Marriage of Weibert , 378 Mont. 135 ( 2015 )

February 3 2015
DA 14-0418
Case Number: DA 14-0418
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2015 MT 29CRISSY WEIBERT, n/k/a TIEMAN,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
JIM WEIBERT,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DR-10-064 (C)
Honorable Heidi J. Ulbricht, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Katherine P. Maxwell, Maxwell Law, PLLC, Kalispell, Montana
For Appellee:
Valori E. Vidulich, Kaufman Vidal Hileman Ellingson, PC,
Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 7, 2015
Decided: February 3, 2015
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Appellant Jim Weibert (Jim) appeals from an order of the Eleventh Judicial
District, Flathead County, awarding Crissy Tieman (Crissy) custody of their daughter and
attorney’s fees.
¶2 The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred when it ordered Jim to
pay Crissy’s attorney’s fees.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
¶3 Jim and Crissy divorced on February 25, 2012. They have one minor child, B.W.,
who is autistic. Initially, the parties agreed that Crissy would be the primary residential
parent and B.W. would visit Jim on an alternating, two-week basis. In October 2010,
Crissy notified Jim of her intention to move to Bellingham, Washington. The parties
participated in two mediation sessions, with two different mediators, during this time. In
July 2011, Doctor Jennifer Simon-Thomas evaluated B.W. and made several written
recommendations, including increases in speech and language therapy.
¶4 On August 16, 2011, the District Court held a hearing on the issue of Crissy’s
relocation to Washington. The Court concluded that Crissy could move and that it was in
B.W.’s best interest to continue living with Crissy. Crissy relocated to Washington and
has remained there since. The parties then entered into a stipulation setting forth a new
visitation schedule, whereby Jim would travel to Washington once a month and Crissy
would bring B.W. to Montana once a month. The parties later informally changed this
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plan, as the travel put strain on B.W. The stipulation also required Crissy to follow
Dr. Simon-Thomas’ recommendations.
¶5 On September 26, 2012, Jim filed a motion for modification of the parenting plan
requesting that the District Court grant him primary residential custody of B.W. Jim
claimed that Crissy had failed to follow the recommendations of Dr. Simon-Thomas. In
response, Crissy filed a brief in opposition to Jim’s motion, requesting that the court
implement her proposed amended parenting plan formalizing the parties’ informal
visitation plan and that Jim pay her attorney’s fees. Included in the proposed parenting
plan was a provision to transfer jurisdiction to Washington State.
¶6 On April 26, 2013, the District Court held a contested hearing on Jim’s motion.
At the hearing, Jim partially rescinded his request to be the primary custodial parent on
the condition that B.W. receive additional speech therapy. Due to timing issues at the
District Court, a second day of hearing was scheduled. On the second day, Jim’s lawyer
clarified that Jim no longer sought the change in residential custody, but still requested
the increase in out-of-school speech therapy. After it became clear that Jim had not
conferred with Crissy about his proposal, the judge suggested the parties recess to discuss
the issues. The parties were able to reach an agreement on a number of items, but
remained divided on four issues—jurisdiction, canceled visitation, additional speech
therapy, and attorney’s fees. The District Court ruled that the jurisdiction issue was not
ripe, that Crissy must arrange make-up visits, and denied the request for additional
speech therapy. Additionally, the District Court ordered Jim to pay Crissy’s attorney’s
fees incurred in defending against his motion to amend the parenting plan.
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¶7 On May 29, 2014, the District Court conducted a hearing on the reasonableness of
the fees and ordered Jim to pay $10,359. At the hearing, Crissy presented testimony from
family-law attorney Mary Obermiller, who testified that the fees were reasonable given
the complexity of the case and the seriousness of the matter. The District Court stated its
basis for the award, noting that “after the hearing it became clear to me that the
evaluation had been done by the school, Ms. Impero [Crissy] was abiding by that, and it
was in the best interest everything that was being done.” Additionally, the judge
indicated that she awarded the fees because Jim did not prevail on his motion. Jim
appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8 We review a district court’s award of attorney’s fees in a dissolution action for
abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Dennison, 2006 MT 56, ¶ 23, 331 Mont. 315, 132
P.3d 535. “A district court has abused its discretion if substantial evidence does not
support its award of attorney’s fees.” Marriage of Dennison, ¶ 23.
DISCUSSION
¶9 Issue: Whether the District Court erred when it ordered Jim to pay Crissy’s
attorney’s fees.
¶10 District courts have the discretion to award attorney’s fees. In re Marriage of
Brownell, 263 Mont. 78, 85, 865 P.2d 307, 311 (1993). Pursuant to § 40-4-110, MCA, a
district court “may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the costs to the other
party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under chapters 1 and 4.” An award of
attorney’s fees under § 40-4-110 must be reasonable, based on necessity, and rooted in
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competent evidence. In re Marriage of Barnard, 241 Mont. 147, 154, 785 P.2d 1387,
1391 (1990). This Court will not disturb an award of fees if it is supported by substantial
evidence. In re Marriage of Barnard, 241 Mont. at 154, 785 P.2d at 1392 (citations
omitted).
¶11 Jim argues that § 40-4-110 does not apply to this case because the statute is
directed at marital financial resources. Additionally, he argues that the District Court did
not make any specific findings as to the statute, nor did it consider the parties’ financial
resources. Contrary to Jim’s arguments, § 40-4-110 does apply to this case. The statue
permits a district court to award attorney’s fees incurred defending or maintaining actions
under various chapters of Title 40, MCA, including Chapter 4 “Termination of Marriage,
Child Custody, Support.” Moreover, the Commissioners’ Notes specifically note that the
authority to award fees and costs extends to “different stages of the proceedings” and the
statute expressly allows “sums for legal and professional services rendered . . . after entry
of judgment.” Section 40-4-110, MCA (emphasis added). This action was brought under
Chapter 4 of Title 40, MCA, as Jim initially moved the District Court to alter the
custodial arrangement, and § 40-4-110 applies.
¶12 Jim also argues that both parties prevailed on different issues and thus attorney’s
fees were inappropriate. Jim asserts that he abandoned his request to serve as the primary
custodian after he decided B.W. would do best with Crissy, and that the sole issue was
whether B.W. should receive additional speech therapy sessions. He maintains that
although the District Court denied his request for additional speech therapy, Crissy lost
on the issue of jurisdiction and makeup visitation. He cites In re Marriage of Winters,
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2004 MT 82, 320 Mont. 459, 87 P.3d 1005 and In re Marriage of Pfennigs, 1999 MT
250, 296 Mont. 242, 989 P.2d 327, for the premise that attorney’s fees are not appropriate
when both parties prevail. Winters and Pfennigs are distinguishable from the facts in this
case. The district courts in those cases relied on the parties’ dissolution agreements,
which provided for fees to the prevailing party. In Winters, we affirmed the district
court’s decision to deny fees, and cited Pfennigs for the rule that “a contractual provision
awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party in a divorce action was not effective when
each party prevailed on different issues.” Winters, ¶ 59 (citing Pfennigs, ¶ 42). Here, the
District Court did not base its award on the parties’ contract and thus Winters and
Pfennigs are factually distinguishable from the case at bar.
¶13 It is also important to note that § 40-4-110 does not require a party to prevail to
receive attorney’s fees. Under § 40-4-110, “attorney fees are based on the respective
financial resources of the parties and not based on which party prevailed.” In re
Marriage of Brownell, 263 Mont. at 85, 865 P.2d at 311. Instead, the district court judge
examines what is reasonable in light of each party’s circumstances. Awarding Crissy
attorney’s fees was not unreasonable when Jim changed his position on his motion after
eight months and caused the parties to expend considerable expenses to resolve an issue
that may have been resolved through direct discussion or mediation.
¶14 Jim also argues that the District Court did not state a basis for the award.
Although the judge did not make a specific reference to § 40-4-110, she did state the
grounds on which she awarded the fees. On June 10, 2013, when ruling on the issue of
attorney’s fees, the judge stated that the “hearing has changed substantially from what -
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what the Court was presented” and the “motion could have been prevented if the parties
had talked to one another prior to getting the Court involved.” Additionally, at the
hearing on reasonableness of the attorney’s fees, the judge found that Jim presented no
medical or professional basis for his request and B.W. was receiving proper therapy.
¶15 Substantial evidence supports the District Court’s order. First, as the District
Court noted, the hearing could have been avoided had the parties discussed Jim’s
concerns. Nothing prevented Jim from speaking with Crissy directly; indeed the parties
had utilized mediation multiple times in the past. However, the parties did not discuss
Jim’s concern until the hearing and only after the judge suggested the parties discuss the
speech therapy off the record.
¶16 Second, evidence at the hearing established that B.W. was receiving appropriate
speech therapy services. Jim was unable to substantiate his claims that Crissy failed to
follow the medical recommendations for B.W. For example, he testified that
Dr. Simon-Thomas recommended speech therapy two or three times weekly, but then
was unable to corroborate this statement with the doctor’s report, which simply
recommended “increase in speech and language therapy . . . . School-based service
should continue, as well as outpatient adjunct therapy.” Additionally, on
cross-examination, Jim admitted to lying in his affidavit when he stated that Crissy had
not placed B.W. in any speech therapy programs. At the hearing, he conceded to
knowing that his daughter actually went to speech therapy.
¶17 Third, Crissy prevailed in establishing that B.W. received adequate speech therapy
services. Although insurance and waiting lists initially prevented B.W. from receiving
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additional speech therapy services, she received in-school therapy weekly from the
outset. At the time of the hearing, B.W. received one hour of out-of-school therapy, in
addition to the school-based services and equine therapy, and was registered to
participate in a summer program for autistic children. Jim testified that he was happy
with B.W.’s school and pleased with her participation in the equine and summer
programs.
¶18 Finally, Jim’s decision to change his mind at the last minute resulted in
unnecessary legal costs to Crissy that may have been avoidable. The District Court heard
testimony from Crissy that she had to sell a car, take out a loan, and max out her credit
cards to hire an attorney to defend against Jim’s motion. Under these facts, the District
Court had discretion to award attorney’s fees.
¶19 Crissy has requested this Court to award attorney’s fees and costs on appeal. We
decline to award Crissy fees on appeal.
¶20 Affirmed.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
We Concur:
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ JIM RICE
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