Q. The east side you observed him?
    -2-
    A. Yes.
    Q. And is the east side of the intersection in the Village of Bull Valley?
    A. No, that’s–Not there it is not [sic].
    Q. Okay. And at any point in time did Mr. Zeinz’s vehicle travel in the Village of
    Bull Valley?
    A. It came out of the Village of Bull Valley. I just didn’t see the violation right
    there.”
    ¶4       Page testified that the two vehicles “rolled slightly through McHenry County jurisdiction,
    and then into the City of McHenry.” After he stopped defendant, defendant told him that he
    was driving home from a friend’s house. Asked whether defendant mentioned the location of
    his friend’s house, Page testified, “I believe it was in Wonder Lake, but I don’t have–That is
    just off the top of my head right now. I don’t recall exactly where he said, but I think we
    were talking about Wonder Lake.”
    ¶5       Page testified that defendant failed several field sobriety tests. Page arrested defendant
    for DUI and drove him to the police station, where he refused a breath test.
    ¶6       Page testified on cross-examination as follows. When he first saw defendant’s car, both
    of them were driving east on Route 120. Page did not remember any car being between them,
    although there could have been. The two momentary traffic offenses–crossing the fog line
    and crossing the center line–were the only ones that Page observed.
    ¶7       The Village rested. Defendant moved for a directed finding (see 725 ILCS 5/115-4(k)
    (West 2012)), based on section 16-102(c), which reads, “The State’s Attorney of the county
    in which the violation occurs shall prosecute all violations except [that,] when the violation
    occurs within the corporate limits of a municipality, the municipal attorney may prosecute if
    written permission to do so is obtained from the State’s Attorney.” 625 ILCS 5/16-102(c)
    (West 2012). Defendant noted Page’s testimony that Bull Valley’s limits do not include
    Route 120 west of Ridge Road. He argued that the Village had produced no evidence that he
    had committed any offenses within its corporate limits–i.e., east of the intersection with
    Ridge Road–as Page’s testimony had never placed him there. Therefore, defendant reasoned,
    section 16-102(c) did not authorize the Village to bring this case.
    ¶8       The Village responded that defendant should have raised his argument in a pretrial
    motion instead of a motion for a directed finding. It noted that Page had testified that
    defendant admitted driving on Route 120. Defendant replied that the evidence showed only
    that he had been in Wonder Lake, then McHenry, not that he had committed any offense in
    the Village. Also, he could not have raised the jurisdictional issue before trial, as he could not
    have predicted Page’s trial testimony.
    ¶9       The trial court denied the motion, stating as follows:
    “[U]nder a local ordinance, even if it was a local ordinance that adopted the Vehicle
    Code, one of the elements would be that the offense would have to take place in the
    Village of Bull Valley.
    As far as the Court can see *** these offenses were written on state charges, and
    the officer said that he was coming from Bull Valley when he saw him allegedly
    either in or near Bull Valley.
    So, because it’s not a local ordinance, I am going to have to deny the motion for a
    directed finding.”
    -3-
    ¶ 10       Defendant put on no evidence. In closing argument, he reiterated his assertion that
    section 16-102(c) barred the Village from prosecuting the case, as there had been no
    evidence that any of the offenses occurred within the Village’s corporate limits. The trial
    court found defendant guilty of DUI and ILU. On defendant’s jurisdictional argument, the
    court stated:
    “Officer Page indicated the Defendant was coming through Bull Valley, even
    though he made the observations outside of Bull Valley. If this had been a local
    ordinance where being–the things having been done in Bull Valley, that would have
    been an element of the offense, but it was not. These were written as State charges,
    and that the officer as a sworn officer, if he saw some indication that an offense
    occurred in Bull Valley, he could investigate and make those stops pursuant to the
    authority of the State of Illinois.
    So, the Court believes that the officer indicated that–that the Defendant was
    coming through Bull Valley and he observed these things outside of the Village of
    Bull Valley. They are still sufficient under the Illinois Vehicle Code.”
    ¶ 11       Defendant moved to reconsider, based on section 16-102(c). At the hearing on the
    motion, the Village produced a letter dated December 1, 2012, from the McHenry County
    State’s Attorney authorizing the Village to prosecute DUI, driving with a suspended or
    revoked license, and “Summary Suspension Matters” for “offenses occurring within the
    corporate limits of your village.” Defendant argued that, although Page could stop him
    outside the Village limits, that did not authorize the Village to prosecute him for offenses that
    occurred outside the Village limits. The trial court stated:
    “The Court heard the testimony in this case, and there was some dispute as to
    whether the Defendant ever drove in the Village of Bull Valley. Certainly
    there–There could be an interpretation that he did. He was in–indicated that he did
    not. He may have.
    However, there’s no doubt in the Court’s mind that when the officer saw him, the
    officer may have been within the Village limits of Bull Valley, but the defendant was
    outside of those corporate limits ***. I think he was in the County jurisdiction at that
    time outside the corporate limits of Bull Valley.”
    ¶ 12       The court continued, “The Court believes that the offense may not have occurred within
    the corporate limits of the Village–may or may not. The issue was unclear as to whether the
    defendant was driving within the corporate limits of the Village.” The court framed the issue
    as whether, “when a Village police officer exercising his right to stop someone for violations
    of
    State statutes that were observed *** within the Village but occurred outside of the
    Village–does the local prosecutor gain the right to prosecute those cases based on an
    authority letter from the State’s Attorney under [section 16-102(c)].” The court concluded,
    “[I]f, in fact, the officer has the authority to stop and charge someone outside the limits of his
    Village, then that would impliedly give the Village prosecutor the right to prosecute those
    charges ***.” The court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider. He timely appealed.
    ¶ 13       On appeal, defendant argues that the judgment must be reversed because the Village
    lacked the authority to prosecute offenses that occurred outside its corporate limits.
    Defendant reasons that section 16-102(c) plainly bars such prosecutions. He concludes that,
    -4-
    because the Village adduced no evidence that he committed any of the offenses while he was
    within the Village’s limits, the prosecution was unauthorized and the judgment cannot stand.
    ¶ 14        The Village does not dispute defendant’s construction of the statute. However, it argues
    that, although Page stopped defendant just outside the Village limits, the evidence allowed
    the trial court to infer that defendant had committed DUI while he was inside the Village
    limits. The Village also contends that Page’s testimony established this fact directly. The
    Village concedes that there was no evidence that defendant committed ILU while he was
    within the Village limits, and it concedes that this conviction must be reversed.
    ¶ 15        To decide the issue that defendant raises, we must first construe section 16-102(c). The
    construction of a statute raises a question of law that we decide de novo. JPMorgan Chase
    Bank, N.A. v. Earth Foods, Inc., 
    238 Ill. 2d 455
    , 461 (2010). Our object is to effectuate the
    legislative intent, the best guide to which is ordinarily the statutory language itself. 
    Id. When the
    language is unambiguous, we must apply it without resort to aids of construction. 
    Id. We may
    not depart from the plain language by reading in exceptions, limitations, or conditions.
    
    Id. ¶ 16
           Section 16-102(c) unambiguously forbids a municipality from prosecuting a violation of
    the Vehicle Code unless (1) the violation occurs within the municipality’s corporate limits
    and (2) the State’s Attorney has provided written permission. Otherwise, the State’s Attorney
    “shall prosecute all violations.” (Emphases added.) 625 ILCS 5/16-102(c) (West 2012). The
    trial court erred in reasoning that, because Page had the authority to stop a vehicle outside the
    Village for a traffic offense, the Village “impliedly” had the right to prosecute an offense that
    did not occur within the Village’s limits. The court simply read in an exception to section
    16-102(c)’s unambiguous limitation on the Village’s authority. Thus, the judgment cannot be
    sustained on the ground that the trial court chose. Of course, as we review the court’s
    judgment and not its reasoning (Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 
    168 Ill. 2d 83
    , 97
    (1995)), we must still decide whether defendant’s convictions violated section 16-102(c). We
    hold that they did and that both convictions must fall.
    ¶ 17        The Village does not dispute that the trial court misread section 16-102(c) and, in its
    appellate brief, it makes no argument that defendant forfeited his challenge to the prosecution
    by failing to raise it before trial. In any event, from the time that it decided to prosecute this
    case, the Village was on notice that section 16-102(c) required it to prove that defendant
    committed the charged offenses within Village limits, so it can hardly claim unfair surprise.
    The Village contends that the trial court properly found that defendant committed DUI while
    he was within Village limits.
    ¶ 18        We note again that the Village concedes that the trial court could not properly have found
    that defendant committed ILU within Village limits. Page testified only that defendant, while
    driving east on Route 120 east of Ridge Road, crossed over the fog line, then back over the
    center line. That conduct was outside Village limits. 1 Thus, we reverse defendant’s
    1
    Further, the State’s Attorney’s letter reads, in pertinent part, “[Y]ou are hereby authorized *** to
    prosecute Driving While License Suspended/Revoked, Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs,
    and Summary Suspension matters written as violations of the Illinois Vehicle Code by your police
    department for offenses occurring within the corporate limits of your village.” ILU is not among the
    listed offenses. On this basis also, the conviction of ILU must be reversed.
    -5-
    conviction of ILU. See People v. Herman, 
    2012 IL App (3d) 110420
    , ¶ 12 (reversing because
    municipality lacked power under section 16-102(c) to prosecute defendant).
    ¶ 19       The more difficult issue is whether the Village lacked the authority to prosecute
    defendant for DUI. Defendant contends that there was no evidence that he committed DUI
    within the Village’s limits, as Page never saw him drive there. The Village responds that the
    court could credit Page’s testimony that defendant’s car “came out of the Village of Bull
    Valley.” In reply, defendant first argues that two maps of which he requests we take judicial
    notice prove that the eastern boundary of Bull Valley was actually considerably west of
    Ridge Road, making Page’s statement all the more infirm. Defendant argues second that, in
    any event, Page’s statement that defendant “came out of the Village” was a pure conclusion
    that was legally insufficient to prove the location of the DUI. We agree with defendant’s
    second point, which is wholly dispositive. We need not consider whether the maps strengthen
    his argument further.
    ¶ 20       The Village’s argument suffers from two grave weaknesses. The first is that, whatever
    the trial court could have found, it did not actually find that defendant committed DUI within
    the Village limits. The court refused to decide this factual issue, as it proceeded under the
    erroneous assumption that, because location was not an element of the offense, the Village
    need not prove where defendant committed it. The court mentioned Page’s testimony that
    defendant’s car “came out of the Village of Bull Valley,” but it did not credit this testimony.
    Its comments in denying defendant’s motion to reconsider negate any assertion that it found
    that defendant had committed DUI within Village limits. The court stated, “The Court heard
    the testimony in this case, and there was some dispute as to whether the Defendant ever
    drove in the Village of Bull Valley. Certainly there–There could be an interpretation that he
    did. He was in–indicated that he did not. He may have.” The court added, “The Court
    believes that the offense may not have occurred within the corporate limits of the
    Village–may or may not. The issue was unclear as to whether the defendant was driving
    within the corporate limits of the Village.” The court explicitly refused to decide whether
    defendant had committed DUI within the Village limits.
    ¶ 21       The second and more important weakness in the Village’s argument is that the trial court
    could not have properly found that defendant committed DUI within Village limits. At oral
    argument, the Village conceded that the sole basis to do so was Page’s statement that
    defendant “came out of the Village.” But this was a conclusion–essentially, a guess. Page did
    not see defendant’s car until it was east of Ridge Road, going farther east. We agree with
    defendant that he could have driven from Wonder Lake onto Route 120 and proceeded east
    without entering the Village at all. Indeed, that would seem to have been the most direct
    route. Even accepting Page’s testimony that Bull Valley ended at the intersection of Route
    120 and Ridge Road, the court could do no more than speculate that defendant ever drove
    through the Village.
    ¶ 22       Under the case law, a municipality relying on a grant of authority to prosecute offenses
    under the Code must establish that it has satisfied section 16-102(c). See 
    id. ¶ 10;
    Village of
    Hoffman Estates v. Spychalski, 
    33 Ill. App. 3d 83
    , 85-86 (1975). The cases do not specify a
    burden of proof. We assume for the sake of this analysis that the Village was required to
    prove only by a preponderance of the evidence that the prosecution of defendant complied
    with section 16-102(c). Although we recognize that location is a factual issue, we may decide
    whether the facts in evidence were legally sufficient for the Village to prevail. We hold that
    -6-
    they were not. For the reasons given earlier, any conclusion that defendant committed DUI
    within the Village was sheer speculation. When the Village decided to prosecute this case, it
    took on the burden to prove that defendant committed his offenses within Village limits. The
    Village did not meet this obligation, and the judgment cannot stand.
    ¶ 23       We caution that nothing in our opinion should be read to address the question of whether
    double jeopardy bars the reprosecution of the offenses at issue. Neither party has raised that
    issue, and we shall not do so here.
    ¶ 24       For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County is
    reversed.
    ¶ 25      Reversed.
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2-14-0053

Filed Date: 11/25/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/26/2014