Joseph Vanderslice v. Harold Stewart and Camden County (073362) , 220 N.J. 385 ( 2015 )

SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)
Joseph Vanderslice v. Harold Stewart (A-58-13) (073362)
Argued November 10, 2014 -- Decided January 29, 2015
SOLOMON, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers the impact of a court clerk’s failure to notify a party that the form of
payment filed with a notice rejecting an arbitration award and demanding a trial de novo (demand) was
nonconforming pursuant to Rule 1:5-6(c)(1)(A).
Harold Stewart, a sergeant in Camden County’s Fire Police Department, was involved in a motor vehicle
accident with plaintiff Joseph Vanderslice while operating a Camden County vehicle. Plaintiff filed a complaint
against Camden County, the Camden County Fire Police Department, and Stewart (defendants), alleging personal
injuries sustained as a result of the accident. The case was referred to mandatory, non-binding arbitration, as
required by New Jersey’s court rules.
On January 18, 2012, an arbitration panel determined that defendants were 100% liable for plaintiff’s
injuries, and awarded $145,970 for noneconomic damages and lost wages. The next day, defendants submitted the
required demand forms to the Camden County Arbitration Administrator, an employee in the Superior Court’s Civil
Division who manages arbitration proceedings on behalf of the county clerk. Attached to defendants’ demand was a
payment voucher, which gave the recipient the right to draw upon Camden County’s account with the State
Treasury. The Arbitration Administrator signed the voucher and sent it to the State Treasurer for payment, and the
Treasurer issued a check on February 17, exactly thirty days after the arbitration award was filed.
On February 19, thirty-two days after the award, the Arbitration Administrator received the check.
However, because the check was not received within thirty days of the arbitration award as required by Rule 4:21A-
6(b)(1), the clerk did not file the demand or deposit the check. Neither the clerk nor the Arbitration Administrator
informed defendants of their nonconforming payment. Rather, defendants were alerted to the issue when, on
February 23, plaintiff moved to confirm the arbitration award and enter judgment. Defendants opposed the motion
and asked the trial court to permit a late filing. Concluding that defendants had substantially complied with the
court rules, the court permitted the late filing and rejected plaintiff’s motion to confirm the award and enter
judgment. The case proceeded to trial and the jury returned a verdict of “no cause of action” in favor of defendants.
Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court should not have permitted defendants’ late filing, and that the
arbitration award should have been confirmed and judgment entered for plaintiff. In an unpublished decision, the
Appellate Division determined that defendants’ demand was filed too late, reversed the trial court, and remanded the
matter for entry of an order confirming the arbitration award and entering judgment in plaintiff’s favor. The Court
granted defendants’ petition for certification. 217 N.J. 286 (2014).
HELD: Defendants’ demand was not filed out of time. Thus, the Appellate Division’s judgment is reversed and the
jury’s verdict is reinstated. Because the Court finds that defendants’ notice was timely, it does not reach the issue of
the standard for expanding the thirty-day time limit under Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1).
1. This matter involves an interpretation of the court rules governing mandatory arbitration. Rule 4:21A-1(a)(1)
provides that “[a]ll tort actions arising out of the operation, ownership, maintenance or use of an automobile shall be
submitted to arbitration[.]” A dissatisfied party may have the arbitration panel’s decision reviewed de novo by the
Superior Court by filing the demand forms and a $200 check, “payable to the ‘Treasurer, State of New Jersey,’” R.
4:21A-6(c), “within thirty days after filing of the arbitration award,” R. 4:21A-6(b)(1). (p. 6).
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2. Documents in civil actions are deemed filed when the original is received by “the deputy clerk of the Superior
Court in the county of venue.” R. 1:5-6(b)(1). Once received, the clerk “may notify the person filing if such papers
do not conform[.]” R. 1:5-6(c) (emphasis added). However, if the required filing fee is not paid, “the paper[s] shall
be returned stamped ‘Received but not Filed (date).’” R. 1:5-6(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). This procedure affords
notice to the party seeking a trial de novo that its form of payment has been deemed deficient. In those
circumstances, Rule 1:5-6(c)(1) provides for both mandatory notice and a ten-day window during which the filing
party may cure their error. (pp. 6-7)
3. It is clear that the court rules elevate a litigant’s right to pursue a claim over the procedural bars resulting from
technical filing defects. Indeed, the Court has held that the failure to include the required fee should not defeat a
filing that was otherwise proper and within time. Similarly, the comment to Rule 1:5-6(c)(1) explains that technical
defects should not serve to defeat an otherwise valid filing, but rather “the original filing date is protected if the fee
which should have accompanied the filing is transmitted within 10 days.” Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court
Rules, comment 3 on R. 1:5-6 at 72-73 (2015). Because it recognizes that technical defects should not serve to
defeat an otherwise validly filed demand, the Court concludes that Rule 1:5-6(c)(1) is the correct frame of reference
(p. 8)
4. In Flett Associates v. S.D. Catalano, Inc., 361 N.J. Super. 127, 129 (App. Div. 2003), the Appellate Division
considered the effect of a delay in serving the opposing party with a demand for a trial de novo under Rule 4:21A-
6(b)(1), which governs the filing deadlines and procedures following an arbitrator’s award. The panel held correctly
that, “a delay in satisfaction of the service requirement does not have the same deleterious effect upon efficient
administration of the arbitration program as a failure to file the demand within time.” Id. at 134. Rule 4:21A-
6(b)(1) sets a short deadline for filing a trial de novo demand to ensure that the court will promptly schedule trials in
cases that cannot be resolved by arbitration. This short deadline compounds the dangers of faulty filings because
actions that are subject to mandatory arbitration will be dismissed administratively if a party does not move to
dismiss or confirm the arbitration award within fifty days of its filing. R. 4:21A-6(b)(2),(3). Thus, in the context of
a demand for trial de novo, the mandatory notice provisions of Rule 1:5-6(c)(1) are critical. (p. 9)
5. In this case, defendants submitted their demand one day after the arbitration panel made its decision. The
Arbitration Administrator forwarded the voucher to the State Treasurer the following day. The clerk was then
required by Rule 1:5-6(c)(1)(A) to notify defendants that the form of payment was nonconforming. Parties such as
defendants whose filings are deficient are entitled to ten days from the date of the clerk’s notice to bring the filing
into conformity with the applicable rule. Because notice of defendants’ deficient filing was never transmitted by the
clerk, the ten-day period to cure never began to run. Defendants received actual notice of the deficiency on
February 23, four days after the deficiency had been cured. By any measure, the conforming check was not received
by the county clerk’s office out of time. (pp. 9-10)
6. Because the Court determines that defendants’ filing was timely, it does not analyze the additional question
presented in this appeal: whether substantial compliance or extraordinary circumstances is the proper standard for
the consideration of a motion to relax the thirty-day limit of Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1). (p. 10)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for
reinstatement of the judgment in favor of defendants.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, and FERNANDEZ-
VINA; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion.
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SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-58 September Term 2013
073362
JOSEPH VANDERSLICE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
HAROLD STEWART, CAMDEN COUNTY
FIRE POLICE DEPARTMENT, and
CAMDEN COUNTY,
Defendants-Appellants.
Argued November 10, 2014 – Decided January 29, 2015
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Howard L. Goldberg, First Assistant County
Counsel, argued the cause for appellants
(Sherri L. Schweitzer, Camden County
Counsel, attorney; Mr. Goldberg, William H.
Kenney, and Tara L. Humma, Assistants County
Counsel, on the briefs).
Patricia B. Quelch argued the cause for
respondent (Helmer, Conley & Kasselman,
attorneys).
JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we are asked to consider three issues: first,
the impact of a court clerk’s failure to notify a party that the
form of payment filed with a notice rejecting an arbitration
award and demanding a trial de novo (demand) was nonconforming
pursuant to Rule 1:5-6(c)(1)(A); second, whether “extraordinary
circumstances” is the appropriate standard for expanding the
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thirty-day time limit to file a demand; and third, if so,
whether the failure of the clerk to notify a filing party
pursuant to Rule 1:5-6(c)(1)(A) satisfies that standard.
Because we hold that defendants’ demand was not filed out
of time, we reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment and
reinstate the jury’s verdict. Therefore, we need not reach the
issue of the standard for expanding the thirty-day time limit
under Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1).
I.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Harold Stewart, a
sergeant in Camden County’s Fire Police Department, while
operating a Camden County vehicle, was involved in a motor
vehicle accident with plaintiff Joseph Vanderslice. Plaintiff
filed a complaint against Camden County, the Camden County Fire
Police Department, and Stewart (defendants), alleging personal
injuries sustained as a result of the accident. The case was
referred to mandatory, non-binding arbitration, as required by
our court rules.
On January 18, 2012, an arbitration panel determined that
defendants were 100% liable for plaintiff’s injuries, and
awarded $145,970 for noneconomic damages and lost wages. The
2
next day, defendants submitted the required demand forms to the
Camden County Arbitration Administrator.1
Attached to defendants’ demand was a payment voucher -- a
writing that gave the recipient the right to draw upon Camden
County’s account with the State Treasury.2 The Arbitration
Administrator signed the voucher and sent it to the State
Treasurer for payment. The Treasurer issued a check on February
17, exactly thirty days after the arbitration award was filed.
On February 19, thirty-two days after the award, the Arbitration
Administrator received the check. However, because the
Arbitration Administrator concluded that the check was not
received within thirty days of the arbitration award as required
by Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1), the clerk did not file the demand or
deposit the check.
Although Rule 1:5-6(c)(1)(A) required the clerk to notify
defendants of their error, neither the clerk nor the Arbitration
Administrator informed defendants of their nonconforming
1 The Arbitration Administrator, although an employee in the
Superior Court’s Civil Division and not the clerk’s office,
manages arbitration proceedings on behalf of the county clerk.
2 Black’s Law Dictionary defines voucher as “[a] written or
printed authorization to disburse money.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 766 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 3rd pocket ed. 2006). New
Jersey’s use of the term “voucher” is, in this context,
consistent with that definition. See Franklin Tower One v.
N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 608-09 & n.1 (1999) (explaining procedures
by which private landlords receive compensation from state and
federal governments under the Section 8 voucher program).
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payment. Rather, defendants were alerted that the demand had
not been filed when, on February 23, plaintiff moved to confirm
the arbitration award and enter judgment. Defendants opposed
the motion and asked the trial court to permit a late filing.
Concluding that defendants had substantially complied with the
court rules, the court permitted the late filing and rejected
plaintiff’s motion to confirm the award and enter judgment. The
case proceeded to trial and the jury returned a verdict of “no
cause of action” in favor of defendants.
Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court should not
have permitted defendants’ late filing, and that the arbitration
award should have been confirmed and judgment entered for
plaintiff. In an unpublished decision, the Appellate Division
determined that defendants’ demand was filed too late, reversed
the trial court, and remanded the matter for entry of an order
confirming the arbitration award and entering judgment in
plaintiff’s favor. The appellate panel reasoned that defendants
failed to show extraordinary circumstances justifying the late
filing of their demand. We granted defendants’ petition for
certification. Vanderslice v. Stewart, 217 N.J. 286 (2014).
II.
Defendants contend before this Court that filing documents
“encompasses a process and is not a single event.” They argue
that process is governed in part by Rule 1:5-6(c)(1)(A), which
4
requires the clerk to provide written notice to a litigant who
submitted a nonconforming filing fee. In addition, defendants
argue that the Appellate Division failed to recognize the
obligations of the clerk, and that filing is a process involving
multiple actors rather than a discrete event dependent on the
actions of one party.
Defendants also assert that they substantially complied
with the filing requirements. They maintain that the issue here
requires application of a court rule, not a statute; thus the
appropriate standard is “substantial compliance” rather than
“extraordinary circumstances.” Alternatively, defendants argue
that “substantial compliance coupled with the lack of notice and
an opportunity to cure constitutes an extraordinary
circumstance.”
Plaintiff counters that Rule 1:5-6(c)(3) requires rejection
of a demand for trial de novo if it is not filed within thirty
days of the arbitration award. Plaintiff also contends that the
county clerk is not required to provide a party whose filings
are deficient an opportunity to cure. Therefore, defendants’
only recourse was to file a motion to relax the thirty-day time
limitation for filing a demand under Rule 4:21A-6, which
requires a showing of extraordinary circumstances. Plaintiff
also argues for application of the extraordinary circumstances
standard set forth in Flagg v. Township of Hazlet, 321 N.J.
5
Super. 256, 260 (App. Div. 1999), which held that courts should
find extraordinary circumstances only in unique situations.
Plaintiff contends that a payment deficiency is too common to
qualify as an extraordinary circumstance.
III.
Because this matter involves an interpretation of the court
rules governing mandatory arbitration, which is a question of
law, we undertake a de novo review. See State ex rel. A.B., 219
N.J. 542, 554-55 (2014). Our analysis begins with a review of
those rules.
A.
Rule 4:21A-1(a)(1) provides that “[a]ll tort actions
arising out of the operation, ownership, maintenance or use of
an automobile shall be submitted to arbitration[.]” A
dissatisfied party may have the arbitration panel’s decision
reviewed de novo by the Superior Court by filing the demand
forms accompanied by “a check payable to the ‘Treasurer, State
of New Jersey’ in the amount of $200,” R. 4:21A-6(c), “within
thirty days after filing of the arbitration award,” R. 4:21A-
6(b)(1).
Under Rule 1:5-6(b)(1), documents in civil actions are
deemed filed when the original is received by “the deputy clerk
of the Superior Court in the county of venue.” Once received,
the clerk “may notify the person filing if such papers do not
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conform[.]” R. 1:5-6(c) (emphasis added). However, if the
required filing fee is not paid, “the paper[s] shall be returned
stamped ‘Received but not Filed (date).’” R. 1:5-6(c)(1)(A)3
(emphasis added); see Johnson v. Schragger, Lavine, Nagy &
Krasny, 340 N.J. Super. 84, 92 (App. Div. 2001). This procedure
affords notice to the party seeking a trial de novo that its
form of payment has been deemed deficient.
Rule 1:5-6(c)(1) provides for both mandatory notice in
those circumstances and a ten-day window during which the filing
party may cure their error.
If a paper is returned under this rule, it
shall be accompanied by a notice advising that
if the paper is retransmitted together with
the required signature, document or fee, as
appropriate, within ten days after the date of
the clerk’s notice, filing will be deemed to
have been made on the stamped receipt date.
[R. 1:5-6(c)(1) (emphasis added).]
Applying this rule, the Appellate Division in Johnson, supra,
held that “if the required filing fee is not paid, the judgment
or order must be returned by the Clerk to the proponent with a
notation that it had been received, but not filed.” 340 N.J.
Super. at 92.
3
In addition to the notice requirement for deficient filing fees,
Rule 1:5-6(c)(1) requires the clerk to notify the filing party
when filings fail to include a completed case information
statement, required affidavits in Family Part cases, signatures,
or a title search in certain actions.
7
It is clear that the above provisions of our court rules
elevate a litigant’s right to pursue a claim over the procedural
bars resulting from technical filing defects. Indeed, we have
held that the failure to include the required fee should not
defeat a filing that was otherwise proper and within time.
Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436, 439-42 (1951) (deeming papers filed
under prior court rules where filing fee was paid four days
after filing deadline and the court clerk had not demanded fee
payment before stamping papers “received and filed”).
Similarly, the comment to Rule 1:5-6(c)(1) explains that
technical defects should not serve to defeat an otherwise valid
filing. Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment
3 on R. 1:5-6 at 72-73 (2015). Referencing State v. One 1986
Subaru, 230 N.J. Super. 451, 458 (App. Div. 1989), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 120 N.J. 310 (1990), a case involving a
form of a promise to pay similar to a voucher, the comment
states “the original filing date is protected if the fee which
should have accompanied the filing is transmitted within 10
days.” Pressler & Verniero, supra, comment 3 on R. 1:5-6 at 72-
73.4 Because it recognizes that technical defects should not
serve to defeat an otherwise validly filed demand, we conclude
that Rule 1:5-6(c)(1) is the correct frame of reference.
4 We therefore reject plaintiff’s argument that Rule 1:5-6(c)(3)
sets forth the proper analytical framework.
8
In Flett Associates v. S.D. Catalano, Inc., 361 N.J. Super.
127, 129 (App. Div. 2003), the Appellate Division considered the
effect of a delay in serving the opposing party with a demand
for a trial de novo under Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1), which governs the
filing deadlines and procedures following an arbitrator’s award.
The panel in Flett held correctly that, under the facts
presented, “a delay in satisfaction of the service requirement
does not have the same deleterious effect upon efficient
administration of the arbitration program as a failure to file
the demand within time.” Id. at 134.
Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1) “set[s] a short deadline for filing a
[trial] de novo demand” to “ensure[] that the court will
promptly schedule trials in cases that cannot be resolved by
arbitration.” Nascimento v. King, 381 N.J. Super. 593, 597
(App. Div. 2005). This short deadline compounds the dangers of
faulty filings because actions that are subject to mandatory
arbitration will be administratively dismissed if a party does
not move to dismiss or confirm the arbitration award within
fifty days of its filing. R. 4:21A-6(b)(2),(3). Thus, in the
context of a demand for trial de novo, the mandatory notice
provisions of Rule 1:5-6(c)(1) are of paramount importance.
B.
As set forth above, defendants submitted their demand on
January 19, 2012, one day after the arbitration panel made its
9
decision. The Arbitration Administrator forwarded the voucher
to the State Treasurer on January 20, 2012. The clerk was then
required by Rule 1:5-6(c)(1)(A) to notify defendants that the
form of payment was nonconforming.
Parties such as defendants whose filings are deficient are
entitled to ten days from the date of the clerk’s notice to
bring the filing into conformity with the applicable rule.
Ibid. Notice of defendants’ deficient filing was never
transmitted by the clerk and, therefore, the ten-day period to
cure never began to run.5 Defendants received actual notice of
the deficiency on February 23, four days after the deficiency
had been cured, when plaintiff filed his motion to confirm the
arbitration award. By any measure, the conforming check was not
received by the county clerk’s office out of time. Since this
filing was not untimely, we need not analyze whether substantial
compliance or extraordinary circumstances is the proper standard
for the consideration of a motion to relax the thirty-day limit
of Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1).
IV.
5
This cure period cannot extend indefinitely, as Rule 4:21A-
6(b)(2) and (3) operate to dismiss any complaint subject to the
mandatory arbitration provisions of the court rules if the
parties do not dismiss or confirm the award within fifty days of
the arbitration panel’s decision.
10
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment of
the Appellate Division and remand the matter to the trial court
for reinstatement of the judgment in favor of defendants.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON,
FERNANDEZ-VINA; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in
JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion.
2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
NO. A-58 SEPTEMBER TERM 2013
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
JOSEPH VANDERSLICE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
HAROLD STEWART, CAMDEN COUNTY
FIRE POLICE DEPARTMENT, and
CAMDEN COUNTY,
Defendants-Appellants.
DECIDED January 29, 2015
Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Solomon
CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
REVERSE/
CHECKLIST REMAND/
REINSTATE
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X
JUSTICE ALBIN X
JUSTICE PATTERSON X
JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA X
JUSTICE SOLOMON X
JUDGE CUFF (t/a) X
TOTALS 7
1