Pablo Salas-Caballero v. Loretta E. Lynch , 786 F.3d 1077 ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 14-2556
    ___________________________
    Pablo Salas-Caballero
    lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner
    v.
    Loretta E. Lynch
    lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent
    ____________
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    ____________
    Submitted: February 9, 2015
    Filed: May 20, 2015
    [Published]
    ____________
    Before LOKEN, SMITH, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    The Department of Homeland Security placed Pablo Salas-Caballero, a citizen
    of Mexico, in removal proceedings. He conceded removability, applied for
    cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), and now petitions for review
    of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision upholding an Immigration
    Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of that application. We dismiss the petition for lack of
    jurisdiction to review the issue presented.
    The Attorney General has discretion to grant cancellation of removal if four
    statutory requirements are met, including “exceptional and extremely unusual
    hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States
    or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
    Salas-Caballero claims that removing him to Mexico would result in exceptional and
    extremely unusual hardship to his United States citizen son.
    At the November 2012 removal hearing, Salas-Caballero testified that he
    recently began living with his nine-year-old son and his son’s mother, who lacked
    legal status but was not in removal proceedings. Salas-Caballero testified that his son
    would not accompany Salas-Caballero if he were removed to Mexico. Rather, his son
    would remain with his mother in the United States if Salas-Caballero were removed
    and would accompany his mother if she were removed to Mexico in the future. The
    IJ concluded that “none of the evidence or testimony relating to conditions in Mexico
    would appear to be relevant” to the son’s hardship and denied cancellation of removal
    because any hardship “amount[ed] to the normal hardships experienced by family
    members when someone is deported.”
    The BIA affirmed, rejecting Salas-Caballero’s contention that the IJ did not
    adequately consider country conditions in Mexico and the possibility that his son
    would move to Mexico:
    The Immigration Judge properly considered the evidence of hardship to
    [Salas-Caballero’s] child, including his health and age, the lack of
    special educational needs, economic and employment issues, and family
    separation. Even taking into account the country conditions in Mexico
    . . . when all factors are considered in the aggregate, the respondent did
    not establish the requisite hardship to his qualifying family member.
    -2-
    The BIA therefore concluded that Salas-Caballero did not qualify for cancellation of
    removal. Salas-Caballero petitions for judicial review, arguing the BIA “erred, as a
    matter of law, by not considering the hardship [his] child would suffer if he
    accompanied his father to Mexico.”
    Congress has limited our jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s denial
    of discretionary cancellation of removal; we may only review “constitutional claims
    or questions of law.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(B)(i) and (D). Salas-Caballero argues
    the BIA committed an error of law by improperly applying its prior decisions in
    analyzing whether his United States citizen son would suffer exceptional and
    extremely unusual hardship if Salas-Caballero were removed. In reviewing
    cancellation-of-removal denials, we have repeatedly held that an alien’s contention
    “that the BIA applied the incorrect legal standard by failing to adequately consider
    certain factors that the BIA has considered relevant in other decisions” is beyond our
    jurisdiction because the alien “really challenges the discretionary conclusion of the
    BIA against him.” Solis v. Holder, 
    647 F.3d 831
    , 833 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
    
    132 S. Ct. 1032
     (2012); see Tejado v. Holder, 
    776 F.3d 965
    , 969 (8th Cir. 2015);
    Hernandez-Garcia v. Holder, 
    765 F.3d 815
    , 816 (8th Cir. 2014) (“we lack jurisdiction
    to review a discretionary BIA decision that petitioner’s removal would not ‘result in
    exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,’ even when the petitioner seeking
    review attempted to ‘create jurisdiction by cloaking an abuse of discretion argument
    in constitutional or legal garb’”); Nunez-Portillo v. Holder, 
    763 F.3d 974
    , 976-77 (8th
    Cir. 2014); Garcia-Torres v. Holder, 
    660 F.3d 333
    , 338 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
    
    133 S. Ct. 108
     (2012). Salas-Caballero’s contention falls squarely within the
    controlling reach of these prior decisions. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review
    his claim.
    The petition for review is dismissed.
    ______________________________
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-2556

Citation Numbers: 786 F.3d 1077, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 8278

Judges: Loken, Smith, Colloton

Filed Date: 5/20/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024