People v. Shenault , 2014 IL App (2d) 130211 ( 2015 )

Illinois Official Reports
Appellate Court
People v. Shenault, 2014 IL App (2d) 130211Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption HELEN SHENAULT, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Second District
Docket No. 2-13-0211
Filed December 23, 2014
Held Defendant’s convictions on two counts of resisting or obstructing a
(Note: This syllabus peace officer arising from an incident in which defendant was arrested
constitutes no part of the following an encounter with a police officer as she was picking up her
opinion of the court but child at school were upheld, notwithstanding her contentions that she
has been prepared by the was entitled to a new trial on one count due to the trial court’s
Reporter of Decisions improper application of the hearsay rule to bar the testimony of an
for the convenience of eyewitness favorable to the defense and that her guilt was not proven
the reader.) beyond a reasonable doubt as to the second count, since the excluded
hearsay related to defendant’s contention that she drove away when
she mistakenly thought that the officer was telling her that she could
leave the scene and defendant failed to make a proper offer of proof
that would support her claim, and as to defendant’s second argument,
there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that
defendant obstructed the police officer from arresting her when she
repeatedly refused to get out of her car and forced the officer to risk his
own safety by forcing her out.
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County, No. 11-CF-510; the
Review Hon. Patricia Piper Golden, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Thomas A. Lilien, and Richard C. Harris, all of
Appeal State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.
Joseph H. McMahon, State’s Attorney, of St. Charles (Lawrence M.
Bauer and Kathryn E. Kohls, both of State’s Attorneys Appellate
Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Hudson and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 A Kane County grand jury returned a three-count indictment against defendant, Helen
Shenault. Count I charged defendant with aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(18) (West
2010)) and counts II and III charged her with resisting or obstructing a peace officer (720 ILCS
5/31-1(a) (West 2010)). Following a jury trial, defendant was found not guilty of the
aggravated battery charge but guilty of both counts of resisting or obstructing a peace officer.
Defendant argues on appeal that she is entitled to a new trial on count II because the trial court
misapplied the hearsay rule to bar certain eyewitness testimony favorable to the defense. She
also argues that her conviction on count III must be reversed because the State failed to prove
her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.
¶2 Count II of the indictment alleged, in pertinent part, that defendant “knowingly obstructed
the performance of Matthew Fichtel of an authorized act within his official capacity, being the
investigation of a traffic offense, knowing Matthew Fichtel to be a peace officer engaged in the
execution of his official duties, in that the defendant after being lawfully stopped by Matthew
Fichtel drove away from the traffic stop without authorization from Matthew Fichtel.” Count
III alleged, in pertinent part, that defendant “knowingly obstructed the performance of
Matthew Fichtel of an authorized act within his official capacity, being the arrest of defendant,
knowing Matthew Fichtel to be a peace officer engaged in the execution of his official duties,
in that the defendant being told by Matthew Fichtel that she was under arrest refused to exit her
vehicle.”
¶3 The evidence presented at trial established that on March 11, 2011, Fichtel was an officer
with the Aurora police department and was assigned to serve as a school resource officer at
Aurora East High School. Fichtel testified that at about 3 p.m. he was sitting in a marked squad
car, monitoring traffic as students left school for the day. Fichtel’s squad car was located in a
southbound lane of Smith Boulevard. Fichtel observed defendant drive up alongside his
vehicle and come to a stop, blocking traffic behind her. Shortly thereafter, defendant’s son
exited the school and got into defendant’s vehicle. As defendant started to drive off, Fichtel
activated his vehicle’s emergency lights and defendant stopped her vehicle. Fichtel told
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defendant that he had stopped her because she had been obstructing traffic when she stopped to
pick up her son. According to Fichtel, defendant became argumentative. Fichtel decided to
issue a ticket to defendant. He told her not to move and he then walked back to his squad car
and called dispatch for backup. Defendant began to pull away slowly. Fichtel approached the
driver’s-side window of defendant’s vehicle and told defendant to stop. Fichtel asked to see
defendant’s driver’s license and proof of insurance. According to Fichtel, defendant responded
with an expletive and said, “I don’t have to give you shit.” Fichtel repeated his request and was
met with a similar response. Defendant then drove away.
¶4 Fichtel returned to his squad car and followed defendant’s vehicle as it proceeded south on
Smith Boulevard and then east on Sixth Avenue. Fichtel caught up with defendant’s vehicle at
the corner of Sixth Avenue and Farnum Avenue. Defendant pulled her vehicle over. Fichtel
told defendant that she was under arrest and directed her to exit the vehicle. According to
Fichtel, defendant responded, “I don’t have to do shit.” Fichtel again told defendant to exit the
vehicle, but defendant continued to protest and did not comply. Fichtel opened the
driver’s-side door and again told defendant to get out of the vehicle. Again defendant did not
comply. Fichtel grabbed defendant’s left arm and told defendant once more to exit the vehicle.
Defendant pulled her arm away. Fichtel reached into the vehicle to remove defendant’s
seatbelt. As he did so, he felt defendant kick him in the chest. Fichtel then pulled defendant out
of the vehicle and placed her under arrest.
¶5 Kelly Rodriguez testified for the State that, on the date in question, she was employed by
the high school as a cafeteria worker and her daughter attended the school. Rodriguez was
acquainted with Fichtel. At around 3 p.m., while waiting to pick up her daughter, Rodriguez
observed that Fichtel was involved in a confrontation with a woman whose vehicle was parked
in the designated bus area. Rodriguez was parked in a driveway leading from a parking lot to
Smith Boulevard. Rodriguez heard the woman tell Fichtel that she was not moving her vehicle.
The woman was upset and was cursing. Rodriguez, whose vehicle had been standing next to a
fire hydrant, pulled forward onto Smith Boulevard and stopped in a spot that was one car
length ahead of the woman’s vehicle. Rodriguez heard Fichtel ask for the woman’s driver’s
license. Asked how the woman responded, Rodriguez testified, “She said ‘I am not giving you
shit.’ ” Rodriguez saw Fichtel walk back to his squad car. She did not know whether the
woman had given Fichtel her driver’s license. By that point, Rodriguez’s daughter arrived.
Rodriguez started to drive off, but the woman pulled away from behind Rodriguez and drove
past her on Smith Boulevard. Rodriguez testified that she pulled over in order to avoid being
struck by the woman’s vehicle.
¶6 On cross-examination, the following exchange took place:
“Q. And at some point when you pulled out or when you were in that area, did
Officer Fichtel say to you it was okay for you to go?
MR. STAJDOHAR [Assistant State’s Attorney]: Objection, hearsay.
THE COURT: Well, that’s sustained.
[MS. BYRD] [defense attorney]:
Q. You were initially in the parking lot; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And before you left the parking lot, you were hesitant to leave that area; correct?
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A. No. I pulled around to the side so I didn’t get in trouble for parking by the fire
hydrant.
Q. And before you left the area, did you ask permission to leave the area?
A. Yes. I asked Officer Fichtel if it was okay for me to go.
Q. And did he respond to that at all?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he respond?
MR. STRAJDOHAR: Objection, hearsay.
THE COURT: Sustained.
[MS. BYRD]:
Q. Did he give a response that made you believe it was okay to go?
A. Yes.
MR. STRAJDOHAR: Objection. Calls for hearsay response.
THE COURT: Sustained. The jury will disregard.”
¶7 Defendant’s son, D’Wayne McCoy, testified for the defense. He indicated that the initial
encounter with Fichtel on Smith Boulevard lasted about 10 minutes. McCoy testified that
defendant’s vehicle was in gear during the encounter. While Fichtel was walking back to his
squad car, defendant put her vehicle in park. When she took her foot off the brake the vehicle
moved slightly. Fichtel said “ ‘Don’t move.’ ” Afterward, however, Fichtel made a hand
gesture, which McCoy demonstrated. The court described the gesture (as demonstrated by
McCoy) as follows: “He held his hand up bending his elbow putting his palm to the front and
moved that forward and back.” McCoy indicated that Fichtel also yelled something at that
point. When defense counsel asked what Fichtel had yelled, the State objected on hearsay
grounds. At that point, the following exchange took place:
“MS. BYRD: This goes to the affect [sic] on the listener, and it’s not offered for the
truth of the matter asserted.
THE COURT: And the affect [sic] of [sic] the listener being this witness?
MS. BYRD: He was there and it had an affect [sic] on him subsequently, yes.
THE COURT: Well, that’s–I sustain the objection.”
¶8 Defendant testified that during the initial encounter with Fichtel on Smith Boulevard she
raised her voice when Fichtel indicated that he was going to issue a citation. However, she
denied that she used profanity or told Fichtel “I don’t have to give you shit.” Asked what
happened when Fichtel walked back to his squad car, defendant replied as follows:
“I saw him reach his radio or something like he was talking into his radio, and the
next thing–because I am looking in my rear-view mirror looking at him, and I see him
say, ‘You okay. You can go.’ ”
Defendant testified that she believed that Fichtel was addressing her. She started to pull away
from the curb. As she did so, another vehicle started to pull away. Defendant stopped her
vehicle and the other vehicle also stopped. Defendant thought that the other driver was letting
defendant pull into traffic. Defendant pulled away, proceeded south on Smith Boulevard, and
turned left on Sixth Avenue.
¶9 While driving on Sixth Avenue, defendant saw Fichtel’s squad car behind her. Its
emergency lights and siren were activated. Defendant testified that she pulled over and
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removed her seatbelt. According to defendant, Fichtel approached her vehicle, “snatched” the
door open, and told her that she was under arrest. She testified that Fichtel “instantly started
reaching” for her. Defendant “snatched” her arm away. She explained that she had two
herniated disks and was concerned that Fichtel would hurt her back. Fichtel continued to reach
for defendant several times, but she pulled away. She denied ever kicking Fichtel. She also
denied that Fichtel told her to get out of the car before he pulled open the door.
¶ 10 We first consider defendant’s argument that she is entitled to a new trial on count II of the
indictment. Count II alleged that defendant committed the offense of resisting or obstructing a
peace officer by driving away from a lawful traffic stop without authorization from the officer
who conducted the stop. According to defendant, the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s
hearsay objections when defense counsel asked Rodriguez whether that officer–Fichtel–gave
Rodriguez permission to drive away from the school and when defense counsel asked McCoy
what Fichtel said before defendant drove away. Defendant argues that defense counsel was
attempting to elicit evidence that would corroborate defendant’s testimony that she thought
Fichtel was addressing her when he apparently gave Rodriguez permission to leave. The State
counters that defendant’s failure to make a proper offer of proof is fatal to her argument. We
agree.
¶ 11 It is well established that ordinarily an offer of proof is necessary to preserve a claim of
error arising from the exclusion of evidence. People v. Thompkins, 181 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1998).
“The two primary functions of an offer of proof are to disclose to the trial judge and opposing
counsel the nature of the offered evidence, enabling them to take appropriate action, and to
provide the reviewing court with a record to determine whether exclusion of the evidence was
erroneous and harmful.” Id.¶ 12 Rodriguez testified that she asked for Fichtel’s permission to leave the scene of the initial
encounter between Fichtel and defendant. When asked whether Fichtel’s response made
Rodriguez “believe it was okay to go,” Rodriguez answered “Yes.” The trial court instructed
the jurors to disregard the answer. Defense counsel failed to make an offer of proof regarding
the content of Fichtel’s statement and any other circumstances indicating whether defendant
could have heard the statement and believed that it was directed to her. In the absence of such
an offer of proof, we cannot determine whether the testimony defendant sought to elicit from
Rodriguez would have any appreciable value as corroboration of defendant’s testimony.
Similarly, because there was no offer of proof of McCoy’s excluded testimony, it is impossible
to determine whether its exclusion could have resulted in any prejudice to defendant.
¶ 13 Although defendant does not concede that offers of proof were necessary in this case, she
contends that, even if they were, the exclusion of the testimony in question should be reviewed
under the plain-error rule. “The plain-error doctrine is a very limited and narrow exception to
the forfeiture or procedural default rule that allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved
error if either one of the following two circumstances is present: (1) a clear or obvious error
occurred and the evidence in the case was so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to
tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error; or (2) a
clear or obvious error occurred and the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of the
defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness
of the evidence.” People v. Belknap, 2013 IL App (3d) 110833, ¶ 87, appeal allowed, No.
117094 (Ill. Mar. 26, 2014). Defendant contends that the evidence is closely balanced. Be that
as it may, however, the plain-error rule does not apply here. As this court has recently noted,
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“the first step in determining whether the plain-error doctrine applies is to determine whether
any reversible error occurred.” People v. Miller, 2014 IL App (2d) 120873, ¶ 17. Defendant’s
failure to make proper offers of proof makes it impossible for us to take this first step.
Cf. People v. Leamons, 127 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1070 (1984) (in prosecution for aggravated
indecent liberties with a child, exclusion of evidence of a prior false complaint by the alleged
victim’s mother was not plain error; because defendant made no offer of proof “concerning the
manner in which he would prove the prior false complaint, *** [reviewing court was] in no
position to determine whether the matter was subject to proper proof or not”).
¶ 14 We next consider whether the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant committed the offense of resisting or obstructing a peace officer, as charged in count
III. A reviewing court will not set aside a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so
improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. People
v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, “ ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The trier of fact is responsible for resolving conflicts in
the testimony, weighing the evidence, and determining what inferences to draw, and a
reviewing court ordinarily will not substitute its judgment on these matters for that of the trier
of fact. People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431 (2000).
¶ 15 Count III alleged that defendant obstructed Fichtel’s performance of an authorized act by
refusing to exit her vehicle after being told that she was under arrest. Section 31-1(a) of the
Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2010)) provided that “[a] person who
knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be a peace
officer, firefighter, or correctional institution employee of any authorized act within his official
capacity commits a Class A misdemeanor.” Defendant does not dispute that Fichtel was
authorized to place her under arrest. Nor does she dispute that she knew that Fichtel was a
peace officer. However, according to defendant, “viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, all that can be said regarding [defendant’s] refusal to get out of her
vehicle is that she allegedly became argumentative and said ‘I don’t have to do shit.’ ”
According to defendant, her conduct did not “actually obstruct[ ]” Fichtel’s effort to place her
under arrest.
¶ 16 In People v. Synnott, 349 Ill. App. 3d 223 (2004), this court affirmed a conviction of
obstructing a peace officer, based on the defendant’s repeated refusal to comply with the
officer’s lawful order, following a traffic stop, to exit a vehicle. After the officer had given the
order for the fourth time, the defendant grabbed the steering wheel with both hands. The officer
then grabbed the defendant by the arm and pulled on him. On direct examination, the officer
testified that “ ‘within a matter of seconds’ ” the defendant released the steering wheel and
exited the vehicle. Id. at 224. On cross-examination, the officer testified that the defendant
exited the vehicle a “ ‘split second’ ” after the officer grabbed the defendant’s arm. Id. The
defendant argued that a conviction of obstructing a peace officer could not be sustained absent
proof of a physical act. Id. at 225. According to the defendant, merely refusing to comply with
a police officer’s orders did not constitute obstruction.
¶ 17 The Synnott court noted that in People v. Raby, 40 Ill. 2d 392 (1968), our supreme court
observed as follows:
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“ ‘ “ ‘Resisting’ or ‘resistance’ means ‘withstanding the force or effect of’ or the
‘exertion of oneself to counteract or defeat’. ‘Obstruct’ means ‘to be or come in the
way of’. These terms are alike in that they imply some physical act or exertion. Given a
reasonable and natural construction, these terms do not proscribe mere argument with a
policeman about the validity of an arrest or other police action, but proscribe only some
physical act which imposes an obstacle which may impede, hinder, interrupt, prevent
or delay the performance of the officer’s duties, such as going limp, forcefully resisting
arrest or physically aiding a third party to avoid arrest.” ’ ” Synnott, 349 Ill. App. 3d at
225 (quoting Raby, 40 Ill. 2d at 399, quoting Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 959
(N.D. Ill. 1968)).
We concluded, however, that “the distinction between acting and refraining from action is
[not] dispositive.” Id. at 227. We reasoned that “in common usage in the criminal law context,
the word ‘act’ is used broadly and is understood to include ‘a failure or omission to take action’
[citation].” Id. Citing City of Chicago v. Meyer, 44 Ill. 2d 1 (1969), we noted that “merely
refusing a police officer’s lawful order to move can constitute interference with the officer in
the discharge of his or her duty.” Synnott, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 227. We reasoned that “[t]he
words ‘interference’ and ‘obstruction’ are nearly synonymous [citation], and if the former may
consist of inaction, we see no reason why the latter may not also.” Id.
¶ 18 In affirming the defendant’s conviction of obstructing a peace officer in Synnott, we
observed as follows:
“Following a lawful traffic stop, the police may, as a matter of course, order the driver
and the passengers out of the vehicle pending the completion of the stop without
violating the protections of the fourth amendment. [Citations.] The rule is based on
considerations of officer safety. It seems clear that any behavior that actually threatens
an officer’s safety or even places an officer in fear for his or her safety is a significant
impediment to the officer’s performance of his or her duties. For these reasons, we
cannot endorse the reasoning or result in the Fifth District’s decision in People v.
Flannigan, 131 Ill. App. 2d 1059 (1971), heavily relied on by defendant, which
dismissed a motorist’s repeated refusal to emerge from his car after being placed under
arrest as ‘at most an insubstantial display of antagonism or belligerence.’ Flannigan,
131 Ill. App. 2d at 1063. In our view, a meaningful threat of prosecution for the sort of
noncooperation in Flannigan and the present case is necessary to reduce the likelihood
of physical confrontations.” Id. at 228.
¶ 19 Citing, inter alia, People v. Taylor, 2012 IL App (2d) 110222, defendant contends that
“[t]his Court has recently re-examined the requisite level of obstruction needed for a
conviction in light of the Illinois Supreme Court’s holding in People v. Baskerville, 2012 IL
111056.” In Baskerville, a police officer observed the defendant’s wife, Christine Baskerville,
driving on a county highway. The officer recognized Christine and believed that her license
had been suspended. The officer knew where Christine lived, and he drove to her home. As the
officer arrived he saw Christine pull into the driveway, step out of the vehicle, and walk toward
the house. Although the officer asked Christine to return to her vehicle, she continued into the
house. The defendant then emerged from the house and spoke with the officer. The officer
indicated that he had observed Christine driving on a suspended license. The officer asked the
defendant to return to the house and to bring Christine outside. The defendant stated that he
had been driving and that Christine was not home. The defendant then entered the house. When
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he reemerged, he gave the officer permission to enter the house to look for Christine, but the
officer declined to do so. The defendant was charged with obstruction on the basis that he
provided false information to the officer.
¶ 20 Confronted with the above facts, the Baskerville court offered the following observations
about the scope of the term “obstruction”:
“Based upon the plain language of the statute, section 31-1 does not particularize
all of the types of obstructive conduct that may fall within its purview. [Citation.]
Rather, the legislature has chosen to frame the provision here in broad terms within the
confines of free speech, rights of assembly and other constitutional concerns. Although
a person may commit obstruction of a peace officer by means of a physical act, this
type of conduct is neither an essential element of nor the exclusive means of committing
an obstruction. The legislative focus of section 31-1(a) is on the tendency of the
conduct to interpose an obstacle that impedes or hinders the officer in the performance
of his authorized duties.” (Emphasis added.) Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 23.
¶ 21 Ultimately, however, the Baskerville court concluded that the defendant’s lie about his
wife’s whereabouts did not rise to the level of obstruction:
“In analyzing the factual scenario, the false statement only has legal significance if
it was made in relation to an authorized act within the officer’s official capacity and if
the false information actually impeded an act the officer was authorized to perform.
[Citation.] At no point did defendant’s false statement that Christine was not home
hinder [the officer] in executing the traffic stop. Even if [the officer] had probable
cause to arrest Christine, and Christine thwarted his ability to arrest her in a public
place, defendant consented to a search and [the officer] chose not to enter the home.
Therefore, there was no evidence that defendant’s statement hampered or impeded the
officer’s progress in any way.” Id. ¶ 35.
¶ 22 Taylor arose from a street encounter between a De Kalb police officer and the defendant,
Donnell Taylor. The officer recognized the defendant from prior encounters but was not
completely certain that the defendant was, in fact, Donnell Taylor. The officer had previously
been made aware that there was a warrant for Taylor’s arrest. When the officer asked the
defendant for identification, the defendant indicated that he did not have any with him and
gave a false name to the officer. However, the officer was quickly able to confirm the
defendant’s identity and place him under arrest. The defendant was convicted of obstruction of
justice on the basis that he provided false information to the officer. This court reversed the
conviction, reasoning as follows:
“In our view, Baskerville confirms that the relevant issue in weighing a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a conviction for obstruction of justice is
whether the defendant’s conduct actually posed a material impediment to the
administration of justice. Applying that standard here, we find that [the defendant’s]
initial giving of a false name to [the officer] and his denial that he had identification did
not materially impede [the officer’s] arrest of [the defendant]. By all accounts, the
entire encounter took no more than a few minutes. Although [the officer] himself
testified that he was not ‘100 percent sure’ of [the defendant’s] identity, he conceded
that he was ‘pretty sure.’ *** [I]t is clear that [the defendant’s] initial lies to [the
officer] did not deter [the officer] from arresting him: [the officer] arrested [the
defendant] almost immediately despite [the defendant’s] false statements. [The
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officer’s] caution in checking the false name [the defendant] gave against the computer
database was commendable, but it did not significantly delay the arrest. *** [The
defendant’s] false statements did not actually interfere with or materially impede the
police investigation.” Taylor, 2012 IL App (2d) 110222, ¶ 17.
Relying on Taylor, defendant argues that, because Fichtel “immediately” arrested her “despite
her alleged refusal to exit her car,” her refusal did not materially impede Fichtel in the
performance of an authorized act. We disagree. Neither Baskerville nor Taylor categorically
held that the degree of obstruction is measured only by the amount of time necessary for a
peace officer to overcome the defendant’s conduct. The considerations of officer safety that
were at the heart of our decision in Synnott were not present in Baskerville and Taylor. Those
considerations are paramount here. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that
defendant repeatedly refused Fichtel’s direction to exit her vehicle and that, as a result, Fichtel
was forced to place his own safety at risk. Pursuant to Synnott, such conduct qualifies as
obstruction.
¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.
¶ 24 Affirmed.
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