Barner v. State , 2015 Ark. LEXIS 383 ( 2015 )


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  •                                     Cite as 
    2015 Ark. 247
    SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
    No.   CR-14-577
    RUFUS BARNER                                      Opinion Delivered   May 28, 2015
    APPELLANT
    APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
    V.                                                COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST
    DIVISION
    [NO. CR2013-3126]
    STATE OF ARKANSAS
    APPELLEE         HONORABLE JAMES LEON
    JOHNSON, JUDGE
    AFFIRMED.
    ROBIN F. WYNNE, Associate Justice
    Rufus Barner appeals from the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his appeal
    to that court from Pulaski County District Court. He argues the following on appeal: (1) that
    precedent from this court relied on by the State and the circuit court is not applicable to his
    case; (2) that Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-305(a)(1) creates a right to appeal from
    the imposition of probation in the absence of a judgment of conviction; and (3) that the
    dismissal of his appeal by the circuit court violated his constitutional right to a jury trial.
    Because this case presents an issue of first impression and a significant issue needing
    clarification or development of the law, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Arkansas Supreme
    Court Rule 1-2(b)(1) and (5) (2014). We affirm.
    On September 12, 2013, appellant pled nolo contendere to a charge of third-degree
    domestic battery and was sentenced to one year of probation and assessed a fine and costs
    Cite as 
    2015 Ark. 247
    pursuant to Act 346 of 1975, also known as the First Offender Act, which is codified at
    Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-93-301 to -305. The order of probation states that it
    is being entered without a finding of guilt and that if appellant demonstrates rehabilitation and
    fulfills the terms and conditions of his probation, an order will be entered upon petition or
    motion dismissing the case, discharging appellant without an adjudication of guilt, and
    expunging the record.
    Appellant appealed to the Pulaski County Circuit Court from the order of probation.
    He subsequently executed a waiver of jury trial in circuit court. On November 14, 2013, the
    State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal to circuit court in which it alleged that a defendant
    who enters a plea of nolo contendere and is ordered to complete probation pursuant to Act
    346 of 1975 is not eligible to appeal the order of probation to circuit court. After a hearing
    on January 22, 2014, which consisted solely of argument by counsel, the circuit court made
    an oral ruling granting the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal on the basis that there was no
    conviction in district court from which appellant could appeal to circuit court. Appellant filed
    a motion to reconsider on February 12, 2014, in which he argued that section 5-4-305
    granted him the right to appeal to circuit court and that dismissing his appeal would violate
    his right to a trial by jury. The circuit court entered a written order granting the State’s
    motion to dismiss the appeal from district court on March 6, 2014. This appeal followed.
    In seeking to dismiss appellant’s appeal from district court, the State relied on this
    court’s decision in Lynn v. State, 
    2012 Ark. 6
    . In that case, the defendant entered a negotiated
    plea of guilty to possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia in circuit court
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    2015 Ark. 247
    and was sentenced under the First Offender Act. She subsequently appealed to this court.
    Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Criminal 1(a) (2014) provides that any person
    convicted of a misdemeanor or felony by virtue of a trial in circuit court has the right to
    appeal to the Arkansas Court of Appeals or Arkansas Supreme Court. In our opinion
    dismissing the appeal, we reiterated our statement from prior decisions that pleas of guilty or
    nolo contendere tendered pursuant to the First Offender Act are not convictions. See Montoya
    v. State, 
    2010 Ark. 419
    ; Harrell v. State, 
    331 Ark. 232
    , 
    962 S.W.2d 325
    (1998); Duncan v.
    State, 
    308 Ark. 205
    , 
    823 S.W.2d 886
    (1992). Because the defendant was not convicted in
    circuit court, we held that she could not appeal to an Arkansas appellate court.
    Appellant’s first argument on appeal is that Lynn is not controlling authority in this
    case. He alleges that this is the case for the following three reasons: (1) Lynn involved an
    appeal from circuit court to an appellate court, not an appeal from a district court to circuit
    court; (2) the court in Lynn did not address a defendant’s right to trial by jury; and (3) Lynn
    did not address the possibility that a First Offender Act disposition in district court is, for the
    purposes of an appeal to circuit court, a conviction. The differing circumstances presented
    in this case as compared to Lynn clearly make this case distinguishable from Lynn and prevent
    it from being controlling authority on the issue presented. However, its holding that a plea
    of nolo contendere tendered pursuant to the First Offender Act is not a conviction is
    instructive to our analysis of the case at bar, and the State’s reliance on Lynn does not provide
    a basis for reversal.
    Appellant next contends that Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-305(a)(1) grants
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    2015 Ark. 247
    a defendant the right to appeal from district court to circuit court, despite the language of
    Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. Pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure
    36(a) (2014), a person convicted of a criminal offense in a district court, including a person
    convicted upon a plea of guilty, may appeal the judgment of conviction to the circuit court
    for the judicial district in which the conviction occurred. The State successfully argued to the
    circuit court that because, pursuant to Lynn and similar cases, a plea of nolo contendere
    tendered under the First Offender Act is not a conviction, appellant was not permitted to
    appeal to circuit court under Rule 36(a). Appellant argues that this decision interferes with
    the right to appeal he contends was granted to him under Arkansas Code Annotated section
    5-4-305(a)(1) (Repl. 2013), which states as follows:
    (a) If a court suspends imposition of sentence on a defendant or places him or
    her on probation, the fact that a judgment of conviction is not entered does not
    preclude:
    (1) An appeal on the basis of any error in the adjudication of guilt or any error
    in the entry of the order of suspension or probation[.]
    Appellant is incorrect that section 5-4-305 grants him the right to appeal to circuit
    court from the district court’s order of probation. Section 5-4-305(a)(1) allows an appeal on
    two bases: (1) an allegation of error in the adjudication of guilt and (2) an allegation of error
    in the entry of the order of suspension or probation. There has been no adjudication of guilt
    in this case; the district court’s order of probation explicitly states this. Appellant also never
    alleged any error in the entry of the order of suspension or probation. Therefore, section 5-4-
    305(a)(1) does not apply in this case and does not provide a basis to reverse the circuit court’s
    order dismissing the appeal from district court.
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    2015 Ark. 247
    Appellant’s final argument is that the circuit court’s order dismissing his appeal from
    district court denied him his rights under the constitutions of the United States and the State
    of Arkansas to a trial by jury. However, he is mistaken. In district court, appellant availed
    himself of the First Offender Act which, as codified, states in relevant part that
    [w]henever an accused enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere prior to an
    adjudication of guilt, the judge of the circuit court or district court, in the case of a
    defendant who previously has not been convicted of a felony, without making a finding
    of guilt or entering a judgment of guilt and with the consent of the defendant, may defer further
    proceedings and place the defendant on probation for a period of not less than one (1)
    year, under such terms and conditions as may be set by the court.
    Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-303(a)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 2013) (emphasis supplied). The Act further
    provides that upon violation of a term or condition, the court may enter an adjudication of
    guilt and proceed as otherwise provided. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-303(a)(2). Appellant
    voluntarily agreed to defer his criminal proceedings and be placed on probation for at least one
    year. If his probation is successful, he will be discharged without an adjudication of guilt, his
    case will be dismissed, and his record will be expunged. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-303(b).
    If he violates his probation and is adjudicated guilty of the offense charged, he will be able to
    appeal to circuit court at that time. Thus, appellant’s right to a trial by jury was not violated
    by the circuit court’s dismissal of his appeal from district court.
    Affirmed.
    Llewellyn J. Marczuk, Deputy Public Defender, by: Clint Miller, Deputy Public
    Defender, for appellant.
    Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Eileen W. Harrison, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CR-14-577

Citation Numbers: 2015 Ark. 247, 464 S.W.3d 450, 2015 Ark. LEXIS 383

Judges: Robin F. Wynne

Filed Date: 5/28/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024