Morristown Associates v. Grant Oil Company (073248) , 220 N.J. 360 ( 2015 )

SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)
Morristown Associates v. Grant Oil Co. (A-38-13) (073248)
Argued October 6, 2014 -- Decided January 26, 2015
LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The issue in this appeal is whether the general six-year statute of limitations contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1
applies to private claims for contribution made pursuant to the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act
(Spill Act), N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a).
In 1979, plaintiff, Morristown Associates, purchased commercial property located in Morristown, New
Jersey. The property contained a strip-mall-style shopping center known as Morristown Plaza. Among the tenants
of Morristown Plaza was Plaza Cleaners, a dry cleaning business owned at the time by Robert Herring (Herring).
Herring and his wife had entered into a lease with the property’s previous owner, Morris Center Associates, in 1976.
Due to construction, Herring was unable to occupy and operate Plaza Cleaners until approximately January 1, 1978.
At some point before moving in, Herring installed a steam boiler in a room at the rear of the leased space and an
underground storage tank (UST) for fuel to operate the boiler. In 1985, Herring sold Plaza Cleaners to defendants
Edward and Amy Hsi (collectively the Hsis). The Hsis owned the business until 1998 when it was sold to current
owner and third-party defendant, Byung Lee (Lee). In August 2003, a monitoring of a well installed near Plaza
Cleaner’s UST revealed fuel oil contamination. A subsequent investigation revealed that although the UST was
intact, the fill and vent pipes were “severely deteriorated, with large holes along a significant portion of their
lengths.” Plaintiff’s experts concluded that those holes had developed as early as 1988 and, since that time, oil had
been leaking from the pipes each time the tank was filled. Each of the named oil company defendants in this case
allegedly supplied fuel oil to Plaza Cleaners at various times between 1988 and 2003.
Plaintiff took steps to remediate and clean up the contamination. On July 31, 2006, plaintiff filed an initial
three-count complaint naming as a defendant Grant Oil Company. Count one of the complaint asserted a claim
under the Spill Act, seeking contribution for costs related to the cleanup and removal of the fuel oil. Between
October 2007 and July 2009, plaintiff filed three amended complaints, adding as defendants the Hsis and other
heating oil companies. Lee and Multi Cleaners, Inc., doing business as Plaza Cleaners, were brought into the action
as third-party defendants. In response to a series of motions, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
defendants on various claims against them. In particular, the trial court held that the general six-year statute of
limitations for injury to real property, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1, applied to private claims for contribution pursuant to the
Spill Act and, as such, claims against defendants for damage that had occurred more than six years before that
defendant was brought into the case were time-barred.
On appeal, plaintiff argued, in part, that its claims were not untimely because the six-year statute of
limitations contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 does not apply to Spill Act contribution claims. The Appellate Division
rejected that argument and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in a published decision. 432 N.J. Super. 287 (App.
Div. 2013). In its reasoning, the appellate panel cited case law, including decisions from this Court, that had found
general statutes of limitations applicable when particular statutes did not set forth a specific limitation period.
Because of its holding on the statute of limitations issue, the panel determined that it need not address any other
issues raised by the parties.
Plaintiff filed a petition for certification to this Court that focused on whether the general six-year statute of
limitations applied to contribution claims under the Spill Act. The Court granted certification. 216 N.J. 365 (2013).
HELD: The general six-year statute of limitations contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 does not apply to private claims
for contribution made pursuant to the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10-
23.11f(a)(2)(a).
1
1. As originally enacted, the Spill Act contemplated that most cleanup actions would be conducted by the
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) using monies from the New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund (Spill
Fund) where needed. See L. 1976, c. 141, § 7. The Spill Act scheme made “[t]he fund . . . strictly liable, without
regard to fault, for all cleanup and removal costs and for all direct and indirect damages no matter by whom
sustained.” Id. § 8(a). In addition, the Spill Fund could recover damages up to certain limits subject only “to the
defenses enumerated in subsection [(d)] of this section.” Id. § 8(b). Owners and operators of major facilities or
vessels could only raise as defenses “[a]n act or omission caused solely by war, sabotage, governmental negligence,
God, or a third party or a combination thereof.” Id. § 8(d). “Any other person” could raise “any defense authorized
by common or statutory law.” Ibid. In 1979, the Spill Act was revised. Subsection (d) was revised to provide that
“[a]n act or omission caused solely by war, sabotage, or God, or a combination thereof, shall be the only defenses
which may be raised by any owner or operator of a major facility or vessel responsible for a discharge in any action
arising under the provisions of this act.” L. 1979, c. 346, § 5(d). In 1991, subsection (c) of the liability section was
amended to read, in relevant part: “Any person who has discharged a hazardous substance, or is in any way
responsible for any hazardous substance, shall be strictly liable, jointly and severally, without regard to fault, for all
cleanup and removal costs no matter by whom incurred.” L. 1991, c. 85, § 4 (emphasis added). (pp. 19-24)
2. Based on the Spill Act’s development of joint and several strict liability, any responsible party, even if only
partially responsible, can be required to pay the entire cost of a cleanup. As a result, remediation actions are now
often undertaken by private parties acting through an agreement with DEP. The Legislature amended the Spill Act
in 1991 expressly to “allow[] those parties who enter into an agreement with [DEP] to remove a hazardous discharge
to seek contribution from those responsible parties who have not entered into such an agreement.” Assemb. 3659
(Sponsor’s Statement), 204th Leg. (1991). The contribution provision of the Spill Act cross references N.J.S.A.
58:10-23.11g(c) (“Any person who has discharged a hazardous substance, or is in any way responsible for any
hazardous substance, shall be strictly liable, jointly and severally, without regard to fault, for all cleanup and
removal costs.”) and N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g(d) (“An act or omission caused solely by war, sabotage, or God, or a
combination thereof, shall be the only defenses which may be raised by any owner or operator of a major facility or
vessel responsible for a discharge.”). (pp. 25-27)
3. The Spill Act provides a right of contribution for “dischargers or persons [who] clean[] up and remove[] a
discharge of a hazardous substance” against “all other dischargers and persons in any way responsible for a
discharged hazardous substance or other persons who are liable for the cost of the cleanup and removal.” N.J.S.A.
58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a). Neither this provision, nor any other provision in the Spill Act, sets forth a statute of
limitations applicable to such contribution actions or states that a statute of limitations is not applicable. However,
while the contribution provision does not explicitly state that no statute of limitations applies, it does state that “[a]
contribution defendant shall have only the defenses to liability available to parties pursuant to [N.J.S.A.
58:10-23.11g(d)].” N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a) (emphasis added). The Spill Act’s incorporation of the defenses
enumerated in N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g(d) limits defendants to the following defenses: “an act or omission caused
solely by war, sabotage, or God, or a combination thereof.” The Spill Act enumerates the only defenses specified as
available to contribution defendants and a statute of limitations defense is not included. The Legislature could not
have intended to permit its imposition of contribution liability on culpable dischargers to be frustrated by the
imposition of a general and prior enacted, but unreferenced, statute of limitations. By giving effect to the words of
the Legislature, the Court does not unsettle a decades-long understanding in this State that no limitations period
restricts contribution claims against responsible parties. (pp. 27-34)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter REMANDED for consideration of
the unaddressed issues raised on appeal.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and
SOLOMON; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion.
2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-38 September Term 2013
073248
MORRISTOWN ASSOCIATES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GRANT OIL COMPANY, ABLE
ENERGY, PARSIPPANY FUEL OIL,
EDWARD HSI and AMY HSI and
SPARTAN OIL COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
PETRO INC., JOHNSON OIL
COMPANY, MEENAN OIL COMPANY
d/b/a REGIONAL OIL COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
GRANT OIL COMPANY, ABLE
ENERGY, INC., PARSIPPANY FUEL
OIL CO., and PETRO INC.,
Defendants/Third Party
Plaintiffs,
v.
BYUNG LEE and MULTI CLEANERS,
INC., d/b/a PLAZA CLEANERS,
EDWARD HSI and AMY HSI,
JOHNSON OIL COMPANY, MEENAN
OIL COMPANY d/b/a REGION OIL
as successor in interest to
Johnson Oil Company and
SPARTAN OIL COMPANY,
Third-Party Defendants.
1
Argued October 6, 2014 – Decided January 26, 2015
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is
reported at 432 N.J. Super. 287 (2013).
Steven T. Singer argued the cause for
appellant.
David W. Field argued the cause for
respondents Edward and Amy Hsi (Lowenstein
Sandler, attorneys).
Kristin V. Hayes argued the cause for
respondent Spartan Oil Company (Wiley
Malehorn Sirota & Raynes, attorneys; Ms.
Hayes and Carolyn C. Duff, on the briefs).
Joseph M. Gaul, Jr., argued the cause for
respondents Petro, Inc., Johnson Oil
Company, and Meenan Oil Company, d/b/a
Region Oil Company (Gaul, Baratta & Rosello,
attorneys; Mr. Gaul, Lawrence F. Rosello,
and Jay T. Weatherston, on the briefs).
Edward Lloyd argued the cause for amici
curiae Ironbound Community Corporation, The
Association of New Jersey Environmental
Commissions, NY/NJ Baykeeper, Environment
New Jersey, The Delaware Riverkeeper Network
and The New Jersey Work Environment Council
(Morningside Heights Legal Services,
attorneys; Susan J. Kraham, on the brief).
A. Paul Stofa, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for amicus curiae New
Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney
General of New Jersey, attorney; Melissa H.
Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Mark S. Heinzelmann, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
2
Craig S. Provorny argued the cause for
amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar
Association (Paris P. Eliades, President,
attorney; Ralph J. Lamparello, of counsel;
Mr. Provorny and Laurie J. Sands, on the
brief).
Janine G. Bauer submitted a brief on behalf
of amici curiae Richard Catena, Richard
Catena Auto Wholesalers, Inc., A&S Russo
Real Estate, LLC, Tiffany’s Bodily Divine
Salon, and Spa, Inc. (Szaferman, Lakind,
Blumstein & Blader, attorneys).
Stuart J. Lieberman submitted a brief on
behalf of amicus curiae Passaic River
Coalition (Lieberman & Blecher, attorneys;
Mr. Lieberman, Michael G. Sinkevich, and
Shawn M. LaTourette, on the brief).
Edward W. Purcell, Associate Counsel,
submitted a brief on behalf of amici
curiae New Jersey State League of
Municipalities and New Jersey Institute
of Local Government Attorneys
(William J. Kearns, Jr., General Counsel,
attorney).
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certification in this matter to determine
whether the general six-year statute of limitations contained in
N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 applies to private claims for contribution made
pursuant to the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act
(Spill Act), N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a). Based on the plain
language of the Spill Act, reinforced by its legislative
history, we hold that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1’s six-year statute of
limitations is not applicable to Spill Act contribution claims.
We therefore reject the contrary determination of the Appellate
3
Division and reverse and remand this matter to the Appellate
Division for its consideration of other issues raised on appeal
that were unaddressed.
I.
A.
When enacted in 1976, L. 1976, c. 141, the Spill Act
constituted “a pioneering effort by government to provide monies
for a swift and sure response to environmental contamination.”
Marsh v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 152 N.J. 137, 144 (1997).
Passed initially as a response to concerns about the potential
for off-shore oil spills, the Spill Act soon was amended to
address a wider range of toxic pollution concerns. See
generally Buonviaggio v. Hillsborough Twp. Comm., 122 N.J. 5, 7,
9-10 (1991) (discussing amendments to Spill Act adopted through
enactment of L. 1979, c. 346). Importantly, the Spill Act now
“prohibits the discharge of hazardous substances,” “provides for
the cleanup of that discharge,” and imposes joint and several
liability on the responsible parties. See Magic Petroleum Corp.
v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 218 N.J. 390, 401-02 (2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted). As of 1991, the Spill Act also
permits those who clean up a contaminated site to seek
contribution from other liable parties. N.J.S.A. 58:10-
23.11f(a)(2)(a); L. 1991, c. 372. This case concerns the
application of a statute of limitations to that contribution
4
provision. The provision on which we are focused provides:
Whenever one or more dischargers or persons
cleans up and removes a discharge of a
hazardous substance, those dischargers and
persons shall have a right of contribution
against all other dischargers and persons in
any way responsible for a discharged hazardous
substance or other persons who are liable for
the cost of the cleanup and removal of that
discharge of a hazardous substance. In an
action for contribution, the contribution
plaintiffs need prove only that a discharge
occurred for which the contribution defendant
or defendants are liable pursuant to [N.J.S.A.
58:10-23.11g(c)], and the contribution
defendant shall have only the defenses to
liability available to parties pursuant to
[N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g(d)]. In resolving
contribution claims, a court may allocate the
costs of cleanup and removal among liable
parties using such equitable factors as the
court determines are appropriate.
[N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a) (emphasis
added).]
The incorporated section, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g(d), does not
contain a statute of limitations defense. To provide background
to the present question of statutory interpretation, a brief
summary of the three decades of history to this case follows.
B.
In 1979, plaintiff, Morristown Associates, purchased
commercial property located at 30 Lafayette Avenue in
Morristown, New Jersey. The property contained a strip-mall-
style shopping center known as Morristown Plaza. Among the
tenants of Morristown Plaza was Plaza Cleaners, a dry cleaning
5
business owned at the time by Robert Herring (Herring). Herring
and his wife had entered into a lease with the property’s
previous owner, Morris Center Associates, in 1976. Due to
construction, Herring was unable to occupy and operate Plaza
Cleaners until approximately January 1, 1978. At some point
before the move-in date, Herring installed a steam boiler in a
room at the rear of the leased space and an underground storage
tank (UST) beneath the concrete floor of that room; the UST held
fuel oil needed to operate the boiler. The boiler and UST were
installed to generate the heat and steam required for the dry
cleaning process. Fill and vent lines for the UST protruded
through an exterior wall of the building into an alleyway.
In 1985, Herring sold Plaza Cleaners to defendants Edward
and Amy Hsi (collectively the Hsis). The Hsis owned the
business until 1998 when it was sold to current owner and third-
party defendant, Byung Lee (Lee). The original boiler remained
in operation from the time the business opened in 1978 until
approximately November 2003; Lee later replaced it with a
natural-gas-fired boiler.
In 1993, as part of a proposed refinancing, plaintiff hired
Giorgio Engineering, P.C., to perform an environmental audit of
the Morristown Plaza property. Giorgio Engineering incorrectly
reported that there were no USTs on the site. In 1999, an UST
that served a ShopRite grocery store in Morristown Plaza leaked.
6
It was removed under the supervision of Morristown Plaza’s then
property manager, Ekstein Asset Management.1 Although Ekstein
Asset Management and the Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP) entered into a memorandum of agreement in respect of that
incident, Ekstein Asset Management failed to comply with DEP’s
remedial process; notwithstanding, DEP terminated the memorandum
of agreement on November 1, 2000.
Importantly, in August 2003, a monitoring of a well
installed near Plaza Cleaners’s UST revealed fuel oil
contamination. Plaintiff was informed that the UST used by
Plaza Cleaners might be the source. A subsequent investigation
revealed that although the UST was intact, the fill and vent
pipes were “severely deteriorated, with large holes along a
significant portion of their lengths.” Plaintiff’s experts
concluded that those holes had developed as early as 1988 and,
since that time, oil had been leaking from the pipes each time
the tank was filled. Each of the named oil company defendants
allegedly supplied fuel oil to Plaza Cleaners at various times
between 1988 and 2003. Those companies delivered varying
quantities of oil on a more or less monthly basis, filling the
1 Prior to 1995, the property was managed by Fidelity Management.
Ekstein Asset Management took over the role until 2002 when it
was returned to Fidelity Management.
7
UST from tanker trucks by means of the fill pipe located in the
alley wall.
Plaintiff took steps to remediate and clean up the
contamination and pursued a contribution claim against other
allegedly responsible parties. In its action, plaintiff
contends that, before 2003, it was unaware that any UST existed
on the property.
C.
On July 31, 2006, plaintiff filed an initial three-count
complaint naming as a defendant Grant Oil Company (Grant Oil).
Count one of the complaint asserted a claim under the Spill Act,
N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11 to -23.11z, seeking contribution for costs
related to the cleanup and removal of the fuel oil.
Between October 2007 and July 2009, plaintiff filed three
amended complaints, adding as defendants the Hsis and other
heating oil companies -- Able Energy, Parsippany Fuel Oil
Company (Parsippany Fuel), Petro Incorporated (Petro), Johnson
Oil Company (Johnson Oil), Meenan Oil Company (Meenan Oil) doing
business as Region Oil Company (Region Oil) as successor in
interest to Johnson Oil, and Spartan Oil Company (Spartan Oil).2
The heating oil companies filed answers, third-party complaints,
2 Prior to December 15, 1993, Region Oil was owned and operated
by Spartan Oil. Spartan Oil sold the assets of Region Oil to
Meenan Oil on that date.
8
cross-claims, and counter-claims. Lee and Multi Cleaners, Inc.,
doing business as Plaza Cleaners, were brought into the action
as third-party defendants.
Meanwhile, the parties engaged in extensive discovery. In
response to a series of motions, the trial court entered orders
barring proposed testimony by Robert Walters, plaintiff’s oil
delivery expert, and granting summary judgment in favor of
defendants on various claims against them. In particular, in
respect of the summary judgment motions, the trial court held
that the general six-year statute of limitations for injury to
real property, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1, applied to private claims for
contribution pursuant to the Spill Act and, as such, claims
against defendants for damage that had occurred more than six
years before that defendant was brought into the case were time-
barred. Further, after conducting a hearing pursuant to Lopez
v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 (1973),3 the trial court held that
plaintiff did not get the benefit of the Lopez discovery rule
because plaintiff should have discovered its claims when the
other leaking UST was found in 1999 on the ShopRite property.
3 At a Lopez hearing, a plaintiff whose claims are otherwise
subject to a statute of limitations may seek application of the
discovery rule, which prevents application of the statutory bar
if “a reasonable person in her circumstances would not have been
aware within the prescribed statutory period that she was
injured through the fault of another.” Kendall v. Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc., 209 N.J. 173, 194 (2012).
9
Accordingly, the court granted motions for summary judgment by
Spartan Oil, Petro, Johnson Oil, Meenan Oil doing business as
Region Oil, and the Hsis on statute of limitations grounds.
Able Energy’s motion for summary judgment was granted in part
and denied in part; the claims for damages based on deliveries
occurring in 2001 and 2002 were allowed to proceed. Grant Oil’s
and Parsippany Fuel’s motions for summary judgment were denied.
Following stipulations by the parties and the trial court’s
dismissal of the remaining claims, the trial court’s orders
became appealable as of right. See R. 2:2-3(a). On appeal to
the Appellate Division, plaintiff raised four alleged trial
court errors, one of which is relevant to this appeal.
Plaintiff contended that its claims were not untimely because
the six-year statute of limitations contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-
1 does not apply to Spill Act contribution claims. The
Appellate Division rejected that argument and affirmed the trial
court’s judgment in a published decision.
In doing so, the panel acknowledged Pitney Bowes, Inc. v.
Baker Industries, Inc., 277 N.J. Super. 484 (App. Div. 1994), in
which the Appellate Division held that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.1’s ten-
year statute of repose did not apply to bar a contribution
action under the Spill Act, and that that reasoning had been
applied in a 1999 unpublished decision to find a statute of
limitations defense inapplicable to Spill Act contribution
10
claims. However, the panel found that Pitney Bowes was not
controlling, distinguishing statutes of repose from statutes of
limitations. In its reasoning, the panel cited case law,
including decisions from this Court, that had found general
statutes of limitations applicable when particular statutes did
not set forth a specific limitation period. The panel also
noted that decisions of the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey had held that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1’s six-year
statute of limitations was applicable to Spill Act claims, and
it observed that applying a statute of limitations to the Spill
Act would be consistent with the approach taken in claims
brought under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-
9675.
Accordingly, the panel affirmed the trial court’s
application of the discovery rule based on the facts developed
at the Lopez hearing. Because of its holding on the statute of
limitations issue, the panel determined that it need not address
any other issues raised by the parties.
Plaintiff filed a petition for certification to this Court
that focused on whether the general six-year statute of
limitations applied to contribution claims under the Spill Act.
We granted certification. 216 N.J. 365 (2013). We also granted
amicus curiae status to the Innocent Landowners Group (Innocent
11
Landowners); Ironbound Community Corporation, The Association of
New Jersey Environmental Commissions, NY/NJ Baykeeper,
Environment New Jersey, The Delaware Riverkeeper Network, and
The New Jersey Work Environment Council (collectively
Environmental Amici); New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP); New Jersey State Bar Association (NJSBA); New
Jersey State League of Municipalities and New Jersey Institute
of Local Government Attorneys (collectively Municipal Amici);
and Passaic River Coalition (PRC).
II.
A.
Plaintiff argues that the Appellate Division erred in
holding that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1’s six-year statute of limitations
applies to Spill Act claims. Plaintiff points out that the
Spill Act itself contains no statute of limitations on filing
contribution claims and maintains that there is no “hard and
fast rule” requiring the application of a statute of limitations
when a statute is silent. Plaintiff contends that arguments to
the contrary are based on a mistaken interpretation of Montells
v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282 (1993), in which this Court concluded
that a general statute of limitations should apply to Law
Against Discrimination (LAD) claims where the LAD was silent on
the subject.
Plaintiff emphasizes that the section giving rise to a
12
contribution claim, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a), expressly
provides that the only defenses available to a defendant in a
contribution action are those prescribed in N.J.S.A 58:10-
23.11g(d). That cross-referenced section does not include a
statute of limitations defense.
Plaintiff also notes that the Legislature failed to include
a statute of limitations when it amended the Spill Act in 1991
to permit contribution claims, contrasting that omission with
the Legislature’s explicit inclusion of a statute of limitations
elsewhere in the Spill Act. Specifically, plaintiff points to
N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11k, which mandates that claims with the New
Jersey Spill Compensation Fund (Spill Fund) be made within one
year of the discovery of damage. According to plaintiff, that
specific inclusion of a statute of limitations evidences a
legislative intent to encourage the voluntary remediation of
contaminated sites and the filing of contribution actions.
Plaintiff also asserts that the Appellate Division’s
decision conflicts with an earlier, but well-known, unpublished
Appellate Division decision that found N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1’s
statute of limitations was inapplicable to the Spill Act, an
approach adopted in Pitney Bowes, supra. 277 N.J. Super. at
489-90 (holding statute of repose would not bar Spill Act
claim). Plaintiff argues that the Legislature’s failure to add
a statute of limitations defense to the statute, despite
13
amending it multiple times after those decisions, should be
understood as legislative agreement with those decisions.
From a policy perspective, plaintiff argues that imposing a
six-year statute of limitations would not encourage the speedy
remediation of contribution claims because environmental
remediation efforts can take long periods of time.
Additionally, plaintiff argues that the Spill Act has been
consistently given an expansive interpretation in order to
effectuate its purposes, and points to N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11x,
which provides that the Spill Act “shall be liberally
construed.”
B.
All defendants argue that the Appellate Division correctly
held that a six-year statute of limitations applies to
plaintiff’s Spill Act claims. The arguments are largely
consistent with one another and, accordingly, defendants’
arguments are summarized generally below.
Relying on an argument premised on Montells, supra,defendants argue that, in the absence of an explicit statute of
limitations, the court should apply the limitations period for
actions seeking comparable relief at common law, focusing on the
nature of the injury, not the legal theory of the individual
claim. Because the injury to plaintiff is damage to real
property, defendants assert that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 governs.
14
Defendants highlight the language of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 that
states that it should be applied in “[e]very action at law” for
injury to real property. Presumably, defendants argue, the
Legislature was aware of this general statute of limitations
when it enacted the Spill Act. Thus, the Legislature’s failure
to expressly prohibit a statute of limitations supports the
application of the limit established in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1. As
additional support, defendants cite a number of federal court
decisions for the District of New Jersey that apply New Jersey
law and conclude that the general six-year statute of
limitations applies to Spill Act claims.
Defendants argue that plaintiff misreads N.J.S.A. 58:10-
23.11g(d)’s limitation of available defenses. Defendants
contend that plaintiff takes out of context the phrase that
identifies defenses, namely the language that reads, “an act
. . . caused solely by war, sabotage, or God . . . shall be the
only defenses which may be raised.” Defendants note that the
section later references owners or operators of major facilities
or vessels and argue that the provision serves to limit defenses
available to defendants that meet that criteria. Defendants
further argue that the Spill Act’s list of available defenses
should not be read to exclude all other defenses because a
defendant presumably maintains other unlisted, procedural
defenses.
15
Defendants assert that plaintiff’s reliance on Pitney Bowes
and related non-precedential case law is misplaced. Defendants
highlight that Pitney Bowes dealt with a statute of repose, not
a statute of limitations.
Finally, as a matter of policy, defendants argue that
imposing a limit will encourage prompt investigation of
contamination claims and seeking of contribution from
potentially responsible parties. Defendants further submit that
responsible parties are more likely to be held accountable if a
statute of limitations is imposed because, as time passes,
businesses may disappear or go bankrupt.
C.
Six groups of organizations and individuals were granted
leave to appear as amici in this case. With the exception of
the NJSBA,4 each of the amici argues that the Appellate Division
incorrectly held that a six-year statute of limitations applies
to Spill Act contribution claims. The amici largely echo
plaintiff’s argument and offer further support for concluding
4 While the NJSBA notes that “practitioners have long understood
that New Jersey courts will not apply a statute of limitations
to a claim for contribution under the Spill Act,” it proceeds
with its argument assuming the Court holds otherwise. NJSBA
principally argues that any decision applying a statute of
limitations should have prospective effect, and that the statute
of limitations should not begin to run at the time of discovery.
Because we find the statute of limitations inapplicable, we do
not address those arguments.
16
that no statute of limitations applies to Spill Act claims. To
the extent that the amici provide practical insight into the
implications of imposing a statute of limitations on Spill Act
contribution claims, we summarize their comments below.
Innocent Landowners outlines the steps taken during the
remedial investigation phase of a site contamination,
emphasizing the length of time the process may take. As such,
Innocent Landowners argues that a filing limit will not
accelerate remedial investigation. Innocent Landowners asserts
that a six-year statute of limitations would subject innocent
owners of contaminated property to de facto liability for
cleanup costs and, correspondingly, permit dischargers of
hazardous material to avoid liability. Finally, Innocent
Landowners asserts that imposing a six-year limit will interpose
tremendous turmoil into Spill Act contribution claims already
filed in the trial courts.
DEP argues that applying a statute of limitations to Spill
Act contribution claims frustrates its ability to achieve the
Spill Act’s purposes. Estimating that seventy-two percent of
the sites currently in the Site Remediation Program are being
remediated by private entities, DEP notes that the viability of
private contribution actions is critical to remediation efforts.
Moreover, DEP asserts that applying a statute of limitations
impedes the ability to collect from those actually responsible,
17
undermining the legislative purpose of the Spill Act. DEP also
contends that the Appellate Division’s opinion frustrates its
ability to enforce the Spill Act by raising uncertainty as to
what other defenses not explicitly provided by the statute may
be added by the courts.
Municipal Amici advise that the Spill Act is an important
tool used by New Jersey municipalities to obtain funds for
remediating contaminated properties. They assert that if the
ability to bring contribution actions is limited, local
taxpayers will bear a greater burden in the cleanup of polluted
sites. Municipal Amici also draw attention to the Industrial
Site Recovery Act (ISRA), N.J.S.A. 13:1K-6 to -13.1, which
provides that when a municipality cleans up a contaminated
property acquired through foreclosure on a tax sale, “all
expenditures incurred in the remediation shall be a debt of the
immediate past owner or operator of the industrial
establishment.” N.J.S.A. 13:1K-9.3. ISRA contains no statute
of limitations. Noting that ISRA was passed the same year that
the contribution provision was added to the Spill Act, Municipal
Amici argue that it would be illogical for a municipality to be
able to recover without a time limitation under ISRA, if a
property was acquired through foreclosure pertaining to a
certificate of tax sale, but not under the Spill Act, when a
property was acquired through purchase or eminent domain.
18
Highlighting the volume of “Known Contaminated Sites”
requiring remediation in New Jersey, Environmental Amici echo
the argument that imposing a statute of limitations would
undermine the Spill Act’s purpose by limiting the ability of the
party conducting a cleanup to seek contribution from those
responsible for the pollution. Environmental Amici express
concern about the impact that the Appellate Division’s judgment,
if affirmed, would have on the State’s “ability to ensure that
its citizens can drink clean water, take their children to
chemical-free playgrounds and build their homes on
uncontaminated land.”
PRC argues that applying a statute of limitations to Spill
Act claims will result in unnecessary litigation and will have a
“chilling effect” on cooperation between potentially responsible
parties. Such an effect, PRC asserts, would be a waste of
judicial resources and would shift party resources away from the
investigation and cleanup activities the Spill Act is designed
to promote.
III.
A.
To provide context to our construction of the contribution
provision, we begin with the Spill Act’s basic liability
structure. As originally enacted, the Spill Act scheme
contemplated that most cleanup actions would be conducted by DEP
19
using monies from the Spill Fund where needed. See L. 1976,
c. 141, § 7 (“Whenever any hazardous substance is discharged,
[DEP] shall act to remove or arrange for the removal of such
discharge, unless it determines such removal will be done
properly and expeditiously by the owner or operator of the major
facility or any other source from which the discharge occurs.”).
In addition, the original version of the Spill Act focused
primarily on the claims for damages that could be brought
against the Spill Fund and on the liability of dischargers for
costs incurred by DEP. See id. §§ 12-15 (describing procedures
associated with claims for damages against Spill Fund); id.
§ 3(d) (“‘Cleanup and removal costs’ means all costs associated
with a discharge incurred by the State or its political
subdivisions or their agents or any person with written approval
from [DEP] . . . .”).
The Spill Act created the Spill Fund “to finance the
prevention and cleanup of oil spills and hazardous-waste
discharges and to compensate . . . people damaged by such
discharges.” Buonviaggio, supra, 122 N.J. at 8; see L. 1976, c.
141. The Spill Act scheme made “[t]he fund . . . strictly
liable, without regard to fault, for all cleanup and removal
costs and for all direct and indirect damages no matter by whom
sustained.” L. 1976, c. 141, § 8(a). Cleanup and removal costs
were originally defined as
20
all costs associated with a discharge incurred
by the State or its political subdivisions or
their agents or any person with written
approval from [DEP] in the (1) removal or
attempted removal of hazardous substances or,
(2) taking of reasonable measures to prevent
or mitigate damages to the public health,
safety, or welfare.
[Id. § 3(d).]
Damages were defined more broadly as including the cost to
repair or replace damaged personal or real property, any lost
income or loss of earning capacity due to property damage, any
reduction in property value, the cost of restoring or replacing
natural resources (if possible), the loss of tax revenue by
State or local government, and the interest on loans obtained to
ameliorate damage pending payment of the claim. Id. § 8(a)(1)-
(5).
As initially established, under the liability section of
the Spill Act, the Spill Fund could recover damages up to
certain limits “without regard to fault” against owners and
operators of major facilities or vessels, subject only “to the
defenses enumerated in subsection [(d)] of this section.” Id. §
8(b). If the discharge was the result of “gross negligence,”
“willful misconduct,” or “a gross or willful violation of
applicable safety, construction or operating standards or
regulations,” the owner or operator would “be liable [to the
fund] for the full amount of such damages.” Ibid.
21
The Spill Act further provided that “[d]amages which may be
recovered from, or by, any other person shall be limited to
those authorized by common or statutory law.” Ibid. However,
in contrast to that limitation on the recovery of damages, the
Spill Act provided that “[a]ny person who has discharged a
hazardous substance shall be strictly liable, without regard to
fault, for all cleanup and removal costs.” Id. § 8(c) (emphasis
added). Available defenses were limited. Owners and operators
of major facilities or vessels could only raise as defenses
“[a]n act or omission caused solely by war, sabotage,
governmental negligence, God, or a third party or a combination
thereof.” Id. § 8(d). “Any other person” could raise “any
defense authorized by common or statutory law.” Ibid.
In 1979, subsection (b) of the Spill Act’s liability
section was revised to provide that, if a discharge was the
result of gross negligence or willful misconduct, or a gross or
willful violation, “the owner or operator shall be liable,
jointly and severally, for the full amount of such damages.” L.
1979, c. 346, § 5(b) (emphasis added). Subsection (c) was
revised to broaden the class of persons who could be held liable
and to clarify that the liability was joint and several. Id. §
5(c). And, subsection (d) was revised to provide that
[a]n act or omission caused solely by war,
sabotage, or God, or a combination thereof,
shall be the only defenses which may be raised
22
by any owner or operator of a major facility
or vessel responsible for a discharge in any
action arising under the provisions of this
act.
[Id. § 5(d).]
The sentence in subsection (d) specifying that common law
and statutory defenses are available to other persons was
deleted in the 1979 amendments, although the reference to a
similar limitation on the recovery of damages from such persons
in subsection (b) was left untouched. The Sponsor’s Statement
to the bill described those amendments as follows:
This section would be amended to specifically
provide for joint and several liability of
dischargers for cleanup and removal costs and
for damages from spills of hazardous
substances. This section also has been
amended to remove the defenses to strict
liability which exists under the present law.
[Assemb. 3542 (Sponsor’s Statement), 198th
Leg. (1979).]
Further, in 1991, subsection (c) of the liability section
was amended to read, in relevant part: “Any person who has
discharged a hazardous substance, or is in any way responsible
for any hazardous substance, shall be strictly liable, jointly
and severally, without regard to fault, for all cleanup and
removal costs no matter by whom incurred.” L. 1991, c. 85, § 4
(emphasis added). None of the statements accompanying the bill
discussed that particular amendment.
Thus, following those amendments, and at all times relevant
23
to this action, the liability section of the Spill Act has
provided, in relevant part, as follows:
a. The fund shall be strictly liable, without
regard to fault, for all cleanup and removal
costs and for all direct and indirect damages
no matter by whom sustained . . . .
b. The damages which may be recovered by the
fund, without regard to fault, subject to the
defenses enumerated in subsection d. of this
section against the owner or operator of a
major facility or vessel, shall not exceed
$50,000,000.00 for each major facility or
$1,200 per gross ton for each vessel, except
that such maximum limitation shall not apply
and the owner or operator shall be liable,
jointly and severally, for the full amount of
such damages if it can be shown that such
discharge was the result of (1) gross
negligence or willful misconduct, within the
knowledge and privity of the owner, operator
or person in charge, or (2) a gross or willful
violation of applicable safety, construction
or operating standards or regulations.
Damages which may be recovered from, or by,
any other person shall be limited to those
authorized by common or statutory law.
c. (1) . . . [A]ny person who has discharged
a hazardous substance, or is in any way
responsible for any hazardous substance, shall
be strictly liable, jointly and severally,
without regard to fault, for all cleanup and
removal costs no matter by whom incurred. . . .
d. (1) In addition to those defenses provided
in this subsection [for persons who purchased
property after 1993 without knowledge of or
responsibility for a prior discharge], an act
or omission caused solely by war, sabotage, or
God, or a combination thereof, shall be the
only defenses which may be raised by any owner
or operator of a major facility or vessel
responsible for a discharge in any action
arising under the provisions of this act.
24
[N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g.]
B.
As noted, when originally enacted, the Spill Act’s scheme
contemplated that most cleanup actions would be conducted by
DEP, using monies from the Spill Fund where needed. See L.
1976, c. 141, § 7 (“Whenever [DEP] acts to remove a discharge or
contracts to secure prospective removal services, it is
authorized to draw upon the money available in the fund.”).
However, based on the Spill Act’s development of joint and
several strict liability, any responsible party, even if only
partially responsible, can be required to pay the entire cost of
the cleanup. Magic Petroleum Corp., supra, 218 N.J. at 402. As
a result, and as the parties in this matter underscore,
remediation actions are now often undertaken by private parties
acting through an agreement with DEP.5 The prevalence of private
party actions by remediating parties, which include demands for
contribution by other responsible parties not subject to an
agreement with the DEP, revealed to policy makers an ambiguity
in the Spill Act. The Legislature recognized that, “[i]n the
normal course of tort law, this person would have a right of
5 In 2009, the Legislature amended existing legislation governing
remediation procedures, L. 2009, c. 60, to require remediation
to proceed under the supervision of a licensed site remediation
professional, without prior approval from DEP. N.J.S.A. 58:10B-
1.3(a), (b).
25
contribution, the right to collect money from others jointly
responsible for the costs.” Assemb. 3659 (Sponsor’s Statement),
204th Leg. (1991). However, the Spill Act had not set forth a
contribution right. See ibid. Accordingly, the Legislature
amended the Spill Act in 1991 expressly to “allow[] those
parties who enter into an agreement with [DEP] to remove a
hazardous discharge to seek contribution from those responsible
parties who have not entered into such an agreement.” Ibid.
The contribution provision of the Spill Act, which has not been
significantly modified since its enactment, currently provides
as follows:
Whenever one or more dischargers or persons
cleans up and removes a discharge of a
hazardous substance, those dischargers and
persons shall have a right of contribution
against all other dischargers and persons in
any way responsible for a discharged hazardous
substance or other persons who are liable for
the cost of the cleanup and removal of that
discharge of a hazardous substance. In an
action for contribution, the contribution
plaintiffs need prove only that a discharge
occurred for which the contribution defendant
or defendants are liable pursuant to [N.J.S.A.
58:10-23.11g(c)], and the contribution
defendant shall have only the defenses to
liability available to parties pursuant to
[N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g(d)]. In resolving
contribution claims, a court may allocate the
costs of cleanup and removal among liable
parties using such equitable factors as the
court determines are appropriate.
[N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a); see also
L. 1991, c. 372, § 1 (enacting contribution
provision).]
26
N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g(c), which is cross-referenced in this
contribution provision, provides that “any person who has
discharged a hazardous substance, or is in any way responsible
for any hazardous substance, shall be strictly liable, jointly
and severally, without regard to fault, for all cleanup and
removal costs,” while N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g(d), which is also
cross-referenced, provides that “an act or omission caused
solely by war, sabotage, or God, or a combination thereof, shall
be the only defenses which may be raised by any owner or
operator of a major facility or vessel responsible for a
discharge.”6
IV.
Our task in this appeal involves construction of the Spill
Act; specifically, whether a statute of limitations should apply
to contribution claims authorized by the Spill Act. When
construing a statutory provision, a court’s role is to discern
and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. DiProspero v.
Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005). To do so, we focus on the plain
language of the statute because it is “the best indicator” of
the Legislature’s intent. In re Plan for the Abolition of the
6 For completeness we note that in 1993, after the contribution
provision was enacted, the Legislature added subsection (d)(2),
creating a specific new defense for innocent subsequent
purchasers of property. N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g(d)(2); L. 1993,
c. 139, § 44.
27
Council on Affordable Hous., 214 N.J. 444, 467 (2013).
Statutory language should be interpreted in accordance with
common sense in order to effectuate the legislative purpose.
N.E.R.I. Corp. v. N.J. Highway Auth., 147 N.J. 223, 236 (1996).
Further, when discerning legislative purpose and intent, the
Court can consider the entire legislative scheme of which a
particular provision is but a part. See Kimmelman v. Henkels &
McCoy, Inc., 108 N.J. 123, 129 (1987). Here the Legislature
expressly stated its intended general purposes upon enactment of
the Spill Act. A central Spill Act purpose is “to provide
liability for damage sustained within this State as a result of
any discharge of [petroleum products and other hazardous]
substances, by requiring the prompt containment and removal of
such pollution and substances.” N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11a.
By its terms, the Spill Act provides a right of
contribution for “dischargers or persons [who] clean[] up and
remove[] a discharge of a hazardous substance” against “all
other dischargers and persons in any way responsible for a
discharged hazardous substance or other persons who are liable
for the cost of the cleanup and removal.” N.J.S.A.
58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a). Neither this provision, nor any other
provision in the Spill Act, sets forth a statute of limitations
applicable to such contribution actions or states that a statute
28
of limitations is not applicable.7
None of the parties contest that, if a statute of
limitations provision is applicable to Spill Act claims, then
N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 would provide the appropriate statute of
limitations; we agree with that assessment. However, the
question remains what import to give to the Legislature’s
silence as to whether a statute of limitations was intended to
be applicable at all.
Here, while the contribution provision does not explicitly
state that no statute of limitations applies, it does state that
“[a] contribution defendant shall have only the defenses to
liability available to parties pursuant to [N.J.S.A.
58:10-23.11g(d)].” N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a) (emphasis
added). The language of the statute expressly restricting the
defenses available under the Spill Act provides significant
support for a conclusion that no statute of limitations applies.
7 In this regard, the Spill Act differs markedly from CERCLA,
which explicitly contains a statute of limitations applicable to
contribution claims. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(g)(3); see also N.J.
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Dimant, 212 N.J. 153, 178-80 (2012)
(noting several differences between Spill Act and CERCLA).
Notably, as originally enacted, CERCLA did not contain a statute
of limitations; however, in 1986, CERCLA was amended to add both
a contribution action and a corresponding statute of
limitations. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 113, 100 Stat. 1613. Although the
Spill Act was amended in 1991 to add the contribution provision,
the Legislature did not add the corresponding statute of
limitations. L. 1991, c. 372.
29
The Spill Act’s incorporation of the defenses enumerated in
N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g(d) limits defendants to the following
defenses: “an act or omission caused solely by war, sabotage,
or God, or a combination thereof.” That list does not include a
statute of limitations defense.
Although, as defendants argue, past case law does provide
some basis to argue for the application of a default statute of
limitations when a statute is silent on such defenses, see,
e.g., Montells, supra, 133 N.J. 282, here the Spill Act is not
silent. The Spill Act enumerates the only defenses specified as
available to contribution defendants and a statute of
limitations defense is not included. Thus, this matter is
unlike Montells, supra, because the Legislature here made an
effort to set forth the defenses that would provide relief from
contribution liability.8 While an express prohibition against
application of the statute of limitations set forth in N.J.S.A.
2A:14-1 would have made the contribution provision explicitly
clear, the legislative choice to proceed by listing the defenses
that would be permitted provides insight into legislative
intent.
8 In light of our rejection of Montells’s applicability in our
analysis, we find it unnecessary to further discuss federal case
law that relied on Montells when determining to apply a statute
of limitations to Spill Act claims. See, e.g., New W. Urban
Renewal Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 909 F. Supp. 219, 228
(D.N.J. 1995).
30
Moreover, we agree with plaintiff and amici that the
Legislature’s reference to the subsection (d) defenses reveals
an intent to incorporate the substantive defenses listed,
without regard to the individual that the section dictates can
assert the defense. The argument is logical and remains true to
the plain language of the statute. The contribution provision
refers to the “defenses” available in subsection (d), and the
defenses enumerated in subsection (d) are independent of the
individuals authorized by that subsection to assert them.
Significantly, we reject defendants’ argument that a reading of
the contribution provision that excludes all other defenses
deprives a defendant of other unlisted defenses that should
presumably be maintained, such as challenges to venue, service
of process, and subject matter jurisdiction. Such defenses are
established by court rules under the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and are not subject to overriding legislation. Statutes
of limitations, by contrast, are a product of the Legislature.
See State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47, 55 (1993) (noting that once
Legislature creates statute of limitations, “that statute
bec[o]me[s] binding on the courts”).
In sum, the plain text supports that the Legislature
intended to include no statute of limitations defense for
contribution defendants. A common-sense reading of the plain
language chosen by the Legislature supports that construction.
31
The “only defenses” available to contribution claims were to be
the ones to which the Legislature specifically referred.
Furthermore, the construction we adopt supports the
longstanding view, expressed by the Legislature and adhered to
by the courts, that the Spill Act is remedial legislation
designed to cast a wide net over those responsible for hazardous
substances and their discharge on the land and waters of this
state. See Pitney Bowes, supra, 277 N.J. Super. at 490 (noting
that Spill Act’s “broad imposition of strict liability excepts
no one actually responsible for that environmental
contamination”); see generally State, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v.
Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 493 (1983) (“Those who poison the
land must pay for its cure.”). The Legislature could not have
intended to permit its imposition of contribution liability on
culpable dischargers to be frustrated by the imposition of a
general and prior enacted, but unreferenced, statute of
limitations.9 Where the Legislature intended to include a
statute of limitations within the Spill Act, it has said so.
See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11k. Accordingly, we will not add
to its list of identified defenses based on an inference from
its silence about statutes of limitations specifically.
9 In fact, plaintiff and amici point to serious practical
consequences that would undermine the legislative objective to
apply strict liability to all responsible parties due to the
often difficult task of identifying all of those parties.
32
Although we do not find the language of the statute to be
ambiguous, we note for completeness that the legislative history
supports our construction. When “the plain language of a
statute is ambiguous or open to more than one plausible
meaning,” the Court may look to extrinsic evidence such as
legislative history in determining legislative intent. State v.
Marquez, 202 N.J. 485, 500 (2010); Marino v. Marino, 200 N.J.
315, 329 (2009). Most notably, in amending the Spill Act in
1979, the Legislature deleted the aspect of subsection (d) of
the liability section providing that persons, other than owners
or operators of major facilities or vessels, “shall have
available to him any defense authorized by common or statutory
law.” L. 1979, c. 346, § 5(d). The Sponsor’s Statement
accompanying that amendment stated that “[t]his section . . .
has been amended to remove the defenses to strict liability
which exist[] under the present law,” Assemb. 3542 (Sponsor’s
Statement), 198th Leg. (1979), evidencing a specific legislative
intent to eliminate other otherwise available defenses.
Our role is simply to discern as best we can legislative
intent and to implement that intent. We do so here by giving
effect to the words of the Legislature. In doing so, we do not
unsettle a decades-long understanding in this State that no
limitations period restricts contribution claims against
responsible parties. See Pitney Bowes, supra, 277 N.J. Super.
33at 487-90. To a certain extent, legislative acquiescence in the
approach historically taken by the courts of this state figures
into our consideration. If the Legislature intended something
other than what we perceive to be a broad approach to holding
parties responsible for their role in polluting the land and
waters of New Jersey, then legislative correction can fix any
interpretive misunderstanding. However, but for such
correction, we see no reason to interpose in these factually
complex cases a new requirement to determine when one knew of a
discharge in order to afford the remediating party the
contribution right that the Spill Act confers as against all
other responsible parties. We decline to handicap the Spill
Act’s intentionally broad effect in such manner. We add only
that our holding does not negatively affect responsible parties
under the Spill Act any more than the Act already has by virtue
of its imposition of contribution liability.
V.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the
matter remanded for consideration of the unaddressed issues
raised on appeal.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-
VINA, and SOLOMON; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion.
34
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
NO. A-38 SEPTEMBER TERM 2013
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
MORRISTOWN ASSOCIATES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GRANT OIL COMPANY, ABLE
ENERGY, PARSIPPANY FULE OIL,
EDWARD HIS and AMY HIS and
SPARTAN OIL COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents.
DECIDED January 26, 2014
Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia
CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
REVERSE AND
CHECKLIST
REMAND
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X
JUSTICE ALBIN X
JUSTICE PATTERSON X
JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA X
JUSTICE SOLOMON X
JUDGE CUFF (t/a) X
TOTALS 7
1