Molly G. (Lachance) Jandreau v. Daniel L. Lachance ( 2015 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2015 ME 66
Docket: Ken-14-398
Submitted
On Briefs: February 26, 2015
Decided: May 14, 2015
Panel: ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.
MOLLY G. (LACHANCE) JANDREAU
v.
DANIEL L. LACHANCE
JABAR, J.
[¶1] Molly G. (LaChance) Jandreau appeals from a divorce judgment
entered in the District Court (Waterville, Dow, J.) dissolving her marriage to
Daniel L. LaChance. Because we agree with Jandreau’s contention that the court
abused its discretion in denying her request for spousal support and attorney fees,
we vacate and remand for reconsideration.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Jandreau and LaChance married in February 1999, and their daughter
was born in June 2000. In March 2013, Jandreau filed a complaint for divorce.
The court found that Jandreau has an annual income of $14,212, which consists
entirely of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. It found that
LaChance has an annual income of $87,896.
2
[¶3] In April 2013, the parties consented to the entry of an interim order
requiring LaChance to pay Jandreau $192 per week in child support. After
participating in mediation, the parties agreed that LaChance would also pay
Jandreau interim spousal support of $1,600 per month, commencing June 13, 2013.
On May 29, 2013, the court entered an order reflecting the parties’ agreement.
[¶4] LaChance paid the June spousal support payment in full and paid
$50 in July. He then ceased making spousal support payments and fell behind in
his child support payments. At trial, Jandreau testified that LaChance’s failure to
pay the ordered support payments rendered her unable to meet her daily living
expenses, causing her to incur overdraft fees and to borrow from payday lenders
and family.
[¶5] In October 2013, Jandreau filed a motion for contempt based upon
LaChance’s nonpayment of his interim support obligations. See M.R. Civ. P.
66(d). On November 15, 2013, the court held a consolidated trial on the contempt
motion and the issues that had not been resolved through mediation in the divorce
proceeding. Jandreau filed an updated child support affidavit and financial
statement in advance of the trial as required by M.R. Civ. P. 108(d)(4). LaChance
did not.
[¶6] At trial, the parties testified to the following facts. Jandreau is disabled
due to anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder, has multiple medical conditions,
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takes ten prescription medications, and sees both a counselor and a psychiatrist.
She was forced to leave her most recent job because of her anxiety. At the time of
trial, she had not worked for a full year or earned more than $10,000 through
employment in any of the previous ten years.
[¶7] In addition to her own SSDI benefits, Jandreau receives $592 in
monthly dependent SSDI benefits for the parties’ daughter and $70 each month in
food stamps. During the marriage, Jandreau was covered under LaChance’s
employer’s health insurance policy, received MaineCare, and spent $104 per
month on a supplemental Medicare plan. She did not incur out-of-pocket expenses
for visits with her counselor or psychiatrist. After the divorce, Jandreau will no
longer be covered by LaChance’s health insurance and will be rendered ineligible
for MaineCare by the child support order. Because of her disability, she will
remain entitled to Medicare, but will have to purchase increased Medicare
coverage at an additional monthly cost of $130. She may also incur out-of-pocket
expenses for visits with her counselor and psychiatrist. Even without including
these additional outlays, the evidence indicates that Jandreau’s expenses exceed
her income by about $1,000 every month.
[¶8] LaChance is a trained machinist and has been operating in that capacity
since 1986. Based on LaChance’s paystub for the week ending June 2, 2013, the
court found that he had “a weekly gross income of $1,623.21,” not including
4
bonuses. Extrapolating this weekly income to an annual amount and including a
bonus of $3,489, the court found that LaChance’s annual income is $87,896.
[¶9] Jandreau requested an award of $1,200 in monthly spousal support.
She also asked the court to award her attorney fees, arguing that the award was
justified (1) by her inability to pay the fees herself, (2) by LaChance’s failure to
file an updated financial statement, and (3) as a remedial contempt sanction for
LaChance’s refusal to comply with the court’s interim spousal support order. At
the time of trial, Jandreau’s attorney fees totaled $9,410.54.
[¶10] In its judgment, entered in August 2014, the court ordered LaChance
to pay Jandreau $230 in weekly child support pursuant to the 19-A M.R.S. § 2006
(2014) support guidelines. The judgment gave Jandreau the right to claim the
parties’ daughter as a dependent for tax purposes, but allowed LaChance to buy the
dependency exemption from her at a price equal to the amount by which
Jandreau’s tax liability would be decreased if she claimed the exemption. The
judgment allocated the marital home and its mortgage to LaChance, providing him
with equity of approximately $25,500. The judgment allocated to LaChance
marital personal property worth more than $7,500, and allocated to Jandreau
marital personal property valued at $300. The judgment assigned LaChance
responsibility for nearly $10,000 of the parties’ non-mortgage marital debts, and
assigned Jandreau responsibility for marital debts in excess of $14,500. To
5
equalize the division of marital assets and liabilities, the court ordered LaChance to
pay Jandreau $18,837. With this payment included, the property division left each
party with a positive net worth of approximately $4,400.
[¶11] The judgment provided that “in light of the child support ordered
herein,” “the tax consequences of the award of the [dependency] exemption to
[Jandreau],” “the property distribution,” and “the incomes of the parties,” “no
spousal support shall be paid now or in the future.” It also stated, without
explanation, that the parties would be responsible for their own attorney fees.
[¶12] In addressing the contempt issue, the court found by clear and
convincing evidence that LaChance “violated the order to pay spousal support
when he at all times had the power to comply.” As a “sanction,” the court ordered
that LaChance’s obligation to pay the interim spousal support would remain in
effect.1 The court found that LaChance owed Jandreau thirteen months of support
at $1,600 per month ($20,800), less his $50 payment to her in July 2013, and
issued a writ of execution against LaChance in Jandreau’s favor in the amount of
$20,750.
1
However, the court also noted that it could not “adjust the amount of spousal support subject to the
contempt motion.”
6
II. DISCUSSION
[¶13] On appeal, Jandreau contends that the court abused its discretion by
denying her requests for spousal support and attorney fees. LaChance elected not
to participate in this appeal and did not file a brief.
A. Spousal Support
[¶14] We review a divorce court’s decision regarding spousal support for an
abuse of discretion. Buck v. Buck, 2015 ME 33, ¶ 6, --- A.3d --- (per curiam). In
so doing, we consider whether competent evidence supports the court’s factual
findings, viewing the record and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the court’s judgment. Id. ¶ 5.
[¶15] Although the trial court has considerable discretion in deciding
whether and in what amount to award spousal support, and we review its decision
with deference, we will vacate a decision that exceeds the bounds of the court’s
discretion. Potter v. Potter, 2007 ME 95, ¶ 7, 926 A.2d 1193; see Payne v. Payne,
2006 ME 73, ¶ 11, 899 A.2d 793. The court’s discretion regarding an award of
spousal support is defined by the factors set forth in 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5)
(2014). Levy, Maine Family Law § 8.2[1] at 8-11 (8th ed. 2013). These factors
include the length of the marriage; the ability of each party to pay; the parties’
income and employment history and potential; the parties’ provisions for health
insurance; the parties’ health and disability status; the contributions of either party
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as homemaker; the ability of the party requesting support to become
self-supporting within a reasonable period of time; the effect of a child support
order on the payee’s need for spousal support and the payor’s ability to pay spousal
support; and a catchall consideration: “[a]ny other factors the court considers
appropriate.” 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5).
[¶16] In determining an award of spousal support, the trial court must
consider all of the statutory factors, but may rely on some factors to the exclusion
of others. Carter v. Carter, 2006 ME 68, ¶ 20, 900 A.2d 200. If the court denies
spousal support after a contested hearing, it must issue an order stating the factors
on which it relied in reaching its decision. 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(1)(D) (2014).
[¶17] Here, the court’s judgment cites four factors on which it relied in
reaching its decision to deny Jandreau’s request for support: (1) its award to
Jandreau of $230 in weekly child support, (2) its allocation of the dependency tax
exemption for the parties’ daughter, (3) the parties’ incomes, and (4) its
distribution of the parties’ marital assets and liabilities. As discussed below,
neither these factors court nor the record itself support a complete denial of
Jandreau’s request for spousal support.
1. Factors Cited in the Judgment
[¶18] The first factor that the court relied upon—ordered child support—is
relevant to Jandreau’s need for spousal support and to LaChance’s ability to pay
8
that support, and was thus appropriately considered in determining spousal
support. See 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5)(P)(2); Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick,
2006 ME 140, ¶ 11 n.2, 910 A.2d 396. The court did not make findings regarding
the effect of the child support order on LaChance’s ability to pay spousal support,
but did find that, during the five months preceding the trial, LaChance had the
ability to pay spousal support of $1,600 per month. The judgment is likewise
devoid of findings regarding the effect of the child support order on Jandreau’s
need for spousal support. However, the only evidence of Jandreau’s financial
condition demonstrates that her income will be not be sufficient to meet her living
expenses even during the three years that the child support order remains in effect.2
[¶19] The second factor that the court relied upon—allocation of the income
tax dependency exemption—is relevant to an award of spousal support insofar as it
affects the parties’ finances. Due to the progressivity of the income tax, income
tax exemptions increase in value, up to a certain point, as income increases. See
Cross v. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449, 459 (W. Va. 1987); see also Stevens v. State Tax
Assessor, 571 A.2d 1195, 1196 (Me. 1990). Jandreau, with an annual income of
$14,212, receives a minor benefit from the dependent tax exemption; LaChance,
with an annual income of nearly $88,000, would benefit significantly from the
2
The child support order will automatically terminate in June 2018, when the parties’ daughter turns
eighteen, unless she has not graduated, withdrawn, or been expelled from high school, in which case it
will terminate when she turns nineteen. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(12) (2014).
9
exemption, even after purchasing it from Jandreau.3 The dependency exemption
allocation thus improves LaChance’s financial position vis-à-vis Jandreau.
[¶20] The third factor that the court relied upon was the parties’ incomes.
See 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5)(E). LaChance earns nearly $88,000 annually–more
than six times the $14,212 per year that Jandreau receives in personal SSDI
benefits. Though the parties’ incomes alone are not dispositive of the need for
spousal support, a difference of this magnitude provides no support for the court’s
decision to deny Jandreau’s request for spousal support.
[¶21] The fourth and final factor that the court relied upon was the division
of the parties’ marital assets and liabilities.4 Pursuant to that division, each party
received an equal share of the property accumulated during the marriage.
[¶22] In Bonnevie v. Bonnevie, we concluded that an award of temporary
spousal support to the wife was inadequate when the husband earned almost four
times as much as the wife, the court had equally distributed the parties’ marital
property, and the wife would be forced upon termination of spousal support to
consume her share of the marital property in order to maintain her standard of
3
The court’s allocation of the exemption allows LaChance to “buy” the exemption from Jandreau at a
price equal to the amount by which her tax liability would be decreased if she claimed the exemption.
4
The court’s division of the parties’ marital property may well be a consideration that falls into the
19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5)(Q) (2014) catchall factor, because spousal support and the distribution of marital
property are related components of an equitable divorce judgment. See Ketchum v. Ketchum,
1998 ME 62, ¶ 6, 707 A.2d 803.
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living. 611 A.2d 94, 94-95 (Me. 1992). In Sewall v. Snook, we vacated a
judgment denying the wife spousal support when the husband earned more than
three times as much as she did, the court had awarded the wife a larger share of the
marital assets, and the record indicated that the wife’s ordinary living expenses
would exceed her income from employment and child support payments.
687 A.2d 234, 235-36 (Me. 1996).
[¶23] Here, the court’s equal property distribution did nothing to ameliorate
the inequality in the parties’ economic positions. An equal property division
simply does not provide a basis for denying spousal support when, as here, the
parties have very disparate earning power and there is a significant disparity
between one party’s income and expenses. In such cases, an equal property
distribution, and even a distribution that favors the spouse with less income, is not
alone sufficient “to ensure that the overall financial result of the divorce is
equitable.” Id. at 236.
[¶24] Jandreau did not move for further findings pursuant to M.R. Civ. P.
52(b). Under these circumstances, we would ordinarily assume that the court
found that Jandreau was able to meet her needs without spousal support. See
Sorey v. Sorey, 1998 ME 217, ¶ 12 n.5, 718 A.2d 568. In this case, however, under
any standard of review, no matter how deferential, the evidence provides no
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support for a determination that Jandreau’s income will be sufficient to meet her
living expenses.
2. Factors Not Cited in the Judgment
[¶25] Because the four factors on which the court explicitly relied to deny
spousal support do not provide an adequate foundation for that denial, we search
the record to determine whether any competent evidence otherwise supports the
court’s judgment. See Buck, 2015 ME 33, ¶ 5, --- A.3d ---. Even when viewed in
the light most favorable to the court’s judgment, the fully developed record before
us contains no evidence regarding any of the remaining statutory factors that would
support the court’s denial of Jandreau’s request for spousal support. Cf. id. ¶¶ 5,
7-8 (affirming an award of spousal support when the record, though incomplete,
contained some support for the court’s judgment).
[¶26] To the contrary, the record suggests that the court’s denial of spousal
support resulted from a failure to adequately consider all of the parties’
circumstances and all relevant statutory factors. See Nixon v. Nixon, 2008 ME 157,
¶ 15, 957 A.2d 101. For example, the judgment does not discuss Jandreau’s
(1) contributions as homemaker during the parties’ fourteen-year marriage,
(2) health and disability, (3) provisions for health insurance, (4) income and
employment potential, or (5) ability to become self-supporting within a reasonable
period of time. See 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5)(A), (D)-(E), (G), (I), (K), (O). Each
12
of these factors indicates that Jandreau was entitled to some amount of spousal
support.
B. Attorney Fees
[¶27] At trial, Jandreau requested attorney fees (1) in the nature of spousal
support; (2) as a sanction for LaChance’s failure to file an updated financial
statement; and (3) pursuant to her contempt motion, as a sanction for LaChance’s
failure to comply with the interim spousal support order.
[¶28] The court’s authority to award attorney fees derives from statutes and
court rules. Levy, Maine Family Law § 9.1 at 9-1 (citing Strater v. Strater,
159 Me. 508, 511, 196 A.2d 94 (1963)). The court may order one party to pay
another party’s reasonable attorney fees for participation in any family proceeding,
19-A M.R.S. § 105(1) (2014), and may in a divorce proceeding award attorney fees
“in the nature of support,” 19-A M.R.S. § 952(3) (2014). In a family proceeding,
the court may award attorney fees as a sanction for a party’s failure to file a child
support affidavit without good cause. M.R. Civ. P. 108(f)(2)(C). Further, in a
plenary remedial contempt proceeding, the court may award reasonable attorney
fees if it finds that one party’s contempt has injured the other party. M.R. Civ. P.
66(d)(3)(C).
[¶29] We review the court’s decision not to award attorney fees for an abuse
of discretion. See Bond v. Bond, 2011 ME 54, ¶ 9, 17 A.3d 1219. In deciding
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whether to award attorney fees, the court “has discretion to consider all factors that
reasonably bear on the fairness and justness of the award.” Smith v. Padolko,
2008 ME 56, ¶ 17, 955 A.2d 740 (quotation marks omitted). Relevant factors
include the parties’ relative capacity to absorb the costs of the litigation and
conduct by one party that increases the costs of the litigation. See Miele v. Miele,
2003 ME 113, ¶¶ 15-16, 832 A.2d 760.
[¶30] Here, LaChance makes significantly more than Jandreau, was found
to be in contempt of court for failing to pay interim spousal support, and failed to
file an updated child support affidavit without good cause. It was an abuse of
discretion for the court to deny Jandreau’s request for attorney fees.
III. CONCLUSION
[¶31] The record reflects a great disparity in the parties’ earning power and
reveals that Jandreau’s income without spousal support will be inadequate to meet
her ordinary living expenses even while she is receiving child support. Because
the court’s decision to deny spousal support is not supported by the factors on
which the court explicitly relied and the record does not provide support for
findings capable of otherwise sustaining that decision, we vacate the portion of the
judgment denying spousal support and remand for reconsideration. On remand,
the court should also reconsider Jandreau’s request for attorney fees.
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The entry is:
The portions of the judgment denying spousal
support and attorney fees are vacated. The
remainder of the divorce judgment is affirmed.
Remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
On the briefs:
Daniel W. Marra, Esq., Marden, Dubord, Bernier & Stevens,
Waterville, for appellant Molly G. (LaChance) Jandreau
Daniel L. LaChance did not file a brief
Waterville District Court docket number FM-2013-74
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY