CHARLES M. COATES v. UNITED STATES , 2015 D.C. App. LEXIS 147 ( 2015 )


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    DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 12-CF-2047
    CHARLES M. COATES, APPELLANT,
    V.
    UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.
    Appeal from the Superior Court
    of the District of Columbia
    (CF1-7379-11)
    (Hon. William M. Jackson, Trial Judge)
    (Argued: December 10, 2014                                Decided: April 23, 2015)
    Daniel Gonen, Public Defender Service, with whom James Klein, Samia
    Fam, and Sonam Henderson, Public Defender Service, were on the briefs, for
    appellant.
    John Cummings, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Ronald C.
    Machen Jr., United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Elizabeth
    Trosman and Michael Liebman, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the
    brief, for appellee.
    Before GLICKMAN and FISHER, Associate Judges, and RUIZ, Senior Judge.
    GLICKMAN, Associate Judge: On trial for murder, appellant Charles Coates
    admitted having shot and killed his cousin and close friend Eddie Leonard, but
    claimed he did so unintentionally and in self-defense when Leonard, freaking out
    2
    on PCP, threatened him with a gun. The key witness against appellant—the
    government’s only witness capable of disputing his account of the shooting—was a
    jailhouse informant, who testified that appellant confessed to killing Leonard, not
    in self-defense, but in a fight over the proceeds of a robbery they committed.
    Appellant denied having confessed to this, but the jury, evidently crediting the
    informant’s testimony, found him guilty of second-degree murder while armed,
    possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, and other related firearm
    offenses.
    In a trial that pitted appellant’s credibility against that of the informant,
    appellant claims the trial court made two erroneous evidentiary rulings that
    unfairly skewed the contest against him. First, appellant argues that the court
    violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation by precluding him from
    impeaching the informant with evidence of his bias—specifically, evidence
    implying the informant had corruptly fabricated a murder confession by an
    innocent man in another case in order to curry favor with the government. Second,
    appellant contends the court also erred in allowing the prosecutor to impeach his
    (appellant’s) veracity by introducing extrinsic evidence of his prior uncharged
    misconduct—specifically, his statement to police that he had committed what he
    called “trick” robberies factually unrelated to the charges in this case.
    3
    We agree with appellant that each of these rulings was erroneous, and that
    the ruling limiting his ability to establish the informant’s corruption bias cannot be
    deemed harmless. We therefore vacate appellant’s convictions and remand for a
    new trial.1
    I.
    The evidence at trial established that the decedent, Eddie Leonard, left his
    father’s house in Southeast Washington, D.C., around 11:30 p.m. on the night of
    February 20, 2011, to meet up with appellant and another man. Leonard and
    appellant were cousins. Witnesses described the two men as very close friends
    who frequently hung out together. On this occasion, Leonard was carrying his
    .380 pistol with him. By appellant’s own account, he and Leonard planned to rob
    the man accompanying them, who was a PCP dealer.2
    1
    Although the harmfulness of the first erroneous ruling suffices by itself to
    entitle appellant to a new trial, we consider whether the second ruling also was
    erroneous because otherwise the issue likely will arise again when the case is
    retried. It is unnecessary, however, for us to consider whether the second error was
    prejudicial.
    2
    Two voicemail messages from appellant on Leonard’s phone confirmed the
    presence of a third man. In the first message, left at 11:26 p.m., appellant said,
    “Come out before this MF changes his mind,” and in the second message, at 11:31
    p.m., appellant said, “I got the bama with me.”
    4
    Within fifteen to twenty minutes, Leonard was lying dead in an alley in
    Northeast Washington, D.C. He was killed by a single gunshot to his head, fired at
    close range from his own pistol.3 A toxicology report concluded that Leonard had
    ingested PCP within six hours of his death. Other than appellant, there were no
    eyewitnesses to the killing.4
    Around 4:30 a.m. the next morning, appellant arrived at his mother’s house,
    sweating and crying. He asked his mother to call the police and tell them he had
    information about Leonard’s death. Appellant told his family members and the
    detectives who interviewed him that Leonard was shot by a drug dealer. His
    accounts of how that happened were inconsistent. Ultimately, though, appellant
    stated to the police that he and Leonard tried to rob a PCP dealer (the person who
    was with appellant when Leonard joined them); that Leonard drew his gun and
    attempted to shoot the dealer but the gun failed to fire; and that the dealer then
    pulled out his own gun and shot Leonard.
    3
    The murder weapon was not recovered. A .380 shell casing found in the
    alley matched the ammunition at Leonard’s father’s house.
    4
    Two people living nearby heard the gunshot at approximately 11:45 p.m.
    and saw Leonard’s body in the alley; one of them also saw a man walk out of the
    alley. He could not identify this person.
    5
    The parties agree that appellant’s stories of Leonard having been shot by a
    drug dealer were fabrications. The government and appellant disagreed at trial as
    to what actually occurred.
    The government’s theory of the case was that appellant and Leonard robbed
    someone, possibly a drug dealer, and that appellant afterwards shot Leonard in a
    dispute over how to divide up the proceeds between them. The evidentiary basis
    for this theory was the uncorroborated testimony of a self-described jailhouse
    informant named Robert Bethea. Bethea, who was 37 years old at the time of trial,
    had a lengthy criminal record and had spent most of his adult life in prison.5 He
    had acted as a government informant and witness in seven different homicide cases
    (including this one). In exchange for his cooperation, he had received numerous
    benefits, including the dismissal or reduction of charges, sentencing concessions,
    and tens of thousands of dollars in housing and living expenses through the witness
    protection program. “If I’m going to put my life on the line, yeah, there’s got to be
    some benefits,” Bethea testified. “[I]f I’m going to provide information, I’m going
    to receive something in return.”       Bethea insisted, though, that “receiv[ing]
    5
    The jury was informed that Bethea was convicted of cocaine possession in
    1992 and again in 1994; robbery in 1993; escape in 1999; contempt in 2000;
    assault in 2004; and distribution of heroin in 2011.
    6
    something in return” was not his only reason for serving as a government
    informant: “I’m cooperating because of the benefits of cooperating,” he stated,
    “and because, also, it’s the right thing to do. You’re talking about murder.” On
    cross-examination, Bethea readily admitted that he was “not the most honest guy in
    the world,” that he had committed “a lot” of crimes, and that if he were caught, he
    would lie about what he had done to “weasel out of it.”6 However, Bethea was
    adamant that he was “always truthful” and “very honest” when he provided
    information about a murder committed by someone else. He would lie about his
    own misconduct to get out of trouble, he said, but “for me to sit and lie on
    somebody else to where it can cost them their whole life, never.”
    Bethea claimed he earned appellant’s confidence while the two were locked
    up together following appellant’s arrest in this case. Initially, Bethea testified,
    appellant told him the same story he had told his family and police—that Leonard
    was shot by a drug dealer in a robbery gone awry. Eventually, however, after a
    number of conversations on the subject and some prodding by Bethea, appellant
    confessed his own involvement in the shooting: “What [appellant] said,” Bethea
    6
    Bethea also acknowledged having given apparently false testimony when
    asked about his nickname in his 2000 trial on drug charges, though he explained
    that his answer was not dishonest, but reflected how he understood the question.
    7
    testified, “was that him and his cousin went on a robbery, they got the money, got
    away and then his cousin be tripping off the PCP . . . and they got to arguing about
    some money. Then he said he—he said, yeah.” Prompted to elaborate, Bethea
    continued:
    I said, you keep telling me that some other guy shot your
    cousin, this and that. I said, man, I think you did it. And
    then that’s when he just came out smiling and he said,
    yeah, man, we were on the move,[7] man, we got the
    money. Once we came back he be tripping off the [PCP]
    and, yeah. And he had a smile on his face. And I just
    looked at him and that’s when I knew that . . . [h]e killed
    his cousin.
    Apart from Bethea’s testimony, the government presented no evidence that
    appellant killed Leonard in an argument over the proceeds of a robbery, or even
    that there was a robbery or a dispute of any kind between appellant and Leonard.8
    Thus, Bethea’s testimony about appellant’s confession to a murder was the
    linchpin of the government’s case; the jury had to believe Bethea to convict
    appellant.
    7
    “On the move” meant committing robbery or “some type of crime.”
    8
    The trial court granted appellant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on
    the charge of robbery at the close of the government’s case.
    8
    Testifying in his own defense, appellant denied having spoken with Bethea
    about his case and gave a different account of Leonard’s death. According to
    appellant, on the night of the shooting, he and Leonard planned to rob a PCP dealer
    known to him as “Little Bob.” Outside Leonard’s father’s house, they got into
    Little Bob’s car and drove off, on the pretext that they were going to consummate a
    large purchase of PCP. On the way, Little Bob allowed Leonard to smoke a PCP-
    laced cigarette to test the drug before they paid for it. After doing so, however,
    Leonard unexpectedly became agitated and started rocking back and forth in his
    seat, stomping his feet, and violently hitting the dashboard, “like the car was
    closing in on him.” Apparently alarmed by Leonard’s behavior, Little Bob stopped
    the car, jumped out, and fled. Leonard also got out of the car and staggered down
    an alley. Appellant followed him and tried to calm him down and lead him away,
    but Leonard, getting more and more out of control, pulled out his gun and pointed
    it at appellant. Appellant attempted to wrest the gun away. A struggle ensued until
    the gun went off and Leonard fell to the ground, mortally wounded.
    Claiming he was in shock at this turn of events, appellant testified that he
    wandered out of the alley and walked a few blocks before sitting down on some
    steps to try to recover. Realizing he still had the gun, he abandoned it on the steps,
    left the area, and returned to his mother’s house. Appellant admitted that the
    9
    stories he told his family and the police about the shooting were lies; he was in
    denial and still in shock, he explained.
    Appellant’s account was corroborated by the toxicological evidence
    confirming that Leonard had ingested PCP, and by the voicemails indicating that
    they were with a third person just before the shooting. But “Little Bob,” who
    supposedly saw Leonard become agitated, did not appear as a witness; and no one
    other than appellant saw the shooting. Thus, appellant’s credibility was essential
    to his defense.
    II.
    The rulings challenged in this appeal concerned each side’s effort to
    impeach the other side’s most important witness at trial. One ruling thwarted
    appellant’s effort to show Bethea’s corruption and bias with evidence that he had
    made a false report of a confession in another murder case. The other ruling
    allowed the government to attack appellant’s veracity with extrinsic evidence of
    prior misconduct for which appellant had not been convicted. We address these
    rulings in turn.
    10
    A. The Limitation on the Impeachment of Bethea with Evidence of
    Corruption Bias
    Prior to trial, the government informed appellant of potential impeachment
    evidence suggesting Bethea had made a false report of a murder confession in
    another, unrelated case. In 2009, Bethea claimed that a fellow jail inmate named
    Travis Freeman confessed to having shot and killed his cousin, Ryan Collins.
    Bethea turned over to the government a hand-drawn map, which he said Freeman
    had given him to show where he had buried the murder weapon. Freeman denied
    Bethea’s report. Moreover, because Freeman was incarcerated when Collins was
    murdered, he could not have committed the homicide or hidden the murder
    weapon. Freeman was never charged with Collins’s murder.
    Having commendably disclosed this potential impeachment evidence, the
    government nonetheless moved to exclude any mention of it at appellant’s trial on
    the ground that it was collateral. Appellant disagreed, arguing that it was strong
    evidence Bethea had lied about Freeman’s confession and manufactured false
    evidence, demonstrating not only the untruthfulness, but also the corruption and
    bias of the government’s key witness. The ensuing colloquy between the court and
    counsel over appellant’s right to explore these issues at trial extended over three
    days. Initially, appellant argued somewhat more narrowly that he was entitled to
    11
    explore whether Bethea made a false report of a murder confession because it was
    a prior bad act that bore directly on Bethea’s veracity with respect to the issues
    involved in the trial.9 Under this rationale, appellant could have cross-examined
    Bethea about the falsity of his report, but he would not have been allowed to prove
    its falsity with extrinsic evidence.10 Appellant eventually broadened his argument,
    however, to make clear that he sought to use the falsity of the report of Freeman’s
    confession to establish Bethea’s corruption and consequent bias.11 Because bias is
    not a collateral issue, “evidence from which the jury can infer bias may be
    presented not only through cross-examination, but also by the introduction of
    extrinsic evidence.”12
    The trial court agreed that “the centrality of Mr. Bethea in this case is
    apparent” and that the falsity of his claim that Freeman had confessed to a murder,
    if shown, would be probative of his bias. The court accordingly allowed appellant
    to cross-examine Bethea about his report of Freeman’s confession and map, to call
    9
    See Sherer v. United States, 
    470 A.2d 732
    , 738 (D.C. 1983).
    10
    
    Id. 11 See
    Longus v. United States, 
    52 A.3d 836
    , 852 (D.C. 2012) (citing, inter
    alia, In re C.B.N., 
    499 A.2d 1215
    , 1219 (D.C. 1985)).
    12
    
    Id. 12 Freeman
    as a defense witness to deny having made the confession or the map, and
    to present other evidence (if it existed) showing that Bethea could not have heard
    what he claimed.13
    Yet even though the government was willing to stipulate that it was
    physically impossible for Freeman to have committed the murder to which he
    supposedly confessed, the court refused to permit appellant to present such a
    stipulation or otherwise prove that Freeman did not kill his cousin.14 The court
    reasoned that Freeman’s actual innocence was “irrelevant” to whether he had
    confessed the murder to Bethea, because it did not “negate” the possibility that he
    “could have said it.” Freeman, the court hypothesized, could have been boasting
    about a crime he did not commit in order to bolster his reputation at the jail.
    “People brag all the time,” the court observed, for “any number of different
    reasons.”15 Appellant argued that while Freeman’s undisputed innocence may not
    13
    The court envisaged the possibility that evidence Bethea and Freeman
    were never together at the Jail “obviously . . . would disprove” Bethea’s claim. No
    such evidence was presented, however.
    14
    The government’s willingness to stipulate laid to rest any worry, which
    the court entertained initially, that an inquiry into whether Freeman killed Collins
    would metastasize into a “mini-trial” that might confuse and distract the jury.
    15
    As the court elaborated:
    (continued…)
    13
    have made it literally impossible that he confessed the murder to Bethea, it
    certainly made it a lot less likely and made Freeman’s denial of Bethea’s report a
    lot more credible. “The idea that someone would confess to a crime that they
    didn’t commit is so counterintuitive,” appellant pointed out, “that we’ve made an
    exception to the hearsay rule. . . . [S]omeone wouldn’t say it, if it weren’t true.”
    But the court was not persuaded by this argument.
    The court’s restrictive ruling clearly hobbled appellant’s impeachment of
    Bethea. On cross-examination, Bethea testified that when he and Freeman were
    incarcerated together in the fall of 2009, Freeman told him he had killed Collins
    and buried the gun he used to do it. To test whether Freeman’s story was true,
    Bethea said, he asked Freeman to draw a map showing where he secreted the
    murder weapon.      Freeman complied with this request.        Bethea reported this
    information and provided the map to prosecutors.         Bethea testified he heard
    nothing back from them about the case and therefore surmised Freeman “probably
    (continued…)
    I suspect that people in the jail may boast about any
    number of different things that are not true, precisely
    because jail’s a dangerous place. People get hurt. And
    so people may very well admit to—oh, I’ve shot people.
    I’ve done this. I’m the baddest person on the block. I’m
    in this gang, [etc.], because there’s a lot of bravado there.
    14
    was lying.”   On redirect, though, Bethea elaborated on the circumstances of
    Freeman’s confession, recalling that Freeman originally blamed someone else for
    Collins’s murder before he finally “broke down” one night under Bethea’s
    prodding and admitted to it—all of which suggested that Freeman was not lying at
    all when he allegedly confessed.
    In the defense case, appellant called Travis Freeman to the witness stand.
    Freeman testified that his cousin was killed in a robbery attempt. He denied
    knowing Bethea, telling him he had killed Collins and buried the murder weapon,
    or drawing a map showing where the gun was hidden. Freeman confirmed that he
    was never charged with the homicide. However, he was prevented from testifying
    that he could not possibly have killed Collins or secreted the gun because he was in
    custody at the time.16 On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited Freeman’s
    acknowledgement that he was familiar with the area of First and Ingraham Streets
    Northwest and then confronted him with a hand-drawn map of that area. Freeman
    denied having drawn it.
    16
    When Freeman was asked whether he ever drew anyone a map showing
    where he had buried the gun used to kill Collins, he began his answer by saying,
    “No. That’s impossible, sir, because I was in—,” and the court sustained the
    government’s objection and cut him off.
    15
    In its rebuttal case, the government recalled Bethea to the stand. Over
    appellant’s objection, Bethea identified the map the prosecutor had shown Freeman
    as the same one Freeman had drawn for him. Bethea explained that he was able to
    convince Freeman to draw it by offering to help him retrieve the gun he had
    buried. The map was admitted in evidence (again, over appellant’s objection).17 In
    view of this rebuttal evidence, appellant renewed his request for permission to call
    Freeman to testify that he could not have killed Collins or buried the murder
    weapon because he was in custody at the time. Adhering to its prior ruling that the
    evidence was irrelevant, the court denied the request.18
    Bethea thus came through this attempted bias impeachment unscathed. Not
    having heard that Freeman indisputably did not kill Collins or bury the murder
    weapon, and having seen the map Freeman allegedly drew, the jury had no reason
    to believe Freeman, or to disbelieve Bethea’s testimony and perceive him to be a
    17
    While the map was produced in court, nothing established that Freeman
    drew it other than Bethea’s word. Nor was there evidence that a gun was found in
    the hiding place shown on the map.
    18
    In doing so, the court again raised the specter of “a mini-trial over whether
    or not Mr. Freeman did a murder or paid anyone to do a murder.” But the
    government was prepared to stipulate that Freeman did not commit the murder, and
    it never proffered anything to support the speculation that Freeman hired someone
    to kill Collins.
    16
    corrupt informant who would fabricate the confession of an innocent man and
    manufacture incriminating evidence. In closing argument, the government thus
    was well able to argue that Bethea was a trustworthy informant with a good track
    record; that “[t]he reason he continues to sell information and the reason people
    buy it still is because it can be credited”; and that Bethea “doesn’t like murderers,
    and he is very pleased to tell the government [when] people who are charged with
    murder admit their crimes to him, people like this defendant.” And in response to
    appellant’s crippled suggestion that Freeman’s testimony showed otherwise, the
    government in rebuttal was poised to dismiss it out of hand, by arguing as follows:
    Mr. Freeman is the person who denies to you that he ever
    said he killed anybody, to Robert Bethea or anyone else.
    Is anyone surprised about that? Is anyone surprised that
    Mr. Freeman didn’t get on the stand and say, [w]ell,
    actually, yeah, I [did] tell Robert Bethea back in 2009
    that I killed somebody. . . . That would have been a jaw-
    dropping moment for Travis Freeman to get on the stand
    and say, yeah, I did admit to killing a guy, yeah. . . . No
    one expected that to happen. Of course, it didn’t
    happen. . . . There’s no way Mr. Freeman was going to
    admit that he confessed to a murder. But he does know
    that area [described in the map]. He did admit that,
    doesn’t he?
    17
    This would have been a difficult argument to make if the jury had learned that it
    was physically impossible for Freeman to have killed Collins.19
    We are persuaded it was reversible error to preclude appellant from
    introducing a stipulation or other evidence that Freeman could not and did not
    commit the murder to which he allegedly confessed. Freeman was relevant to this
    case only if he did not confess to Bethea. His unquestioned innocence of the
    murder was the strongest evidence that he did not confess. There was no sound
    justification for depriving the jury of this pertinent information.
    Extrinsic evidence showing Bethea fabricated his report of Freeman’s
    confession was admissible (as the trial court recognized) because it was probative
    not merely of his lack of veracity, but of his corruption—his “willingness to
    19
    Appellant intimates in his briefs that to the extent the government’s
    rebuttal argument implied Freeman could have been guilty of his cousin’s murder,
    it was misleading (citing Woodard v. United States, 
    56 A.3d 125
    , 128 (D.C. 2012)
    (“[A] prosecutor’s misleading statements during closing argument, especially
    rebuttal argument, may ‘so infect [] [a] trial with unfairness as to make the
    resulting conviction a denial of due process.’”) (quoting Darden v. Wainwright,
    
    477 U.S. 168
    , 181 (1986))). Appellant did not object to the argument on this
    ground at trial, however, nor does he directly assert on appeal that the trial court
    erred by failing to take corrective action sua sponte. We therefore refrain from
    determining whether the argument was improper or, if so, whether appellant would
    be entitled to relief for that reason.
    18
    obstruct the discovery of the truth by manufacturing or suppressing testimony” or
    otherwise “to thwart the ascertainment of truth in a judicial proceeding.”20 Such
    corruption is acknowledged to be a distinct form of testimonial bias.21           And
    because the bias of a witness is always a proper subject of inquiry, in a criminal
    case “[a] trial court’s refusal to allow questioning [by the defendant] about facts
    indicative of a witness’s bias from which the jury could reasonably draw adverse
    inferences of reliability is an error of constitutional dimension”22—specifically, a
    violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. While that
    right is “subject to reasonable limits imposed at the discretion of the trial judge,”23
    the exercise of such discretion “cannot justify a curtailment which keeps from the
    jury relevant and important facts bearing on the trustworthiness of crucial
    testimony.”24
    20
    
    Longus, 52 A.3d at 852
    (quoting, respectively, In re 
    C.B.N., 499 A.2d at 1219
    , and (Reginald) Bennett v. United States, 
    763 A.2d 1117
    , 1123 (D.C. 2000));
    see also 
    id., 52 A.3d
    at 853-54 n.29 (“[W]e wish to lay to rest any suggestion that
    ‘prior bad acts’ of the witness are not admissible in bias examination.”).
    21
    
    Id. at 852.
          22
    
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and brackets omitted).
    23
    Scull v. United States, 
    564 A.2d 1161
    , 1164 (D.C. 1989).
    24
    (Jerry) Bennett v. United States, 
    797 A.2d 1251
    , 1257 (D.C. 2002)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    19
    The trial court in this case was familiar with the foregoing principles and
    undertook to apply them properly. The court’s error was in deeming Freeman’s
    uncontested innocence of Collins’s murder to be irrelevant to the question of
    Bethea’s corruption bias because it did not prove conclusively that Bethea
    fabricated Freeman’s confession. This set the bar too high. “The probativity
    threshold for purposes of admissibility is low: An item of evidence, to be relevant,
    need only ‘tend[] to make the existence or nonexistence of a fact more or less
    probable than would be the case without that evidence.’”25 The evidence that it
    was physically impossible for Freeman to have killed his cousin or buried the
    murder weapon easily met this test, for, as a rule, “we believe that it is unlikely that
    a rational person would admit to a crime if it were not true.”26 Nor is it implausible
    that a jailhouse informant would, in order to curry favor with the government or for
    other personal motives, lie about a fellow inmate having confessed.27 Thus, the
    proffered evidence of Freeman’s undeniable innocence certainly would have
    25
    In re L.C., 
    92 A.3d 290
    , 297 (D.C. 2014) (quoting Punch v. United States,
    
    377 A.2d 1353
    , 1358 (D.C. 1977)).
    26
    Laumer v. United States, 
    409 A.2d 190
    , 197 (D.C. 1979) (en banc).
    27
    “The likelihood that evidence gathered by self-interested jailhouse
    informants may be false cannot be ignored.” Kansas v. Ventris, 
    556 U.S. 586
    , 597
    n.2 (2009) (Stevens, J. dissenting). See, e.g., Hon. Stephen S. Trott, Words of
    Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS L. J. 1381,
    1394 (1996) (“The most dangerous informer of all is the jailhouse snitch who
    (continued…)
    20
    helped appellant “establish the . . . improbability”28 of Bethea’s testimony that
    Freeman “broke down,” admitted killing his cousin, and drew Bethea a map
    showing where he hid the gun he used to commit the homicide.               The mere
    conjecture by the court that Freeman was boasting of a crime he did not commit,
    which in point of fact was inconsistent with Bethea’s account,29 was not a proper
    ground on which to exclude the evidence of Freeman’s factual innocence as
    irrelevant. “[E]vidence may not be rejected as irrelevant merely because it is
    (continued…)
    claims another prisoner has confessed to him. The snitch now stands ready to
    testify in return for some consideration in his own case. Sometimes these snitches
    tell the truth, but more often they invent testimony and stray details out of the
    air[.]”); Jackson v. Brown, 
    513 F.3d 1057
    , 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that
    “promises of assistance . . . gave [two jailhouse informants] a strong incentive to
    lie about exactly that part of the testimony that was most crucial to” the charged
    offense); Zappulla v. New York, 
    391 F.3d 462
    , 470 n.3 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting
    authorities observing that jailhouse informants’ “testimony is oftentimes partially
    or completely fabricated”) (citations omitted); United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco,
    
    826 F.2d 310
    , 315 (5th Cir. 1987) (“It is difficult to imagine a greater motivation to
    lie than the inducement of a reduced sentence.”); United States v. Meinster, 
    619 F.2d 1041
    , 1044-45 (4th Cir. 1980) (“We think it obvious that promises of
    immunity or leniency premised on cooperation in a particular case may provide a
    strong inducement to falsify in that case.”); United States v. Alexander, 
    430 F.2d 904
    , 906 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (describing prisoner affidavits stating that appellant’s
    deceased accomplice had confessed as “inherently incredible”).
    28
    In re 
    L.C., 92 A.3d at 298
    (quoting Plummer v. United States, 
    813 A.2d 182
    , 188-89 (D.C. 2002)).
    29
    Bethea’s description of Freeman’s reluctant confession was a far cry from
    the boastful posturing the court imagined.
    21
    contradicted by other evidence,”30 let alone because it is contrary to a theoretically
    plausible but factually unsubstantiated speculation.
    The excluded evidence of Freeman’s innocence was far from cumulative of
    other evidence demonstrating Bethea’s corruption bias.        To be sure, Bethea’s
    credibility was impeached in other ways (for example, by his ironically candid
    admission that he would lie about his own wrongdoing to get out of trouble), and
    there was ample evidence of his motive to curry favor with the government. But
    impeachment of a witness’s credibility is not a substitute for bias impeachment,
    and we have recognized that “the allowance of some examination for one type of
    bias (currying favor with the government) does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment
    with respect to cross-examination for corruption, a different type of bias.”31 None
    of this other impeachment evidence made a serious dent in the government’s
    argument that it was in Bethea’s self-interest to provide only truthful reports as a
    government informant and that he had a sterling track record of doing so. While
    appellant could still attempt to make a corruption bias argument, none of this other
    30
    In re 
    L.C., 92 A.3d at 298
    .
    31
    
    Longus, 52 A.3d at 52
    .
    22
    evidence of his motive to curry favor and lack of veracity directly showed that
    Bethea was corrupt in the sense we use the term here.
    Without the excluded evidence of Freeman’s innocence, the jury thus had
    little or no reason to credit his uncorroborated denial of Bethea’s testimony about
    him, and therefore little or no reason to conclude that Bethea was in fact motivated
    to manufacture incriminating evidence against appellant. If anything, the effect of
    the court’s ruling was to render the testimony concerning Freeman a distracting
    sideshow that ended up bolstering the credibility of Bethea’s assertion that he
    would never lie about someone having admitted to a murder. But if the jury had
    known Freeman could not possibly have committed the murder, it might well have
    credited his denial and believed that Bethea had lied and manufactured falsely
    incriminating evidence in his case. Bethea’s corruption bias then would have been
    manifest, and the jury would have had ample reason to distrust his report of
    appellant’s confession. We have recognized in the past that “[i]f a witness is
    willing to lie about a murder, a jury may well conclude that she is likely to be
    willing to lie about anything. More particularly, if she has lied about one murder,
    there may be little if any reason to credit her testimony about a different murder.”32
    32
    (Jerry) 
    Bennett, 797 A.2d at 1255-56
    .
    23
    Apart from its mistaken relevance determination, the trial court had no other
    sound reason to exclude the evidence of Freeman’s innocence. The only other
    concern the court identified—the risk of a mini-trial on the issue that might distract
    and confuse the jury—was dispelled by the government’s stated willingness to
    stipulate that Freeman did not commit the murder of his cousin. There would have
    been no mini-trial, and no attendant risk of jury confusion.
    On appeal, the government argues that appellant did not have a
    constitutional right to confront Bethea about Freeman because his factual proffer
    did not “show convincingly” that Bethea had lied about Freeman’s confession.
    This argument misapprehends the nature of the impeachment here. We have said
    that where a defendant seeks to present evidence of a witness’s prior false claim in
    order to impeach the witness’s credibility but not to prove his testimonial bias in
    the case at bar, “the confrontation clause mandates that the trial court give [the]
    defendant leave to examine about the prior claim only where it is ‘shown
    convincingly’ that the prior claim is false.”33 Here, however, the impeachment of
    Bethea was for bias. In order to be constitutionally entitled to pursue a line of bias
    33
    Garibay v. United States, 
    72 A.3d 133
    , 138 (D.C. 2013) (quoting
    Roundtree v. United States, 
    581 A.2d 315
    , 321 (D.C. 1990)); see also Sherer v.
    United States, 
    470 A.2d 732
    , 738-39 (D.C. 1983).
    24
    inquiry, a party need only “proffer ‘some facts which support a genuine belief’ that
    the witness is biased in the manner asserted”34 or, lacking such facts, at least “a
    ‘well-reasoned suspicion’ [of bias] rather than ‘an improbable flight of fancy.’”35
    This standard is more lenient than the “shown convincingly” standard for general
    credibility impeachment with prior false claims, and it unquestionably was
    satisfied here by Freeman’s denial that he had confessed to a murder and the
    government’s acknowledgment that Freeman could not have committed it.
    We hold that, by withholding from the jury “relevant and important facts
    bearing on the trustworthiness of crucial testimony,”36 the trial court’s ruling
    violated appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.
    Given the centrality of Bethea’s testimony to the government’s case against
    appellant, the absence of evidence corroborating Bethea’s report of appellant’s
    confession, and the uniqueness and potential value of evidence demonstrative of
    34
    (Irving) Jones v. United States, 
    516 A.2d 513
    , 517 (D.C. 1986) (citation
    omitted).
    35
    (Rocky) Brown v. United States, 
    683 A.2d 118
    , 125 (D.C. 1996) (quoting
    Scull v. United States, 
    564 A.2d 1161
    , 1164 (D.C. 1989)); see also Clayborne v.
    United States, 
    751 A.2d 956
    , 963 (D.C. 2000) (counsel must proffer a “well-
    grounded” basis that the inquiry will be “probative of bias.”).
    36
    (Jerry) 
    Bennett, 797 A.2d at 1257
    .
    25
    Bethea’s corrupt willingness to fabricate false evidence of guilt in a murder case,
    we cannot find the constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.37
    Appellant is entitled to a new trial on this ground.
    B. The Impeachment of Appellant’s Veracity With Extrinsic Evidence
    of Prior Uncharged Misconduct
    The second challenged ruling allowed the government to introduce
    appellant’s videotaped admission of prior uncharged misconduct—what appellant
    referred to as “trick” robberies—for the purpose of attacking his character for
    truthfulness. We agree with appellant that this ruling was erroneous.
    During his interrogation by police, appellant denied having robbed anyone
    with his cousin Leonard and explained his own preferred modus operandi as
    follows:
    37
    See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 
    475 U.S. 673
    , 684 (1986) (“The correct
    inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the [impeachment]
    were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was
    harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”); (Emmett) Jones v. United States, 
    853 A.2d 146
    , 154 (D.C. 2004) (“To show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt, the
    government must show that (1) appellant would have been convicted without the
    witness’s testimony, or (2) the restricted line of questioning would not have
    weakened the impact of the witness’s testimony.”).
    26
    You know . . . usually I try to get a flip in, but when you
    got something sweet, he know I don’t do nothing but
    sweet rob—I ain’t never robbed nobody with a gun. . . . I
    do trick robbery. I talk you out your money. You know
    what I’m saying? Act like I’m doing this and I’m doing
    this, and I’m getting you. But all the—I do trick robbery.
    Over appellant’s objection, the trial court allowed the government to introduce
    these statements in its case-in-chief because they would help the jury evaluate
    appellant’s veracity when (as was anticipated from the defense opening statement)
    he later took the stand. The court explained:
    It seems to me that he’s basically saying his weapon, if
    anything, is his mouth. He basically is a con person. He
    talks you out of your money. And if that portion is to be
    credited, it’s probative of whether or not, it seems to me,
    his in-court testimony is to be credited by that jury on
    whether or not he’s, quote, unquote, conning them, as he
    says he does in this particular statement[.]
    In other words, the court stated, appellant’s statements were admissible to show
    that he was not “a truth teller.”
    When appellant did take the stand and testify, the government did not cross-
    examine him about his “trick robberies” statement. But at the trial’s conclusion,
    the prosecutor ended his rebuttal argument by reminding the jury of appellant’s
    admission that “[h]e was a trickster” and telling the jury that appellant “was trying
    to trick you when he got on the stand.”
    27
    Allowing the government to introduce appellant’s “trick robbery”
    admissions in evidence and use them to attack his truthfulness as a witness was
    improper. Appellant’s “trick robberies” were prior bad acts, and his recorded out-
    of-court statements to the police constituted extrinsic evidence of those acts. As
    this court explained in Sherer, under our case law it is impermissible to impeach a
    witness’s truthfulness with extrinsic evidence of prior bad acts that did not result in
    a criminal conviction:
    The general credibility of a witness can be impeached by
    evidence that the witness has been convicted of a
    [felony], or of a crime involving dishonesty or false
    statement. The conviction can be established either
    through cross-examination or by extrinsic evidence.
    In contrast, a witness may be cross-examined on a
    prior bad act that has not resulted in a criminal conviction
    only where: (1) the examiner has a factual predicate for
    such question, and (2) the bad act bears directly upon the
    veracity of the witness in respect to the issues involved
    [in] the trial. Moreover, where such impeachment is
    permitted, evidence of the prior misconduct may be
    elicited only by cross-examination of the witness; it may
    not be proved by extrinsic evidence.[38]
    38
    
    Sherer, 470 A.2d at 738
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);
    see also (James) Brown v. United States, 
    726 A.2d 149
    , 153 (D.C. 1999) (“Prior
    bad acts not rising to the level of a criminal conviction . . . cannot be proven by
    extrinsic evidence.”); D.C. Code § 14-305 (b)(1) (providing that “for the purpose
    of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been
    convicted of a criminal offense shall be admitted if offered, either upon the cross-
    examination of the witness or by evidence aliunde. . . .”).
    28
    We have recognized no exception to this rule where the extrinsic proof of the prior
    misconduct consists of the witness’s out-of-court admissions.39
    The government argues that appellant’s statements about committing trick
    robberies were admissible as false statements evincing his consciousness of guilt.40
    However, that was not the basis on which the court admitted appellant’s
    statements, nor was it how the government used them. The government argued
    that appellant’s trick robbery claims were true, not false, and that they showed his
    dishonesty, not his consciousness of guilt.
    At his new trial, this extrinsic evidence of prior uncharged misconduct may
    not be admitted to attack appellant’s veracity.
    39
    Cf. United States v. Shinderman, 
    515 F.3d 5
    , 18 (1st Cir. 2008)
    (explaining that extrinsic evidence of prior misconduct to prove a witness’s
    untruthfulness is prohibited by Federal Rule of Evidence 608 (b) even if the
    witness admits the misconduct).
    40
    See Nelson v. United States, 
    601 A.2d 582
    , 595 (D.C. 1991) (“[A] false
    statement made by a defendant in explanation of conduct which is the subject of
    criminal charges against him is admissible as tending to show consciousness of
    guilt.”).
    29
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we vacate appellant’s convictions and remand for
    a new trial.
    So ordered.