Nasrin Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 782 F.3d 9 ( 2015 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued October 20, 2014                 Decided April 3, 2015
    No. 13-7109
    MANOUCHEHR MOHAMMADI, ET AL.,
    APPELLANTS
    v.
    ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, ET AL.,
    APPELLEES
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:09-cv-01289)
    Larry Klayman argued the cause and filed the brief for
    appellant.
    Before: KAVANAUGH and SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges,
    and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SRINIVASAN.
    SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge: Plaintiffs, three Iranian
    émigré siblings and the estate of their deceased brother, seek
    recovery for imprisonment, torture, and extrajudicial killing
    they allegedly suffered at the hands of the Islamic Republic of
    Iran. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that
    it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, principally because of
    2
    defendants’ foreign sovereign immunity. The court also
    denied plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration and their
    associated motion for leave to file a fourth amended
    complaint. We affirm the district court.
    I.
    As college students in Tehran during the 1990s, plaintiff
    Manouchehr Mohammadi and his late brother, Akbar
    Mohammadi, became leaders in the Iranian pro-democracy
    movement. As part of their political activism, the brothers
    participated in the 1999 student protests.
    Iranian officials arrested the brothers for their role in the
    protests and confined them in Evin prison in Tehran, where
    they allegedly suffered brutal physical and psychological
    abuse and torture. According to plaintiffs’ testimony, the
    brothers were repeatedly flogged, hung from the ceiling by
    their hands, beaten to the point of unconsciousness, burned on
    their genitalia, exposed to the elements, and subjected to
    mock executions.
    Akbar’s and Manouchehr’s sisters, Nasrin Mohammadi
    and Simin Taylor, also allegedly suffered severe mistreatment
    at the hands of the Iranian regime. Nasrin testified that an
    Iranian agent attempted to murder her in Germany in 2002,
    and Simin claims to have been imprisoned and threatened
    with rape while living in Iran.
    Akbar died in prison in 2006. Manouchehr fled Iran
    while on temporary release from prison to attend Akbar’s
    funeral. By late 2006, the three surviving siblings all had
    settled in the United States. Nasrin and Simin ultimately
    obtained United States citizenship, and Manouchehr became a
    lawful permanent resident. Plaintiffs contend that Iranian
    3
    agents continued to harass them in the United States,
    threatening them over the phone with murder, refusing to let
    their parents leave Iran, hacking their computers, and
    circulating doctored photographs of Nasrin depicted in an
    immodest light.
    In 2009, plaintiffs brought an action to recover for their
    injuries. They named as defendants the Islamic Republic of
    Iran, the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution
    (the Revolutionary Guard), and two Iranian leaders, Ayatollah
    Sayid Ali Hoseyni Khamenei and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
    Plaintiffs amended their complaint on three occasions.
    Because defendants never appeared in court to contest the
    allegations against them, plaintiffs filed a motion for entry of
    default and a default judgment. The district court granted the
    motion for entry of default and scheduled an evidentiary
    hearing to establish damages. The court also directed
    plaintiffs to submit briefing addressing the basis for the
    court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
    Following several rounds of supplemental briefing, the
    district court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of
    subject-matter jurisdiction. Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic
    of Iran, 
    947 F. Supp. 2d 48
     (D.D.C. 2013). The court held
    that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1602
     et seq., afforded Iran and the Revolutionary Guard
    immunity from the court’s jurisdiction. Mohammadi, 947 F.
    Supp. 2d at 62-68. The court rejected plaintiffs’ reliance on
    the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act’s terrorism exception,
    28 U.S.C. § 1605A. Id. That exception abrogates immunity
    if, among other things, the complaint seeks damages for
    “torture” or “extrajudicial killing” and the victim was a
    “national of the United States” at the time of those acts. 28
    U.S.C. § 1605A(a). The district court held that plaintiffs
    4
    failed to qualify as United States “nationals” at the time of the
    relevant acts in Iran, and that any acts postdating plaintiffs’
    relocation to the United States failed to constitute “torture”
    within the meaning of the statute. Mohammadi, 947 F. Supp.
    2d at 68. With regard to the individual defendants, Khamenei
    and Ahmadinejad, the court held that the claims against them
    would be treated as claims against Iran itself and thus would
    likewise be dismissed based on foreign sovereign immunity.
    Id. at 72-73. Because the court concluded that it lacked
    subject-matter jurisdiction, it also denied plaintiffs’ motion
    for default judgment.
    Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration and an
    accompanying motion for leave to file a fourth amended
    complaint.      The district court denied both motions.
    Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    947 F. Supp. 2d 48
    ,
    74 (D.D.C. 2013), recons. denied (D.D.C. Jul. 12, 2013).
    Plaintiffs now appeal the dismissal of their third amended
    complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and the
    denial of their motions for reconsideration and for leave to file
    a fourth amended complaint.
    II.
    The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1602
     et seq., affords the “sole basis for obtaining
    jurisdiction over a foreign state” in United States courts.
    Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 
    488 U.S. 428
    , 434 (1989). While the FSIA establishes a general
    rule granting foreign sovereigns immunity from the
    jurisdiction of United States courts, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1604
    , that
    grant of immunity is subject to a number of exceptions, see 
    id.
    §§ 1605-1607. In their third amended complaint, plaintiffs
    asserted subject-matter jurisdiction based solely on the
    FSIA’s terrorism exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. Reviewing
    5
    the matter de novo, see National Air Traffic Controllers Ass’n
    v. Federal Service Impasses Panel, 
    606 F.3d 780
    , 786 (D.C.
    Cir. 2010), we agree with the district court’s conclusion that
    the terrorism exception is inapplicable here.
    The terrorism exception abrogates immunity in cases in
    which a plaintiff seeks damages for personal injury or death
    caused by “torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage,
    hostage taking, or the provision of material support or
    resources for such an act,” if “engaged in by an official,
    employee, or agent” of a foreign country. 28 U.S.C.
    § 1605A(a)(1). The exception further requires that (i) the
    foreign country was designated a “state sponsor of terrorism
    at the time [of] the act,” (ii) the “claimant or the victim was” a
    “national of the United States” at that time, and (iii) the
    “claimant has afforded the foreign state a reasonable
    opportunity to arbitrate the claim.” Id. § 1605A(a)(2).
    Because Iran has been designated a state sponsor of
    terrorism since 1984, plaintiffs satisfy the first of those
    conditions. See Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    735 F.3d 934
    , 937 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
    
    646 F.3d 56
    , 58 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Plaintiffs, however, fail
    to satisfy the second condition with regard to the torture and
    extrajudicial killing allegedly committed against them while
    in Iran, because none of them was a “national of the United
    States” at the time of those acts.
    The terrorism exception assigns the term “national of the
    United States” the “meaning given that term in section
    101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act” (INA), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(22). 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(5). The
    referenced provision of the INA, in turn, generally describes
    “national of the United States” to mean either a “citizen of the
    United States” or a “person who, though not a citizen of the
    6
    United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United
    States.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(22).
    Here, it is undisputed that none of the plaintiffs was a
    United States citizen between 1999 and 2006, when the
    central alleged acts of torture and extrajudicial killing
    occurred in Iran. Instead, plaintiffs argue that they qualified
    as United States nationals during that time because they
    “owe[d] permanent allegiance to the United States.” They
    assert that Manouchehr, Akbar, and Nasrin had personally
    pledged permanent allegiance to the United States and
    disclaimed their loyalty to Iran following the “first signs of
    persecution” in Iran, and that Nasrin exhibited her allegiance
    by applying for and attaining United States permanent
    resident status before Akbar’s death in 2006. Mohammadi,
    947 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
    Plaintiffs’ argument is foreclosed by our precedent. We
    have held that “manifestations of ‘permanent allegiance’ do
    not, by themselves, render a person a U.S. national.” Lin v.
    United States, 
    561 F.3d 502
    , 508 (D.C. Cir. 2009). That is
    because the “phrase ‘owes permanent allegiance’” in 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(22) is “a term of art that denotes a legal status for
    which individuals have never been able to qualify by
    demonstrating permanent allegiance, as that phrase is
    colloquially understood.” Marquez-Almanzar v. INS, 
    418 F.3d 210
    , 218 (2d Cir. 2005); see Lin, 
    561 F.3d at 508
    (relying on Marquez-Almanzar). The reference in 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(22) to a United States national as a person who
    “owes permanent allegiance to the United States” is
    descriptive of someone who has attained the status of United
    States nationality through other statutory provisions; it does
    not itself set forth an independent basis by which to obtain
    that status. The language, that is, “describes, rather than
    confers, U.S. nationality.” Marquez-Almanzar, 
    418 F.3d at
                                 7
    218; see Lin, 
    561 F.3d at 508
    . The conferral of United States
    nationality must come from elsewhere.
    The sole such statutory provision that presently confers
    United States nationality upon non-citizens is 
    8 U.S.C. § 1408
    . See Lin, 
    561 F.3d at 508
    ; Marquez-Almanzar, 
    418 F.3d at 219
    . Plaintiffs make no claim that they qualify as
    United States nationals under that provision, much less that
    they did so at the time of the alleged torture and extrajudicial
    killing in Iran. Section 1408 describes four categories of
    persons who “shall be nationals, but not citizens, of the
    United States at birth.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1408
    . Those categories
    generally consist of persons born in, or possessing a specified
    personal or parental connection with, an “outlying possession
    of the United States,” 
    id.
     § 1408(1)-(4), presently defined as
    American Samoa and Swains Island, id. § 1101(a)(29). See
    Lin, 
    561 F.3d at 508
    ; see also Hashmi v. Mukasey, 
    533 F.3d 700
    , 703 n.1 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that the category of those
    who owe “permanent allegiance to the United States . . . [is]
    apparently limited to residents of American Samoa and
    Swains Island”).
    The courts of appeals to consider the issue thus have
    overwhelmingly concluded that the status of non-citizen
    United States nationality is limited to those persons described
    in 
    8 U.S.C. § 1408
    , and that, apart from that provision, an
    effort to demonstrate “permanent allegiance to the United
    States” does not render a person a United States national. See
    United States v. Sierra-Ledesma, 
    645 F.3d 1213
    , 1224-26
    (10th Cir. 2011); Abou-Haidar v. Gonzales, 
    437 F.3d 206
    ,
    207 (1st Cir. 2006); Omolo v. Gonzales, 
    452 F.3d 404
    , 409
    (5th Cir. 2006); Sebastian-Soler v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    409 F.3d 1280
    , 1285-87 (11th Cir. 2005); Marquez-Almanzar, 
    418 F.3d at 218-19
    ; Perdomo-Padilla v. Ashcroft, 
    333 F.3d 964
    , 972
    (9th Cir. 2003); Salim v. Ashcroft, 
    350 F.3d 307
    , 309-10 (3d
    8
    Cir. 2003) (per curiam). While one court of appeals has
    indicated otherwise, see United States v. Morin, 
    80 F.3d 124
    ,
    126 (4th Cir. 1996), we specifically “join[ed] the majority”
    approach in Lin, 
    561 F.3d at 508
    . (And the continuing
    practical force of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Morin
    within that circuit appears unclear. See Fernandez v. Keisler,
    
    502 F.3d 337
    , 348 (4th Cir. 2007).) Plaintiffs likewise err in
    relying on certain district court decisions attributing United
    States nationality to non-citizens based on unique
    circumstances indicating a “permanent allegiance to the
    United States.” See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    515 F. Supp. 2d 25
    , 39 n.4 (D.D.C. 2007); Asemani v. Islamic
    Republic of Iran, 
    266 F. Supp. 2d 24
    , 26 (D.D.C. 2003).
    Those decisions predate ours in Lin.
    After Lin, in short, plaintiffs’ professed “attitudes of
    permanent allegiance do not help” them establish United
    States nationality. 
    561 F.3d at 508
    . Plaintiffs thus fail to
    satisfy the terrorism exception’s nationality requirement for
    the 1999-2006 time period, when the central alleged acts of
    torture and extrajudicial killing took place in Iran.
    Since 2006, however, two of the plaintiffs have
    unquestionably become “nationals” within the meaning of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(22): Nasrin and Simin obtained United
    States citizenship in 2009 and 2011, respectively. Plaintiffs
    therefore contend that they can establish jurisdiction under the
    terrorism exception with respect to events occurring after
    Nasrin and Simin became United States citizens. That
    argument could have merit, however, only if, after Nasrin
    became a citizen in 2009, the Iranian regime engaged in
    conduct against plaintiffs constituting “torture, extrajudicial
    killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of
    material support or resources for such an act.” See 28 U.S.C.
    § 1605A(a)(1), (a)(2). According to plaintiffs, the Iranian
    9
    regime continued to “torture” them in the United States by
    making threatening phone calls, hacking certain of plaintiffs’
    online accounts, and disseminating doctored, sexually explicit
    photographs of Nasrin. We conclude that those alleged acts,
    while certainly harassing and objectionable, fail to amount to
    “torture” within the meaning of the terrorism exception.
    The terrorism exception defines “torture” by reference to
    the definition of that term contained in the Torture Victim
    Protection Act (TVPA), 
    106 Stat. 73
    , note following 
    28 U.S.C. § 1350
    . See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(7). The TVPA, in
    turn, defines torture as “any act, directed against an individual
    in the offender’s custody or physical control, by which severe
    pain or suffering . . . is intentionally inflicted on that
    individual.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1350
     (note). It is doubtful that
    plaintiffs could be considered to have been in the Iranian
    regime’s “custody or physical control” after their relocation to
    the United States.
    Even assuming otherwise, the challenged acts postdating
    plaintiffs’ settlement in the United States fail to satisfy the
    statute’s severity requirement. Plaintiffs’ allegations did not
    involve physical acts against them. And the non-physical acts
    alleged—viz., threatening phone calls made from Iran,
    hacking of Facebook and email accounts, and circulation of
    explicit photographs—fall short of anything previously held
    to constitute “torture” within the meaning of the TVPA. See
    Simpson v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
    326 F.3d 230
    , 234 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
    In addition to claiming that they have been subjected to
    continuing torture after their settlement in the United States,
    plaintiffs argue that Iran has engaged in “hostage taking”
    within the meaning of the FSIA’s terrorism exception because
    the Iranian regime refuses to permit their parents to leave
    10
    Iran. The district court found that argument to have been
    waived on the ground that plaintiffs failed to press it until
    their post-judgment motion for reconsideration. We find no
    abuse of discretion in that ruling. See GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat’l
    Port Auth., 
    680 F.3d 805
    , 811 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
    In any event, a prohibition on international travel of the
    kind alleged by plaintiffs would not constitute “hostage
    taking.”    The statute’s definition of “hostage taking”
    incorporates the definition from Article 1 of the International
    Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, see 28 U.S.C.
    § 1605A(h)(2), and that definition applies to a person who
    “seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue
    to detain another person,” Simpson, 
    326 F.3d at 234
     (internal
    quotation marks omitted). Even if plaintiffs’ parents are
    barred from traveling abroad from Iran, there is no allegation
    that they have been “seized or detained” within Iran under any
    ordinary understanding of those terms. Courts thus have
    found “hostage taking” in cases involving physical capture
    and confinement, not restrictions on international travel. See,
    e.g., Simpson v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
    
    470 F.3d 356
    , 358 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Anderson v. Islamic
    Republic of Iran, 
    90 F. Supp. 2d 107
    , 109-111, 113 (D.D.C.
    2000).
    Because plaintiffs fail to satisfy the statutory
    requirements of the terrorism exception, Iran, as a “foreign
    state,” is “immune from the jurisdiction” of federal courts.
    See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1604
    . The district court concluded that it also
    lacked jurisdiction over the Revolutionary Guard because the
    FSIA defines “foreign state” to include “a political
    subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality
    of a foreign state,” 
    id.
     § 1603(a). Plaintiffs have forfeited any
    challenge to that conclusion by failing to contest it on appeal.
    See, e.g., World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of
    11
    Kazakhstan, 
    296 F.3d 1154
    , 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs
    also raise no challenge to the district court’s determination
    that foreign sovereign immunity extended to the individual
    defendants, Khamenei and Ahmadinejad. Immunity under the
    FSIA therefore applies to all defendants.
    In a final effort to establish subject-matter jurisdiction,
    plaintiffs invoke the Alien Tort Statute, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1350
    .
    The Alien Tort Statute, however, does not confer any waiver
    of foreign sovereign immunity. See Amerada Hess, 
    488 U.S. at 438-39
    ; Enahoro v. Abubakar, 
    408 F.3d 877
    , 883 (7th Cir.
    2005); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 
    965 F.2d 699
    , 713 n.13 (9th Cir. 1992). The Alien Tort Statute affords
    jurisdiction for suits against private defendants, not against
    foreign sovereigns. The FSIA provides the “sole basis for
    obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state.” Amerada Hess,
    
    488 U.S. at 439
    . We therefore affirm the district court’s
    dismissal of plaintiffs’ third amended complaint for lack of
    subject-matter jurisdiction.
    III.
    After the district court granted dismissal, plaintiffs filed
    motions for reconsideration and for leave to file a fourth
    amended complaint. The only basis for jurisdiction under the
    FSIA asserted in the third amended complaint was the
    terrorism exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. In the proposed
    fourth amended complaint, plaintiffs sought to invoke 
    28 U.S.C. § 1605
    (a)(5), the FSIA’s noncommercial torts
    exception, as an additional basis for jurisdiction. The district
    court denied plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration and
    consequently denied as moot plaintiffs’ motion to file a fourth
    amended complaint. Mohammadi, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 84. We
    review the district court’s ruling for abuse of discretion, see
    GSS Group Ltd., 
    680 F.3d at 811
    ; In re InterBank Funding
    12
    Corp. Securities Litigation, 
    629 F.3d 213
    , 218 (D.C. Cir.
    2010), and we perceive no basis for overturning it.
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave
    to amend shall be “freely give[n]” when “justice so requires.”
    But after entry of judgment, a court has no obligation to grant
    leave to amend unless a plaintiff first satisfies “Rule 59(e)’s
    more stringent standard for setting aside that judgment.”
    Ciralsky v. CIA, 
    355 F.3d 661
    , 673 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). “[R]econsideration of a judgment
    after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be
    used sparingly.” 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
    Practice & Procedure § 2810.1 (3d ed. 2012). A district court
    need not grant a Rule 59(e) motion unless there is an
    “intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new
    evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent
    manifest injustice.” Patton Boggs LLP v. Chevron Corp., 
    683 F.3d 397
    , 403 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    Plaintiffs do not allege any change in applicable law, new
    evidence, or clear error. Rather, they contend that the district
    court’s failure to consider the fourth amended complaint
    constituted a “manifest injustice” because they had included
    the noncommercial torts exception as a jurisdictional basis in
    the initial complaint and first two amended complaints, but
    omitted it—allegedly inadvertently—from the third amended
    complaint.
    “[W]hen a plaintiff files a complaint in federal court and
    then voluntarily amends the complaint,” however, “courts
    look to the amended complaint to determine jurisdiction.”
    Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 
    549 U.S. 457
    , 473-74
    (2007). The district court thus had no obligation to consider
    jurisdictional bases set forth in prior iterations of the
    13
    complaint. Moreover, plaintiffs made no reference to the
    noncommercial torts exception at the evidentiary hearing or in
    their supplemental briefing addressing jurisdiction. In those
    circumstances, the district court acted comfortably within its
    discretion in relying on the sole jurisdictional basis set forth in
    the third amended complaint and associated supplemental
    briefing. There could be no “manifest injustice” where, as
    here, plaintiffs could have “easily avoided the outcome” but
    either failed to “exercise[] due diligence,” Fox v. American
    Airlines, Inc., 
    389 F.3d 1291
    , 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2004), or
    “elected not to act” until after the entry of judgment, Ciralsky,
    
    355 F.3d at 673
    .
    Having concluded that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration
    under Rule 59(e), we likewise find that the court did not err in
    denying plaintiffs’ Rule 15(a) motion for leave to file a fourth
    amended complaint. “Since the court declined to set aside the
    judgment under Rule 59(e), it properly concluded that
    [plaintiffs’] motion to amend under Rule 15(a) was moot.”
    Ciralsky, 
    355 F.3d at 673
    .
    *    *   *    *    *
    We affirm the district court’s dismissal for lack of
    subject-matter jurisdiction and its denial of plaintiffs’ motions
    for reconsideration and for leave to file a fourth amended
    complaint.
    So ordered.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-7109

Citation Numbers: 414 U.S. App. D.C. 327, 782 F.3d 9, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 5380, 2015 WL 1499342

Judges: Kavanaugh, Srinivasan, Edwards

Filed Date: 4/3/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024

Authorities (26)

Asemani v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 266 F. Supp. 2d 24 ( 2003 )

susana-siderman-de-blake-jose-siderman-carlos-siderman-and-lea-siderman , 965 F.2d 699 ( 1992 )

Fox v. American Airlines, Inc. , 389 F.3d 1291 ( 2004 )

Fernandez v. Keisler , 502 F.3d 337 ( 2007 )

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chief-anthony-enahoro-dr-arthur-nwankwo-femi-aborisade-owens-wiwa-cd , 408 F.3d 877 ( 2005 )

Omolo v. Gonzales , 452 F.3d 404 ( 2006 )

David Sebastian-Soler v. U.S. Attorney General , 409 F.3d 1280 ( 2005 )

Lin v. United States , 561 F.3d 502 ( 2009 )

Hashmi v. Mukasey , 533 F.3d 700 ( 2008 )

Mohammed Salim v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the ... , 5 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 759 ( 2003 )

Jose Luis Perdomo-Padilla v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General , 333 F.3d 964 ( 2003 )

Jose Napoleon Marquez-Almanzar v. Immigration and ... , 418 F.3d 210 ( 2005 )

Simpson v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya , 326 F.3d 230 ( 2003 )

Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 646 F.3d 56 ( 2011 )

Simpson Ex Rel. Estate of Karim v. Socialist People's ... , 470 F.3d 356 ( 2006 )

Wrld Wde Mnrl v. Repub Kazakhstan , 296 F.3d 1154 ( 2002 )

Abou-Haidar v. Gonzales , 437 F.3d 206 ( 2006 )

In Re Interbank Funding Corp. SEC. Litigation , 629 F.3d 213 ( 2010 )

Rockwell International Corp. v. United States , 127 S. Ct. 1397 ( 2007 )

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