The Bank of Maine v. William M. Peterson , 2014 Me. LEXIS 163 ( 2014 )


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  • MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT                                        Reporter of Decisions
    Decision: 
    2014 ME 155
    Docket:   Lin-14-141
    Argued:   December 10, 2014
    Decided:  December 31, 2014
    Panel:          ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and CLIFFORD, JJ.
    THE BANK OF MAINE
    v.
    WILLIAM M. PETERSON
    GORMAN, J.
    [¶1] William M. Peterson appeals from a judgment of foreclosure entered in
    the Superior Court (Lincoln County, Hjelm, J.) granting summary judgment to The
    Bank of Maine (the Bank) following the court’s denial of Peterson’s request for
    mediation.       Peterson contends that the denial of mediation was an abuse of
    discretion and that the Supreme Judicial Court exceeded its rulemaking authority
    when it enacted M.R. Civ. P. 93, which governs foreclosure mediation. We affirm
    the judgment.
    I. BACKGROUND
    [¶2]     This case involves two foreclosure matters concerning separate
    properties in South Bristol. The cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal,
    but Peterson’s primary argument concerns the second foreclosure, and his only
    issue on appeal from the first case involves the issue of attorney fees. For those
    2
    reasons, we do not provide an outline of the pleadings in the first case and discuss
    it only as needed.
    [¶3] On August 13, 2013, the Bank filed a complaint seeking foreclosure of
    Peterson’s primary residence and, seven days later, the Bank served the complaint
    on Peterson. Included with the complaint served on Peterson was a form entitled
    “Response to Complaint And Request for Mediation,” and a summons informing
    Peterson that, if he wished to oppose the lawsuit, he had to serve a written answer
    within twenty days. After Peterson failed to file a timely answer, the Bank filed an
    application for entry of default on September 18, 2013.        One week later, on
    September 26, 2013, the court (Hjelm, J.) entered Peterson’s default. On the same
    date, Peterson used the form mentioned above to respond to the complaint and
    request mediation, but did not include with his filings a motion or request to accept
    his late filings. On December 9, 2013, the court (Sparaco, J.) entered an order
    denying Peterson’s request for mediation because he “filed an untimely response to
    [the] complaint” as “[t]he response was filed on the same day that the court entered
    its entry of default.” The court also ordered, however, that Peterson could “move
    to set aside default for good cause shown pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 55(c).”
    Peterson did not make any motion to set aside the default and, on January 6, 2014,
    the Bank filed motions for summary judgment in both foreclosure cases.
    3
    [¶4] On March 17, 2014, the court (Hjelm, J.) granted summary judgments
    to the Bank and entered judgments of foreclosure that included cumulative legal
    fees of $23,827.07.1 In a separate order, the court noted that Peterson’s request for
    mediation in the second case had been untimely; referenced its December 9, 2013,
    order; and stated that, although Peterson had objected to the entry of default in the
    other foreclosure, he had not done so in this second case, which involved his home.
    Peterson timely appealed pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2014) and M.R. App. P. 2.
    II. DISCUSSION
    [¶5] The crux of Peterson’s argument is that the time limit established by
    M.R. Civ. P. 93 improperly limits a defendant’s substantive right to mediation in
    violation of 4 M.R.S. § 8 (2014). We are not persuaded.
    [¶6]     In addition to ignoring our broad rulemaking authority, found in
    4 M.R.S. § 8, Peterson’s argument ignores the specific directive from the
    Legislature to the Supreme Judicial Court included in the legislation that created
    the foreclosure mediation program. Title 4 M.R.S. § 18-B(12)(A) (2014) specifies
    that the Supreme Judicial Court is to administer the foreclosure mediation program
    and 14 M.R.S. § 6321-A(3) (2014) specifies that the Supreme Judicial Court shall
    “adopt rules to establish a foreclosure mediation program.” (Emphasis added.)
    1
    The Bank’s consolidated bill totaled $23,827.07, which the court awarded the Bank in both dockets.
    At oral argument, the Bank conceded that it is entitled to and can collect only $23,827.07 in fees.
    4
    [¶7] Contrary to Peterson’s assertion, M.R. Civ. P. 93 was promulgated by
    the Supreme Judicial Court as an appropriate exercise of the broad authority
    expressly granted to it by the Legislature to create and administer the foreclosure
    mediation program. It is not an improper limitation of the substantive rights of
    litigants.
    [¶8] Peterson has also asserted that, if it was not obvious error for the court
    to deny his untimely request for mediation, it was an abuse of the court’s discretion
    to do so.          Review of an exercise of discretion involves resolution of three
    questions: (1) whether the factual findings, if any, were supported by the record
    according to the clear-error standard; (2) whether the court understood the law
    applicable to its exercise of discretion; and (3) given all the facts and applying the
    appropriate law, whether the court’s weighing of the applicable facts and choices
    was within the bounds of reasonableness. Charette v. Charette, 
    2013 ME 4
    , ¶ 7,
    
    60 A.3d 1264
    . Here, the court determined that Peterson’s filings were untimely
    because they were due on or about September 10, 2013, based on a service date of
    August 20, 2013. This reflects an accurate understanding of the date of service and
    the applicable time limitations of M.R. Civ. P. 93(c)2 and, therefore, the court’s
    decision was within the bounds of reasonableness.
    2
    These limitations are found in M.R. Civ. P. 93(c)(1), (3), as well as Rule 93(d)(1).
    5
    [¶9]     Because Peterson did not request mediation pursuant to M.R.
    Civ. P. 93(c) in a timely manner, the court did not err or abuse its discretion in
    denying his request for mediation.
    The entry is:
    Judgment affirmed.
    On the briefs:
    Walter F. McKee, Esq., and Matthew D. Morgan, Esq., McKee Billings,
    LLC, Augusta, for appellant William M. Peterson
    Andrew W. Sparks, Esq., Patrick C. Lever, Esq., and Michael T. Devine,
    Esq., Drummond & Drummond, LLP, Portland, for appellee The Bank of
    Maine
    At oral argument:
    Matthew D. Morgan, Esq., for appellant William M. Peterson
    Andrew W. Sparks, Esq., for appellee The Bank of Maine
    Lincoln County Superior Court docket numbers RE-2013-3, RE-2013-35
    FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Docket Lin-14-141

Citation Numbers: 2014 ME 155, 107 A.3d 1122, 2014 Me. LEXIS 163

Judges: Alexander, Mead, Gorman, Jabar, Clifford

Filed Date: 12/31/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/26/2024