Jordana Elrom v. Elad Elrom , 439 N.J. Super. 424 ( 2015 )


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  •                   NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4565-12T4
    JORDANA ELROM,
    APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    February 23, 2015
    v.
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    ELAD ELROM,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _______________________________
    Submitted November 3, 2014 - Decided February 23, 2015
    Before   Judges     Lihotz,    St.    John    and
    Rothstadt.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New
    Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,
    Bergen County, Docket No. FM-02-2214-11.
    Townsend, Tomaio & Newmark, LLC, attorneys
    for appellant (John E. Clancy, on the
    briefs).
    Jordana Elrom, respondent pro se.
    The opinion of the court was delivered by
    LIHOTZ, P.J.A.D.
    Defendant, Elad Elrom, appeals from provisions set forth in
    a November 19, 2012 final judgment of divorce (FJOD), entered
    following trial.    He challenges the imputation of income to the
    parties for the purpose of calculating child support and limited
    duration alimony payable to plaintiff Jordana Elrom.          Defendant
    also challenges supplemental child support added for child care
    and     extracurricular         activities,            the    allocation         of    assets
    equitably      distributed,      and   appeals          from       a   February    21,    2013
    order denying reconsideration of the FJOD's terms.
    Following our review of the issues raised on appeal, in
    light of the record and the applicable law, we agree the judge
    erred    in   increasing    child      support         by    work-related         child-care
    costs during a period of plaintiff's unemployment and the cost
    of the children's everyday extracurricular activity expenses,
    which generally are included in the amount of child support.                                  In
    all   other    respects,        including        the    imputation        of     income,      we
    affirm.
    I.
    The facts pertinent to our review are taken from the five-
    day trial record.           The parties appeared self-represented and
    presented     testimony     regarding        their       incomes,        along    with    fact
    testimony      from      plaintiff's         father          and       expert     testimony.
    Numerous documents were introduced into evidence regarding the
    parties' respective incomes, expenses, and assets.
    The     parties,    who    are   now       thirty-eight,           were    married     in
    February 2005 and separated in September 2010.                             They have two
    young children, who were born in 2008 and 2010.                                 Prior Family
    Division proceedings between the parties were consolidated into
    2                                        A-4565-12T4
    this matter (FD-02-435-11) or dismissed.                        Although the parties
    litigated custody and parenting time at trial, they successfully
    mediated an agreement, largely resolving custody issues.
    Plaintiff is an attorney, licensed to practice in New York
    and   New    Jersey.        When    she     married      defendant,      she    worked      in
    Newark earning an annual salary of $102,000.                          Thereafter, she
    took a position with a New York firm, earning $175,000 per year.
    In early 2008, just prior to the birth of the parties' first
    child, plaintiff was laid off.                She testified the parties agreed
    she would stay home to raise the children, possibly                                   working
    part-time.        In 2009, plaintiff commenced part-time employment,
    working     ten    to     fifteen    hours       per    week.       When    the       parties
    separated,     she      earned     $67.50    per       hour,   working     approximately
    twenty-six        hours     per     week.          Plaintiff        next    secured         an
    associate's position earning $80,640, but lost her job prior to
    trial.      Asserting child-care obligations required she "focus her
    job search on New Jersey firms," plaintiff intended to seek a
    New Jersey position and asked "the [c]ourt impute [to] her a
    salary of $80,640.00."
    Defendant      is    a   software      engineer,         technical    writer,         web
    developer, and entrepreneur.                  In the past, he held positions
    with Sigma, HBO, Weight Watchers, and MTV.                          During an earlier
    non-dissolution         matter,      he     earned       $193,375    per       year    as     a
    3                                    A-4565-12T4
    consultant for HBO.               Before trial, he changed jobs, and was
    employed       as    the     chief     technical          officer       for    ChatAnd      Inc.
    (ChatAnd), earning a base salary of $120,000, with potential to
    earn as much as $295,000.                  Defendant also owned Elrom LLC, which
    performed consulting services, sponsored an annual technology
    trade show, and participated in several start-up companies.
    At trial, plaintiff produced documents evincing defendant's
    income, and explained he was not compliant with her discovery
    demands.        Plaintiff         asserted     during          the    marriage,    defendant
    received income from "clients on the side" and royalties from
    three books he authored.                   Plaintiff also discovered defendant
    started    a    company      in    Las     Vegas     on    February      2,     2012,    called
    Effective      Idea,       LLC,      and    withdrew        funds       from    Elrom      LLC's
    account, which he transferred to an account at Banca Privada
    d'Andorra.           Defendant        stipulated          the    Andorra       account      held
    $67,978.
    As to the marital standard of living, plaintiff explained
    the   parties       lived    an    "upper      middle       class,      at     times,    lavish
    lifestyle" before the children were born.                            They owned a New York
    City apartment.            When they moved to Englewood in anticipation of
    the birth of their second child, they rented their apartment.
    After   separating,          defendant        moved       to    New     York    City,      while
    plaintiff      and    the    children        moved    into       her    parents'        home   in
    4                                        A-4565-12T4
    Montville.1    Plaintiff had residential custody of the children.
    She sought alimony and listed her actual expenses "to the penny"
    in an amended case information statement (CIS).
    Larry    Frankel,      CPA,    CFF,       plaintiff's      expert       forensic
    accountant, examined monies deposited into the parties' various
    bank accounts to calculate defendant's annual income.                            Frankel
    concluded deposits into Elrom LLC's account from January 2009 to
    February   2012,   totaled     $903,241.            Reducing    the    sums        by   an
    estimated twenty to thirty percent for overhead, he asserted
    profit,    exclusive   of    taxes,       amounted     to    seventy        to     eighty
    percent.
    Defendant     countered       with       testimony      from     his    forensic
    employability expert Gary Young, whose vocational evaluations
    addressed the likely earnings of the parties.                       Young's reports
    were not provided in the appellate record.
    Young    concluded      defendant        was   likely     to    earn    $120,000
    annually as a software engineer and technical writer.                        He based
    this opinion on his review of defendant's resume and a telephone
    interview, but acknowledged he was not provided with defendant's
    ChatAnd    contract,   and    did    not      consider      defendant's          earning
    capacity as a consultant.
    1
    Plaintiff testified she and the children were evicted from
    the Englewood apartment because defendant failed to satisfy his
    portion of the rent.
    5                                      A-4565-12T4
    Young        also        offered          testimony              regarding           plaintiff's
    employability,         although         he        did    not       interview        her.          After
    considering       her       degrees      and           bar    admissions,           he        conducted
    research     using      Internet         sources             and     suggested          her    earning
    possibilities, primarily in New York City, ranged from "$108,740
    to $177,850."          Young did not factor parenting responsibilities,
    the children's special needs, or day care availability into this
    calculus.
    Defendant next offered Jonathan Klopchin, a credentialed IT
    recruiter.            His    report          is     not       included        in        the    record.
    Evaluating defendant's experience with "Flash, Flex, Front and
    implementation"         technologies,               which          Klopchin     explained          were
    declining in demand, he asserted a full-time Flex engineer could
    make $100,000 to $150,000, although some Flex developers could
    garner more than $200,000, which was "more the exception than
    the rule."       He stated a Flex consultant would be "fortunate to
    get [$]90 an hour" and "a lead developer" could earn $165,000.
    During defendant's direct testimony, he asserted the actual
    gross receipts of Elrom LLC for 2010 were merely $145,000.                                             He
    argued    Frankel's         use    of    deposits             inflated        estimated          income
    because    it    included         rental      receipts             from   the      New    York      City
    apartment       and    funds       withdrawn            but        re-deposited.              However,
    defendant    later      admitted        he        received          receipts       of    $19,000       in
    6                                           A-4565-12T4
    royalties   and    $88,000     from   consulting,       and    spent    $11,000    in
    payroll expenses.        The sums, along with his salary, make his
    total 2010 income $252,000.              Defendant discussed his reported
    receipts in 2011, as captured on Schedule C of his federal tax
    return,    which    totaled     $250,000.2       He    mentioned       $206,000    in
    consulting fees from HBO, a position he lost.                     Defendant also
    asserted    ChatAnd     just   terminated      his    services,     and   his    last
    paycheck was July 27, 2012.              Defendant suggested $120,000 per
    year should be imputed to him, as opined by Young.
    Following     trial,      the   judge     issued     a    written    opinion
    granting    plaintiff's        request   for    divorce.          Addressing      the
    collateral issues arising upon the dissolution of the marriage,
    the   judgment     awarded     plaintiff     limited     duration      alimony    for
    three years in the amount of $1,000 per week "based upon the
    differential       in   their     earnings,      [p]laintiff's          needs     and
    [d]efendant's ability to pay."                The judgment further ordered
    defendant to pay child support in the amount of $697 per week,
    which included insurance premiums and work-related child care,
    plus fifty percent of the children's uncovered medical costs,
    exceeding $250 per child, and fifty percent of the children's
    2
    Defendant   introduced   several   documents   during   his
    testimony; however, the record exhibits do not contain the trial
    markings making it difficult to reconcile his testimony with the
    record.
    7                                 A-4565-12T4
    extracurricular and sporting activity fees, provided defendant
    consents to their participation in advance.                       Defendant received
    an    $8,702    credit    for      overpayment      of   work-related         child-care
    expenses.
    In calculating support, the judge found plaintiff's income
    was   represented       by   her    last    full-time      job,    as    an    associate
    attorney in New Jersey, and imputed $80,640 per year.                         The judge
    rejected defendant's argument to limit his earning ability to
    $120,000.         Rather,       after      considering     defendant's           historic
    earnings,      which    were    "readily      ascertainable       from     his   limited
    liability company and personal bank statements over the past
    three years . . . as examined and quantified by [p]laintiff's
    forensic accounting expert, [Frankel]," the judge imputed gross
    income to defendant of $230,731.42 per year, calculating the
    three-year average gross receipts and factoring an "expense-out
    rate of 20%."3
    Equitably       distributing     the     parties'    marital        assets,     she
    ordered:       an equal division of the bank account associated with
    rental    receipts       from   their      former    New   York     City      apartment;
    plaintiff receive $11,000 to equalize the values of the parties'
    3
    The judge found defendant's business gross receipts were
    $286,313.71 in 2009, $321,614.41 in 2010, and $257,314.69 in
    2011, for an average of $288,414.27 over this three-year period.
    8                                    A-4565-12T4
    respective automobiles; plaintiff retain her three retirement
    accounts and personal property; and defendant retain Elrom LLC,
    any other start-up companies in which he held an interest, and
    his personal property.
    Both parties moved for reconsideration of the provisions of
    the FJOD.    The motions were denied and this appeal followed.4
    On appeal, defendant attacks the imputed income levels for
    each party, arguing the income level imputed to him was too high
    and the level imputed to plaintiff was too low.                    Defendant also
    argues the judge erred in adding child-care and the children's
    extracurricular         activity   costs       as   additional    child     support.
    Finally,    defendant      challenges      the      equitable    division    of   the
    parties' assets.         We consider these issues.
    II.
    Our review of a trial judge's factual findings, following a
    non-jury trial, is limited.             Cesare v. Cesare, 
    154 N.J. 394
    , 411
    (1998).     Generally, "findings by the trial court are binding on
    appeal     when    supported       by    adequate,      substantial,        credible
    evidence."        
    Id. at 411-12.
            In    matrimonial    matters,       this
    "[d]eference      is    especially      appropriate      when    the   evidence     is
    largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility," 
    id. 4 On
    July 25, 2013, we granted defendant's motion to file his
    appeal as within time.
    9                                 A-4565-12T4
    at 412 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), because
    the trial judge has "a feel of the case" and is in the best
    position   to     "make   first-hand    credibility       judgments    about    the
    witnesses who appear on the stand."             N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
    Servs. v. E.P., 
    196 N.J. 88
    , 104 (2008).                   Review of the cold
    record alone "can never adequately convey the actual happenings
    in a courtroom."          N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M.,
    
    211 N.J. 420
    , 448 (2012) (citing 
    E.P., supra
    , 196 N.J. at 104).
    Reversal is warranted only when a mistake must have been
    made    because    the    trial   court's      factual     findings    are     "'so
    manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent,
    relevant   and     reasonably     credible     evidence    as    to   offend   the
    interests of justice . . . .'"                 Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v.
    Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 
    65 N.J. 474
    , 484 (1974) (quoting
    Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 
    78 N.J. Super. 154
    , 155 (App.
    Div.), certif. denied, 
    40 N.J. 221
    (1963)).                 Consequently, when
    a reviewing court concludes there is satisfactory evidentiary
    support for the trial court's findings, "'its task is complete
    and it should not disturb the result . . . .'"                  Beck v. Beck, 
    86 N.J. 480
    , 496 (1981) (quoting State v. Johnson, 
    42 N.J. 146
    , 162
    (1964)).    "Deference is appropriately accorded to factfinding;
    however,    the     trial     judge's        legal   conclusions,       and     the
    application of those conclusions to the facts, are subject to
    10                               A-4565-12T4
    our plenary review."             Reese v. Weis, 
    430 N.J. Super. 552
    , 568
    (App.     Div.    2013).         Finally,        legal     conclusions       are    always
    reviewed    de    novo.         Manalapan     Realty,      L.P.   v.    Twp.    Comm.     of
    Manalapan, 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378 (1995).
    A.
    Defendant urges income imputation is reserved for parties
    who,    without    just     cause,      are      intentionally         and   voluntarily
    unemployed or underemployed.                Because he was working, he argues
    his    circumstances       do    not   trigger        income     imputation        and   his
    salary should have been accepted as an appropriate earning level
    when    fixing     support.            Defendant          also    argues       imputation
    principles require an increase in plaintiff's income, not mere
    acceptance of the modest salary she last earned.                         We reject the
    legal premise as applied, and note the facts of record belie
    defendant's contentions.
    "'Imputation       of     income     is    a      discretionary       matter      not
    capable     of    precise        or    exact      determination[,]           but    rather
    require[es] a trial judge to realistically appraise capacity to
    earn and job availability.'"                  Gnall v. Gnall, 
    432 N.J. Super. 129
    , 158 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Storey v. Storey, 373 N.J.
    Super. 464, 474 (App. Div. 2004)), certif. granted, 
    217 N.J. 52
    (2014).     While an "abuse of discretion . . . defies precise
    definition," we will not reverse the decision absent a finding
    11                                     A-4565-12T4
    the     judge's    decision        "rested      on    an     impermissible        basis,"
    considered "irrelevant or inappropriate factors," Flagg v. Essex
    Cnty.    Prosecutor,        
    171 N.J. 561
    ,       571    (2002)    (citations       and
    internal        quotation      marks      omitted),         "failed        to    consider
    controlling legal principles or made findings inconsistent with
    or unsupported by competent evidence."                     
    Storey, supra
    , 373 N.J.
    Super. at 479.
    Certainly, the court is authorized to impute income for the
    purpose of determining child support when a parent is found to
    be voluntarily unemployed or underemployed without cause.                              See
    Caplan v. Caplan, 
    182 N.J. 250
    , 268-70 (2005) (stating parent's
    ability to earn income, or "his [or her] human capital," should
    be "theoretically activated for the purpose of evaluating his
    [or   her]      support   obligation"        and     the    amount    of    income   that
    "should be imputed to him [or her]").                      "'In treating the matter
    of support, our courts have always looked beyond the [parent's]
    claims of limited resources and economic opportunity.                           They have
    gone far to compel a              parent to do what in equity and good
    conscience should be done for [the] children.'"                        Lynn v. Lynn,
    
    165 N.J. Super. 328
    , 341 (App. Div.) (quoting Mowery v. Mowery,
    
    38 N.J. Super. 92
    , 102 (App. Div. 1955), certif. denied, 
    20 N.J. 307
    (1956)), certif. denied, 
    81 N.J. 52
    (1979).                       Thus, a "'court
    has     every    right    to      appraise      realistically        [a]    defendant's
    12                                    A-4565-12T4
    potential earning power,'" 
    ibid. (quoting Mowery, supra
    , 
    38 N.J.
    Super. at 102), and examine "potential earning capacity" rather
    than actual income, when imputing the ability to pay support.
    Halliwell v. Halliwell, 
    326 N.J. Super. 442
    , 448 (App. Div.
    1999).
    This    authority   is   incorporated   in    the    New   Jersey   Child
    Support    Guidelines   (Guidelines).       See     R.     5:6A   (adopting
    Guidelines set forth in Appendix IX-A to the Court Rules).                The
    Guidelines state:
    [i]f the court finds that either parent is,
    without      just     cause,     voluntarily
    underemployed or unemployed, it shall impute
    income to that parent according to the
    following priorities:
    a.   impute   income    based    on
    potential employment and earning
    capacity using the parent's work
    history,    occupational     quali-
    fications, educational background,
    and prevailing job opportunities
    in the region.     The court may
    impute   income   based   on    the
    parent's former income at that
    person's    usual     or     former
    occupation or the average earnings
    for that occupation as reported by
    the New Jersey Department of Labor
    (NJDOL);
    b.   if potential earnings cannot
    be determined, impute income based
    on the parent's most recent wage
    or benefit record . . . .
    [Child   Support  Guidelines,  Pressler   &
    Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment
    13                               A-4565-12T4
    12 on Appendix        IX-A      to   R.    5:6A     at   2635
    (2015).]
    These   legal   precepts     equally      apply     when      establishing       a
    party's obligation to pay alimony.                   See Tannen v. Tannen, 
    416 N.J. Super. 248
    , 261 (App. Div. 2010) (noting a trial judge "may
    impute income" in the process of "determining an appropriate
    alimony award"), aff'd o.b., 
    208 N.J. 409
    (2011); 
    Storey, supra
    ,
    373 N.J. Super. at 474-80 (imputing income to obligor based on
    earning capacity despite actual job earning a lower income).
    "[O]ne   cannot    find   himself     in,      and    choose    to    remain     in,    a
    position where he has diminished or no earning capacity and
    expect to be relieved of or to be able to ignore the obligations
    of support to one's family."              Arribi v Arribi, 
    186 N.J. Super. 116
    , 118 (Ch. Div. 1982).             See also 
    Gnall, supra
    , 432 N.J.
    Super. at 159 (affirming imputation of income to party based on
    past salary as computer programmer despite a desire to work as a
    teacher for lower pay).
    Further,   "failure   .    .   .     to   provide       adequate     financial
    information place[s] the hearing judge in a position where he
    [or she] ha[s] to . . . realistically impute income."                          Tash v.
    Tash, 
    353 N.J. Super. 94
    , 99 (App. Div. 2002).                       Imputation may
    also   be   justified     when    examining      income        reported     by    self-
    employed obligors, who control the means and the method of their
    earnings.      See Donnelly v. Donnelly, 
    405 N.J. Super. 117
    , 128-29
    14                                   A-4565-12T4
    (App.   Div.     2009)   (noting     a   self-employed      obligor        is   "'in     a
    better position to present an unrealistic picture of his or her
    actual income than a W-2 earner'" (quoting Larbig v. Larbig, 
    384 N.J. Super. 17
    , 23 (App. Div. 2006))); Platt v. Platt, 384 N.J.
    Super. 418, 426-27 (App. Div. 2006) (affirming court's rejection
    of last annual income of self-employed defendant in favor of
    imputing    income).        Accordingly,          "[b]oth   when    setting        child
    support and in reaching a proper alimony award, a judge must
    examine    not    only   each    party's        income,   but    also     his   or    her
    earning ability."        
    Gnall, supra
    , 432 N.J. Super. at 159.
    We focus on the facts supporting imputation.                       Contrary to
    defendant's       current       claims     of      full-time       employment,          he
    specifically      testified     he   was     released     from    his     position     at
    ChatAnd.    When pressed on whether his circumstances would change
    once ChatAnd received requested financing, defendant insisted
    his employment was terminated.
    Historically, defendant received wages and other payments
    from one main company, such as Sigma, HBO, and ChatAnd, along
    with    royalties    and    separate     consulting       fees.      The    level       of
    earnings proffered by Frankel, who analyzed defendant's business
    deposits,   along    with     defendant         concessions,     evinced     his     2010
    gross income of at least $252,000; 2011 fees from HBO alone were
    $206,000       and   reported        gross       receipts       totaled     $250,000.
    15                                   A-4565-12T4
    Additional         unrefuted             proofs           showed       defendant          received
    supplemental        earnings,           not    only       from      self-employment         through
    consulting, but also reoccurring royalty receipts.
    Significant           to    rejecting          defendant's            suggested     earnings
    level was the trial judge's credibility findings.                                    In light of
    the   documented        historic         earnings,            the    judge     found     defendant
    "attempted        to    portray          himself         as    lacking        the    skills         and
    education to sustain a salary in the $250,000.00 range, when all
    the evidence is to the contrary."                              Further, she rejected as
    unsupported       defendant's            claim       he    accepted          the    lower      salary
    position     at    ChatAnd         to    spend       more      time     with       the   children.
    Several     times      in    her       opinion       she      found    defendant         was    being
    dishonest with the court.
    The   judge       considered            and    rejected         the    testimony         of   the
    defendant's       experts.              Young's          opinion      defendant       might         earn
    $80,000     to    $100,000         was    labeled          "borderline         preposterous          in
    light of the documented proofs that [d]efendant's income has
    been 2.5 to 3 times more [than that amount] for the past three
    years."     Young ignored defendant's employability and earnings as
    a   consultant,        and       his    employment         contract,         allowing     possible
    earnings up to $295,000.                      Even Klopchin testified defendant's
    salary range was higher than defendant's and Young's estimates.
    Nevertheless, the judge rejected the expert's suggested earning
    16                                      A-4565-12T4
    level    simply        because        for     years,     defendant's         salary     always
    exceeded Klopchin's estimates.
    In light of all of this evidence, we reject as factually
    unsubstantiated and legally insufficient the notion imputation
    does not apply when determining this defendant's income because
    he    held    a   full-time       position.             We    determine       the     evidence
    supports      the      judge's        findings         that     defendant's         field     of
    expertise,        as   well      as     his     employment          and   salary      history,
    demonstrate a substantial earning capacity, well in excess of
    his    last   documented         base       salary     of     $120,000      per     year,    and
    provided a sound basis to impute additional income.
    We further discern no abuse of discretion in using a three-
    year    average        of     defendant's           earnings         from    all      sources,
    demonstrated by deposits into his business account.                               Overall, we
    conclude this was a fair and reasonable methodology to fix an
    appropriate level of income for consideration of support based
    on "sufficient credible evidence present in the record after
    consideration of the proofs as a whole."                             Rolnick v. Rolnick,
    
    262 N.J. Super. 343
    , 360 (App. Div. 1993) (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    Defendant        alternatively           argues        the    court    should        have
    appointed an expert to determine his earning capacity, because
    Frankel's use of deposits and an estimated overhead expense was
    17                                     A-4565-12T4
    hypothetical      and    failed       to    consider     his    actual       earnings     and
    expenses.       We disagree.
    Although the court may appoint an expert to resolve an
    economic    issue,       R.     5:3-3(c),         defendant     had     an    affirmative
    obligation to provide the requested discovery, which included
    proof of his earnings and expenses through employment and his
    closely held businesses.              Defendant controlled the documentation
    on this issue and chose not to fully reveal all the facts.
    Defendant   even        chose    to    not    provide        relevant    facts       to   his
    retained        experts,        resulting         in     a     distorted           analysis.
    Defendant's lack of credibility, demonstrated by his refusal to
    disclose    information         or     respond      to   inquiries,          was    properly
    weighed    in    rejecting       his       claims   of   limited      earnings.           See
    
    Cesare, supra
    , 154 N.J. at 412.                   Moreover, the judge's reliance
    on   plaintiff's         exhibits,          Frankel's        expert      opinion,         and
    defendant's       own     admissions,          provided        substantial         credible
    evidence to impute income without the need to appoint a court
    expert.
    Defendant next argues the judge abused her discretion when
    imputing income to plaintiff.                 Defendant notes plaintiff earned
    as much as $175,000 as an attorney in New York City.                               Further,
    he relies on Young's testimony stating attorneys in New York
    18                                     A-4565-12T4
    City can earn between $108,000 and $178,850.                   He thus asserts
    use of $80,640 per year was error.              We reject these arguments.
    At trial, plaintiff was unemployed after being "dismissed"
    from her job.         Prior to obtaining that position, she worked
    part-time.      Her last full-time New York City job was in 2008,
    four   years    prior    to   trial.      During     the    intervening      years,
    plaintiff bore two children and, since separation served as the
    primary residential parent.             The parties' children are young:
    one is seven and has special medical needs because the child is
    "severely allergic to dairy, eggs, nuts and seeds[,]" and the
    other is only four.           Defendant's parenting time, set forth in
    the FJOD, is limited to seven and one-half hours on alternate
    Saturdays      and   Sundays,    with     no    parenting     time    during      the
    workweek.       Taken   together,       these    facts     support    the   imputed
    income level determined by the trial judge.
    Considerations     involving      children    must     be     weighed    when
    imputing income.        The first factor listed by the Legislature in
    guiding a judicial determination of a fair child-support award
    is serving the "[n]eeds of the child . . . ."                   N.J.S.A. 2A:34-
    23(a)(1).      Also, the Guidelines discuss the need to account for
    young children's needs when imputing income to the parent of
    primary residence, stating:
    In determining whether income should be
    imputed to a parent and the amount of such
    19                                 A-4565-12T4
    income, the court should consider: (1) what
    the employment status and earning capacity
    of that parent would have been if the family
    had remained intact or would have formed,
    (2) the reason and intent for the voluntary
    underemployment or unemployment, (3) the
    availability of other assets that may be
    used to pay support, and (4) the ages of any
    children in the parent's household and
    child-care alternatives. . .       .    When
    imputing income to a parent who is caring
    for young children, the parent's income
    share of child-care costs necessary to allow
    that person to work outside the home shall
    be deducted from the imputed income.
    [Pressler & 
    Verniero, supra
    , comment 12 on
    Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A at 2635.]
    On this issue, the Supreme Court has "noted that '[t]he key to
    both the [G]uidelines and the statutory factors is flexibility
    and the best interest of children.'"            
    Caplan, supra
    , 182 N.J. at
    266 (first alteration in original) (quoting Pascale v. Pascale,
    
    140 N.J. 583
    ,   594   (1995)).    The    importance      of    addressing      a
    child's needs because of health or tender years may dictate the
    proximity of parental employment.
    Finding    plaintiff     accessible      to   address    the      children's
    needs "paramount," the judge determined plaintiff's decision to
    limit   her    employment     search   to     New   Jersey    was       reasonable.
    Plaintiff's sole responsibility for the children's care during
    the workweek and a need to be available if the older child
    suffers      anaphylaxis    support    this    decision.           We   agree     the
    children's     needs   were    properly     weighed    and    found       to    limit
    20                                  A-4565-12T4
    plaintiff's work schedule and confine her employment search to
    New Jersey.
    Young's       testimony    regarding   plaintiff's       earning   capacity
    was rejected by the trial judge for several reasons.                 First, the
    trial judge noted Young had no experience in the legal field.
    Second, he "conducted little if no research [and] failed to test
    plaintiff," "admitting that he did nothing more than an internet
    engine search of New York job opportunities."                      Third,   Young
    "failed to consider [p]laintiff's parenting responsibilities and
    desire to work within New Jersey to remain in close proximity to
    the children," and, therefore, eliminated consideration of New
    Jersey    opportunities.        Finally,    Young's    evaluation      did    not
    examine "[p]laintiff's skill set [] in the financial and banking
    areas," a legal specialty he admitted put her at "a disadvantage
    in today's market," because of limited available positions.
    We determine the amount of wages imputed to plaintiff was
    based on her immediate prior position with a large New Jersey
    firm,    headquartered   in    a   major   city.      This    is   appropriate.
    Young's     testimony    was    properly    rejected     as    a    generalized
    statement    of   New   York   City   attorney     wages,     rather   than    an
    opinion of what plaintiff could earn.              Accordingly, we find no
    abuse of discretion in imputing plaintiff's income as guided by
    her past wages.
    21                                A-4565-12T4
    B.
    Challenging the child support award, defendant asserts the
    judge   erred    by     requiring    him     to     contribute        to     what     he
    characterized    as    "exorbitant    child-care       expenses"        at    a     time
    plaintiff was unemployed, and to pay, as additional support,
    one-half the cost of the children's extracurricular activities.
    Plaintiff acknowledged she was not working, but insisted "[t]he
    need for childcare was evident," rationalizing she was "consumed
    with an intense, though unsuccessful search for employment" and
    "preparation for trial," which she characterized as "a full-time
    job."      Finally,    plaintiff    urged    the    need   for    child      care    to
    prevent disruption to the children's "established routine" and
    because preschool "space was limited," making it "impossible to
    obtain a spot again if either [child] was taken out for a period
    of time."
    Following       our   review,     we     find    plaintiff's           assertions
    unavailing.     We agree with defendant the judge erroneously added
    child-care    and     extracurricular       activity   costs      as       additional
    support.
    The     Guidelines    state:    "The    average    cost      of    child      care,
    including day camp in lieu of child care, is not factored into
    in the schedules.         The net cost (after tax credits) of work-
    related child care should be added to the basic obligation if
    22                                     A-4565-12T4
    incurred."       Pressler & 
    Verniero, supra
    , comment 9 on Appendix
    IX-A to R. 5:6A at 2632.        The Guidelines do not sanction child-
    care expenses as additional support when a party is unemployed.
    
    Ibid. Rather, the Guidelines'
    recognition of                 child care is
    factored when imputing income to the custodial parent.                 Pressler
    & 
    Verniero, supra
    , comment 12 on Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A at
    2635.     Thus, an equitable adjustment to the custodial parent's
    imputed earnings accounts for the economic reality of parental
    employment.
    As to the cost of children's activities, the Guidelines
    specify      a    child   support         award     includes      entertainment
    expenditures, specifically "[f]ees, memberships and admissions
    to    sports,     recreational,      or     social     events,     lessons    or
    instructions, movie rentals, televisions, mobile devices, sound
    equipment,       pets,    hobbies,        toys,      playground      equipment,
    photographic      equipment,    film      processing,     video    games,     and
    recreational,      exercise    or    sports       equipment."      Pressler     &
    
    Verniero, supra
    , comment 8 on Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A at 2631-
    32.     Guidelines support may be supplemented by court approved
    extraordinary expenses, which are
    predictable   and   recurring  expenses   for
    children that may not be incurred by average
    or   intact    families   such   as   private
    elementary or secondary education, special
    needs of gifted or disabled children, and
    NCP/PAR time transportation expenses.     The
    23                              A-4565-12T4
    addition of these expenses to the basic
    obligation must be approved by the court.
    If incurred, special expenses that are not
    predictable and recurring should be shared
    by the parents in proportion to their
    relative incomes (i.e., the sharing of these
    expenses should be addressed in the general
    language of the order or judgment). Special
    expenses not included in the award should be
    paid directly to the parent who made or will
    make the expenditure or to the provider of
    the goods or services.
    [Pressler & 
    Verniero, supra
    , comment 9 on
    Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A at 2633.]
    Finally, use of the Guidelines is rebuttable, as "[t]he
    [G]uidelines may be modified or disregarded by the court []
    where good cause is shown," including "the presence of other
    relevant factors which may make the [G]uidelines inapplicable or
    subject to modification . . . ."          R. 5:6A.
    In her opinion, the trial judge did not explain why she
    deviated    from     the   Guidelines      by    adding       child-care    and
    extracurricular      activity     costs     as      supplemental      support.
    Reviewing the record we find plaintiff's assertions of need were
    not   evidentially   supported;    they    merely    reflect    her   opinion.
    Such testimony fails to establish the "good cause" necessary for
    disregarding the Guidelines provisions.               
    Ibid. Further, the record
    is silent on a timeline for plaintiff's resumption of
    full-time employment, or her specific efforts to resume working.
    In light of this record, we do not find a legal basis to require
    24                                A-4565-12T4
    payment of child-care expenses.                The costs could be added as
    additional support once plaintiff resumes employment.                         At the
    same time, the court's calculation of child support failed to
    reduce plaintiff's imputed income by her share of imputed child-
    care expenses.
    In     her      merit's    brief,    plaintiff      seeks   to    validate     the
    inclusion      of     child-care     expenses     by     suggesting      the     sums
    represent extra support authorized because the parties' incomes
    exceed the maximum net income to which the Guidelines apply.
    See Pressler & 
    Verniero, supra
    , Appendix IX-F to R. 5:6A at 2708
    (showing    the      maximum    combined    net   weekly    income      of    parents
    listed   on    the    schedule     for    computing     Guidelines      support     is
    $3,600).      Plaintiff correctly states the judge has discretion to
    award supplemental support when net income exceeds the specified
    gross income threshold of $187,200.5                 See Pressler & 
    Verniero, supra
    , comment 20 on Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A at 2645.                       See also
    Isaacson v. Isaacson, 
    348 N.J. Super. 560
    , 579-80 (App. Div.)
    ("We have generally recognized that where the parties have the
    financial      wherewithal      to      provide   for     their      children,     the
    5
    The   Guidelines  provide   "the  court   shall   apply the
    [G]uidelines up to $187,200 and supplement the [G]uidelines-
    based award with a discretionary amount based on the remaining
    family income (i.e., income in excess of $187,200) and the
    factors specified in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23."    Pressler & 
    Verniero, supra
    , comment 20 on Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A at 2645.
    25                                 A-4565-12T4
    children are entitled to the benefit of financial advantages
    available to them. . . .           Children are entitled to not only bare
    necessities, but a supporting parent has the obligation to share
    with his children the benefit of his financial achievement."
    (citations     omitted)),     certif.     denied,     
    174 N.J. 364
      (2002).
    However, the judge's opinion, although thoroughly addressing the
    underpinnings      supporting      her   conclusion      on   other    issues,      is
    silent   on    the   need    for    or   basis   of      imposing     supplemental
    support.
    "Rule 1:7-4 requires a judge to provide findings of fact
    and conclusions of law on every [decision] decided by a written
    order that is appealable by right."              Fodero v. Fodero, 355 N.J.
    Super. 168, 170 (App. Div. 2002).                See R. 1:7-4 (requiring a
    trial judge to accompany all opinions with findings of fact and
    conclusions of law).        The omission of critical factual findings,
    supporting the basis to supplement the Guidelines support award,
    impedes our review and requires a remand limited to this issue.
    See Ducey v. Ducey, 
    424 N.J. Super. 68
    , 74 (App. Div. 2012).
    C.
    Defendant next suggests the court failed to make adequate
    findings      of   fact     and    conclusions      of     law   regarding        its
    distribution of the parties' marital property.                   Defendant urges
    reversal of FJOD provisions permitting plaintiff to retain her
    26                                 A-4565-12T4
    retirement      accounts      and    permitting       each    party       to    retain   the
    marital property in his or her possession.                            We reject these
    arguments.
    "[T]he goal of equitable distribution . . . is to effect a
    fair and just division               of marital [property]."                   Steneken v.
    Steneken,    
    183 N.J. 290
    ,     299    (2005)     (citation         and     internal
    quotation marks omitted).              To fashion an equitable distribution
    award,    the    trial       judge    must        identify    the     marital       assets,
    determine the value of each asset, and then decide "how such
    allocation can most equitably be made."                      Rothman v. Rothman, 
    65 N.J. 219
    , 232 (1974).           In addition, the judge must consider, but
    is not limited to, the sixteen statutory factors set forth in
    N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1.            Fashioning an equitable distribution of
    marital assets and debts requires more than simply "mechanical
    division"; it requires a "weighing of the many considerations
    and circumstances . . . presented in each case."                                  Stout v.
    Stout, 
    155 N.J. Super. 196
    , 205 (App. Div. 1977).
    The     trial     judge    properly       reviewed       all    the    evidence      and
    performed       the   three-step        Rothman        analysis.               Specifically
    discussing plaintiff's IRA and two 401(k) accounts, the judge
    noted "significant portions," that is two of three accounts,
    were "pre-marital," and not subject to equitable distribution.
    See Painter v. Painter, 
    65 N.J. 196
    , 214 (1974) ("[A]ny property
    27                                    A-4565-12T4
    owned . . . at the time of marriage will remain [] separate
    property of such spouse and . . . will not qualify as an asset
    eligible for distribution.").           The third account resulted from a
    job     held   for   approximately       fourteen     months.         The      court
    acknowledged the exact values of plaintiff's retirement assets
    were "[u]nknown" and, also stated "[n]o evidence was presented
    as to the value of [d]efendant's . . . companies."
    Defendant identifies nothing in this record to refute the
    judge's conclusions the assets held in the parties' respective
    possession had limited value and, therefore, should be offset.
    Her opinion noted "the parties agree that there is little by way
    of assets or liabilities to divide."           On this record, we cannot
    conclude the judge erred in implementing the practical approach
    of offsetting these minimal assets.
    Regarding personal property, the parties separated in 2010.
    Each argued the other took significant personalty.                    The judge
    found    the   parties'    respective    assertions       of   undivided     assets
    were unsupported.         Specifically, defendant offered "[n]o proofs
    as to the value of the furniture or wedding gifts" he claimed
    plaintiff took, and plaintiff did not provide support for her
    claims defendant retained a Rolex watch, a Tiffany wedding band,
    and     expensive    electronics   (although        she    produced    an      email
    exchange showing defendant took the marital bedroom and dining
    28                                  A-4565-12T4
    set).    Following review, with the proofs in equipoise, we find
    no error in denying additional relief.                 Pacifico v. Pacifico,
    
    190 N.J. 258
    , 269 (2007).
    In light of our opinion, we need not separately review the
    appeal of the order denying reconsideration.                     As noted, the
    judge's findings regarding imputation of income to fix support
    will    not    be     disturbed,   except     sums    added   as   supplemental
    support,      which    must   be   vacated.      We    reverse     that   limited
    provision of the FJOD and remand for further review.                 On remand,
    the judge must consider the propriety of adding child-care costs
    and whether good cause for a separate allocation of specific
    extracurricular         activities   is     warranted.        To    the    extent
    defendant paid unsupported child-care or activity expenses, the
    judge shall determine the applicable credit and the method for
    repayment.      Finally, we reject claims of error in the FJOD's
    provisions providing for equitable distribution.
    Affirmed in part, reversed, and remanded in part.
    29                                 A-4565-12T4